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ABSTRACT  
Over the last few decades, the debate on the topic of business and human rights has dominated the 
international scene. Initially, the debate focused on the question whether corporations have obligations 
beyond making profits. This is no longer contested, and the issue now at hand is the need to define what 
these obligations are and to determine how they can be enforced. In the history of the development of 
human rights, the duty to uphold human rights and secure their protection was considered a preserve of 
the state. However, with changing economic dynamics and increased globalization, it is undeniable that 
states are no longer the only or major threat to human rights; the modern corporation, much bigger in 
structure and complex in operations than before, has taken its place beside the state, having as much 
potential as the state to negatively impact human rights.  
Kenya adopted a new Constitution in 2010, at the same time that John Ruggie, the Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary General on Business and Human Rights was finalizing his mandate and putting 
together his findings based on research he had conducted over a number of years. The business and 
human rights deliberations Ruggie steered at the international level were expected to culminate in the 
negotiation of an internationally binding instrument. This did not happen. This study shows that the 
failure to propose the negotiation of a treaty was not fatal to the Business and Human Rights agenda, but 
rather that the alternative approach taken presents a more ideal opportunity to prepare the ground for the 
future negotiation of a treaty. Ruggie developed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights and proposed them as a common global platform for action, an authoritative focal point to direct 
efforts geared at understanding the corporate obligation for human rights.  
Although both the Constitution of Kenya and Ruggie’s findings underscore the role of the corporation in 
upholding human rights, the corporate obligation with regards to human rights is not clear. The main 
objective of the research was therefore to give human rights obligations of corporations in Kenya greater 
specificity so that both corporations and the State may more effectively implement them. The study 
undertook to investigate what the corporate obligation for human rights entails, building on the 
foundation established by the 2010 Constitution, which provides for horizontal application of the Bill of 
Rights to juristic persons, and the guidance offered for states and corporations and other business entities 
through the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework and the UN Guiding Principles.  
The study established what the obligations under the three pillars recommended in the UN Framework 
would mean for Kenya. The mistaken belief commonly held by corporations that corporate social 
responsibility is the same as human rights obligation was explored. The findings also show that the State 
Duty to Protect will mainly be exercised through the enactment of laws that offer guidance to 
corporations on what constitutes their duty and how it can be executed in practice. The study therefore 
recommends that amendments and additions be made to particular laws, the main one being the 
Companies Act of Kenya, to guide corporations in executing their human rights obligation. Furthermore, 
a recommendation is made that the Commission charged with implementing the Constitution include a 
specific section on Business and Human Rights in the National Policy and Action Plan drawn up to 
implement the 2010 Constitution. This will ensure that due attention is given to the subject, and a clear 
and comprehensive approach adopted to make corporate accountability for human rights violations a 
practical and realistic goal. The proposals made for the Action Plan include factors that will improve 
access to remedy for victims of human rights violations.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1 INTRODUCTION: AN EMERGING INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF CORPORATIONS 
 
1.1. Background to the study 
Traditionally, corporate law and human rights have been considered very distinct and separate legal 
and policy spheres.
1
 Much of what business entities do is dictated by their definition and status as 
profit making entities accountable to shareholders only. Business entities have consequently 
mainly been governed by corporate laws which hold them accountable to shareholders. When 
corporations moved beyond a pure shareholder-centric perception, they embraced corporate 
social responsibility, which in most cases is seen as a philanthropic duty to the communities and 
needy people in society. For its part, the concept of human rights is not clear or unambiguous; it 
has its own inherent assumptions and contextual considerations that colour its universal 
application. Human rights have for a long time been considered the concern of the state and 
treated as such. Introducing human rights to business thus presents a novel alliance, difficult to 
define. 
In Kenya’s most recent comprehensive development strategy, Vision 2030, the 
Government commits itself to respect the supremacy of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
and at the same time underscores its will to respect the property rights of investors, both local 
and foreign.
2
 The government further pledges its commitment to ‘the rule of law applicable in a 
modern market based economy in a human rights-respecting state’.3 As a specific objective, the 
government aims to ‘align the national policy and legal framework with the needs of a market-
based economy and national human rights and gender equity commitments’.4 In its objectives in 
the strategy, the Government however fails to say how it will execute this intention to 
incorporate a human rights theory for development into its agenda for business.  
                                               
1
 Human Rights Council ‘Business and human rights: Towards operationalising the “protect, respect and remedy” 
framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (22 April 2009) A/HRC/11/13 [Ruggie Report 2009]. 
2
 Government of the Republic of Kenya ‘Kenya Vision 2030’ [Popular Version] (2007) at 22.To meet this objective, 
the Government will have to ensure that there is a proper and adequate balance between protection of the individuals 
and their fundamental rights and protection of property. 
3
 Ibid at 23. 
4
 Ibid. 
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Kenya aims to be a newly industrialized middle-income country by 2030.
5
 It is the biggest 
and most diversified economy in East Africa.
6
 It has a market-friendly business environment and 
flourishing small and medium enterprises attributed to a constant effort by the government to 
improve the ease of doing business.
7
 The Nairobi Securities Exchange is the largest in East and 
Central Africa, accounting for more than 60 per cent of the companies in East Africa.
8
 With a sound 
economy and high aspirations, Kenya is seeing the beginning of what promises to be enormous 
investments in the country with potential for continued economic growth.  
An unrestricted market economy, free from government restrictions and regulations, will 
undoubtedly facilitate the business environment and help to attract the needed investors. 
However, the unrestricted market economy is not the ideal one, as it cannot guarantee the 
protection of the poorest. For markets to operate optimally and result in both the economic 
prosperity and human development sought there is need for ‘adequate institutional 
underpinnings’9 where human rights are integrated in the values of the business and executed in 
its operations and enforced by the state. The role of the state in coordinating the economy 
through planning and policies is thus vital.
10
 The state ought to ensure that a human rights 
approach to economic development is adopted and that any action taken in attracting investors 
and facilitating investments bears in mind the human rights consequences of the choices made.  
Although not openly documented, a number of significant economic transactions have 
been reported in the Kenyan media between the Kenyan government and foreign corporations 
                                               
5
 Ibid at 1 
6
 World Bank Group ‘Country Partnership Strategy for Kenya’ (2014-2018) available at  
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/publication/kenya-country-partnership-strategy-2014-2018, accessed 
on 7 June 2015. The Country Partnership Strategy notes at para 30 that… “Kenya holds a distinctive position … in 
EastAfrica. The country is a leader and connector within the East African Community (EAC), not least through its 
facilitation of regional trade,investment, and flow of skills across borders.” 
7
 Walter O Odero et al, ‘African Economic Outlook – Kenya’ (2015) AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 9. 
8
 See Land Matrix data on international land deals (as of April 2012) available at  
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0ApF51UgS889tdE1EblRCdUh2bUE0ZjRHM09XSlZtYmc#gid=0, 
accessed on 1 February 2014. A government offering land for investment, currently approximated at more than 
600,000 hectares, displacing local communities without proper consultation or consideration of their needs. 
9
 Ruggie Report 2009 op cit note 1, 7. The UN Secretary General alluded to this when he observed that “Much has 
been done to devise, and enforce, rules that facilitate the expansion of global markets. But attempts to address 
equally urgent social objectives - such as eradicating poverty, protecting the environment and promoting human 
rights and labour standards - have lagged behind.” Press Release SG/SM/7357 (12 April 2000) ‘Secretary-General, 
in Havana on eve of first ‘Group of 77’ summit meeting, evokes promises and pitfalls of globalisation’. 
10
 See P A Nyong’o ‘Review and Critique of Current Development Strategies in Africa’ in K Kibwana (ed) 
Constitutional Law and Politics in Africa (1998). Nyong’o notes the important distinction that led to the success of 
the East Asian economies even when they faced similar situations of poverty as the Sub-Saharan developing states. 
These markets while being oriented by the market forces were regulated by government. 
    
3 
 
and governments. The Government has reportedly signed a contract with a Chinese company for 
the construction of a Port on the Kenyan Coast and infrastructure connecting the neighbouring 
countries.
11
 A project is underway to improve the railway and road connection within the 
country, and the infrastructure linking neighbouring countries (the South Sudan/Ethiopia road 
and rail network) with the aim of improving regional trade and opening up the neighbouring land 
locked economies.
12
 The recent discovery of oil and gas in the country has also opened doors to 
numerous potential mining investors. While this sector presents potential for massive socio 
economic transformation in the country,
13
 it also raises the possibility of human rights abuses. In 
a survey of human rights violations by corporations, the oil, gas and mining sector was 
underscored as dominating the reported abuses of human rights, accounting for two thirds of the 
total abuses.
14
 
The current spate of influx of investors and potential investment opportunities presents a 
cause for worry. All these proposed and numerous other contemplated transactions will result in 
the disruption of livelihoods and the displacement of many from their homes, creating a possible 
negative human rights impact on them. The government appears more interested in the economic 
prospects these transactions offer, and not the potential harm they can cause to individuals and 
communities. Some of the reported business transactions that might have harmful human rights 
impact are outlined below. 
A company entered a deal with the government for the mining of titanium in the Tana 
River Delta, but without consultations with the local communities, as prescribed by the Mining 
Act and the Environmental Management and Coordination Act.
15
 A public-private joint venture 
was entered into for the conversion of land into plantations for agro fuel production; notices were 
given to the locals about the decision to lease out the land, as opposed to calling for consultations 
                                               
11
 ‘Kenya and China sign Sh 42bn Lamu port deal’ Daily Nation August 4 2014 available at 
http://mobile.nation.co.ke/counties/Kenya-and-China-Lamu-Port-deal/-/1950480/2405458/-/format/xhtml/-/c91t1a/-
/index.html, accessed on 6 September 2014. See also Lamu Port and South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) 
Corridor Project, a flagship project of the Kenya Vision 2030 national strategy available at 
http://www.vision2030.go.ke/index.php/pillars/project/macro_enablers/181, accessed on 28 August 2014. 
12
 Africa Economic Outlook op cit note 7 at 6 and World Bank Country Partnership Strategy for Kenya op cit note 6.  
13
 Katiba Institute, Round table discussion on human rights and the extractive sector (oil, gas, and minerals) 21 May 
2014.  
14
 Human Rights Council ‘Interim report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (22 February 2006) E/CN.4/2006/97 
[Ruggie Report 2006], para 25. 
15
 Abdirizak Arale Nunow ‘The Dynamics of Land Deals in the Tana Delta, Kenya’ (2011) 16. See also general 
investment concerns available at http://ejatlas.org/country/kenya, accessed on 6 September 2014. 
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about the intended transaction.
16
 This venture will result in the displacement of thousands of 
people from their ancestral land which has already been given over to the development agency 
running the project.
17
 Another multinational seeks to acquire a huge tract of land through a 45-
year lease to grow crops for agro-fuel production.
18
 Foreign governments have also shown a 
keen interest to acquire land in Kenya. One contemplated transaction involves the Emirate of 
Qatar, which is said to have offered a loan for the building of a second port on the Kenyan Coast 
in exchange for 40,000 hectares of land for growth of food crops for export to Qatar. The 
government plans to relocate the locals on grounds that they are few and did not use the land 
effectively.
19
 
As these examples show, the desire of the government to increase private sector 
investment is usually not balanced by reciprocal demands on investors, oftentimes resulting in a 
one-sided endeavor to secure investments at whatever cost.
20
 The quest for investments and the 
economic benefits they promise must be balanced against the wellbeing of the individuals. The 
state ought to be concerned about the needs and welfare of individuals, shown by an equally 
aggressive effort to demand that businesses undertake to uphold human rights as they make the 
effort to increase trade and investments and as they undertake to secure the property rights, 
security and a conducive business environment for investors.  
Globalisation was envisioned as a phenomenon that would open the world to 
opportunities and the benefits of limitless trade across borders to parties on all sides. On the one 
hand, globalization provides the platform for aligning local conditions with international 
standards and expectations. This would bring sanity to what would otherwise be the typical 
tyranny of the powerful in a domestic context where rules either do not exist or are not respected. 
                                               
16
 Ibid at 16-7. See also Environmental Justice Atlas ‘Environmental Conflicts in Kenya’ available at 
http://ejatlas.org/conflict/exploration-of-oil-in-block-10bb-and-block-13t-turkana-kenya, accessed on 6 September 
2014. 
17
 Ibid at 16. Deal between the Tana and Athi River Development Authority and the Mumias Sugar Company. See 
also Environmental Conflicts in Kenya ibid. A similar bid for acquisition of land for sugar cane growing by another 
multinational has been more successful because of engaging the communities in the area and offering them benefits 
of part of the acquired land as out growers (Ibid at 17). 
18
 Bedford Biofuels, see Ibid. See also Environmental Conflicts in Kenya ibid. GA Industries; see Abdirizak op cit 
note 15. See also Environmental Conflicts in Kenya ibid. A UK-based company seeks to acquire land for growing of 
oil seed, but the deal is more acceptable because the company has conducted an Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment, and has solicited and received feedback from the local communities. 
19
 Ibid at 18. 
20
 Mayer Brown Mining in Kenya – the start of a new era? (April 2013) 3. “Kenya, as with its East African 
neighbours, is showing signs of a mining industry with enormous potential. The challenge for the Government is to 
ensure that the legal and regulatory regime strikes the correct balance between optimising its national interest whilst 
encouraging large-scale foreign investments.” 
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However, if markets are left to rule, they will determine labour conditions; corporations will 
favour locations with cheaper sources of labour, making labour a source of competition among 
states,
21
 resulting in disregard for the condition of workers and the pursuit of investments as an 
end in itself. If the desire for economic progress and growth is pursued as a purely profit making 
concern, it almost always results in disregard for the person, his dignity and human rights. 
With the recognition of the growth in size and power of the modern corporation, efforts 
have been made at the international level over the last few decades to develop codes of conduct 
that could be applied to curb excessive corporate power and ensure its activities did not have a 
negative impact on society. The study revisits the attempts at the international level to regulate 
the conduct of corporations. 
 
1.2. History of attempts at regulation of corporate human rights conduct 
1.2.1. Pre-Ruggie developments 
The general impression and view for a long part of human rights history had been that non state 
actors do not have human rights obligations.
22
 Concern for the respect and promotion of human 
rights was seen largely as a task of states which were assumed to have monopoly over human 
rights violations.
23
 At the very beginning of the history of corporations, they were formed for a 
limited purpose, for a limited time and therefore with no foreseen capability to inflict harm on 
individuals in the scale that the state could.
24
 In the 1960s-1970s, political involvement by 
transnational corporations in state affairs roused debate about the need to devise ways of curbing 
                                               
21
 Daniel Adler & Michael Woolcock ‘Justice without the Rule of Law? The Challenge of Rights-Based Industrial 
Relations in Contemporary Cambodia’ 2009 2(2) Justice & Development Working Paper Series  
22
 See Lindsay Moir The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002) 194 (The author says that “Human rights 
obligations are binding on governments only..”); see also Liesbeth Zegveld Accountability of Armed Opposition 
Groups in International Law (2002) 53 (The author argues that “The main feature of human rights is that these are 
rights that people hold against the state only”) 
23
 Gilles Giacca Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict (2014) 243. See also Hitoshi Nasu & Ben 
Saul Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region: Towards Institution Building (2011) 235 
24
 Charlie Cray and Lee Drutman ‘Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the Balance’ (2005) 4(1) Seattle 
Journal for Social Justice, 305. See also Lee Drutman ‘The History of the Corporation’ available at  
http://citizenworks.org/corp/dg/s2r1.pdf  where he says that “[c]orporations could only exist for a limited time, 
could not make any political contributions, and could not own stock in other companies. Their owners were 
responsible for criminal acts committed by the corporation and the doctrine of limited liability (shielding investors 
from responsibility for harm and loss caused by the corporation) did not yet exist” cited in ‘The Rise of the Modern 
Corporation’ available at  
http://sanepolitics2012.blogspot.com/2011/10/rise-of-modern-corporation.html, accessed on 22 July 2014. 
    
6 
 
the growing influence of these private actors on the international scene.
25
 Attempts were made 
since then to create standards for human rights obligations for business both internally at the 
level of the corporations and also at the international level. These attempts led to inconsistent and 
incoherent efforts
26
as none of the codes imposed obligatory, universally acceptable and sanctionable 
requirements on corporations.
27
In these voluntary initiatives, businesses were expected to take on 
proposed guidelines or create guidelines specific for their entities and incorporate them in their 
activities. Internal codes of conduct could be company-specific, designed specifically for a 
company in its particular context; alternatively, they could be industry initiatives promulgated to 
offer guidance to corporations in particular sectors.
28
 
In 1972, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (the Council), requested the 
UN Secretary General to appoint a group of Eminent Persons to study the effect of transnational 
corporations on the world economy.
29
 The Council was inspired in their decision by the esteem 
in which multinational corporations were held because of their size and power, which sometimes 
surpassed entire host country economies.
30
 The Council sought to put in place a set of 
‘institutions and devises to guide the multinational corporations’ exercise of power and introduce 
some form of accountability to the international community into their activities.’31 A Draft Code 
was completed in 1990 addressing a number of issues and making reference to the obligation of 
corporations to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries in which they 
                                               
25
 John Kline ‘TNC codes and national sovereignty: deciding when TNCs should engage in political activity’ (2005) 
14(3) Transnational Corporations 31. 
26
 International Council on Human Rights Policy Beyond Voluntarism: Human rights and the developing 
international legal obligations of companies (February 2002) 4 
27
 Some of these instruments are: The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises which primarily regulate 
commercial matters but also include provisions on workers’ rights and environmental issues; ILO Tripartite 
Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy - more detailed on workers’ rights issues and contains 
provisions on the right to organise and form trade unions, on the principle of non-discrimination in the workplace; 
Making voluntary provisions of corporate responsibility (similar to “human rights clauses”) binding by integrating 
them into civil contracts or international conventions; International Criminal Court (ICC): the Rome Statute 
recognises the human rights responsibility of non-state actors for grave human rights violations. However, no such 
direct responsibility is recognised for violations that cannot be defined as grave. 
28
 Some of these private initiatives include the Sullivan Principles and the MacBride Principles. 
29
 ECOSOC, Official records of the 53
rd
 Session 3-28 July 1972 Resolutions, Supplement No. 1 E/5209, 3. The 
resolution in part read “The Economic and Social Council… requests the Secretary General, in consultation with 
governments, to appoint from the public and private sectors… a study group of eminent persons… to study the role 
of multinational corporations and their impact on the process of development especially in developing countries… to 
formulate conclusions which may possibly be used by governments in making sovereign decisions regarding 
national policy in this respect…” 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 United Nations Department of Economic Affairs ‘Multinational Corporations in World Development’ (1973) 
ST/ECA/190 at 2; Report prepared to facilitate the deliberations of the group of Eminent Persons appointed by the 
Secretary General to look into the issue of multinational corporations and their effect on the world economy. 
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operated.
32
 However, the process leading up to the Code was viewed by some as an unnecessary 
attempt by the UN to meddle in the operations of business
33
 and the deliberations were not taken 
further due to disagreements between developing and developed countries.
34
 The UN General 
Assembly did not formally adopt the Draft Code.
35
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises is an international instrument for the promotion of responsible business 
conduct. Developed in 1976, it offers voluntary recommendations to multinational enterprises in 
the major areas of business, including human rights, for multinational companies operating in 
OECD member states together with a few other non-member signatories. National Contact 
Points are charged with the task of promoting and implementing the guidelines. The OECD 
Guidelines is addressed to all the entities within the multinational enterprise (parent companies 
and/or local entities) which are expected to assist each other to observe the Guidelines. The 
Guidelines may be applicable to smaller entities, but the emphasis is on multinationals.
36
 
In its first form, the OECD Guidelines did not have explicit reference to human rights but 
they have since been re-written to include clear reference to human rights.
37
 Since their 
formulation, they have been revised five times, most recently updated in 2011 on the 50
th
 
anniversary of the OECD. One of the notable features of the updated Guidelines is that it has an 
entirely new chapter on human rights, stating that all enterprises should ‘respect the 
internationally recognised human rights of those affected by their activities.’38 The Guidelines 
require companies to conduct ‘risk-based due diligence’ to identify, prevent and mitigate actual 
and potential adverse impacts, and they give specific indications for human rights due 
                                               
32
 UN ‘Code of conduct on transnational corporations’ (21 December 1990) A/RES/45/186 available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r186.htm, accessed on 16 February 2015. 
33
 Justine Nolan, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Soft Law or Not Law?’ in Surya Deva & 
David Bilchitz (eds) Human Rights Obligation of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (2013) 
138-147. 
34
 Surya Deva ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implications for Companies’ European 
Company Law 102 (April 2012) 9(2). 
35
 John Christopher Anderson ‘Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out’ (2000) 2(3) 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labour and Employment Law 463 at 474-75. 
36
 It is noted that a precise definition of multinational enterprises is not required for purposes of the Guidelines - See 
OECD Guidelines, Concepts and Principles No. 4. 
37
 Another sign of support for the UN Framework and the Guiding Principles. The UN initiative on the rights of the 
Child were also re-written in this light. 
38
 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011), 17. This requirement was informed by the international 
debate on business and human rights at the time, which culminated in the Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework, 
also known as the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights. 
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diligence.
39
 It is comprehensive and offers useful directives for companies on how to strengthen 
the international and legal policy framework in which business is conducted, including the 
implications of exercising a corporate responsibility to respect human rights.
40
 Chapter Four of 
the Guidelines defines the duty of corporations; the commentary to the chapter, following the 
release of the UN Framework and Guiding Principles, elaborates the scope of the duty and 
proposes measures which companies can put in place to express their commitment to respect 
human rights and offer remedies when they have been violated. Despite the existence of the 
mechanism, there are still no procedures for legally enforcing findings that may arise out of it 
against corporations.
41
 
The international law regime has recognised the human rights obligations of business in 
the area of workers’ rights.42 Consequently, labour rights are generally well addressed by 
domestic labour laws and sanctions imposed for infringement - thereby giving more direction to 
companies in their quest to understand and respect human rights relating to labour issues. The 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy was developed in 1977. The Tripartite Declaration 
provides guidelines on workers’ rights to governments, multinational enterprises, employers and 
workers organisations in detail and makes voluntary provisions of corporate responsibility 
binding by integrating them into civil contracts and international conventions. The Declaration 
makes direct reference to human rights, requiring all the parties concerned to ‘respect the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the corresponding International Covenants adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations.’43 
Another initiative, the United Nations Global Compact, was developed in 2000
44
 as a 
‘strategic policy initiative for businesses that want to align their operations to universally 
acceptable principles in areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption.’45 The 
                                               
39
 See Chapter IV. 
40
 OECD Guidelines (2011 Edition) para 8 read together with Chapter 4 of the Guidelines. 
41
 Andrew Clapham Human Rights Obligations of Non State Actors (2006) 202 
42
 Ibid at 215. 
43
 International Labour Organisation ‘Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy’ (2006) para 8 
44
 See Surya Deva’s critique on this in Surya Deva, ‘Treating Human Rights Lightly: A Critique of the Guiding 
Principles’ Complicity in Undermining the Human Rights Obligations of Companies’ in Deva & Bilchitz op cit note 
33 at 78-104. 
45
 UN Global Compact website available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/, accessed on 14 May 2012. With over 
8700 corporate participants and other stakeholders from over 130 countries, it is the largest voluntary corporate 
responsibility initiative in the world. 
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first two principles are derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and are aimed at 
offering guidance to businesses on how to avoid complicity in human rights violations, helping 
them to ascertain where the boundaries of their human rights responsibility lie.
46
 Unlike the Draft 
Code and OECD Guidelines which made reference to multinational enterprises more specifically 
and seemed to leave the other business entities outside their purview, the Global Compact 
addressed itself to businesses generally. However, being voluntary in nature, the Global Compact 
has been criticised in the same manner as the others, that it is soft law, not quite worth the name 
law.
47
 
Following years of voluntary initiatives aimed at regulating the corporate social 
responsibility of companies through corporate or industry level codes of conduct and 
international attempts as highlighted above, the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Business and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
48
 (the 
Norms) were drafted in 1999. The Norms aimed to remedy the piecemeal approach hitherto 
adopted and to bring the Corporate Social Responsibility obligations in one place.
49
 As opposed 
to the regulation of corporate conduct through the medium of the state, the Norms proposed to 
regulate the action of corporations directly, crystalising social responsibility obligations into hard 
law.
50
 The Norms attempted to attribute the obligation of promoting the rights set forth in the 
UDHR directly to business entities as organs of society,
51
 enjoining corporations to have regard 
for human rights in much the same way as states.
52
 The Norms directed corporations and other 
                                               
46
 Global Compact Principle One "Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally 
proclaimed human right." Principle Two "Businesses should make sure they are not complicit in human rights 
abuses." 
47
 Nolan op cit note 32 at 159. She says despite its support by the UN Secretary General, it is difficult to find a softer 
or less binding version of soft law than the Compact.  
48
 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). 
49
 D Kinley, J Nolan & N Zerial ‘The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility: Reflections on the United Nations 
Human Rights Norms for Corporations’ (2007) 25 Companies and Securities Law Journal  30, 33. 
50
 Ibid at 41. 
51
 Giovanni Mantilla ‘Emerging human rights norms for non-state actors: the case for transnational corporations’ 
(2009) 15 Global Governance 279-298, paper presented at the annual meeting of International Studies Association’s 
(ISA) 50
th
 Annual Convention ‘Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future’. Mantilla says the state has a duty to 
protect the human rights of everyone from abuse, including from abuse by third parties (such as corporations). The 
obligation was interpreted to include a duty to ensure that third parties within its territory respect the human rights of 
others. 
52
 Article 1 of the Norms reads: “Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and 
protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law…” (Emphasis added). 
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business enterprises to align their internal rules of operation to operationalise the Norms.
53
 In its 
preamble, the Norms state that transnational corporations and other business enterprises are 
obligated to ‘promote, secure fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect’ human rights 
contained in the United Nations treaties and other human rights instruments. The Norms then 
proceed to list the human rights corporations should abide by.
54
 
The defunct United Nations Human Rights Sub-Commission adopted the draft Norms in 
2003, but the Human Rights Commission did not endorse them. One of the strongest arguments 
against it was that it attempted to make human rights obligations binding without differentiating 
between states’ and corporations’ obligations.55 The Commission also argued that the Norms 
were a re-statement of existing law and had no legal standing
56
 and were thus unacceptable as 
they were.
57
Some have interpreted the approach of the Norms as an attempt to privatize human 
rights, making companies the enforcing agents.
58
 This interpretation raised the question how 
private and undemocratic institutions could be expected to bear the burden of delegated state 
obligations.
59
 
Others however were of the view that the Norms should not have been rejected. In 
criticizing the premature dismissal of the Norms, David Bilchitz argues that the Norms ought not 
to have been deemed fatal; they were, in his view, a work in progress and yet were judged as the 
                                               
53
 Article 15 of the Draft UN Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. 
54
 Section A of the Norms on General Obligations. Article 12 of the UN Norms required corporations and other 
business enterprises to respect human rights and contribute to their realisation.  
55
 Pini Pavel Miretski and Sascha-Dominik Bachmann ‘Global Business and Human Rights - The UN “Norms on 
the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” - A 
Requiem’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 5, 33 
56
 D Weissbrodt & M Kruger 'Norms on the responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Businesses 
enterprises with Regard to Human Rights' (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 901, 913. See also 
Commission on Human Rights, 60th Session, Agenda Item 16, E/CN.4/2004/L.73/Rev.1 (16 Apr. 2004), para. (c) 
and Carlos Lopez ‘The “Ruggie Process”: From Legal Obligations to Corporate Social Responsibility?’ in Deva & 
Bilchitz op cit note 33 at 62-63 where he notes that Ruggie’s critique of the Norms included the fact that they were a 
re-statement of international law which bound only states and not corporations.  
57
 Carolin F Hillemanns ‘UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights’ (2003) 4(10) German Law Journal 1069. 
58
 See http://www.coc-runder-tisch.de/inhalte/texte_grundlagen/tk_news_TALKING_POINTS.htm. Article 15 of the 
Draft Norms requires all companies and business enterprises to adopt and implement internal rules in compliance 
with the Norms, and to ‘incorporate these Norms in their contracts or other arrangements and dealings with 
contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, licensees, distributors, or natural or other legal persons that enter into any 
agreement.’ 
59
 Larry Cata Backer ‘Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International 
Law’ (2006) 37 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 287, 294 
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final output.
60
 He argues that the Norms acknowledged that corporations have existing human 
rights responsibilities although the nature of these responsibilities in international law was in the 
process of being developed.
61
 In his view, the Norms were in the process of negotiation and more 
concrete responsibilities for corporations would emerge in due course.
62
 Other critics of the 
rejection of the Norms noted that the rejected version was in draft form, and had been intended to 
be in such form so that it could be debated and amended before any consideration was made for 
its adoption.
63
 
Though criticised widely and eventually not adopted, the Norms were seen at the time by 
some as the most comprehensive endeavour to deal with human rights obligations of business.
64
 
By providing the possibility of codifying human rights obligations of business, the Norms 
presented a laudable departure from previous international instruments, which limited 
themselves to proposing regulation of labour and environmental rights.
65
 Whereas business 
organisations expressed a general hesitation towards the Norms and the idea of acknowledging 
business responsibility for human rights, civil society seemed to be in favour of them.
66
 The 
rejection of the Norms did not put an end to the desire to see corporations bound by human 
rights. A number of states and interested parties felt that the issue of business and human rights 
did require ‘serious attention’67 and the search for acceptable guidelines continued. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
60
 David Bilchitz ‘A chasm between ‘is’ and ‘ought’? A critique of the normative foundations of the SRSG’s 
Framework and the Guiding Principles’ in Deva & Bilchitz, op cit note 33 at 107-137. See also Penelope Simons 
International law’s invisible hand and the future of corporate accountability for violations of human rights (2012) 
3(1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 5, 7. 
61
 Bilchitz, ibid. 
62
 Bilchitz, ibid at 114-15. 
63
 Kinley et al, op cit note 49 at 31. 
64
 See D Kinley ibid at 30; Bilchitz op cit note 58 at 40. See also Public Statement by Amnesty International ‘2005 
UN Commission on Human Rights: Amnesty International welcomes new UN mechanism on Business and Human 
Rights’ IOR 41/044/2005 (Public) News Service No: 104 (21 April 2005) available at  
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR41/044/2005/en/693c2f6e-d4f9-11dd-8a23-
d58a49c0d652/ior410442005en.html, accessed on 6 June 2012. 
65
 Surya Deva ‘UN's Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: An 
Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?’ (2004) bePress Legal Series Paper 112, 6. 
66
 Karin Buhmann ‘Navigating from ‘train wreck’ to being ‘welcomed’:  Negotiation Strategies and Argumentative 
Patterns in the Development of the UN Framework’ in Deva & Bilchitz op cit note 33 at 29. 
67
 John G Ruggie ‘Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda’ Working Paper for the 
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative June 2007, Working Paper No. 38. 
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1.2.2. Ruggie’s mandate 
In a bid to take the UN Norms a step further and hopefully secure their binding nature, the UN 
Secretary General appointed a Special Representative, John Ruggie, in 2005. The Special 
Representative was given a mandate to identify and provide clarity regarding the expectations of 
business and to identify a clear role of government in regulating transnational corporations and 
other business in the area of human rights.
68
 At the commencement of his initial two-year 
mandate, Ruggie set out to ‘identify and clarify standards’ of corporate responsibility and 
accountability for business enterprises in human rights and elaborate on the role of states in 
effectively regulating and adjudicating corporate conduct in this regard.
69
 The Special 
Representative was mandated to develop materials and methodologies for undertaking human 
rights impact assessments and to compile a compendium of best practices of states and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises.
70
 
At the beginning of his task, Ruggie reviewed the Norms, hoping to find a way of moving 
beyond the stalemate they had created and clarifying the roles and responsibilities of states, 
companies and other social actors in the business and human rights sphere.
71
 However, he 
categorically rejected the Norms citing their exaggerated legal claims – that human rights law 
applied to corporations directly – and their conceptual ambiguities and doctrinal excesses.72 He 
opted to leave them aside, considering them a distraction from, as opposed to a basis for, 
advancing his mandate. 
In 2007, he submitted a report in which he highlighted the existing gap between 
economic forces and the capacity of governments to manage the effects of gobalization.
73
 
Whereas numerous soft law initiatives had arisen to deal with the question of human rights, he 
noted that the only area in which hard law existed governing business conduct in the area of 
                                               
68
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Resolution 2005/69 on Ruggie Mandate 
approved by the Economic and Social Council on 25 July 2005. 
69
 Ibid, Resolution 2005/69 approving the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, for an initial period of two 
years. 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 Ruggie Interim Report 2006 op cit note 14 para 55 
72
 Ibid para 59 
73
 Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 ‘Human Rights Council “Business and 
Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts’ Report of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises (9 February 2007) A/HRC/4/035 
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human rights was the ‘gradual extension’ of liability for international crimes to companies under 
domestic jurisdiction.
74
 In his conclusion, Ruggie opined that no single ‘silver bullet’ could 
resolve the business and human rights challenge and a wide array of measures was needed.
75
 He 
requested a one-year extension to submit his views and recommendations.  
In April 2008, Ruggie submitted what he called the Protect, Respect Remedy Framework, 
which gave a detailed account of the role states had to play in effectively regulating and 
adjudicating human rights obligations of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises.
76
 The Framework refers to three Pillars: the State Duty to Protect, the Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect and Access to Remedy. The state duty to protect against third party 
abuse commits states to refrain from violating human rights, and at the same time requires them 
to ensure that the rights are not violated by anyone, including business enterprises. The corporate 
responsibility to respect is defined as a ‘well institutionalised’ social rather than legal norm, but 
one which in Ruggie’s view has acquired near-universal recognition by all stakeholders, thus 
legitimising it. The access to remedy pillar is defined as part of the state’s obligation, to be 
effected through judicial, legislative or administrative means.  
In this report, the Special Representative noted that there was still need for further 
refinement of the legal understanding of the state duty to protect by authoritative bodies at 
national and international levels. He observed that even within existing legal principles, the 
policy dimensions of the duty to protect required increased attention and more imaginative 
approaches from states.
77
 Ruggie’s approach to the question of corporate standards for human 
rights commanded general support and the Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework was 
unanimously adopted by the Human Rights Council in June 2008.
78
 
His mandate was further extended for another three years to ‘operationalise’ the 
Framework: to propose concrete and practical recommendations to strengthen the duty of states 
to protect, to elaborate on corporate responsibility to respect, and to explore options for 
                                               
74
 Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie “Business and human rights: 
mapping international standards of responsibility and accountability for corporate acts”’ (19 February 2007) 
A/HRC/4/35 [Ruggie Report 2007] para 84. 
75
 Human Rights Council ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises’ (7 April 2008) A/HRC/8/5 [Ruggie Report 2008] 4 (7). 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Ibid para 8(21). 
78
 UN Human Rights Council Resolution 8/7, adopted without a vote. 
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enhancing access to effective remedies.
79
 In June 2011, Ruggie submitted Guiding Principles 
which sought to provide a ‘common platform of action’80 for states and corporations in their 
effort to implement his earlier proposed Framework. The Guiding Principles would, in his view, 
help to frame business obligations in human rights terms and make human rights an issue of 
strategy that businesses could consider in evaluating the other more traditional risks they usually 
factor in their operations and thus devise ways of mitigating them.  
While it may be argued that Ruggie did not deliver what was expected by many, it may 
also be said that he did what was realistic in the circumstances he was faced with.
81
 Discussion 
on the need for corporate accountability at the international level could be rational, but will be 
subject to the rigours of treaty-making, necessarily lengthy deliberations, and the numerous 
compromises that are a natural consequence of the economic and cultural differences in states. 
Yet, process aside, agreement is possible on the practical outcome desired; in the present case the 
desired outcome is that human rights be respected and not violated in any case whatsoever.
82
 
Whereas there may not be consensus on the exact nature of business obligation for human rights, 
it is possible to come up with common practical notions about action, about the need for 
businesses to make their contribution to the safeguarding of, and respect for, inviolability of 
human rights. the UN Framework and Guiding Principles provides this common basis for action. 
In presenting the Framework and the Guiding Principles and securing their unanimous 
adoption by the Council, Ruggie succeeded in building a consensus among corporations and 
governments around his approach. It is commendable that where all other previous efforts had 
failed to yield a final acceptable output, Ruggie succeeded.
83
 It will be noted, however, that 
whereas the previous efforts tried to impose human rights obligations on the corporation at the 
                                               
79
 HRC Resolution 8/7 ‘Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ para 4. 
80
 UN Human Rights Council ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ A/HRC/17/31 [UN Guiding Principles] 5(13). 
81
 Buhmann op cit note 66. 
82
 As J Maritain opines, ‘rational justifications are powerless to create agreement among men because they (the 
justifications) are different and perhaps even opposed to each other.’ See J. Maritain, Man and the State (1951) 77. 
Maritain, an academic and philosopher who played a role in shaping the development of an understanding on human 
dignity during the post war period proposed that to get an agreement on any universal declaration, the aim should be 
to agree on what was prohibited, or what was accepted, without getting into the reasons for agreeing as such because 
such a discussion would lead to disagreements, delays and ultimate failure. See also Christopher McCrudden 
‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4) The European Journal of International 
Law 655, 678. 
83
 The rejected 1990 UN Code on Transnational Corporations and the UN Norms in 2003. 
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international level, Ruggie opted not to follow this approach and offered guidelines instead,
84
 to 
be used by states and corporations in attaining a better understanding of their role, to see where 
gaps exist and take the appropriate steps to fill them. Unlike the previous attempts – where the 
Draft Code of 1990 and the Draft Norms sought to prescribe regulatory conduct for business – 
Ruggie adopted a ‘principled pragmatism’ approach to achieve greater consensus.85 It could be 
that this difference of approach led to the acceptance of his work.  
The UN Framework together with the UN Guiding Principles reflect the most recent 
findings and conclusions of the human rights and business debate at the international level. 
Contrary to the approach taken by the Norms, the Framework that Ruggie came up with was 
consistent with the law as it is, rather than as it ought to be, or would be at some future date.
86
 
The Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework defined the three pillars of corporate accountability; 
the UN Guiding Principles offer guidance to states on how the Business and Human Rights 
Framework may be operationalised. Ruggie points out that because of the varied sizes and 
circumstances of corporations and business entities across the globe, the aim of the Guiding 
Principles was not to be applied as a toolkit.
87
 Each state and each business entity is thus required 
to take on the Guiding Principles and apply them to their particular circumstances thus devising 
human rights respecting cultures founded on its particular context and existing circumstances. 
 
1.3. The 2010 Constitution 
Kenya adopted a new Constitution in 2010, markedly advanced and a great improvement on its 
Independence Constitution, joining modern constitutions such as those of South Africa, which 
defy the traditional model of constitutions that have only a vertical application. Both the Kenyan 
and South African constitutions provide for a horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to 
                                               
84
 Ruggie notes that ‘The Guiding Principles’ normative contribution lies not in the creation of new international law 
obligations but in elaborating the implications of existing standards and practices for states and businesses; 
integrating them within a single, logically coherent and comprehensive template; and identifying where the current 
regime falls short and how it should be improved.’ UN Guiding Principles op cit note 80 at 5(14). 
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 In his 2010 Report, Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie - Business and 
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juristic persons, recognising the reality that corporations can violate human rights.
88
 The 
provisions of the 2010 Constitution were deliberated at the same time when international debate 
on business and human rights was unfolding. The successive drafts of the constitution produced 
during the Constitutional Review Process reflect the clamour at the international level for 
corporations to be held accountable for violation of human rights.
89
 The Constitutional Review 
Process began in the early 2000s, and the new Constitution was adopted in 2010. The 2010 
Constitution of Kenya, like that of South Africa, binds ‘all persons’, including juristic persons.90 
Because of this provision, the Constitution of Kenya will have an impact on business and human 
rights deliberations. 
The traditional role of constitutions has been seen as regulating relations between 
individuals and the state. The constitution is deemed necessary for this on grounds of the unequal 
power relations between the state and the individual, which puts the individual at a disadvantage 
and thus in need of protection of a supreme law.
91
 The constraining effects of constitutions was 
limited to ‘governments and legislatures’ because these institutions were seen to enjoy coercive 
power of governance.
92
 Unlike private actors, they exercise a power of compulsion which they 
can misuse and therefore need to be subjected to the authority of constitutions to keep them in 
check.
93
 However, this argument ignores the reality that corporations can exert immense power 
and consequently are capable of causing as much harm as governments and both should be 
subjected to equally effective taming powers. 
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The Constitution of Kenya is the supreme law of the land. International Law forms part 
of the law of the country, but any law, including international law, that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution will be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.
94
 International Law will 
undoubtedly now have a bigger role to play in the decision of matters touching on human rights. 
However, it is not clear what place exactly, or what priority will be given to international law, 
owing to the different decisions arrived at by the Kenyan courts on the matter.
95
 The text of the 
Constitution is ambiguous regarding the place of International Law in relation to the other legal 
norms, thus leaving it to the courts to determine what value they will give it in deciding cases 
before them.
96
 The interpretation given so far has tended to underplay the role of international 
law, and if this view persists the place of International Law will effectively be relegated to a 
lower, rather than higher, position in the hierarchy of laws, as would have been imagined to be 
the intention of the drafters of the ‘new’ (2010) Constitution.97 A few cases decided on the 
question of applicability of International Law domestically will be reviewed to illustrate the hurdles 
to be overcome in applying International Law and the different possible conclusions that may be 
arrived at. 
Kenya prides itself in having one of the most advanced constitutions, having been drawn 
up recently and therefore with the advantage of drawing from the lessons of other jurisdictions.
98
 
As such, it should be able to define itself as a state which values the undeniable rights of the 
human person and one that “sees in the people in authority the ‘vicars of the multitude’”99 who 
seek not only to want, but do whatever is necessary to bring about the common good. A desire 
for the well-being of the people will translate into concrete actions that make it possible for this 
good to be achieved. Kenya is a signatory of the major human rights documents: the ICESCR, 
and the ICCPR among others. To meet its obligations under both covenants,
100
 the government is 
required to submit periodic reports detailing the efforts it is making towards providing for the 
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human rights of individuals. In its 3
rd
 periodic report under the ICESCR,
101
 the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights notes that whereas there was an incorporation of all the human 
rights obligations provided for in the ICCPR in the new Constitution of 2010, conflicting laws, 
challenges in implementation and a general lack of understanding of the implications of the 
provisions of the Covenant were likely to hinder application of the Covenant in the national 
context.
102
 
The courts will play an important role in interpreting the Constitution and bringing about 
its understanding in the development of the business and human rights jurisprudence. The 
effectiveness of the Constitution in ensuring that corporations respect the Bill of Rights will 
ultimately depend on the meaning given by the courts in interpreting the horizontality provisions. 
In the cases that come before them, judges will be called upon to interpret the novel horizontality 
provisions of the Constitution, to give meaning to them; to supply from their own thinking what 
the framers of the constitution meant, what they may or may not have said.
103
 This study will 
attempt to situate the Constitution of Kenya within the possible frameworks of horizontal 
models, and propose interpretations that may be adopted in applying the Constitution to non-state 
actors such as business entities. 
 
1.4. Research Problem and Objectives 
The opening up of national economies through globalisation led to public debate on the role of 
corporations in promoting human rights.
104
 Initially, the business and human rights debate 
focused on the question whether corporations have obligations for human rights. This is no 
longer contested, and the issue at hand now is the need to define what these obligations are and 
to determine how they can be enforced. The negative impact of human rights conduct on 
corporations cannot be denied; the difficulty lies in translating this realisation into workable legal 
standards.
105
 Proceeding from this view, the research problem this study seeks to address is the 
need to give human rights obligations of corporations greater specificity so that they may be 
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more effectively implemented by both corporations and the state.
106
 The research gap addressed in 
this research is the lack of clarity on the subject of corporate obligation for human rights, and the 
lack of concrete means to make corporations accountable for human rights violations in the context 
of Kenya. 
With Ruggie’s Protect, Respect Remedy Framework and the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights as a foundation, the corporate obligation for human rights could 
develop in many ways.
107
In implementing the Guiding Principles, each state is expected to 
consider its particular circumstances and to determine how best to give meaning to the corporate 
obligation for human rights:
108
 this is what this study attempts to do. The 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution which provides for horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to juristic persons 
makes the role of the government in ensuring corporate compliance with human rights even more 
concrete. The study therefore seeks to propose amendments to the corporate law to subject 
corporations to human rights obligations; a further proposal is made that the proposed changes be 
facilitated as part of the requirements needed to implement the 2010 Constitution and 
particularly its horizontality provision. 
The present study applies the general findings and guidelines offered in the Framework on 
Business and Human Rights to the context of Kenya, agreeing with Ruggie’s proposal for a state-
centered solution as opposed to drafting or proposing an international treaty as some had expected. 
The option for a domestic framework for corporate accountability for human rights violation is 
preferred because it offers a more immediate practical application than a theory of international 
accountability. Any international mechanism designed for the resolution of human rights 
violations is normally applied as an option of last recourse. It is therefore to be presumed that a 
domestic framework exists as an option of first recourse. The research focuses on making the 
case for corporate accountability and enforcement of human rights at the national level, thus 
availing a domestic avenue to be resorted to first, before resorting to the international 
mechanisms. Although proceeding on this basis, the study notes the need for internationally 
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binding obligations to cater for cases where the domestic mechanisms do not exist, or are too 
weak to offer efficient remedies to victims of corporate human rights abuses.  
In the absence of internationally binding human rights obligations, this research sets out 
to establish how corporate accountability for human rights in Kenya can be promoted. 
Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles will align the corporate obligation to existing law 
as opposed to changing human rights law as it is; corporations will still not be bound directly by 
human rights obligations.
109
 To achieve its goal, the study seeks: a) to demonstrate that Ruggie’s 
failure to adopt or propose internationally binding corporate human rights obligations is not fatal 
in the effort to advance the human rights and business deliberations; b) to determine whether 
corporate social responsibility is sufficient to underpin the corporate obligation for human rights; 
c) to evaluate whether the Constitutional provision binding juristic and incorporated persons in 
Kenya to respect the Bill of Rights envisions a new form of corporation and what ought to be 
done to give meaning to this provision; and d) to outline amendments to corporate law that will 
give effect to the corporate obligation for human rights envisioned in the Constitution and in the 
UN Guiding Principles. 
Addressing the research problem set out in this Chapter, the research findings and 
recommendations will be presented in the final Chapter. In summary, this research makes the 
following recommendations. First, to amend the Companies Act to expand directors’ duties to 
stakeholders; to include in the proposed Business Review a specific reference to the company’s 
human rights obligations towards stakeholders. It is also recommended that the Kenya Law 
Reform Commission include amendment of provisions of the Companies’ Act in the list of legal 
amendments necessary to implement the Constitution. Second, a recommendation is made for the 
Government through the Ministry of Justice and the Kenya National Commission for Human 
Rights to conduct a human rights audit for all national strategies developed by the government 
for trade and private sector growth.
110
The audit will establish whether they incorporate relevant 
human rights requirements, and thus contribute to executing the human rights agenda of the 
Government in line with the Constitution. It is also proposed that the specific term ‘human 
rights’ be used in Government strategies and corporate policies and plans to denote the particular 
obligation expected of corporations. Third, it is recommended that the plan for the 
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implementation of the 2010 Constitution include a specific section on business and human rights. 
The action plan should express the intention of Government to implement Article 20(1) of the 
Constitution, which binds juristic persons to the Bill of Rights. Fourth, a recommendation is 
made to ensure access to remedy for victims by providing legal aid for those who cannot afford 
to pay. The victims of corporate violation of human rights are likely to be the most vulnerable 
and unable to match the corporations’ resources in seeking redress for violation of their rights. 
Finally, with a view to creating the specific capacity needed to deal with the emerging field of 
business and human rights, and noting the challenges that have been faced so far in interpreting 
the provisions of the Constitution, specific training for judicial officers on Kenya’s human rights 
obligations under International Law is recommended. Together with the training of judicial 
officers, it is further recommended that the Government provide sufficient funding for the 
running of the KNCHR and the development of skills and capacity of its officers to ensure 
effective implementation of the proposed action plan on business and human rights. 
While it is true that larger companies, which are most often the transnational 
corporations, cause more negative impact, it is also true that Kenya’s private sector is relatively 
closed and mainly dominated by domestic firms.
111
 Additionally, the country attracts less foreign 
investment in comparison to its neighbours despite the fact that it has a larger and more robust 
private sector than they have.
112
 Owing to the difference in sizes of corporations operating in the 
country, no one-size-fit-all solution to the question of corporate obligation for human rights will 
work. It is therefore considered justified to focus the thrust of this study on the domestic 
corporations, although the findings and recommendations will apply to all corporations operating in 
the country, including those that are foreign-owned.  
 
1.5. Methodology 
The research will review a number of primary sources of law including international human 
rights treaties and conventions, the Constitution of Kenya and the constitutions of South Africa, 
the USA and Canada for analysis and to draw lessons on the horizontal application of bills of 
rights to the private sphere. It will also refer to the Companies Act Cap 486 Laws of Kenya and 
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Companies Act 2015 of Kenya, to highlight provisions that can be applied to impose human 
rights obligations on corporations, and will draw on lessons from relevant sections of the UK 
Companies Act 2006. Other laws to be reviewed include sections of the Penal Code Cap 63 
Laws of Kenya, which can be amended to impose punishment on corporations for violation of 
human rights. These will be compared with the relevant sections of the Australian Criminal Code 
which has provisions that Kenya can emulate. 
The research will include – where relevant – a comparative analysis of the laws in other 
jurisdictions that offer a plausible example of regulation and enforcement mechanisms for 
corporate responsibility for human rights. It will involve interpretation of laws and international 
guidelines on the subject to find out what they provide regarding the human rights obligation of 
business.   
Secondary sources of law will be applied in the study. Case law, journal articles and 
books will be reviewed. Reference will also be made to empirical studies on corporate social 
responsibility in Kenya, and studies on the relationship between signing and ratification of 
treaties and the practice of human rights in a number of countries, to assess the loss or otherwise 
for failure to create or recommend binding international human rights treaty obligations for 
corporations. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
The study comes at a time when the contribution of business to the global agenda is acknowledged 
and appreciated; but must be checked by introducing a systematic way of dealing with human rights 
concerns.
113
 The current state of the debate on human rights and business presents a moment of 
‘historical transformation’114 at the end of which it is hoped that a well-defined jurisprudence on 
the matter will emerge. Immediate answers to the question of corporate obligation for human 
rights in International Law do not seem forthcoming, but the subject cannot be ignored and must 
be deliberated further with the aim of forging a path towards a definitive solution. This study 
seeks to give greater specificity to the corporate obligation for human rights at the domestic level, 
attempting to propose legal considerations to effect corporate human rights obligations.  
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The UN Human Rights Council endorsed Ruggie’s Guiding Principles: they are here to 
stay. As many acknowledge, the Guiding Principles have received much wider acceptance than 
any of the previous attempts to gain international consensus on the question of business and 
human rights.
115
 The UN Guiding Principles do not comprise law, but they offer an international 
standard and an invaluable source of goals that can guide both companies and states to aim high 
in the effort to create a corporate culture that respects human rights. It is only when applied by 
states in their legal system that international standards acquire force and have an impact.
116
 It is 
hoped that proposing a framework for human rights and business in Kenya will offer a guide for 
the implementation of corporate obligation for human rights.  
This chapter laid the foundations for the study. It introduced the research problem and 
outlined its objectives. Justification for the research was made, its main tenets pointed out and 
the methodology was briefly described. The outline of the study has been highlighted, definitions 
presented and the assumptions and delimitations of its scope established. On these foundations, the 
study proceeds with a detailed description of the research. 
 
1.7. Chapter Outlines 
Chapter Two continues the study with a defense of Ruggie’s overall preference to offer voluntary 
guidelines for states and corporations as opposed to binding international corporate obligations. 
The chapter highlights some of the criticisms levelled against Ruggie’s approach and his 
proposals, arguing that they are not fatal in the effort to make corporate entities accountable for 
human rights violations. The chapter seeks to show that application of the UN Framework will 
be a useful prerequisite for laying the foundation for the implementation of a Business and 
Human Rights Treaty in the future. 
Chapter Three presents the Constitution of Kenya, outlining its horizontal provisions that 
make the Bill of Rights binding on juristic persons, and attempts to project the possible impact it 
will have in developing the business and human rights jurisprudence. The chapter begins by 
considering the inconsistent interpretation that courts have given to International Law under the 
2010 Constitution, suggesting further development of the jurisprudence before International Law 
can be meaningfully integrated in the domestic law. The chapter then seeks to show that the 
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public-private divide created by traditional constitutions is not accurate, arguing that the increase 
in the power of the modern corporation justifies their subjection to the bills of rights. The chapter 
reviews possible models of horizontal application, drawing lessons from the South African 
constitutional model, which is most similar to Kenya’s.  
Chapter Four reviews the topic of corporate social responsibility. The chapter notes the 
importance given by many corporations, specifically in Kenya, to the notion of CSR, and the 
same time highlights the absence of a unified understanding of the duty. The chapter reviews 
Ruggie’s definition of the corporate responsibility to respect, and his view that it is 
acknowledged in the corporate social responsibility of the company. It begins by considering the 
fact that many corporations in Kenya do not make reference to human rights in their policies; 
they do not consider their human rights obligations as a topic in its own right, but rather as a 
component of their corporate social responsibility. The chapter seeks to demonstrate that CSR 
cannot be an absolute measure of a corporation’s human rights obligations by highlighting the 
differences in the concepts. It proposes the use of specific human rights language in company 
policies, and the use of corporate law to bring a human rights understanding to corporations. 
Chapter Five discusses the first pillar of Ruggie’s framework, the state duty to protect 
which includes an obligation to ensure that third parties do not violate human rights. The chapter 
discusses the duty as involving offering guidance to corporations on what their responsibility 
comprises, which, as Ruggie proposes, should involve a mixed economy of approaches, 
voluntary and obligatory, that complement each other. The chapter reviews the Ratification of 
Treaties Act provided for under the Constitution of Kenya outlining the procedure for making and 
ratifying treaties. It highlights the practical challenges that arise from the Act’s requirements which 
might make it difficult to domesticate a treaty on business and human rights (if it existed), further 
supporting the case for the development of the domestic jurisprudence on business and human rights 
before negotiating a treaty on the same. The chapter also offers suggestions on what would 
constitute an ideal model for tracking and reporting human rights performance through formal 
public reporting, as a way for the state to ensure that corporations live up to their human rights 
obligations. A proposal is made to adopt the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines in preparing 
corporate reports. 
Chapter Six discusses the corporate responsibility to respect, Ruggie’s second pillar in his 
Framework on business and human rights. The corporate duty arises from the acknowledgement 
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that the primacy of the duty of the state to protect against human rights violation does not in any 
way preclude the responsibility of business for its actions. The argument is made that defining 
the corporate responsibility to respect necessitates a shift away from the concept of shareholder 
supremacy. This will make it possible to consider other stakeholders who make a contribution to 
the business, and thus be concerned for their interests. The Chapter reviews the question  which 
human rights are important for business, as some say it should be a limited category of business-
related rights, and others opine that they should be responsible for all human rights. The chapter 
then considers the different positive facets of the corporate responsibility devised by Ruggie to 
counteract its apparent negative character, which will bring about a corporate culture respectful 
of human rights, thus making the effort of business entities to respect human rights sustainable. 
Chapter Seven reviews the third pillar of the UN Framework, Access to Remedy for 
victims of corporate human rights violation. It appraises the different levels of remedial measures 
– operational or company level mechanisms, the non-judicial mechanisms (the KNCHR) and the 
judicial mechanism, the courts, and recommends the procedures to be followed in approaching 
the various means of redress. The chapter reviews the attitude that Kenyan courts have had in the 
past on the subject of human rights violations as this is most likely to affect future expectations 
on its approach. A proposal is made for amending the penal law of the country to make it 
possible to bring claims for human rights violations against companies by imposing on them a 
corporate criminal liability. 
Chapter Eight presents the implication of the changes suggested by the UN Guiding 
Principles, and implementation of the 2010 Constitution on the corporate law of the country. The 
chapter proposes amendments and additions to particular laws to enforce the corporate obligation 
for human rights. It proposes amendment of director’s duties to require them to consider the 
interests of stakeholders in decision-making, including an explicit obligation to consider the 
human rights impact of company operations. Constituency Statutes, state laws in the USA which 
were enacted with the intent to codify social and community obligations of directors, are 
proposed as a model for the amendment of the Companies Act. Specific proposals regarding the 
Business Review are recommended, outlining specific areas directors should report on. The 
chapter also proposes coordination between departments and considerations necessary to align 
sectoral policies to the national strategy and the state’s international human rights obligations as 
expressed in its Constitution and in international law. This chapter further makes a proposal to 
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the Commission charged with implementing the Constitution to include a specific section on 
business and human rights in the Action Plan drawn up to implement the 2010 Constitution. 
Chapter Nine concludes the study, summarizing the findings and recommendations of the 
research. In concluding this study, the chapter reviews the core arguments of the research and 
proceeds to make recommendations under the state duty, the corporate responsibility and access 
to remedy pillars of the business and human rights framework and proposes the way forward. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. A DEFENSE OF RUGGIE’S APPROACH AND FINDINGS ON THE QUESTION OF 
THE CORPORATE OBLIGATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The introduction chapter reviewed the attempts made at the international level to regulate 
corporate human rights conduct. One of the most recent outputs of the international deliberations 
on the subject is the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework”1 together with the UN 
"Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights"
2
 (the UN Guiding Principles) developed to 
implement the Framework. Both documents were developed by the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General of the UN on Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie. Ruggie, who had 
been tasked to provide clarity regarding standards of corporate responsibility and accountability 
of business and the role of government in regulating transnational corporations and other 
business entities in the area of human rights.
3
 At the onset of his mandate, it was hoped that 
Ruggie would come up with a report ‘making recommendations on new kinds of legislation, 
regulation, or standard-setting activity’ to provide clarity at the international level.4 However, 
Ruggie argued against coming up with a set of binding international obligations, thereby 
presenting an apparent return to the status quo he was tasked to move away from.
5
 
Ruggie’s decision not to create binding international obligations for business appears to 
be the biggest criticism of his findings.
6
 This chapter enumerates a number of justifications to 
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illustrate that the decision by the Special Representative not to develop binding international 
obligations at the first instance is not fatal to the effort to make corporate entities accountable for 
human rights violations. Negotiations at the international level presuppose a minimum of 
consensus among the different states; in the absence of this consensus, it is imperative that 
common ground be established: what human rights can be linked to business – all, or only some; 
how are the positive duties for the realisation of social and economic rights to be understood in 
relation to business; are the concepts of corporate social responsibility and human rights linked 
and to what extent; in a case like Kenya’s where the Constitution provides for human rights of 
juristic persons, how are its provisions to be interpreted and how would the constitutional 
provisions fare against International Law obligations? These and numerous other issues must be 
deliberated and a greater understanding reached within the domestic context in order to provide a 
sound basis for the effective implementation of an international treaty. The study thus supports 
the preference for development of the domestic jurisprudence as proposed by Ruggie. This is 
seen as a more feasible and effective option for the present moment, and a useful prerequisite for 
laying the foundation for the implementation of a business and human rights treaty in the future. 
In discussing Ruggie’s findings and the extent of my reliance on them, I do not consider 
the entire spectrum of his proposals. I will limit myself to what I consider necessary or relevant 
to the typical corporation in Kenya, the prevalent form of corporate entity. Whereas Ruggie’s 
work and findings are directed at transnational corporations and other business enterprises, this 
study will limit itself to the category of ‘other business enterprises’, as these, rather than the 
former, constitute the majority of the business entities in Kenya. Most of the business entities in 
Kenya operate within the state and would be classified as small in scale (in comparison with the 
multinational companies), but they are corporations nonetheless and subject to human rights 
standards. For this reason, this research does not look at the question of extraterritoriality, or 
obligation of home states for violations committed abroad. Nor does the study look at the case 
for supporting business respect for human rights in conflict affected areas, for the reason that 
Kenya is not a conflict affected state in the sense understood generally, as defined by 
international organisations such as the World Bank.
7
 This research contemplates the typical 
corporation in Kenya and makes proposals with that kind of entity in mind. Multinational 
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corporations will nonetheless be included in the ambit of the proposals made because the 
recommendations made will apply to all corporations operating in the country. 
 
2.2. Should Ruggie have built upon the UN Norms to develop a binding treaty?8 
A legal corporate human rights obligation as would be presented in an international treaty would 
be more ideal compared to the social norm for corporations proposed by Ruggie in the second 
pillar of the UN Framework because it would trigger more effective regulatory and remedial 
mechanisms.
9
 Binding obligations in the form of a treaty would have the advantage that they 
defy differing national standards; corporate obligations would be the same across the board, thus 
deterring the possibility of corporations evading their obligations by seeking to operate in poorly 
regulated jurisdictions. If direct obligations existed under an international treaty, monitoring 
bodies would review corporate conduct as they review state conduct: now they cannot. Any 
monitoring mechanisms that could be applied to ensure that corporate obligations are adhered to 
are given effect by the constituting law and in the absence of such law remain unenforceable. 
Those who are of the view that the time is ripe for a treaty on business and human rights 
argue that Ruggie should not have rejected the UN Norms, and perhaps treated them as a 
predecessor to a binding treaty, in the same way that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) was for the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
10
 The UN General 
Assembly adopted the UDHR in 1948; the UDHR is regarded as the parent human rights 
document and the constitution of the entire human rights movement. It has also been termed the 
international Magna Carta for all humankind.
11
 The UDHR, being a Declaration as opposed to a 
treaty, was general in its terms. At the time of adopting the UDHR, the committee of experts 
working on it was cognizant of what they saw as a great difficulty in establishing a complete list 
of human rights acceptable to all sides. There was a divergence in beliefs of those involved 
owing to the diversity of the peoples they represented and the different political and economic 
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systems they subscribed to.
12
 As such, the outcome of the deliberations, the rights listed and 
described in the UDHR were acknowledged to contain great ambiguity.
13
 
The ultimate agreement on what should be listed as human rights in the Declaration did 
not mean that there was consensus on what meaning should be given to the rights. Commenting 
on a surprise reaction to the agreement the drafters had reached despite the different cultures, 
ideologies and religions of member states of the UN, one of the drafters is said to have remarked 
“yes we agree on the rights, so long as no one asks us why”.14 The lack of consensus on the 
reason behind the choice of human rights was not considered fatal by the drafters. The agreement 
on the basics was deemed sufficient for the development of a framework that could form the 
basis for further consideration and development.
15
 Commenting on the same point during the 
first deliberations of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIWG) on a Legally 
Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with respect to 
Human Rights, precaution was urged against fixed definitions.
16
 This was based on the grounds 
that experience had shown that it was not always possible to agree on definitions although it was 
possible to reach a common understanding on the subject of deliberation.
17
  
Maritain, an academic and philosopher who played a role in shaping the development of 
an understanding on ‘human dignity’ during the post-war period proposed that to get an 
agreement on any universal declaration, the aim should be to agree on what was prohibited or 
what was accepted, without getting into the reasons for agreeing as such because such a 
discussion would lead to disagreements, delays and ultimate failure.
18
 He was of the view that 
“rational justifications are powerless to create agreement among men because they (the 
justifications) are different and perhaps even opposed to each other.”19 If this reasoning was 
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applied by Ruggie, it may have been possible to conclude an international agreement on business 
and human rights. 
The UDHR had an initial ‘burs’ of enthusiasm20 and was ‘terser, more general and 
grander in its provisions than treaties’.21 Unlike the ICCPR, for example, which enjoins the 
signatories to submit reports showing the measures they have implemented to give effect to the 
rights enumerated in the Covenant, the UDHR merely ‘proclaims a common standard of 
achievement for the promotion of respect for rights and freedoms by all peoples’.22 Also unlike 
the ICCPR and ICESCR, the UDHR was not opened for signatures of states and ratification by 
interested parties. The UDHR conceptualized the notion of human rights, while the ICCPR and 
ICESCR fleshed out the details of the ideal that was brought to light by the UDHR. 
Referring to the “open-ended general clauses in human rights documents”, a member of 
the Committee constituted to come up with common areas of potential agreement on the meaning 
of human rights at the deliberations on the UDHR said that the ambiguities did not result from 
confusion or contradiction but were instead productive ambiguities that reflected experience and 
knowledge gained over a long history of human rights.
23
 These general clauses would be a 
foundation for future deliberations.
24
 The future deliberations did indeed take place, on the 
foundation that the UDHR had set, and they produced the ICCPR and the ICESCR. In a similar 
manner, perhaps Ruggie could have used the opportunity he was granted to devise a declaration 
on business and human rights, albeit not binding, which could have set a firmer foundation for 
the development of a treaty on business and human rights in the future. 
Despite any advantages that could have arisen from developing the Norms, the call for 
binding obligations for Trans National Corporations (TNCs) and other business entities raises the 
question how different a treaty would be from the rejected Norms. Would not an attempt to 
create direct human rights obligations for corporations be met with the same reservations as the 
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Norms?
25
 There is the possibility that the resistance put up against the Norms would at least 
contribute to prolonged negotiations for a treaty to iron out differences in views. 
 
2.3. Is the failure to create internationally binding corporate human rights obligations fatal 
to the business and human rights agenda? 
In an attempt to defend Ruggie, this chapter explores some of the reasons why the failure to 
come up with binding International Law obligations for corporations is not considered fatal to 
the human rights and business discourse. Ruggie’s work and the outcome of his research leaned 
towards self-regulation and, in this aspect, is more in keeping with the prior initiatives which all 
resulted in voluntary guidelines, therefore arguably maintaining rather than advancing the debate 
on the question of business and human rights. Ruggie’s arguments maintain the current condition 
where companies are encouraged but not required to respect human rights, and where business 
responsibility for human rights at the international level remains unclear.
26
 Rather than move 
beyond the self-regulatory approach as expected, Ruggie stayed true to this approach and the UN 
Guiding Principles are seen as the latest in a long line of mechanisms adopted to merely 
encourage rather than oblige business entities to uphold human rights.
27
  
David Kinley disputes Ruggie’s reason for not pursuing the International Law or treaty 
option, saying that if we were to shun such tasks (of creating binding international obligations) 
owing to their perceived difficulty, then most post-war International Law instruments would not 
have made it ‘beyond the stage of high minded rhetoric’.28 In my view, looking at the two 
options Ruggie weighed in the course of his work, it was both practical and most reasonable in 
the circumstances to have opted for the alternative that promised more immediate results. In any 
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case, Kinley concedes that the international treaty option will ‘inevitably be a long road’;29 the 
current state of business and human rights requires a more immediate solution.  
 
2.3.1. UN Guiding Principles are an interim measure of practical application pending the 
negotiation of a treaty on business and human rights. 
It will be noted, to his credit, that Ruggie acknowledged that his work and proposals did not in 
any way rule out the option of internationally binding obligations; they were indeed a possibility 
but at a future time.
30
 His reservation against a treaty therefore was only with regard to its 
appropriateness as the solution needed for the present moment. International Law appears as an 
immature legal system whose enforcement mechanisms lag behind its legislation. It is conceded 
that lack of enforcement does not mean the absence of an obligation.
31
 Nonetheless, rather than 
pushing for an international treaty that would then face the typical hurdles of treaties in 
international law, it is proposed to first develop the domestic jurisdiction to create a workable 
system of corporate accountability for human rights obligations (which is what Ruggie tries to do 
with the UN Framework and Guiding Principles) before embarking on the negotiation of a treaty.  
After adoption of the UN Guiding Principles, the Human Rights Council established a 
Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises.
32
 Among other things, the Working Group was to promote the effective and 
comprehensive dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles, to offer support 
where requested and solicit and disseminate good practices identified in the process of 
implementing the Guiding Principles.
33
 Following on the consultative approach that 
characterised the process leading up to the Guiding Principles, the Working Group operates by 
requesting for – and considering input – from the broad range of stakeholders on the issues it 
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seeks to address.
34
 Two annual surveys were completed, for 2012 and 2013, and received a 
relatively low response rate with no African country responding.
35
 The initial 3-year mandate of 
the Working Group was extended for a further three years from June 2014.
36
 The Human Rights 
Council also established a Forum on Business and Human Rights to function under the guidance 
of the Working Group, to discuss and promote dialogue on issues arising in implementation of 
the Guiding Principles.
37
 The Forum has organised three annual meetings of member states, and 
a fourth is scheduled for December 2015. 
Further to Resolution 17/14
38
 and development of the deliberations on the issue of the 
obligation of TNCs and other business enterprises, The Human Rights Council in 2014 
established an ‘Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIWG) on a Legally Binding 
Instrument on Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with respect to Human 
Rights’.39 The mandate of the OEIWG was to elaborate an international legally binding 
instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.
40
 
Kenya was among the states that supported this historic resolution.
41
 Majority of the participating 
states were in favour of the proposal, but there was some resistance to the idea on grounds that 
the focus of the intended instrument seemed to be on trans-national corporations to the detriment 
of domestic corporations.
42
 Those opposing the move called for equal treatment of companies, 
                                               
34
 In November 2011, the Working Group called for submissions on its program and received contributions from a 
broad range of stakeholders available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Submissions.aspx, accessed on 7 June 2012. 
35
 UN General Assembly Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises ‘Uptake of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: practices and 
results from pilot surveys of Governments and corporations’ (16 April 2013)  UN Doc A/HRC/23/32/Add.2 para 8. 
If Kenya or any other African country responded to the survey, they did not give their permission for their responses 
to be published. 
36
 Human Rights Council, Draft Resolution A/HRC/26/L.1. 
37
 Paragraph 12 of Resolution 17/4 op cit note 32. 
See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages/ForumonBusinessandHumanRights.aspx, accessed on 
24 August 2014. 
38
 Adopting the UN Guiding Principles and establishing the Working Group on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises. 
39
 Human Rights Council ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’ (14 July 2014) A/HRC/RES/26/9. 
40
 Draft Resolution on Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises with respect to human rights (25 June 2014) A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1. 
41
 Action on the Resolution on the Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights – available at  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14785&LangID=E>, accessed on 9 June 
2015. 
42
 Statement of the ESCR Net Corporate Accountability Working Group (CAWG) “States at the Human Rights 
Council must ensure all business enterprises are the subject of new normative international developments. …The 
    
35 
 
domestic or trans-national, which, being of the same nature – profit making entities – stand the 
chance of neglecting or inadequately addressing operational impacts in the quest for profits.
43
 
The deliberations on the question whether the binding treaty proposed should regulate TNCs 
only, or whether domestic corporations should also be regulated, continued to be a subject of 
deliberations in the First Session of the OEIWG.
44
 In the event that resolution of the matter 
determines that the treaty will only be applicable to TNCs, there would be need for an alternative 
set of laws and regulations to govern national corporations, adding to the  reasons in support of 
development of the domestic jurisprudence on business and human rights. 
The OEIWG was tasked to begin collecting views from states and other stakeholders, 
conduct deliberations of the scope, nature and form of the proposed instrument and is expected to 
submit a report on the progress made for consideration at the Human Rights Council’s thirty-first 
session.
45
 The OEIWG held its first session on July 6-10 2015, thus commencing talks on the 
development of a treaty on business and human rights.
46
 The work of the inter-governmental 
Working Group is the continuation of the long road that could eventually result in an 
internationally binding instrument on business and human rights. The working group will 
undoubtedly build on the consensus developed during the course of Ruggie’s research, and the 
work being done as a result of his proposals together with the UN Guiding Principles, which 
many states and corporations have taken up and are trying to implement. The UNGPs are 
considered by many states as a starting point and reference for the work of the OEIWG.
47
 The 
discussions that have been generated in the course of Ruggie’s mandate and the deliberations 
around the implementation of the Guiding Principles have created awareness and raised 
questions that will feed into the treaty making process. The Framework and Guiding Principles 
are serving their purpose in the intervening period: they can be applied to guide states and 
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corporations in taking practical steps at present to live up to their obligations. Other reasons that 
support the development of the domestic jurisprudence on business and human rights before 
embarking on work on a treaty are discussed below. 
 
2.3.2. Ratification of a treaty on business and human rights will not of itself guarantee 
compliance with human rights obligations 
It may be easier for states to commit to treaties that offer reciprocal benefits, for example bi-
lateral or multi-lateral treaties that require signatories to give certain favourable treatment to 
other member states, than a general treaty that offers no immediate tangible benefits for the 
signatories. In a bilateral treaty, a source of motivation for a state to honour the terms of the 
treaty would be the fact that its efforts will be reciprocated by the partner state.
48
 A state is 
unlikely to ratify a bilateral economic agreement and fail to abide by its terms because there are 
consequences immediately applicable for not observing the promises made. But human rights 
treaties impose obligations without offering any tangible or immediate benefits; member states 
are expected to uphold and protect human rights, and if they do this, it is not because of any 
direct expectations on the other states. In the absence of direct obligations as would arise under a 
multilateral treaty binding the contracting states, it is difficult for other states to intervene and 
require violating states to comply.  
The drafters of the UDHR held the view that the most effective defense of human rights 
would be in the minds and wills of the people. The UDHR therefore expressed the hopes of its 
founders; the formation of a human rights conscience in the people
49
 so that, convinced of the 
value of human rights these individuals and social groups would seek to secure them. Capturing 
this view, one of the main architects of the Declaration observed: 
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home – so 
close and so small that they cannot be seen on any map of the world. Yet they are the 
world of the individual person: the neighbourhood he lives in; the school or college he 
attends; the factory, farm or office where he works. Such are the places where every man, 
woman, and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without 
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discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning 
anywhere.
50
 
Declarations and documents by themselves would not bring about the change needed. To 
be effective, the proposals for change must be accompanied by resolute action by both the rights 
holders and the duty bearers: the rights holders to know their rights and seek them, and the duty 
bearers to uphold, respect and protect the rights, and ensure that they are respected, upheld and 
protected by others.  
Commenting on the status of the world at the 50
th
 Anniversary of the UDHR, a leading 
human rights lawyer observed that the barbarous acts that gave rise to the universal effort to draft 
human rights instruments continued to recur and human rights for many remained an elusive 
dream.
51
 More than fifteen years later, the situation is perhaps even worse with wars and 
atrocities continuing to claim the lives of numerous people. What was noted at the time of 
drafting the declaration continues to be as true today, that “even the noblest and most solemn of 
declarations could not suffice to restore faith in human rights”.52 The writings declaring rights 
needed action to give them life, absent which they remained mere declarations. Further reference 
will be made to a number of empirical studies that have attempted to show the correlation 
between signing treaties and the behaviour or practices of states. 
The Relation between treaty ratification and state observance of human rights obligations 
as shown in human rights ratings is not always linear. A study carried out in 2002 by Hathaway 
sought to establish whether countries complied with human rights treaties, and if the treaties 
improved human rights practices in the country.
53
 The study involved the analysis of over forty 
years of data from 166 countries in five areas of human rights law.
54
 One of the findings was that 
treaty ratification is not infrequently associated with worse human rights ratings than expected;
55
 
states with the worst ratings of human rights violation sometimes had higher ratification than 
those with better ratings.
56
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A similar study by Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui also proved the “paradox of empty 
promises” thesis, where states sign treaties to signify compliance but violate them in practice. 
The act of signing treaties by some states was tantamount to an act of “window dressing” which 
gave rise to the danger that the legitimacy thereby derived in the eyes of other states removed the 
pressure from the violating state and acted as a shield against criticism as they engaged in or 
allowed violating acts at the domestic level. There was no positive relation between human rights 
compliance and the number of treaties that a state had signed; the data showed that states that 
had signed more treaties were more likely to repress human rights than those that had not signed 
the treaties. Ultimately, the study concluded that international human rights treaties do little to 
encourage better human rights practices in a country, and in many instances it did not stop states 
from a spiral of increasing repressive behaviour and may even exacerbate poor or violating 
practices.
57
  
A scathing response to the Hathaway study findings was rendered by Goodman and Jinks 
who labelled them as “wildly counterintuitive”.58 Although they acknowledged that this 
particular study was the most well-conceived empirical study on the subject at the time, they 
took issue with the fact that it failed to adequately account for the means by which and 
conditions under which human rights norms are incorporated into national practice.
59
 They point 
out that ratification of treaties is only a point in the broader process and not the “magic moment” 
of acceptance of human rights norms.
60
 Goodman and Jinks proposed that rather than 
considering the ratification of treaties as a measure of compliance, the various processes that 
necessarily accompany the signing should be given importance.
61
 Such processes include the 
reservations subject to which the treaties are ratified, the adoption of implementing legislation 
and the withdrawing of crippling reservations among other practical concerns.
62
 If these were 
considered, what becomes important is not so much the signing or ratification of treaties, but 
rather the factors that move the process forward, or those that make it stall.
63
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Goodman and Jinks also took issue with the data sets used to arrive at the findings. They 
argued that owing to problems of conceptualising the variables, it was not accurate for Hathaway 
to conclude that the lack of a significant relationship between signing treaties and state practices 
showed that treaty impact is insignificant.
64
 They proposed instead that the data should account 
for change in violating behaviour. If using torture as a measure of state compliance for example, 
the study must check if reduction in torture was replaced by another form of human rights abuse 
before concluding that human rights violations decreased because torture decreased.
65
 The study 
did not take such factors into account. Hathaway used only five human rights for her study; 
Goodman and Jinks proposed that the effectiveness of a treaty should rather be assessed by its 
impact on all the rights contained in the treaty, or a larger sample than the five human rights 
analysed in her study.
66
 They concluded that signing treaties builds national human rights 
cultures; that treaties have a widespread effect on practices of states by changing the discourse 
on expectations regarding certain rights.
67
 In the absence of accurate studies that connect the law 
to reality, they proposed adherence to the conventional assumption that treaties advance the 
cause they claim to promote.
68
 
There is credit to Goodman and Jinks’ criticisms; Hathaway’s study may have produced 
different results had all the suggestions proposed in the critique been borne in mind. In a similar 
study carried out by Keith to establish whether signing of the ICCPR had an observable impact 
on state behavior, the main conclusion was that it would be “overly optimistic” to expect being a 
party to an international human rights treaty to produce results that could be observed.
69
 The data 
analysed covered 178 countries over a period of eighteen years and across four measures of 
human rights behaviour.
70
 A synthesis was done of 27 rights categories found in the ICCPR 
using two standards of measure for human rights.
71
 The data analysis was grouped into states 
parties to the ICCPR against states that were not; the human rights situation of the state before 
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signing the ICCPR was also compared to the situation after. An inquiry was made to establish 
whether the improved behaviour after signing of the ICCPR could be attributed to the decision to 
sign the instrument. This study supported the conclusion that being party to the ICCPR ‘may 
only be the final step in a long socialisation process within the international community that 
influences state willingness to protect human rights”.72 The socialisation process would include 
factors such as a building of consensus and the creation or facilitation of the capacity within the 
government to implement the obligations assumed.
73
 
It is further noted that reliance on reported rights to inform the analysis may not lead to 
accurate results because repressive regimes may sensor the media, thus reporting fewer 
violations than committed.
74
 Additionally, an efficient monitoring and reporting treaty 
mechanism can result in more cases being reported, which may not necessarily mean an increase 
in violations; a higher incidence of reported violations could also be a consequence of the treaty 
affording lawyers terms to meaningfully phrase problems that existed before, thereby giving the 
impression of increased cases where that may not be the case in reality.
75
 However, later studies 
made the same observations that Hathaway made, and at the very least raise the probability that 
there is some truth in the findings.
76
  
Some of the findings of the empirical studies indicated that the signing of international 
treaties by states does not always signify or guarantee compliance with its provisions: states were 
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moved to comply by the political mobilisation of actors pushing for compliance rather than the 
mere signing of documents.
77
 The strength of International Law in many states with poor 
practices came from NGOs and western liberal states, which paid attention to and exerted 
pressure on these states to change.
78
 Civil society provided the enforcement mechanism that the 
treaties lacked; the action and pressure from international non-governmental organisations 
moved governments to change their behaviour.
79
 Compliance with international treaty 
requirements is thus seen by some as a matter of coercion and coincidence rather than the law.
80
  
However, coercion from other states for violating states to comply is usually only 
strategic: powerful states seeking to impose sanctions do so not looking at whether states had 
signed treaties or not, and it is arguable that pressure is brought to bear upon weaker states that 
the stronger states would have something to gain from if human rights were respected.
81
 These 
findings support the view by other authors who say that it is democracy, peace and economic 
development rather than signing of treaties that leads to the protection of human rights.
82
 The 
impact of the media and human rights activists projecting human rights violations and creating 
pressure on violating states to react are seen as having more impact on the action of states than 
the mere act of signing treaties.
83
 If this observation is accurate, then states can be moved to 
respect human rights even without signing treaties. What is needed is monitoring of practices, 
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and pressure on government to stop the violating acts, or to exercise its powers to stop third 
parties violating the rights.  
 
2.3.3. Strong institutions vital to ensure capacity to align behaviour of states with their 
human rights obligations 
It has been said, with some credit to the argument, that human rights law by its very nature can 
be an authoritative tool in negotiations even in the absence of enforcement because it reflects 
some pre-negotiated and internationally legitimate understanding about what is just.
84
 Those who 
argue thus are of the view that the mere entrenchment of human rights rules in the social and 
political contexts counts for more than their formal enforceability.
85
 If human rights have an 
authoritative force by mere existence, a lack of enforcement mechanisms in International Law 
would be of little consequence. The creation of a treaty on business and human rights in this 
context would have a greater advantage than if enforcement was considered a necessary 
accompaniment of the treaty. The mere existence of rules can be a spur for conscientious 
corporations to seek to abide by them and make the effort to put measures in place to achieve this 
end.  
It is also true, however, that many corporations which perceive that there is nothing to 
lose by disregarding the law will not be deterred by its existence. In many cases, the law will be 
present in the operating environment of corporations, for example in labour laws. But other 
factors could play a more defining role;
86
 for example, a cultural context of impunity where law 
breaking does not result in any negative consequences; or foreign companies that venture into the 
country in search of cheap labour and enter into agreements with the government to legitimise 
this objective. If the latter were the case, the mere existence of the law will not stop violation of 
human rights.  
Ratification of treaties could thus fail to change the behaviour of states if states ratify 
treaties without the capacity or will to comply with human rights obligations. The fact that 
human rights atrocities are committed in states that have signed international treaties could lead 
to the question why states ratify treaties if they have no intention of complying with them. 
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Alternatively, what moves states to change behaviour pursuant to signing or ratifying treaties?
87
 
Because of the low cost of ratification, many states ratified treaties without the will or capacity to 
align domestic behaviour with the treaty obligations.
88
 The implementation of international 
treaties relies too much on the good will of the parties, and if this were lacking, there would be 
little change in behaviour.
89
 In the absence of self or external enforcement mechanisms, states 
can, and do, contravene treaties they have signed with no dire consequences, or at least no 
immediate consequences.
90
 Without the capacity and will to implement obligations signed onto, 
the act of the state will amount to mere window dressing, or it will be a far cry from the reality 
intended. 
Another empirical study carried out by Hathaway supported the claim that even without 
international enforcement; treaties are likely to lead to change in behaviour where there is 
domestic enforcement of treaty commitments.
91
 Development and strengthening of institutions 
that can ensure that the obligations signed onto in a treaty on business and human rights will be 
enforced will therefore serve to make the obligations signed onto more practical. In addition to 
the courts, other entities such as the national human rights institutes will play a part in ensuring 
that any corporate obligation for human rights are respected. It may be worthwhile to develop 
these institutions first before taking on the treaty obligations. The formal signing of a treaty on 
human rights and business when the treaty is eventually negotiated will then be a symbolic 
recognition of behavioural norms and international standards that the state had previously 
accepted and began to act upon.
92
  
For practical reasons, experiences at the domestic level have been found to be useful in 
the development of jurisprudence at the international level. Experiences of constitutionalisation 
and adjudication of socio-economic rights at the national level from jurisdictions such as South 
Africa, India and Argentina were factored in the development of the “Optional Protocol for the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights”,93 (Optional Protocol) 
providing lessons that helped to develop a stronger and more effective system at the international 
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level.
94
 It was considered useful to assess current trends in the legal enforcement of socio-
economic rights at the national level, in order to project the impact an Optional Protocol was 
likely to have at the international level, and thus decide if it was a worthy option to pursue or 
not.
95
 For the reason that victims of international human rights abuse seek remedy at the 
domestic level, it is important that the development of the international system be informed by 
the reality of the domestic context, to avoid a disconnect between the international and local 
spheres and ensure that confidence in international human rights is not undermined by a 
perception of inapplicability.
96
 
Ruggie’s preferred approach requiring states to take up the responsibility of ensuring that 
human rights violations by corporations are prevented or redressed is in keeping with 
international law. It has been considered a development in International Law that treaties require 
states to provide legal remedies for corporate violation of treaty provisions.
97
 The UN Norms on 
the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to 
Human Rights sought to create binding corporate human rights obligations at the international 
level, but the obligations were to be enforced under the domestic law of the states. The draft 
Norms stipulated that:  
States should establish and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative framework 
for ensuring that the Norms and other relevant national and international laws are 
implemented by transnational corporations and other business enterprises.
98
 
The proposed use of domestic laws to impose human rights obligation on companies in 
this instance was referred to as the “usual means of international law”.99 Examples of treaties that 
required domestic enforcement of its provisions include the Council of Europe Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption, which requires state parties to:  
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… adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that legal 
persons can be held liable for the criminal offences of active bribery, trading in influence 
and money laundering established in accordance with this Convention, committed for 
their benefit by any natural person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the 
legal person, who has a leading position within the legal person.
100
 
The Inter American Convention against Corruption provides that: 
… each State Party shall prohibit and punish the offering or granting, directly or 
indirectly, by its nationals, persons having their habitual residence in its territory, and 
businesses domiciled there, to a government official of another State, of any article of 
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage, in connection 
with any economic or commercial transaction in exchange for any act or omission in the 
performance of that official's public functions.
101
 
The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions provides that:  
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its legal 
principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public 
official.
102
 
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime provides that: 
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, consistent with its legal 
principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for participation in serious crimes 
involving an organised criminal group and for the offences established in accordance with 
articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention.
103
 
Each state party was required to take measures at the domestic level to hold legal persons 
or corporations liable for violation of the various treaties and conventions. Although the treaties 
and conventions were of international character and there was a presumption that their 
enforcement would be at the international level, it was preferable – perhaps for the same 
practical reasons that Ruggie alludes to – to have enforcement at the national level.104 
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The UN Guiding Principles will apply domestic means to establish measures to hold 
corporations liable for violation of human rights. Ruggie offers an ideal guide for the 
development of the domestic jurisprudence. He offers what may be considered a timely solution 
that will set a more solid foundation for further developments, including the development of a 
treaty on business and human rights. Without sound institutions at the national level, 
deliberations at the international level will only be a one-sided approach to a double-faced 
problem and will not yield the results expected. For this reason, it could be more prudent to 
develop the domestic systems of enforcement before embarking on the development of a treaty, 
especially for a jurisdiction like Kenya, where the majority of business entities are domestic 
corporations. 
The UN Framework and the UN Guiding Principles offer states a means to build a 
foundation which must be set before any effective work can be carried out at the international 
level. In order to prepare the state to implement treaty provisions by ensuring enforcement, 
reforms that aim to enhance the state’s capacity to comply with human rights treaties should be 
considered. Such reforms include for example guidance in drafting effective legislation and 
crafting strategies to overcome institutional inertia and empower relevant institutions to take on 
monitoring or enforcement duties. These factors will better prepare states, including Kenya, to 
ratify treaties with the intention and capacity to improve state practices.
105
 
 
2.4. Exhaustion of local remedies a prerequisite for recourse to enforcement at the 
international level 
It is a rule of International Law that local remedies must be exhausted before international 
proceedings can be instituted.
106
 In a case decided at the European Court of Human Rights on the 
principle of subsidiarity, the Court held that: 
…[I]n line with the principle of subsidiarity, it is best for the facts of cases to be 
investigated and issues to be resolved insofar as possible at the domestic level. It is in the 
interests of the applicant, and the efficacy of the Convention system, that the domestic 
authorities, who are best placed to do so, act to put right any alleged breaches of the 
Convention. 
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Even when the International Treaty on Business and Human Rights exists, it will be a 
requirement that any parties to a dispute have recourse to local remedies and exhaust them before 
they can take the matter to an international court. The fact that local remedies must be exhausted 
before recourse is had to International Law is a reason to prefer the development of a dependable 
domestic system of the business and human rights jurisprudence before an international treaty on 
the subject is sought.  
Ruggie disputes the strict distinction made between voluntary and mandatory obligations, 
noting, for example, that even though treaties are considered mandatory, they are not so in the 
strict sense because in the absence of an international enforcement mechanism, no one can be 
forced to implement them.
107
 Because there are no enforcement mechanisms for many of the 
international human rights instruments, International Law resorts to domestic enforcement of its 
obligations for treaties that have been domesticated.
108
 Therefore, assuming that an international 
treaty for corporate human rights obligations was created, there would still be the hurdle of 
enforcement to deal with.  
Many of the modern human rights treaties lack effective and reliable enforcement 
mechanisms, the most common enforcement mechanism being voluntary self-reporting.
109
 The 
ICCPR and ICESCR require states to file periodic reports detailing their efforts to comply with 
the provisions of the covenants; but the recommendations of reporting committees have no legal 
force.
110
 Under the existing mechanisms, states do not take seriously their obligation to report on 
progress: many have overdue reports
111
 and those that submit them offer a description of 
domestic law rather than an analysis of the human rights record of the country.
112
 Additionally, 
whereas the Committee can make comments on the human rights situation of a country, it cannot 
compel the state to act on the comments made.
113
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Noting the shortcomings of international law, Ruggie expressed uncertainty about the 
efficiency of any attempt at enforcement at the international level.
114
 In his view, the proposal of 
an international court for business entities is not realistic in the near future.
115
 Yet enforcement 
mechanisms are essential, to mete out punishment to violators, and procure redress to the 
victims, addressing the violating actions in the bid to ensure rights are upheld. If no such 
mechanism exists or can be created for business and human rights, it may be too optimistic to 
expect much from an international treaty in terms of timely remedy for victims of corporate 
abuse.  
 
2.5. Other criticisms leveled against Ruggie in the research and deliberations leading up to 
the UN Framework and Guiding Principles 
2.5.1. Lack of consensus 
Some critics say that there was a lack of tolerance for opposing views in the process and 
disregard has consequently been shown for the apparent ‘consensus’ that characterised Ruggie’s 
deliberations throughout the consultations, drafting and adoption of his findings.
116
 If this 
criticism holds any water, the uncritical adoption of the UN Guiding Principles could be seen as 
undermining the legitimacy of his findings and proposals and the entire process that resulted in 
them. In the view of some, the ‘consensus’ proposition is seen as part of Ruggie’s vocabulary,117 
and a fact that leads to self-legitimisation of the outcome.
118
 Surya Deva argues that there should 
have been a ‘piercing of the “façade” of consensus’, a going against this ‘coalition of the 
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willing’119 if a more robust outcome was to be arrived at. Deliberations of any kind ought to be 
preceded by expression of the fundamental differences that give rise to the need for the 
deliberations, then negotiations would follow to try and address the differences and only then can 
an agreement be reached, reflecting the compromises made to arrive at a given position. 
Ruggie’s critics argue that he failed to acknowledge the differences that arose regarding the 
issues in discussion, he did not articulate them, neither did he acknowledge the final position 
taken in view of these differences; nor did he offer reasons why his choice was the preferred 
option.
120
 However, there is evidence to the contrary of this argument.
121
 There seems to be an 
exchange of views around Ruggie’s findings at all stages, for example as documented by the 
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre.
122
  
David Kinley notes in his description of Ruggie’s work: 
Ruggie’s tenure in the position has been marked by extra ordinary energy, a 
commendable willingness to engage and openness to debate; a determination to find 
common ground and move off that which has been ‘poisoned’; and a prodigious output 
of well-researched, succinct and readable reports and papers.
123
 
A record of consultation meeting reports, including responses to the various outputs 
delivered by Ruggie are kept by the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, in support of 
Kinley’s view.124 
Ruggie adopted a consensus approach to arrive at the UN Guiding Principles, taking a clear 
turn away from the means that had been applied in previous failed attempts to create human rights 
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obligations for corporations.
125
 As an initiative, Ruggie’s work stood out compared to the 
previous initiatives around business and human rights because it was more inclusive;
126
 he held 
consultations with numerous stakeholders from governments, business (which otherwise would 
not have had a say in the Human Rights Council
127
) and civil society thus resulting in an output 
representative of the views and wishes of a broad spectrum of interested parties and therefore 
more likely to be accepted. Ruggie’s work was characterised by continued support by the 
Council, and the Guiding Principles were eventually unanimously adopted by the Council in 
June 2011, thus giving them legitimacy.
128
 
Ruggie’s approach has been praised and criticised in the same breath: criticised on the basis 
that arriving at a consensus could have demanded too much compromise in view of the differences 
between the negotiating states, that it would consequently undermine the agreement reached;
129
 it 
was praised on the basis that it ‘prizes dialogue and agreement over ambition’130 thereby 
presenting practical solutions that can be applied in the present.  
Ruggie explains that at the time of starting any treaty negotiations a minimum consensus, 
one that went beyond the mere acknowledgement of the existence of a problem, was needed 
among states. This, in his view, was missing on the subject of human rights and business, hence 
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his preferred approach.
131
 Faced with the problem of failure of corporations to respect, promote 
or uphold human rights, a tempting solution is to fix this problem by drafting better rules, 
creating internationally binding obligations against corporations and building modern 
bureaucratic institutions to enforce them, perhaps an international court to enforce the corporate 
obligations created.
132
 This may be perceived as a shortcut to attaining the desired end, but it 
may be more preferable to begin with dialogue within states involving all the different players, 
then among states. Dialogue over issues arising will generate concern and procure commitment 
from the deliberating parties; a result will be agreement on principles which can then build onto 
further agreement on rules and a commitment to enforce the rules.
133
 Ruggie subscribes to this 
line of thought, while his critics propose the reverse, creation of rules and then working towards 
a consensus on them. Whereas the same end may ultimately be reached, this research proposes a 
preference for the former, beginning with a dialogue and an effort to build consensus among the 
different stakeholders, then building on that to generate a binding agreement.  
The subject of business and human rights is a relatively new field where more questions 
are asked than answers given to the meaning of concepts and procedures. Development of a 
human rights respecting corporate culture at the domestic level is therefore important as it will 
create common ground for any solid progress in the business and human rights field; 
corporations must appreciate the role that they have to play, taking it as an obligation they must 
fulfill not if they can, but always; knowing what is expected of them and how they are to bring it 
about. States on their part must also appreciate their obligation to facilitate and ensure that 
corporations understand and uphold human rights. States should be able to hold corporations 
accountable if they fail in this task, and know the means they can apply to attain this end. Any 
agreement about what the duty to uphold human rights means, and what it entails, must be 
preceded by discussions among states which also requires a certain level of harmony of thoughts 
among the negotiating parties. It seems more rational therefore to begin by creating consensus as 
a foundation for any further progress at the international level. The UN Framework and Guiding 
Principles will go a long way in creating this consensus within and among states, building a solid 
foundation for the negotiation of a treaty. 
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2.5.2. The UN Guiding Principles re-state the obvious 
In his 2005 HRC Mandate, Ruggie was asked to identify and clarify standards of corporate 
responsibility and accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
with regard to human rights.
134
 In his findings, he noted that direct corporate human rights 
standards did not really exist. In law, human rights obliges only states – only states can be held 
accountable for violations and individuals were liable only for grievous crimes.
135
 Direct human 
rights obligations for business do not exist in International Law for all human rights, but they are 
nonetheless guaranteed indirectly through the state.
136
 International law, awake to reality of 
corporate violation, holds them accountable indirectly through the state. The conventions of the 
UN on human rights and the comments of the UN interpreting international conventions impose 
the blame for violations of human rights on the state on behalf of third parties (such as business 
entities) thereby in turn conferring on the state the obligation to ensure that private persons 
within their territory respect and do not violate or contribute to the violation of human rights. 
The UN Guiding Principles are thus criticised for re-stating what already exists and Ruggie’s 
point of departure that corporations did not have obligations in International Law is argued to be 
inaccurate.
137
 
As some argue for an international system of corporate obligations for human rights,
138
 
others opine that engagement with business on the issue of human rights does not give rise to 
new obligations unknown in international law.
139
 David Bilchitz, says that it is incorrect for 
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Ruggie to argue that corporations have no human rights obligations in International Law 
because, in any case, these would effectively exist by extension of the State Duty to Protect.
140
 
He argues that “this [the duty of states to ensure that the rights of individuals are not violated by 
third parties] is an essential component of the uncontroversial duty to protect which Ruggie 
embraces as one prong of his framework.”141 
It will be noted that Ruggie does indeed make this very observation, contrary to the above 
criticism. As he progresses with his work and takes it to completion, Ruggie holds the view that 
international standards for corporations are not necessary because they follow from states’ 
international obligations to regulate and adjudicate human rights generally, including the 
behaviour of non-state actors.
142
 In my view, Ruggie acknowledges the existing obligations of 
corporations in International Law right from the beginning of his work. In his 2007 Report, he 
says that “The regional human rights systems also affirm the state duty to protect against non-
state abuse, and establish similar correlative state requirements to regulate and adjudicate 
corporate acts”.143 He goes on to say that “the increasing focus on protection against corporate 
abuse by the UN treaty bodies and regional mechanisms indicates growing concern that states 
either do not fully understand or are not always able or willing to fulfill this duty”144 therefore 
necessitating the elaboration of these duties as he set out to do. He says that ‘states are not the 
only duty bearers under international law’145 (emphasis added) and he proceeds to acknowledge 
that there has been an evolution from the initial state-only-liability thinking and notes that ‘long-
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standing doctrinal arguments over whether corporations could be subjects of International Law 
were beginning to yield new realities’.146 
Ruggie further noted that because corporations had certain rights under bilateral 
investment treaties, and owing to the fact that they were subject to duties under several liability 
conventions dealing with environmental pollution, it was more difficult to maintain the initial 
position that corporations should not be held liable for breach of responsibilities in other areas of 
international law.
147
 Such observations clearly made and reflected throughout his work are quite 
contrary to the allegations that he fails to acknowledge the existing human rights obligations of 
corporations. The point that Ruggie makes, which in my view is valid, is that with the possible 
exception of certain war crimes and crimes against humanity, there are no generally accepted 
international legal principles that bind corporations directly.
148
 
The distinction being made here seems to be between direct and indirect obligations. The 
contention in my view is whether it is even advisable that corporations have direct human rights 
obligations owing to the difficulties that will be encountered in enforcing them. Ruggie grapples 
with the question whether the entire body of human rights obligations applies to corporations.
149
 
He came to a negative conclusion: the entire body of human rights obligations did not apply to 
corporations as human rights instruments generally did not impose direct legal obligations on 
corporations. International Law supports Ruggie’s position; it distinguishes between direct and 
indirect obligations for human rights.
150
 
The duty of the state to ensure that corporate violation of human rights can thus be found 
along a continuum. For a majority of corporate obligations, international instruments merely 
require states to ensure corporations do not violate human rights – but they do not state what 
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states should do to achieve this end.
151
 For another category of corporate obligations, treaty 
bodies or regional tribunals can be required to interpret the duty of the state, and to say how it 
should ensure corporations do not violate human rights; decisions of these tribunals and treaty 
bodies are then endorsed by the UN General Assembly. In elaborating on the nature of state duty 
implied in the instruments, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ECOSOC or the Committee) directs states to use legal or political means to respect the 
enjoyment of the right to health and to prevent third parties from violating the right to health in 
other countries.
152
 In the same General Comment the Committee attributes violation of the 
obligation to protect to the failure of the state to prevent infringement of the right by third 
parties.
153
 In General Comment Number 15, the Committee enjoins states to prevent abuse of the 
right to water by both citizens and companies.
154
 There is a direct obligation on corporations for 
a much smaller category of human right violations - for grievous crimes, for example, genocide, 
war crimes, crimes of aggression and crimes against humanity.
155
 Ultimately, International Law 
contemplates more duties for corporations than it specifies, and it specifies more duties than it 
enforces.
156
 
In most instances, corporations are considered nationals of their state of incorporation, or 
where they conduct their main business, and therefore expected to rely on their government for 
protection, having no direct access to International Law for protection of their rights.
157
 In other 
circumstances however, a more direct link between corporations and International Law may be 
drawn. If contractual relations involve the state on the one hand, and the corporation on the 
other, for example for the exploration of natural resources, because the corporation performs 
activities that impact the state or more than one state, and because the contractual relations may 
expressly be governed by International Law – if the provisions of the agreement so stipulate, the 
private corporation may be regarded as possessing a measure of international personality, and 
                                               
151
 Ibid. The obligation of states here is obligation of conduct, not result; see Human Rights Council ‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises’A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) [Ruggie Report 2008] para 14. 
152
 General Comment No.14 para 39. 
153
 Ibid para 51. 
154
 Paragraph 33. 
155
 Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
156
 Knox op cit note 31. 
157
 Wolfgang Friedmann, Olive J Lissitzyn & Richard C Pugh International Law Cases and Materials (1969) 216. 
    
56 
 
therefore subjects of international law.
158
 Whatever duties corporations have cannot be identical 
to state obligation for human rights, yet it is only states that are accorded this direct obligation as 
set out in the treaties that contain them. What Ruggie means, therefore, is that no obligations 
exist for corporations as do for states, at least not framed in a clear and universally acceptable 
manner.
159
 Whereas state duties are enforceable and have been so for a long time, corporations 
have not been considered subjects of International Law in a similar manner.
160
 
 
2.5.3. Use of vague terminology 
In undertaking the task of fulfilling the mandate given to him, Ruggie faced a difficult situation: 
he could not create direct legal obligations of corporations for International Law (as the Norms – 
which he outrightly rejected - tried to) but at the same time he needed to come up with 
obligations that have a real impact.
161
 What was expected in essence was a treaty, but not like the 
Norms. In Pillar 2 and 3, Ruggie deals with this problem by attempting to balance between 
avoiding overstating the corporate obligation on the one hand and allowing corporations to 
violate rights with impunity on the other, because they had unenforceable obligations. He thus 
crafted the corporate obligation as societal expectations as opposed to binding obligations as the 
Norms had done, and then proposed ways of making corporations aware of the potential legal 
costs of violating the Guiding Principles, in the hope that this would deter them from committing 
violations. 
It has been argued that going by the terminology he applies in the UN Framework and 
Guiding Principles, the law was not ‘necessarily at the heart of Ruggie’s framework’.162 Ruggie 
is criticised for not having done substantive work in defining the corporate obligation for human 
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rights. Some aspects of Ruggie’s findings extend beyond legal concerns.163 He creates a vague 
responsibility to respect that is not exactly a legal obligation, continuing the ambiguity of 
corporate codes of conduct, which are non-binding. The Guiding Principles refer to 
responsibilities and not duties of corporations, giving the impression that companies have no 
legal duties. Robert Grabosch observes that nowhere in the Framework or Guiding Principles 
does Ruggie elaborate the standards of any human rights in the business context.164 Surya Deva 
opines that the language of the Guiding Principles has the potential to undermine the corporate 
obligations for human rights.165 
Ruggie’s responsibility to respect is much under-specified; arguably not to distort the 
political and social status quo, which does not recognise corporate obligation for human rights, 
and thus stand a chance to survive.
166
 Ruggie is said to have used confusing terminology, which 
did not exist in international law, specifically the creation of the ‘protect/respect’ cages in the 
2008 ‘UN Protect Respect Remedy Framework’.167 While he is of the view that corporations can 
violate all human rights, Ruggie nevertheless strongly argues for the ‘protect/respect’ cages 
which characterise the framework for business and human rights. Ruggie describes the corporate 
responsibility to respect as a baseline responsibility and adds that unless the companies perform 
certain public functions, more should not be required of them in terms of human rights 
obligations.
168
 In essence therefore, he places no limitations on the rights, but limits the 
respective corporate duties.
169
 His position implies that although business entities can inflict a 
varied range of human rights violations, they have the corresponding duty only to respect and not 
more. This gives the impression that the obligation required of business entities is much less 
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compared to the harm they can cause, thereby implying that they can do whatever they want to 
do. 
Ruggie defines the responsibility to respect as comprising responsibility to ‘avoid causing 
or contributing to adverse human rights impacts’ and to ‘seek to prevent or mitigate adverse 
human rights impacts’.170 Ruggie’s efforts to distinguish between the obligations of corporations 
and those of states led him to use language that can leave room for corporations to get away with 
not fulfilling anticipated responsibilities. “Duty” is considered obligatory, while “responsibility” 
is voluntary, thereby implying that the duty of the state is obligatory, while that of corporations is 
not.
171
 
However, if one agrees that International Law does not as yet impose direct obligations 
on companies, then Ruggie’s distinction between duty and responsibility is indeed valid. In his 
2010 report, Ruggie says that: 
The term “responsibility” to respect, rather than “duty”, is meant to indicate that 
respecting rights is not an obligation that current international human rights law 
generally imposes directly on companies.
172
 
He thus gives the term ‘responsibility’ a very specific meaning, which, if accepted, may 
justify the distinction he creates between state and corporate obligations for human rights, 
implying that states have a legal obligation whereas the obligation of corporations is only a 
moral or social one.
173
 He goes on to clarify that ‘respect’ does not only imply a negative duty as 
the critics interpret it, but rather include positive implications as those that require the business 
entity to “undertake human rights due diligence to become aware of, prevent and address adverse 
human rights impacts” which in reality would entail positive acts such as integrating human 
rights policies throughout company operations.
174
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To add to the confusion and difficulty in giving meaning to the duty defined by Ruggie, 
the UN Guiding Principles are proposed not to be applied as a one-size-fits-all framework, but 
rather in context-specific circumstances.
175
 Yet again in the same breadth, the responsibility to 
respect human rights applies to all entities irrespective of size, sector, operational context, 
ownership or structure.
176
 The responsibility to respect contemplated is universal, and at the 
same time modifiable to be applicable to different contexts. The leeway given to states to tailor 
the responsibility to respect to suit particular entities can be used to reduce the impact of the 
responsibility and it could easily translate into a lesser obligation for one entity compared to 
another.
177
 Additionally, insistence on a universal standard that applies to all entities regardless 
of context can be seen as an imposition of western ideas, a propagation of ‘colonial imperialism’ 
resulting in measures that are far removed from the local reality.
178
 This can lead to resistance to 
the Guiding Principles or subsequent entity-specific regulations by local corporations. 
Although the vagueness is criticised, it has its advantages, which justify the approach 
chosen by Ruggie. The flexibility offered by the context-specific application of the Guiding 
Principles will make the burden of compliance bearable on the business entities concerned. 
Sensitivity to the operating context of the different business entities is important to determine 
how businesses connect with communities.
179
 This knowledge will be invaluable in undertaking 
the human rights due diligence, analysing the corporation’s operations to foresee any likely 
negative human rights impact on the stakeholders, in order to put in place preventive or 
mitigating measures in good time.  
The universal applicability of the Guiding Principles follows from the universal nature of 
human rights, and the nature of business entities, which, being similar, presumes the capacity to 
violate human rights by all entities. But, as shown above, the well-meaning duty to contextualise 
the operations of the Guiding Principles, is necessary if the responsibility to respect were to be 
practical. However, what is lacking is clear procedural guidelines necessary to translate the 
general principles of the responsibility to respect into every day operational context.
180
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Another criticism seen as Ruggie’s invention is his replacement of the ‘violation’ 
language typical in human rights discourse with ‘risk’ and ‘impact’ mitigation - this has the 
potential to undermine the value of human rights.
181
 The risks normally considered by business 
entities in the usual course of their operations are risks to the business, to profits or production, 
but human rights risks are risks to the right holders. Because it involves individuals who are 
owed rights, anticipating and mitigating against human rights risks cannot be simply a 
calculation of probabilities to the business; effort must be made not to confuse the contexts by 
ensuring engagement and communication with persons, victims of corporate violations of human 
rights.
182
 
While some make this distinction between direct and indirect obligations, others still 
argue against the notion of internationally accepted human rights standards for business. Steven 
Ratner notes: 
To the extent that one contemplates recognising in law a large number of duties on entities 
other than the State, one has potentially asked International Law to do too much and 
ignored the expectation that states should enjoy the prerogative to regulate most areas of 
private conduct on their territory.
183
 
In apparent support of this notion, Ruggie says in his Report that ‘[w]hile corporations 
may be considered “organs of society”, they are specialised economic organs, not democratic 
public interest institutions and as such, their responsibilities cannot and should not simply mirror 
the duties of states.
184
 The effort to distinguish the obligations of the state and corporations give 
rise to the need for the different terminology that Ruggie uses in his findings. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
If Ruggie has not proposed binding corporate obligations for human rights thus taking the 
argument beyond mere expectation, what has his work contributed to the debate on business and 
human rights? Did he succeed in advancing the debate? Yes he has. The fact that Ruggie does 
not offer any uniquely novel solution is no reason to undermine the usefulness of his work. 
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Where other attempts stopped at merely stating that corporations have human rights obligations, 
Ruggie went ahead to specify the state and corporate duties, to expound on them and propose 
ways of making them accountable for violation of those rights by offering remedies for corporate 
violations.
185
 
Despite the existence of the state duty to protect, the different policy options the state can 
employ to fulfill this duty with respect to business activities are not clear.
186
 Ruggie’s work has 
sought to “elaborate on the implications of existing standards and integrate them into a 
comprehensive template to be applied in different national contexts and for business entities of 
different sizes as each state or corporation would deem appropriate”.187 This view responds well 
to the criticism against the Draft Norms: that they were designed to take away the attention and 
resources necessary to improve the capacity of states to implement their human rights laws by 
attempting to place direct obligations on corporations.
188
 The UN Framework and Guidelines are 
addressed to corporations, and states, offering guidance on understanding the obligations of each 
in the task of promoting human rights. If domestic mechanisms were well developed and able to 
handle the human rights grievances brought before them, there would be no need to escalate the 
problem to the international level. Further, if the Guiding Principles are effectively implemented, 
the need for a treaty may be diminished.
189
 
Because International Law mostly depends on the domestic jurisdiction for enforcement, 
it is important to have a well-developed domestic law jurisprudence on the subject of business 
and human rights. Additionally, because the human rights and business jurisprudence is an 
emerging one, and in view of the fact that not much has been achieved in the effort to regulate 
this area even within states, it would be more important to consider what could be done presently 
while more lasting solutions are sought and evaluated. There is more to gain by focusing in the 
present, giving meaning to corporate obligations at the state and corporate level, creating 
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consistent state practice, and moving on to seeking consensus at the international level later, 
when substantive progress has been made at the domestic level to agree on this relatively novel 
concept of business and human rights.
190
 With the negotiations of a treaty on business and human 
rights now underway, and the attendant difficulties now more perceptible,
191
 the UN Framework 
and Guiding Principle remain a concrete tool that can be applied in the present to advance the 
business and human rights deliberations, making corporate respect for human rights a practical 
concern for states and corporations, pending the ultimate conclusion of the treaty.
192
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF CORPORATIONS UNDER THE 2010 
CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The promulgation of the 2010 Constitution in Kenya came at the same time as the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General of the UN on the question of Business and Human 
Rights, John Ruggie, was finalising his mandate and proposing the way forward in the debate on 
business and human rights. The traditional form of constitutions distinguish between governments 
and private persons, the former being bound by the Bill of Rights and the latter free to do what 
they willed, on the basis that the power of government to regulate them is limited by the Bill of 
Rights .
1
 The 2010 Constitution moves away from the traditional application of the constitution 
to the public sphere by making provision for a horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to 
incorporated or unincorporated juristic persons. Because it binds juristic persons, the 2010 
Constitution of Kenya is expected to have an important impact on the relationship between 
business and human rights.  
This chapter will query the traditional perception that constitutions and bills of rights are 
written for states only.
2
 It will attempt to situate the Constitution of Kenya within the possible 
frameworks of horizontal models, and assess what benefits would accrue by adopting the 
interpretation most likely to be adopted in applying the Constitution to non-state actors such as 
business entities. The discussion on horizontality focuses on the South African model because it 
is on this model that the Kenyan Constitution is most closely mirrored. Decisions made by South 
African courts on interpretation of the horizontality provisions are reviewed with the aim of 
gleaning possible lessons that the Kenyan courts can apply in interpreting the relevant provisions 
of the Constitution. 
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3.2. The place of International Law in light of the 2010 Constitution 
After the end of colonisation and cessation of the numerous inequalities that the system 
propagated, the nation state emerged as the new social and political group, a sovereign entity 
separate from the colonial states, and with it came the view that individual rights were given by 
the state, which could, when it so desired and at its wish, curtail the rights and freedoms for what 
it perceived as the greater good of the group or state.
3
 Before 2010, the constitution which had 
been in force since independence provided for a limited set of human rights, all of them civil and 
political rights. Chapter Five of the old Constitution made provision for the rights to life and 
personal liberty; it provided for freedom from slavery, forced labour, inhuman treatment, 
deprivation from property, freedom of conscience, expression, assembly and association, 
freedom of movement and protection against arbitrary search and entry and discrimination.
4
 By 
providing for a limited set of rights, the old constitution implicitly gave the state discretion with 
regard to human rights, presumably giving greater importance to the enumerated rights and 
freedoms, thus giving the wrong perception of human rights as something the state can choose to 
grant or withhold. With such an understanding, human rights in the emerging states of the Third 
World did not have the meaning they had in the western countries where they embodied the 
notions of inalienability and individuality.
5
 
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya is hailed as being one of the most progressive in Africa 
as pertains the subject of human rights.
6
 As one human rights activist noted in the deliberations 
leading up to the 2010 Constitution, with the new Constitution, the state would henceforth not 
pretend to give rights (as it presumably did in the numerous cases of political detentions and 
other human rights-infringing actions it perpetrated under previous political regimes), but would 
now secure and protect the rights elaborately outlined in the new Bill of Rights .
7
 The 2010 
Constitution categorically states that rights and fundamental freedoms ‘belong to each individual 
and are not granted by the State’.8 The Bill of Rights is said to bind all persons,9 including 
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4
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juristic persons, departing from the general position that constitutions are generally enforceable 
only against the state,
10
 implying an appreciation of the changing circumstances where the 
public-private divide is somewhat blurred. 
It is envisioned that the Bill of Rights will offer a framework for development of 
government policies on economic, social and cultural matters.
11
 It covers a list of civil and 
political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights all clearly enumerated.
12
 The Bill of 
Rights goes beyond the rights listed and will include those rights not in the Bill but which are 
recognised and conferred by law.
13
 
International human rights perform an important task of filling in the gaps in domestic 
bills of rights, if they do not exist at all, or if they are inadequate: it substitutes the domestic Bill 
of Rights .
14
 However, in places where a written constitution exists and where it provides for all 
the human rights that are found in international law, and where it further provides for a 
horizontal application of the bill to non-state actors, International Law plays no ‘non-duplicative’ 
function and may be seen to be superfluous.
15
 The advantage of International Law over 
constitutional law would be that International Law binds states acting beyond their jurisdiction, 
but even then, much depends on the treaty language and whether it makes provision for such an 
interpretation.
16
 
The constitutional Bill of Rights is similar to the international Bill of Rights because both 
protect the fundamental rights of citizens. The Constitution of Kenya makes provision for both 
civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights, as is provided in International 
Law in the two main human rights instruments, the ICCPR and the ICESCR. The 2010 
Constitution goes further to clarify that the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Constitution 
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“do not exclude other rights and fundamental freedoms not in the Bill of Rights , but recognised 
or conferred by law…”17 Human rights are given constitutional status to show the state’s 
commitment to them as very important legal norms.
18
 
There is also similarity in the scope of application in that although both the international 
and domestic bills of rights were initially intended to regulate state action, both have evolved to 
include non-state actors within their jurisdiction. International treaties now include non-state 
actors in their purview either directly, or indirectly by requiring states to ensure that non state 
actors do not violate or contribute to the violation of human rights.
19
 Modern constitutions, 
including Kenya’s, have evolved from an exclusive state-centred structure, or interpretation, and 
many are now considered to extend their jurisdiction to non-state actors through a horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights, or by interpretation.  
The creation of an internationally binding instrument on corporate obligations for human 
rights will offer direct application of human rights to corporations, much in the same way as the 
Bill of Rights is directly applicable to corporations. If possible at all, it is rare for there to be a 
conflict between a state’s human rights obligations and other International Law obligations: state 
obligations in International Law are the same obligations if found or provided for in national 
laws.
20
 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya might therefore render an international treaty on 
business and human rights gratuitous for the particular circumstances of Kenya. 
 
3.2.1. Incorporating International Law in Kenya under the Treaty Making and 
Ratification Act: some practical challenges 
The process of incorporating International Law into national laws will require development of 
national laws, the international and domestic systems being two different legal systems and 
therefore not allowing for an automatic or seamless translation of regulations. An interesting 
feature of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya is its provision for a monist state as opposed to the 
dualist state that existed under the old constitution.
21
 Under monism, there is no need for the 
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explicit translation of international norms into national law.
22
 This makes all the international 
treaties that Kenya has ratified applicable as part of its national law without the need for 
translation or adoption as was the case before. The monist doctrine in International Law applies 
two approaches; one that holds International Law to be supreme in the case of conflict with 
domestic law, and one that defers to domestic jurisdiction to resolve any inconsistencies.
23
 
For all states, including monist states like Kenya for whom International Law forms part of 
domestic law without any additional special requirements, International Law does not usually 
dictate how they should fulfill their obligations.
24
 This means that no matter what is decided at the 
international level, the state has to come up with norms and procedures to apply in enforcing the 
obligations signed on to. The Treaty Making and Ratification Act, Act 45 of 2012, (the Act) was 
enacted to give effect to Article 2(6) of the Constitution
25
 and to provide the procedure for making 
and ratification of treaties. The Act recognises that International Law operates on a separate legal 
system from domestic law (in the same way that a dualist approach to application of International 
Law does), and thus makes provision for the domestication of the treaty. In view of the 
requirements under the Act, it is the suggestion of some that legislation by parliament be enacted 
and applied to harmonise the two systems.
26
  
Adoption of International Law requires thought and will be better assimilated and applied to 
the extent that there is clarity for its application in the domestic context, taking the national 
circumstances and procedures into consideration. In deciding whether to ratify a treaty or not and 
before it is approved for ratification, the Cabinet will consider a number of issues required under the 
Act.
27
 Upon deliberation, it may be decided that laws are required to be enacted or amended prior to 
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ratification in order to make the treaty to be ratified clearer. Financial implications of implementing 
the treaty may demand its postponement to such a time as the necessary resources for implementing 
it will be available. Article 2(4) of the Constitution provides that any law that is inconsistent with 
the Constitution is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency, meaning that ratified treaties that are 
not consistent with the provisions of the Constitution will not be applicable. The monist doctrine 
contemplated in the Constitution is therefore not as direct as may be imagined but, rather, consists 
of a harmonisation of international and domestic law where they interact at different levels.
28
 
Once approved by Cabinet, the treaty and accompanying memorandum will be submitted to 
parliament for ratification.
29
 A parliamentary committee will be set up to review the treaty, and is 
expected to ensure public participation in a review of the treaty before considering it for approval.
30
 
The Constitution requires Parliament to conduct its business in an open manner, and facilitate 
public participation and involvement in the legislative and other business of Parliament and its 
committees.31 Further, the Constitution includes public participation as part of the national values and 
principles of governance.
32
 To guarantee useful public participation in the process of considering the 
treaty, a number of principles can be applied including preemptive move by government and civil 
society to invite public participation; inclusiveness that enables all interested persons and relevant 
groups, including the vulnerable and marginalised, to fully participate in the deliberations; 
transparency that enables the process to be open to input at all stages; and respect for public input 
ensuring it is given due consideration.
33
 
In a study carried out to evaluate local participation under the new constitutional 
provisions,
34
 a number of challenges to public participation were identified. Citizens, especially the 
poor found it difficult to participate, having little personal incentive.
35
 In some instances, the issues 
under consideration were too technical for effective following and intervention by citizens, thus 
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necessitating prior training by government and civil society.
36
 When it comes to participation in the 
assessment of international treaties, there will be need to communicate the content of the treaties 
and explain its implications for there to be useful deliberations about them. Additionally, effective 
mobilisation of the citizens for participation requires time and resources to compensate those 
involved in the technical and administrative work of organising the meetings. Also, for the 
interaction with citizens to be useful, there must be an effective way of communicating the feedback 
and incorporating it in the process in question.
37
 The ultimate implications of the requirement of 
public participation is that even after the drafting of a treaty on business and human rights and its 
coming into force, there would still be a further road to travel before the treaty is applicable locally. 
 
3.2.2. The position of the courts on the place of international law: jurisprudential hurdles 
The Constitution of Kenya is the supreme law of the land.
38
 International Law forms part of the 
law of the country,
39
 but any law, including International Law that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution will be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.
40
 The text of the Constitution is 
ambiguous on the place of International Law in relation to the other legal norms, thus leaving it 
to the courts to determine what value it will have in deciding cases before them.
41
 Whereas there 
is no denying that International Law will have a bigger role to play under the 2010 Constitution 
in the decision of matters touching on human rights, there is no telling what place exactly, or 
what priority will be given to it, owing to the different decisions arrived at by the court on the 
matter. The interpretation given so far has tended to underplay the role of international law, and 
if this view persists the place of International Law will effectively be relegated to a lower rather 
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than higher plane as would have been imagined should be the intention of the drafters of the 
2010 Constitution.
42
 
Article 2(6) of the Constitution provides for the application of International Law in 
Kenya. Owing to the inconsistent decisions by the courts on the interpretation of this provision, it 
is not very clear what attitude the courts will adopt in applying International Law to cases before 
them. This lack of a consistent interpretation would seem to suggest further development of the 
jurisprudence before International Law can be meaningfully integrated into the domestic law. 
Without clear jurisprudence on the topic, which is lacking owing to the very recent application of 
the Constitution, and without legislation to explain the international obligations, there is a likelihood 
that different courts will arrive at different interpretations. A few cases decided on the question of 
applicability of International Law domestically are illustrative of the different conclusions that may 
be arrived at.  
The petitioners in the case of Beatrice Wanjiku & another v Attorney General & another43 
claimed that because Kenya had ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
which disallows civil jail for matters whose cause of action arises from contractual obligations, 
they were entitled to a declaration that civil jail for debtors violates, infringes or threatens rights 
and fundamental freedoms provided for in the Constitution and human rights conventions.44 The 
judge in this case was of the view that under Article 2(6) of the Constitution, international treaties 
and conventions were subordinate to the Constitution and even subordinate to parliamentary 
legislation on grounds that these laws were made by the democratically elected representatives of 
the people. In the judge’s view, “a contrary interpretation would put the Executive in a position 
where it directly usurps legislative authority through treaties thereby undermining the doctrine of 
separation of powers which is part of our Constitutional set up”.45 
The court’s decision in this case made reference to similar cases previously decided 
which had arrived at different conclusions. In Re Zipporah Wambui Mathara,
46
a case decided 
after the 2010 Constitution came into force, the debtor was committed to jail for failing to settle a 
debt, and brought a petition claiming that under Article 2(6) of the Constitution the ICCPR was 
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applicable as part of the laws of Kenya, and it provides that no one shall be imprisoned merely 
on ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation. Allowing the application of the 
International Law provision, the judge in this case held that: 
… by virtue of the provisions of Section 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, 
International Treaties, and Conventions that Kenya has ratified, are imported as part of 
the sources of the Kenyan Law. Thus the provision of Article 11 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which Kenya ratified on 1st May 1972 is part of 
the Kenyan Law. This covenant makes provisions for the promotion and protection of 
human rights and recognises that individuals are entitled to basic freedoms to seek ways 
and means of bettering themselves. It obviously goes without saying that a party who is 
deprived of their basic freedom by way of enforcement of a civil debt through 
imprisonment, their ability to move and even seek ways and means of repaying the debt 
is curtailed.
47
 
Reference was also made in the Wanjiku case to the decision in Diamond Trust Kenya 
Ltd v Daniel Mwema Mulwa
48
 where the main issue before the court was the question whether it 
was unconstitutional to commit a debtor to civil jail. The judge failed to find a hierarchy of 
applicable laws when International Law was in conflict with domestic law. The judge in this case 
said: 
In my view, Article 11 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights cannot 
rank pari passu with the Constitution. The highest rank it can possibly enjoy is that of an 
Act of Parliament. And even if it ranks in parity with an Act of Parliament, it cannot oust 
the application of section 40 of the Civil Procedure Act. Nor for that matter, can it render 
section 40 unconstitutional. For that reason for as long as section 40 remains in the statute 
Book, it is not unconstitutional for a judgment-debtor to be committed to a civil jail upon 
his failure to pay his debts. Since however, section 40 is at variance with the provisions of 
an International Convention which is part of the law of Kenya, it follows that we now have 
two conflicting laws, none of which is superior to the other.
49
 
Failure of the Constitution to outline a hierarchy of application of the different sources of 
law and therefore failing to give a clear position to International Law vis-a-vis domestic laws has 
created a problem of applicability, leading to the differences in views as expressed in the court 
decisions highlighted above. The Diamond Trust case thus expressed no preference of either law 
over the other, and the Mathara case expressed preference for application of International Law over 
domestic law. Disregarding precedents that had given preference to International Law in the face of 
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conflict, the judge in Wanjiku expressed preference for domestic law.
50
 In the Mathara case, the 
court has been criticised for not engaging in a jurisprudence-building analysis of the relationship 
between International Law and local law and ‘merely agreeing’ that International Law was part of 
Kenya law and considering the question of applicable law only as obiter.
51
 In the Wanjiku case, the 
judge expressed his view that International Law could not have been intended to be superior to 
national laws on the basis that the latter were made by democratically elected representatives of the 
people, per incuriam, not relying on any trite law, again failing to engage in any jurisprudence-
building analysis.
52
 In the Diamond Trust case, the judge failed to reach conclusion on the matter of 
hierarchy of applicability of domestic versus international law, being of the view that the court was 
not the proper forum to decide the matter.
53
  The judge’s decision in this case begs the question 
which forum would be ideal to determine the issue if not a court of law.  
 
3.3. The public-private divide in constitutional application 
The constitution limits the powers of the institutions it creates. Because the constitution 
establishes the executive, judiciary and legislature as institutions of government and makes 
provisions for their functioning, it ought to impose limitations on them, and these limitations 
should be enforceable.
54
 However, the inclusion of limitations on the operation of juristic 
persons presents an interesting deviation from the traditional intent of constitutions; unlike the 
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arms of government, the constitution does not create the corporate institution whose powers it 
seeks to limit.  
In the era prior to the 2010 Constitution, the decisions of the courts show that not too 
much thought went into giving meaning to corporate liability for wrongs or violations of human 
rights by corporations in their capacity as separate legal entities. A look at the cases that touch on 
the issue reveals that not too much importance was given to the differences in the nature of the 
personality of corporations and their management or directors, and the crime of corporations was 
attributed to natural persons who managed the entities.
55
 The general view has also been that 
fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the constitution are primarily available against the 
state because the constitution’s function is to define what constitutes government and to regulate 
the relationship between governments and governed.
56
 In the court’s view, the rights or interests 
of individuals are taken care of in the sphere of private law and ought to be redressed as such. In 
a case before a Kenyan court for redress of human rights violation against a corporation the 
judge held that the alleged breach of duty by the appellant (a corporation) could not stand 
because: 
the duties imposed by the constitution under the fundamental rights provisions are owed 
by the government of the day to the governed. I am of the opinion that an individual or 
group of individuals as in this case cannot owe a duty under the fundamental rights 
provisions to another individual or group of individuals since no duty can be owed by an 
individual or group to another under the fundamental rights provisions of the 
constitution…57 
In arriving at this conclusion, the court was attributing the claim against the 
corporate entity to the individuals entrusted with its running. If constitutional rights can 
only be owed by the state to the governed, then corporations or other business entities 
cannot be held liable for human rights violations, contrary to Ruggie’s ‘Corporate Duty to 
Respect’ which envisages accountability of corporations for human rights violations.  
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In the case of Kenya Bus Services Ltd & 2 Others v AG,
58
 decided under the old 
constitution of Kenya, the court, having defined the Constitution as an instrument of government, 
held that fundamental rights and freedoms are contained in the Constitution and are primarily 
available against the state because the Constitution regulates the relationship between 
governments and governed. Noting the absence of local decisions on the matter, the Court 
resorted to the Trinidad and Tobago case of Teitinnang v Ariong & Others
59
, which was deemed 
representative of the Kenyan position. The court in that case held that the rights and duties of 
individuals and between individuals are regulated by private law and no remedy could be sought 
or given against a private individual for breach of a fundamental right. The judge in this case 
held: 
I am of the opinion that an individual or group of individuals as in this case cannot owe a 
duty under the fundamental rights provisions to another individual or group of individuals 
since no duty can be owed by an individual or group to another under the fundamental 
rights provisions of the constitution.
60
 
The court’s decision in this case reflects the understanding of the constitution as being 
applicable only to violations by the state or state agencies. If the action is against the state, 
anyone whose rights are infringed can approach the court without recourse to other means. In the 
case of Kibunja v AG & 12 Others (No. 2),
61
 also decided under the old Constitution, it was held 
that where a party alleges infringement of constitutional rights he has the right to bring an 
application directly and speedily under the Constitution, irrespective of any other recourse that 
may be available to him under any other law.
62
 
One of the objections against the applicability of the constitution to the private sphere 
was the argument that applying the constitution to private litigation would fundamentally change 
the function of courts, transforming them from reviewers of the law into legislators. In Canada, 
the authority given to courts to determine whether an action amounted to a state action and 
therefore was subject to the Charter, or otherwise, was questioned and the objectors claimed that 
it had the effect of transferring power from elected representatives (the legislature) to judges who 
are neither elected by the people nor removable by the people.
63
 It was argued that courts were 
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unprepared for the task of legislating and by nature unsuited to it because they did not give room 
for building consensus among competing interests in arriving at an ideal compromise, but rather 
produced outright winners and losers.
64
 
In responding to this objection, it will be noted that it is the ordinary function of the court 
to take general legal provisions or principles and apply them to specific cases, whether this 
happens in the horizontal application of the constitution, or in its traditional vertical 
application.
65
 The reason that other institutions or bodies were better qualified to make policy 
decisions ought not to justify stopping the court from pronouncing on the issue, especially if the 
question of horizontality arose together with other constitutional issues the court was expected to 
make a pronouncement upon.
66
 
Similarly, in the deliberations leading up to the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, it was argued that in developing common law and legislation the court would 
encroach on the functions of the legislature.
67
 It was the view of some that Article 8(2) of the 
South African Constitution would bestow on the courts the task of balancing competing rights, a 
task viewed as unsuitable for the judiciary.
68
 The objection was rejected on grounds that the 
Courts have always been the sole arm of the government responsible for developing common 
law.
69
 The objection failed to recognise the inherent duty of courts to balance competing rights in 
any case before them, even when the Constitution applied only to the state, it being well within 
its competence.
70
 The court also noted that courts had no power to alter legislations but only to 
determine their compliance with the Constitution.
71
 It was noted that courts provide less 
opportunity for individuals to participate in social and economic discussions compared the 
opportunities provided in the political forums these issues would otherwise be deliberated in.
72
 
Another objection against removing the public-private divide and allowing aggrieved 
private persons to bring cases under the constitution was that it would result in a flood of 
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litigation well beyond the court’s capacity.73 Referring to this danger, made imminent by the 
decision in Meskell v CIE
74
 which stated that there was no need for a specified cause of action 
for a claim of violation of rights to be brought before the court, Heuston queried whether 
“nominate torts like assault, tort, false imprisonment would disappear and be replaced by 
“innominate claims for infringement of rights.75 He could not predict what would happen in 
Ireland but expressed preference for the US system where claimants were expected to approach 
the court using existing avenues before resorting to the constitution. In the US case of Paul v 
Davis,
76
 the court held that it would be considered improper for an aggrieved person to approach 
the court under the constitution without first following the due process of law, since: 
… the weight of [the court’s] decisions establishes no constitutional doctrine converting 
every defamation by a public official into a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.
77
 
This was the position of the Irish courts subsequent to Meskell, despite the bold 
pronouncement in that case that availability of alternative avenues of redress was inconsequential 
to a violation of rights claim.
78
 In a case decided after Meskell, the court made it clear that the 
constitution would be used to provide relief only where it was not possible to provide relief under 
any other available cause of action, or where the relief applicable was ineffective to protect the 
claimant’s constitutional right.79 
In principle, courts should require compliance with the constitution in all cases, whether 
involving government or government agencies or private persons or companies.
80
 The traditional 
public-private divide in constitutional application appears less relevant in modern times. Courts 
that resisted this interpretation initially and interpreted the constitution strictly as a “government 
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document” eventually came round to realising that the constitution did have a place in private 
action, in given circumstances. The text of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the 
Charter) seems to restrict the Charter’s application to the national and provincial parliament and 
government;
81
 Canadian courts have however developed case law to the effect that the Charter 
has limited application in non-state-connected activities where governmental connection in the 
violating act can be established.
82
 Although initially the US courts were adamant that “individual 
invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the [Fourteenth] Amendment”,83 this 
initial stance was amended. The courts identified situations where the constitution would apply 
to private action: if an act is directly regulated by government;
84
 if an act was carried out under 
the coercive power, or with the encouragement, of the state; acts of a non-state actor carried out 
with the involvement of the state or if the violating act was done in the exercise of a function 
usually carried out by the state.
85
 
By creating a public-private divide where only some breaches of the constitution are 
punished (depending on who committed them, whether a public or private actor), a serious 
problem is raised. It would mean that the Bill of Rights has two categories of rights, those that 
attract official punishment, and those that do not. This is not an accurate interpretation of the 
function of the constitution. The constitution guarantees the basic values of society, and threats 
to these basic values in fact can come from the private sector as much as from government. 
When rights have been violated, what matters should not be who committed the wrong act but 
rather that a violation was indeed committed; and if it was committed, then whoever did it should 
be punished. In the case of Velasquez v Honduras,
86
 the court, in establishing what state 
responsibility for violation of human rights entails held: 
For the purposes of analysis, the intent or motivation of the agent who has violated the 
rights recognised by the Convention is irrelevant - the violation can be established even if 
the identity of the individual perpetrator is unknown. What is decisive is whether a 
violation of the rights recognised by the Convention has occurred with the support or the 
acquiescence of the government, or whether the state has allowed the act to take place 
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without taking measures to prevent it or to punish those responsible. Thus, the Court's 
task is to determine whether the violation is the result of a State's failure to fulfill its duty 
to respect and guarantee those rights, as required by Article 1(1) of the Convention.
87 
It would thus be inaccurate to create a strict division between public and private violators 
because states consist of much more than government: the constitution should be able to reach 
every corner.
88
 In creating the public-private divide, the assumption is made that governments 
and legislatures have coercive power and therefore need the constitution to constrain this power, 
but that private actors base their relations on mutual consensus and therefore lack this coercive 
power and do not need constitutions to restrict their actions.
89
 However, the consent between 
private parties is not always a consent of equals; it can be formal as opposed to substantive. 
Courts should not therefore ignore the oppressive power that corporations can have.
90
 
Gavin observes that the public-private divide created in constitutions is not an accurate 
reflection of reality.
91
 Society comprises a thick web of interdependent relations that make it 
difficult to delineate a pure public-private divide or exclusion of constitutional reach from what 
is considered private.
92
 Tushnet finds two answers to rebut the presumption that bills of rights are 
designed only to curtail excessive governmental power.
93
 First, he notes, corporations are bound 
by the Bill’s provisions because of the fact that social charter provisions are written into bills of 
rights, and the nature of social charter rights necessarily link them to corporations, for example 
the right to a reasonable standard of living or the right to jobs and housing.
94
 Violation of the 
right to a reasonable standard of living is bound to arise at the behest of corporate entity-
employers in more or at least equal measure as government employers, and the former should be 
held accountable under the constitution that provides for the rights as much as a government 
employer would. Secondly, according to what he calls the state action doctrine, Tushnet argues 
that private power can be re-characterised as power delegated to corporations by government but 
ultimately attributable to government.
95
 Corporations should be liable to the extent that they 
carry out violating acts in the course of exercising any such powers. Chirwa agrees that the 
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public-private distinction defies coherence,
96
 and is problematic as it calls for a complex and not 
very accurate determination of what is sufficient to amount to an action of state. 
Perhaps the Kenyan courts will be spared the onerous obligation of ‘charting through 
murky waters’97 highlighted above in deciding the question of the applicability of its Bill of 
Rights due to the clarity of the constitutional provision binding all persons, including non-state 
actors.
98
 In theory, the Constitution of Kenya offers a strong tool for the application of human 
rights obligations against corporations. A horizontal application of the Bill of Rights in theory 
implies a change in the nature and structure of corporations to include an explicit demand that 
they respect and protect human rights,
99
 contrary to their current definition as entities created to 
make profits for shareholders. A horizontal application of the Bill of Rights in theory provides a 
clear way of ensuring that corporate laws are aligned with the spirit of the constitution and the 
human rights it provides for.
100
 But how are the provisions creating horizontality likely to be 
interpreted? 
 
3.4. Analysis of different constitutional models of horizontal application 
The debate around the applicability of the constitution to private action seems to culminate in the 
conclusion that enforcement of fundamental rights requires a nexus with the state: violation of 
human rights that arise in the private sphere will be regulated by ordinary law, and be considered 
a constitutional concern only if the ordinary law failed to sufficiently remedy the violation.
101
 
For those constitutional provisions enforceable against private persons, the general position 
seems to be that the normal way of obtaining remedy would be through ordinary legislation; the 
state exercises its duty to protect by ensuring that laws exist or are enacted against private 
                                               
96
 Chirwa op cit note 73 at 21, 23. 
97
 Loveland op cit note 2 at 675. Nolan, op cit note 10 at 89-90 was of the view that the clarity of Article8(1) and (2) 
which made a clear case for horizontality made the state-connected test applicable in the US and Canada 
unnecessary.  
98
 Article 20(1) of the Constitution. 
99
 David Bichitz ‘Business and human rights: the responsibility of corporations for the protection and promotion of 
human rights’(2008) SAIFAC.  
100
 See Shashi Tharoor ‘Are Human Rights Universal?’ (Winter 1999/2000) 16(4) World Policy Journal 1-16. The 
author says that human rights cannot be truly universal without development because universality must be 
predicated on the most underprivileged achieving empowerment. 
101
 In India, it has been held that Article 21 of the Indian Constitution provides recourse for violation committed by 
the state, and if violation is by private actors recourse will be had via common law remedies. See Sandeep Challa, 
The Enforceability of Fundamental Rights vis-a-vis Private Persons: An Analysis of the Interpretation of the 
Supreme Court, Nalsar Student Law Review, 144. 
    
80 
 
persons who violate the rights.
102
 Reference to court developments and court decisions from 
other countries may be instructive in Kenya’s quest to develop its own law to effectively deal 
with the novelty of the provision binding natural and legal persons to the Bill of Rights. The 
study now briefly reviews the different models of horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, 
with the aim of situating Kenya’s constitution and attempting to project how it will be 
interpreted. 
 
3.4.1. Canada 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states: 
32(1) This Charter applies: 
a) To the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the 
authority of Parliament including… 
b) To the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within 
the authority of the legislature in each province. 
The section makes the Charter applicable to the government and government 
departments.
103
 Although the Charter values make reference to the need to develop the law to 
give meaning to constitutional rights, the courts have not been able to effectively explain what 
balancing between constitutional and private rights means or how it is to happen.
104
 Despite the 
existence of Constitutional values and the use of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction to give weight 
to the Constitution, the confusion arising from the attempts of courts to determine whether the 
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constitution was applicable to private action or to what extent is noteworthy.
105
 The provision 
has been subjected to judicial interpretation, in a bid to answer numerous questions arising, 
including whether the Charter applied equally to the private sector as to the government;
106
 to 
what extent constitutional rights could be enforced against corporations and the question whether 
constitutionalism could be an effective safeguard against the abuse of private power.
107
 The 
wording of the provision, seen in light of the amendments that led to it, was said to be 
‘intentionally vague as to deliberately raise the question whether the constitution applied to the 
private sector or not’,108 leaving it to the courts to make the determination.  
The Canadian courts have approached the question if and how the Charter could apply to 
the private sector with formal technicality.
109
 The question of applicability to the private sphere 
was first considered in the case of RWSDU v Dolphin Delivery
110
 where it was held that the 
Charter would not apply to the private sphere generally, but only insofar as and to the extent that 
there was a direct and precisely defined connection between the offending action and the 
government.
111
 This decision of the court gave rise to other questions: what amounts to a direct 
and precise link with the government; was it sufficient that a law passed by the government was 
the source of the offending action? Later cases attempted to refine these requirements. At one 
point, Canadian courts required that the connection with government had to be so direct and 
precisely defined as to turn the private actor into government.
112
 The measure would be to 
ascertain if the private entity was fulfilling a government role and how it represented its role, and 
to establish if it resembled a public entity.
113
 Yet even this decision raised further questions: how 
much connection was sufficient to change the nature of the actor from private to government – in 
other words, how direct is a direct link? In what way could the given actor be said to have 
changed in nature from private to public? Ultimately, the Canadian courts’ attempt to diminish 
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the public-private distinction and make the Charter applicable across the divide was easier said 
than done. This effort to obscure the public-private divide was nonetheless believed not to have 
been the most correct interpretation of the Charter.
114
 Reviewing the application of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights, Gavin agrees that a constitution establishes and regulates government 
institutions, leaving these institutions to order the private affairs of people in a space where the 
Charter of rights should not intrude.
115
 
The “state doctrine theory”, called as such or implied by the action of courts is applied to 
determine whether conduct by non-government entities has sufficient link with government to 
effectively make the action a government or public action. The theory comes with its challenges. 
How, for example, will the determination be made of the source or depth of state influence that 
would be considered sufficient to link a private entity to the state and thus justify extension of 
the application of the constitution to them? In reviewing the Canadian Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, Gavin observes that the wording of Section 32 was deliberately vague, left to the ultimate 
deliberation of the courts.
116
 He points out that had the legislature wanted to make any of the 
positions clear it would have done so: to say with certainty whether the Charter applied to private 
persons or it did not, or whether it applied to only some of them.
117
 He proceeds to interrogate 
the meaning intended by the wording of the Constitution which raises a myriad of further 
questions whose answers are complicated:
118
 can non-governmental bodies be subjected to the 
Charter, and on what basis: because they are linked to the government or because they are 
exercising a governmental function? Can the Charter apply between two private persons where 
there is no government intervention in the violating act?
119
 Can the Charter apply to a case of 
traditional private law for example tort or contract? He looks to the decided court cases to see 
what their determination was, and presents the complex decision-making process arising from 
the courts that presents a case that is far from clear. 
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3.4.2. The United Kingdom 
In the UK, there has been a difference of opinion on the question whether the European 
Convention on Human Rights – domesticated by the Human Rights Act (1998) – could be 
applied in private litigation against companies. Reasons have been given on both sides, starting 
with an effort to construe the meaning of the wording of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (the Convention). The Human Rights Act in the UK, enacted to “give further effect to the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights”120 makes it 
unlawful for a public authority to contravene the Convention rights. In deciding any matter under 
the Human Rights Act, therefore, it must first be established whether the party accused of 
contravening the Convention right is a public authority.
121
 
In a case before the European Court of Justice, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v 
Association Union Cycliste Internationale,
122
 the defendant was a private sector organisation 
with no governmental links. It was held that the rules prohibiting discrimination under the Treaty 
of Rome on free movement of workers applied both vertically and horizontally in actions 
between individuals and/or companies.
123
 It was the court’s view that the intention of the Treaty 
to allow free movement would be defeated if, although the states refrained from breaching the 
rights, violations arose from associations or organisations that did not come under public law.
124
 
The court’s reasoning was that if the private sector was excluded from the ambit of the Treaty, it 
would create inequality in its application. Consequently, the Treaty requirements and the 
numerous economic activities in the European Community which were carried out in the private 
sector would go unchecked, resulting in the violation of the Treaty.
125
 The subjection of private 
bodies to the Treaty also meant that the possibility that services would be transferred from public 
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to private bodies to evade the scrutiny of the treaty was eliminated.
126
 Although the dispute 
before the court did not involve companies, the court made it clear that the Treaty did not apply 
only to public bodies but also to the “furthest recesses of private sector economic activity”.127 
A question of applicability to the private sphere arose in a case brought under the Human 
Rights Act, centered on a provision which provided that the Act applied to “public 
authorities”.128 A white paper was given to support the argument, listing public authorities to 
include the central and local government, the police, prisons courts and companies responsible 
for areas of activity that were previously within the public sector, to the extent that they were 
exercising public functions.
129
 
 
3.4.3. Ireland 
The provisions of the Irish Constitution do not make it directly applicable to private persons, but 
courts have interpreted the Constitution to have an indirect application to non-state actors. 
Horizontality in Ireland arose from judicial decision-making as opposed to an express provision 
of the Constitution as in the case of jurisdictions such as South Africa.
130
 In Ireland, the 
Constitution is applicable to the private sphere via interpretation of Article 40(3) of the Irish 
Constitution which expresses the state duty to protect.
131
 In interpreting the provision, the Irish 
courts have developed a “constitutional tort” which arises when individual rights are violated by 
a third party; the constitution in these cases will have a direct horizontal effect on the non-state 
actor third party.
132
 In the USA and Canada, remedy for human rights violations is available 
through private law actions, but in Ireland, the Constitution has a “full horizontal effect” and 
                                               
126
 Loveland op cit note 2, Chapter 11 on ‘The European Economic Community 1957 – 1986’ 383. 
127
 Ibid at 384. 
128
 Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
129
 Paragraph 2.2 of the White Paper cited in Loveland op cit note 2 at 648.  
130
 Chirwa op cit note 73 at 21, 37. See also Aoife Nolan ‘Holding non-state actors to account for constitutional 
economic and social rights violations: Experiences and lessons from South Africa and Ireland’ (2014) 12(1) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 61, 63, 64. 
131
 Article 40(3)(1) The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and 
vindicate the personal rights of the citizen; and (2) The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may 
from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of 
every citizen. 
132
 Nolan op cit note 130 at 69. 
    
85 
 
claims for human rights violation by private parties may be based directly on the constitution, 
without the need for recourse to private action.
133
 
In the Irish case, Meskell v CIE,
134
 the court held that constitutional rights can be 
protected, regardless of the existence or otherwise of a formal cause of action.
135
 It is precisely 
because they can be claimed by everyone that constitutional rights are fundamental.
136
 The court 
based its decision on the fact that a constitutional right carries within it its own right to a remedy 
or to enforcement.
137
 
Unlike other constitutional models that make a distinction between the public and private 
divide, the Irish Constitution fuses the public and private spheres.
138
 In the case of Educational 
Company of Ireland Ltd v Fitzpatrick
139
 it was held that: 
… if one citizen has a right under the Constitution there exists a correlative duty on the 
party of other citizens to respect that right and not to interfere with it. To say otherwise 
would be tantamount to saying that a citizen can set the Constitution at a naught and that 
a right solemnly given by our fundamental law is valueless.
140
 
The Irish courts thus also see constitutional rights as entitlements to be protected against 
infringement and they undertake to ensure that they are respected by all and if violated, recourse 
is had against those who violate, whoever they may be.
141
 By taking this stand, Irish courts avoid 
the absurd conclusion that some breaches of constitutional rights can go unpunished just because 
they were not committed by the ‘state’ or state actors.  
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It has been argued, however, that despite the existence of horizontality, Irish courts have 
not used the concept to impose constitutional rights obligations on non-state actors such as 
corporations. This aversion could be attributed to a “serious lack of conceptual clarity” regarding 
when, how and to what extent the horizontal effect should be given effect by Irish courts.
142
 
After Meskell, existing alternative avenues, rather than the constitutional provisions, were used 
to channel constitutional remedies: the application of the Constitution tended to be limited by the 
courts by holding that the constitutional tort will not lie where recourse can be had to existing 
remedies in common law or legislation.
143
 A further limitation of the Irish horizontality was the 
refusal of Irish courts to interpret constitutional rights as imposing positive obligations on non-
state actors, a fact that makes it hard to deal with claims against non-state actors for positive 
violation of socio-economic rights.
144
 
 
3.4.4. Possible interpretation of horizontal provisions: lessons from South Africa 
Unlike the other constitutions highlighted above which depend on the courts to make a 
deliberation on whether the facts of each case in question are sufficient to make the Bill of 
Rights applicable in the private sphere, the text of the South African Constitution makes it 
unequivocally applicable to natural and juristic persons, though subject to the nature of the right 
and the nature of the duty imposed by the right.
145
 By providing for the application of the Bill of 
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Rights to juristic persons, the Constitution of Kenya most resembles the South African model of 
horizontality. The application of the Bill of Rights to non-state actors is made explicit in the text 
of the constitution, unlike the Irish or Canadian or UK models where horizontality has arisen 
more from judicial decisions than an interpretation of the text of the constitution. As such, there 
may be useful examples to be drawn from the jurisprudence of the South African courts on the 
matter, built over the last two decades since the adoption of its current constitution.  
The advent of the post-apartheid regime and the ushering in of a radically new law (the 
Constitution) of South Africa called for a change of the existing laws to reflect the new 
‘democratic dispensation’.146 The provisions of the 1996 Constitution reflect the effort to remedy 
the wrongs of the past which was characterised by inequalities in material wealth and resources. 
The Constitution makes extensive provision for Economic Social and Cultural (ESC) rights. 
Decisions of the South African courts on the issue of ESC rights were guided by the notion that 
‘the state, acting on its own and in partnership with the private sector (emphasis added) had a 
responsibility in fields such as housing, welfare, education, and employment.’147 This 
interpretation is justified by the authority given to the state to take ‘reasonable legislative and 
other measures’148 to give effect to such rights, and a realisation that it would indeed be practical 
to get the help of the private sector if the economic, social and cultural  rights are to be effected. 
This reasoning is seen as the rationale behind the constitutional provisions making the Bill of 
Rights binding on juristic persons. In reflecting on the inequalities that exist in the social context 
of the South African society on the question of health, the South Africa Human Rights 
Commission noted that these inequalities could not effectively be addressed through a rights 
framework alone and it was proposed that a preferred approach would require strengthening the 
health care system in its entirety, calling for the engagement of the state with regard to the 
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enforcement of the Constitutional obligations of private actors.
149
 Reporting on the right to 
health, the UN General Assembly also noted that “Ministers and senior public officials have also 
acknowledged that the pharmaceutical sector has an indispensable role to play in relation to the 
right to health and access to medicines”.150 If the corporation contemplated in the South African 
Constitution was to become a reality, the state in this case would have a clear and direct 
obligation to effect corporate compliance with human rights obligations.  
The similarity in the provisions between the Kenyan and South African positions is 
outlined below. The text of Article 20 of the Kenyan Constitution on the application of Bill of 
Rights compared to Article 8 of the South African Constitution reads as follows: 
20(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds all State organs and all 
persons.  
This is similar to Article 8(1) of the South African Constitution which provides: “The Bill 
of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs 
of state” and Article 8(4): “A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the 
extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of the juristic person.” 
‘Person’ is defined in the Kenyan Constitution to include “a company, association or 
other body of persons whether incorporated or unincorporated”.151 The court made note of the 
meaning of this provision in the case of Abdalla Rhova Hiribae & 3 others v Attorney General & 
7 Others where the judge held:  
To my mind, the express constitutional provision that the Constitution in general and 
the Bill of Rights in particular applies to and binds all persons represents a radical 
departure from the position under the former constitution where only the state could be 
held liable for violation or infringement of constitutional rights. In my view, where the 
facts so demonstrate, an individual or corporate person such as the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 6
th
 and 
7
th
 respondents can be held to have violated another person’s constitutional rights, and 
appropriate orders or declarations issued.
152
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Article 20 (2) of the Kenyan Constitution reads: 
 Every person shall enjoy the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights 
to the greatest extent consistent with the nature of the right or fundamental freedom. 
This is similar to Article 8(2) read with Article 8(4) of the South African Constitution. 
Article 8(2) on ‘Application’ reads: ‘A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic 
person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the 
nature of the duty imposed by the right’ and Article 8(4): ‘A juristic person is entitled to the 
rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of the 
juristic person.’ 
Article 20 (3) of the Kenyan Constitution reads: 
In applying a provision of the Bill of Rights , a court shall— a) develop the law to the extent 
that it does not give effect to a right or fundamental freedom; and (b) adopt the 
interpretation that most favours the enforcement of a right or fundamental freedom. 
This is similar to Article 8(3) (a) of the South African Constitution which provides: 
‘When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of 
subsection (2) a court: (a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill must apply or if necessary 
develop the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right.’ b) adopt 
the interpretation that most favours the enforcement of a right or fundamental freedom.  
20 (4) In interpreting the Bill of Rights , a court, tribunal or other authority shall promote - 
a) the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality, equity and freedom; and b) the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights .  
This is similar to Article 39(1) (a) which provides that: ‘When interpreting the Bill of 
Rights a court, tribunal or forum: - (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom…’ There is a slight difference 
between Article 20(4)(b) of the Kenyan Constitution and Article 39(2) of the South African 
Constitution which enjoins every court, tribunal or forum to promote the spirit, purpose and 
object of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation, and not only when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights as the Kenyan Constitution states. 
Article 8(1) and (2) of the South African Constitution in applying to all law and binding 
all persons have been interpreted as contemplating rights and obligations of both individuals and 
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juristic persons.
153
 Article 8(2) appears to impose both positive and negative duties on non-state 
actors.
154
 It was thought that the state by itself could not manage to provide for the economic and 
social rights because the nature of these constitutional rights obliged it to provide for ‘even the 
barest of necessities’155 for its citizens, a task for which the state was highly unlikely to ever have 
sufficient funds for. Friedman supports the constitutional interpretation enjoining the private 
sector in realising the constitutional rights. He argues that given the history of the country, its 
limited resources and the inequalities that existed, the task of rebuilding the country was too 
daunting, and unlikely to be fulfilled by the state alone. He sees horizontality as a form of 
redistribution tool for the enormous wealth that lay with the private sector and which could be 
applied to create equality and enhance the dignity of those who had been previously deprived.
156
 
The South African Constitutional Court acknowledged the role of the private sector in 
realising human rights in the case of South Africa v Grootboom.
157
 The court in the case 
acknowledged the role of non-state actors in provision of housing, and held that Article 26(1) of 
the Constitution imposes a negative obligation on the state and all other entities and persons to 
desist from impairing the right to housing.
158
 The court held:  
A right of access to adequate housing also suggests that it is not only the state that is 
responsible for the provision of houses, but that other agents within our society, including 
individuals themselves, must be enabled by legislative and other measures to provide 
housing.
159
 
Like the South African Constitution, the Kenyan Constitution makes provision for a 
wider scope of rights than the previous constitution. Socio-economic rights tend to have a greater 
association with business, forming as they do a majority of the human rights that businesses can 
be linked with in the their daily operations. Tushnet was of the view that the adoption of 
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economic and social rights would lead to a classification of real and fake rights – the former 
being civil and political rights that were enforceable, and the latter being economic and social 
rights which, in his view, were only aspirational – and this fact would lead to an undermining of 
the constitution because it would be seen as entrenching unenforceable rights.
160
 That his fear 
has come to pass is one victory: economic and social rights are found in constitutions as an 
acknowledgement that human rights are rights regardless of the ability of states to provide for 
them. However, the reality brought about by implementation of these rights will be a separate 
issue and the real test of the value of having a progressive Bill of Rights. 
In theory, the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights is likely to be more 
expensive and resource-intensive compared to that of civil and political rights: they tend to 
demand a positive obligation more than a negative one. Additionally, owing to the longer 
acceptance of civil and political rights, systems and measures to enforce civil and political rights 
are more likely to already be in place, compared to those needed for socio-economic rights which 
may have to be instituted now.
161
 The government will need to have a clear understanding of 
what its obligations for human rights are, and what it needs to do in order to demand from 
corporations compliance with their human rights obligations or facilitate it.
162
 The court will be 
aided in giving meaning to the rights by considering the nature of each right, in light of the 
individual or juristic person claiming violation as provided under Article 20 (2) of the Kenyan 
Constitution.
163
 
The Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa case (Certification 
Case) came before the South African Constitutional Court at the time of transition from the old 
to the new Constitution in 1996.
164
 In the case, the Court reviewed complaints and written 
submissions from political parties, special interest groups and members of the public at large and 
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analysed each provision of the new Constitution against constitutional principles. The 
Certification judgment sought to certify that all the provisions of South Africa’s proposed new 
constitution complied with certain principles contained in the country’s current constitution.165 In 
the Certification Case, objection was raised to Article 8(2) imposing obligations on individuals 
as opposed to granting rights only as was the understanding under the previous constitution.
166
 In 
rejecting the objection, the Court reiterated the fact that rights were almost always limited and 
the courts had to constantly balance competing rights against each other.
167
 It further held that 
since the legislature was bound by the Bill of Rights, its actions and decisions were subject to 
constitutional scrutiny.
168
 
The Court in the Certification case rejected an objection to the extension of rights to 
juristic persons,
169
 further holding that “many universally acceptable fundamental rights would 
be fully recognised only if afforded to juristic persons as well as natural persons”.170 An example 
was given of freedom of speech, which, it was said, must be afforded to the media for it to be 
fully recognised.
171
 In the Certification case, an objection was also raised to affording rights to 
wealthy corporations under Article 8(4) on grounds that it would increase their undue advantage 
over poor individuals, because they have the resources to enforce their rights unlike individuals. 
The Court also rejected this objection, noting that there were many small companies in South 
Africa which needed protection, and the Constitution through the said provision would afford it 
to them.
172
 
If the literal interpretation was applied in interpreting the Constitution, a reading of the 
provision making the Bill of Rights horizontally applicable to corporations ought to inform the 
analysis of corporate compliance with human rights obligations. If a law binds all persons, it 
means they are subject to it, not only as recipients of the rights that are due to them, but also as 
duty bearers with an obligation not to infringe them. If rights in the Bill of Rights are owed to 
individuals, and they are, then all state organs and all persons have the obligation at the very 
least not to infringe human rights. They may not have the obligation to provide for them as this 
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may not be within their power, but because they have the power to infringe them, they must 
refrain from doing so. By implication therefore, should the ‘person’ fail in his duty, he will be 
liable under the provisions of the Constitution. Although the initial case decided under the new 
Constitution of South Africa denied this interpretation, subsequent cases subscribed to it.  
The first case to be decided under the new Constitution of South Africa on the question of 
non-state actors and whether they were bound by the Constitution was the case of Du Plessis and 
Others v De Klerk and Another.
173
 In this case, the rationale in the Dolphin Delivery Canadian 
case was applied resulting in a decision that constitutional rights could be invoked against an 
organ of government but not against a private litigant.
174
 The case of Khumalo & Others v 
Holomisa
175
 was the next case decided on the applicability of constitutional rights to non-state 
actors. In this case, the judge held that the right of free expression was enjoyed by all persons, 
including the press.
176
 
The case of Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v Ahmed 
Asruff Essay N O & Others
177
 involved the governing body of a public school against the trustees 
of a trust that owned the property on which the school was built. The respondents (trustees) 
successfully secured an eviction order against the school, and a case was instituted claiming 
violation of the right to education of the learners. It was held that the Member of the Executive 
Council (MEC) for Education for the Province (and not the Trustees) had an obligation under 
Article 8(1) of the Constitution to respect, promote, protect and fulfill the learners’ right to 
education, and she had failed in this obligation.
178
 The Constitution imposed no obligation on the 
Trust to make any property available to the MEC for the use of the school. The court was of the 
view that the purpose of Article 8(2) was not to impose duties of the state on private parties and 
neither to obstruct private autonomy, but to require private parties not to interfere with or 
diminish the enjoyment of rights.
179
 This view of the court acknowledged a potential invasion of 
constitutional rights by non-state actors. It was therefore held that the Trust had a negative 
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constitutional obligation not to impair the learners’ right to basic education.180 The eviction order 
granted by the High Court ordering the MEC and others claiming right to the property to vacate 
the premises was upheld. 
In cases like these, the court is called upon to deliberate on competing rights: usually the 
right to property against the other human rights outlined in the constitution. Following the 
decision in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers,
181
 the court in Musjid held that in 
the face of such competing rights, the Constitution imposed new obligations and other new and 
equally relevant rights outlined in the Constitution, balancing these against the right to property 
rather than hierarchalising them, considering the facts of each particular case. In the Court’s 
words: 
… The judicial function in these circumstances [of contrasting rights] is not to establish a 
hierarchical arrangement between the different interests involved, privileging in an 
abstract and mechanical way the rights of ownership over the right not to be dispossessed 
of a home, or vice versa.  Rather, it is to balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in 
as just a manner as possible, taking account of all the interests involved and the specific 
factors relevant in each particular case.
182
 
The case of Lingwood and Another v Unlawful Occupiers of R/E of ERF 9 Highlands
183
 
was a case for the eviction of unlawful occupiers by an individual owner. The court held that the 
obligation to provide adequate housing or suitable alternative accommodation for the homeless 
or unlawful occupiers lay with the state or responsible organs such as municipalities.
184
  
Reference was made to the case of Modderklip Boerdery v Modder East Squatters & Another
185
 
where it was similarly held that the obligation to provide housing was an obligation of the state, 
and that the state would strive to comply subject to availability of resources: the obligation had 
not been transferred to individual land owners. Referring to yet another decision, the judge in 
Lingwood agreed that it was inconceivable that the obligation to provide shelter for the homeless 
would be shifted to ordinary owners of land by the state which itself had a conditional obligation 
limited by availability of resources.
186
 The decision of the court was that no obligation lay with 
                                               
180
 Paragraph 60. 
181
 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
182
 Ibid para 23. 
183
 (2006/16243) [2007] ZAGPHC 231. 
184
 Supra para 20. 
185
 2001 (4) SA 125 (T) 23 E-G (Cited in Lingwood, supra para 22). 
186
 Groengras Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Elandsfontein Unlawful Occupants 2002(1) SA 125 (T) 23 E-G. 
    
95 
 
the applicants as private land owners, and the City of Johannesburg had the task to provide 
alternative accommodation for the occupiers who were required to move. 
In Johnson Matotoba Nokotyana & Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and 
Others
187
 a claim was brought under Articles 26 and 27 of the Constitution, together with 
Chapters 12 and 13 of the National Housing Code. It was held that reliance on the Housing Code 
must fail, for failure of the applicants to satisfy prerequisite conditions for the application of the 
two provisions. In pronouncing judgment, the judge held that it was the Court’s repeated view 
that where legislation had been enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, the litigant should 
rely on the legislation to support his claim, or alternatively challenge its constitutionality as 
opposed to approaching the Court directly under the Constitution.
188
 Following the earlier 
precedents, the court held that the applicants would not be permitted to rely on the Constitution, 
appropriate alternative legislation being available, and it would therefore not be proper for the 
court to consider their claim under the constitution.
189
 It was further held in Nokotyana that 
where the Constitution provided for a specific right, the applicant should approach the court on 
the basis of that provision, as opposed to the general right to human dignity, under which a claim 
to the right could alternatively fall.
190
 
It is noteworthy that the majority of cases decided by South African courts so far on the 
question of horizontality concern economic, social and cultural rights: the right to housing and 
the right to education. The nature of the functions of private or non-state actors makes their 
likely impact on socio-economic rights a reality. It is therefore likely that as the jurisprudence 
unfolds before the Kenyan courts, a majority of the rights in issue will similarly be economic, 
social and cultural rights.  
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Despite the constitutional provision making a horizontal application of the Bill of Rights 
possible, the jurisprudence of the South African courts on horizontality is not as well developed 
as would have been expected.
191
 The courts have tended to show a reluctance in applying the Bill 
of Rights horizontally, at least avoiding to make any radical conclusions.
192
 The decisions 
ultimately mirror decisions in other jurisdictions which also show that despite constitutional 
provisions, courts are conservative in holding that the bills or rights have a horizontal 
application.
193
 Only in the Juma Musjid case did the court hold that a private entity had an 
obligation to uphold human rights under the constitution, in this case a negative duty to refrain 
from violating the learners’ right to education. The reason for the conservative nature of the 
court’s decisions seems to be the considered opinion of some authors that the express application 
of Article 8(2) does not directly extend to economic, social and cultural rights owing to their 
inherently limited nature. By definition, economic, social and cultural rights are subject to 
progressive realisation based on the state’s available resources – as such, they cannot be 
unconditionally demanded of non-state actors.
194
 
In the Holomisa case, it was held that once it had been determined that a natural person is 
bound by the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the court ought to apply Article 8(3) of the 
Constitution and if necessary develop the common law to give effect to that right.
195
 If existing 
laws contradict the object, purpose and spirit of the Constitution they should be amended. In a 
similar manner, if it is determined that a juristic person is bound by a given right, meaning it 
possessed the right and was owed the duty with regard to it, and additionally that it also owed an 
obligation to respect the rights of others in relation to the same, any law that fails to give effect to 
this right ought to be developed to conform to it. The provision therefore enjoins the juristic 
person to respect the right – and to have its rights respected. Chirwa interprets Article 8(3) as 
providing avenues for enforcing obligations of non-state actors, or providing redress for 
violations committed by non-state actors.
196
 Article 8(3) excludes direct recourse to the Bill of 
Rights for redress; it mandates the legislature to “devise remedies for redressing violations by 
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enforcing obligations of natural or legal persons”.197 The test laid down in Khumalo was first to 
ascertain whether the right in question was applicable to the person, considering its nature; if it 
did, the next step would be to establish whether it was unlawfully limited by a law and if it was, 
the solution would be to develop the law to give effect to the right.
198
 
The Kenyan Constitution provides that when adjudicating issues concerning the Bill of 
Rights, courts ought to develop the law so that it gives effect to fundamental rights and freedoms, 
adopting the interpretation that most favours the enforcement of the fundamental right or 
freedom.
199
 The South African Constitution makes a similar provision.
200
 In providing for a 
constitutional directive to courts to develop the law, Kenya and South Africa follow the model 
applied in Germany.
201
 In Canada, the obligation to interpret laws to give importance to the spirit 
and law of the Constitution arises from the inherent jurisdiction of the Courts to develop private 
law and not directly from the constitution.
202
 Additionally, the Kenyan courts in interpreting the 
Bill of Rights will be guided by democratic values including human dignity, equality and 
freedom, and the spirit and objects that underlie the Constitution.
203
 This provision of the 
Constitution presupposes a double effect – courts will hear private actions based directly on 
constitutional rights, and they will also interpret and develop existing laws in light of 
constitutional values.
204
 
In Holomisa, it was held that when the primary focus of a case before the court was a 
person as opposed to the state, then the case must be brought under Article 8(2).
205
 Chirwa 
argues that Article 8(2) and 8(3) avail an indirect application of the Constitution through 
common law and legislation, thus permitting the court to create a new remedy for violation of a 
right where existing legislation or common law do not provide an adequate one.
206
 However 
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others hold the opposite view, saying that Article 8 admits of direct application.
207
 Article 39(2) 
of the South African Constitution is said to have an indirect application, as the court needs to 
develop common law to comply with the Constitution.
208
 This would be the same interpretation 
as Article 20(4)(b) of the Kenyan Constitution, owing to the similarity of the two provisions. 
Others opine that there is no difference in effect between Article 8 and Article 39.
209
 
When the provisions of the constitution are applicable directly to the private sphere, 
remedies are available to a complainant that would not have been available to him in the absence 
of these direct provisions. Under indirect application, no new remedies are generated, but the law 
must be interpreted consistently with constitutional values.
210
 In the case of human rights, 
traditionally viewed as a preserve of public law regulating the relations between the state and the 
individual, direct application will mean that the entitlements availed to the individual for breach 
of human rights by the state will also be available if the breach is committed by another private 
person. This aligns well with the principle that the basis of human rights entitlements is the 
dignity of the person,
211
 and this holds true regardless of who the obligation to respect rests upon, 
whether the state or another private person. In other words, where the direct method is applied 
and the constitution specifically provides redress for human rights violations by business entities, 
there will exist two parallel avenues for redress: the constitutional one with whatever remedies 
are provided for in the constitution, and the traditional private law avenue (for example company 
law, contract law, the law of torts) which may deal with the same issues presented by the same 
person seeking to protect or promote the entitlements of his or her dignity.   
In Ireland, courts have no power to develop the law to give effect to rights. Only in cases 
where common law or statutory remedies are inadequate would an action based directly on the 
constitution arise.
212
 The position of the courts has been that implementation of constitutional 
rights is primarily a matter for the states, and courts would only intervene where there was 
failure to implement, or the implementation was inadequate.
213
 In the absence of a statutory or 
common law cause of action, the plaintiff could sue directly for breach of constitutional right; 
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however, if he relied on an existing cause of action he would be confined to the limitations of 
that tort.
214
 
Under the South African Constitution, horizontality is not mandated in all circumstances, 
and the court has to decide based on the “extent required by the nature of the rights and the 
nature of the juristic person”.215 The courts appear reluctant to hold that non-state actors are 
bound by all constitutional rights, though they are less reluctant to make a horizontal application 
in the case of negative obligation (as in the Musjid case) compared to a positive obligation. 
Reliance on Article 39(2) of the Kenyan Constitution, requiring courts to interpret the law and 
develop common law to give effect to the spirit and meaning of the constitution, will reduce the 
need for direct reliance on the constitution in private matters.
216
 Similarly, Article 20 (4) 
provides that in interpreting the Bill of Rights , a court, tribunal or other authority shall promote 
–– (a) the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, 
equity and freedom; and (b) the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights . An indirect 
application of the constitution to the private sphere, as reliance on Article 39(2) of the Kenyan 
Constitution will amount to, is seen to undermine the Bill of Rights.
217
 Similarly, if Article 20(1) 
of the Kenyan Constitution were to be overlooked in favour of application of Article 20(4), this 
would likely result in a similar conclusion of undermining the Bill of Rights , opting as it does 
for an indirect application to the private sphere where a direct application is possible.
218
 
Ultimately, horizontality has proved to deliver much less than it promises, and it remains 
to be seen how its application in the Kenyan context will unfold, considering all the lessons from 
other jurisdictions, especially South Africa’s. Whereas the text of the Constitution offers the 
possibility for ensuring that corporations are bound by the Bill of Rights and thus respect and 
contribute to the fulfillment of human rights, much will depend on the attitude of the judiciary in 
interpreting the law and particularly the provisions of the Constitution on horizontality.  
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3.5. Conclusion 
The 2010 Constitution heralds a new era of human rights understanding in Kenya. Though 
remarkable in its provisions, implementation of the 2010 Constitution will be the real challenge, 
if only for the ambitious nature of its provisions. Whichever method is applied in interpreting the 
provisions of the constitution, the danger exists that discussion can be diverted from basic policy 
questions to unproductive controversies about what provisions mean,
219
 especially given their 
novelty.  
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya does away with some of the ambiguities of the indirect 
horizontality constitutional models discussed above and the challenges they raise by making it clear 
that private persons, including incorporated entities are bound by the Constitution. Contrary to the 
position taken by the courts under the old Constitution of Kenya whose application was designed 
to be, in the public sphere, in line with the traditional understanding of constitutions as 
highlighted above,
220
 the courts acknowledge a different application of the Bill of Rights under 
the 2010 Constitution. In the case of Abdalla Rhova Hiribae & 3 others v Attorney General & 7 
Others, following decisions that had been made in similar cases, the judge held:  
To my mind, the express constitutional provision that the Constitution in general and 
the Bill of Rights in particular applies to and binds all persons represents a radical 
departure from the position under the former constitution where only the state could be 
held liable for violation or infringement of constitutional rights. In my view, where the 
facts so demonstrate, an individual or corporate person such as the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 6
th
 and 
7
th
 respondents can be held to have violated another person’s constitutional rights, and 
appropriate orders or declarations issued.
221
 (emphasis added) 
The Kenyan model of horizontality joins South Africa’s which offers a more direct 
application of the Bill of Rights to corporations and other business entities, and thus presents a 
more hopeful jurisprudence. However, the clarity of South Africa’s direct horizontality appears 
to be in theory only, as it has not resulted in court decisions holding private persons liable for 
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violation of human rights.
222
 The development of the jurisprudence on horizontality so far has 
shown that whereas the mode of horizontal application is important – the direct model of South 
Africa seems to have many more advantages than the other indirect models – also important is 
the judicial attitude and approach towards horizontality.
223
 Like the South African position, 
horizontality in Kenya is not mandated in all circumstances, and it depends on the nature of the 
right, as the court will decide.
224
 Human rights obligations will apply to juristic persons to the 
extent that the nature of the right in question permits.
225
 It will be important for the Kenyan 
courts to factor in the lessons from other jurisdictions and devise a test that will serve as a 
conceptual justification in interpreting Article 20 of the Constitution, determining with greater 
clarity how and when it would apply to provide more consistent decisions by the courts.
226
 It is 
proposed that the courts give a broad interpretation to the “nature of the right” in order to make 
the Bill of Rights widely applicable to private entities. Factors that can guide the court in 
determining whether obligation for a given right is suitable for application to a non-state entity 
include the relationship between the entity and the right-holder and level of dependence between 
the right holder on the non-state actor, for example in the case of an employer and employee.
227
 
The courts should also be more willing to impose an obligation where the right in question is 
important for survival, for example the right to food or health.
228
 Ultimately, only time will tell 
the practical implications of the decision to acknowledge the obligation of corporate entities for 
human rights, and whether the determination of the obligation will face similar challenges as the 
South African courts have faced. 
By providing that juristic and incorporated persons are bound by the Bill of Rights, the 
Kenyan Constitution appears to define a different kind of corporation that is expected from 
inception to have regard for all human rights. In binding juristic persons, the 2010 Constitution 
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arguably calls for a change in the law of corporations as we know it. The horizontal application of 
the Constitution to the private sphere thus offers an interesting foundation to establish what 
meaning should be given to the provision and what the ensuing obligations on the part of the 
corporate entity would look like.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A MEASURE FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS? 
4.1. Introduction 
Ruggie defines the corporate responsibility to respect as an institutionalised social norm.
1
 To 
show that it has the impact which it would lack as a mere social norm, Ruggie argues that the 
norm has acquired near-universal recognition.
2
 By this he means that the corporate responsibility 
is acknowledged by almost all corporations through their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives.
3
 However, CSR initiatives lack a universal application – each company follows its 
own definition, making it impossible to have a universal benchmark of what an ideal CSR 
initiative is. A survey by Ruggie on the subject showed that many corporations understand their 
human rights obligations mostly as corporate social responsibility obligations, as opposed to 
human rights obligations in their own right.
4
 CSR is further understood as philanthropic duties, 
“giving back” to the communities in which the corporations operate.5 
This chapter analyses and seeks to clarify the misconception that corporate social 
responsibility is synonymous with human rights obligations. It demonstrates that CSR, as 
typically understood particularly in the context of Kenya, cannot be an absolute measure of a 
corporation’s human rights obligations. It does this by reviewing the failed attempts made in a 
number of jurisdictions to pass CSR laws, interpreting the failure as saying something about the 
nature of corporations that does not lend itself to forced social responsibility. A contrast is made 
with human rights which, as rights, must be respected. The point is made that although human 
rights and social responsibility may have a nexus - insofar as both demand that the company look 
beyond a purely profit motive - they have different objectives: one speaks to the responsibility of 
                                               
1
 Human Rights Council ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises’ (7 April 2008) A/HRC/8/5  [Ruggie Report 2008] para 46. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid para 47. Ruggie explains that ‘By near-universal is meant two things. First, the corporate responsibility to 
respect is acknowledged by virtually every company and industry CSR initiative, endorsed by the world’s largest 
business associations, affirmed in the Global Compact and its worldwide national networks, and enshrined in such 
soft law instruments as the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the OECD Guidelines’. 
4
 Ibid 8. According to Ruggie, many governments take a narrow approach to managing the business and human 
rights agenda.It is often segregated within its own conceptual and (typically weak) institutional box - kept apart 
from, or heavily discounted in, other policy domains that shape business practices, including commercial policy, 
investment policy, securities regulation and corporate governance. 
5
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the specific company to do what is within its power – gauged by its own standards – while the 
other speaks to the duty of all companies, guided by the international Bill of Rights that 
embodies universal human rights. CSR is seen by some as going above and beyond the law, thus 
not being a matter of business compliance with legally binding rules, but positive contribution of 
business to society ‘above and beyond compliance with the law’.6 CSR may go above and 
beyond the law, but without the law, being only voluntary in most jurisdictions, CSR obligations 
are not enforceable. This Chapter proposes the use of specific human rights language in company 
policies, and the use of corporate law to bring a human rights understanding to corporations. 
 
4.2. Corporate Social Responsibility in Kenya 
In a review of Kenya’s legal landscape on business and human rights, Ruggie observes that 
although compliance with human rights has been improved through the notion of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), the vague nature of the concept in Kenya has made it unusable for 
creating explicit benchmarks for holding corporations accountable for human rights violations.
7
 
Corporate Social Responsibility is a recent concept in Kenya
8
 and is not well developed, lacking 
institutions to promote and monitor it as in the more developed corporate jurisdictions such as 
those of South Africa and the United Kingdom.
9
 
Fewer domestic companies compared to international or foreign companies make explicit 
reference to CSR in their corporate policies and reports,
10
 and some make no reference to it 
although they carry out activities that amount to CSR.
11
 CSR is seen by Kenyan companies 
mostly as a philanthropic concept,
12
 a matter of making corporate donations for charitable ends 
tailored to address national concerns.
13
 The philanthropic motivation of corporations is attributed 
to what has been referred to as the “African values of community spirit” that move companies to 
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want to give back to the communities they serve or in which they operate.
14
 Most donations are 
given for AIDS and other health issues, promotion of education and conservation of the 
environment.
15
 Whereas some companies integrate CSR in the core of their activities, for many 
others it is merely a public relations concern which the company acts upon as a risk mitigating 
response for reputational rather than moral reasons.
16
 The uptake of CSR is dependent on the 
industry and tends to be most in agricultural companies which serve to produce the bulk of the 
country’s exports, and least in transport and social communication and media companies, 
perhaps owing to the nature of these firms.
17
 
Disclosure of CSR in Kenya is voluntary; the regulatory environment serves neither to 
constrain the negative impact of company activities nor to promote CSR through incentives and 
rewards.
18
 Although the government sought to enforce regulations on business, for example 
through environmental laws, it was not ready to go to the extent of regulating CSR for fear of the 
negative impact this would have on the investment climate and attraction of foreign 
investments.
19
 In a study carried out to analyse CSR in Kenya, it was found that adoption of CSR 
by companies pursuant to codes of conduct was only 21.5 per cent for the domestic companies, 
compared to 63.2 per cent of the foreign companies.
20
 In another analysis of the business 
environment of the country, a report by KPMG gives the reasons for a slow uptake of CSR as 
few incentives given by government, which when viewed against the thin financial margins of 
companies, made the case for CSR unattractive.
21
 
 
4.3. Defining Corporate Social Responsibility 
The question of social responsibility of a company has been under much debate in recent times, 
but arguably also as much in the past as now. The attempt to define the obligations of business 
beyond profit-making has taken several forms – business ethics, environmental health and safety 
requirements, community relations, and to a larger extent corporate social responsibility. Though 
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the meaning is arguably elusive,
22
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is seen by many 
companies as encompassing their duties with regard to stakeholders, and there have been varying 
levels of acceptance and different views on the approach to these duties. On one side of the 
debate are those who support the pure profit-maximising motive and are completely against the 
idea of a social responsibility for business; they believe that the company, by definition, has one 
primary purpose and that is to promote the interests of the shareholder as the owners of the 
business. Some accept the idea of social responsibility, but struggle to find an ideal measure that 
may be applied to strike a balance between concern for shareholders and meeting the needs of 
the general public outside the business entity.  
Corporate social responsibility is the behaviour of corporations or companies recognising 
their role as ‘persons’ within the societies in which they operate. Like the responsibility 
attributed to a natural person, social responsibility of a corporation arises from ethical 
considerations that compel the ‘person’ to move beyond the realm of strict compliance with the 
ends of the business, to applying its resources in a manner that is not purely business-minded. 
The EU Commission defines CSR as ‘a concept whereby companies decide voluntarily to 
contribute to a better society and cleaner environment.’23 Social responsibility is seen as ethical 
behaviour, a somewhat general obligation to society which can be interpreted in very broad 
terms.
24
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 Capital Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) The social responsibility of corporations Report (December 
2006) available at 
http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byheadline/pdffinal+reports+2006/$file/csr_report.pdf, accessed on 18 
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 Cited in J Dine Companies, International Trade and Human Rights Cambridge University Press 2005 Cambridge 
227. 
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Initially, definitions of CSR sought to bring to light the interconnected nature of 
corporations with society, dispelling the presumption that they operated as autonomous entities 
independent of the social environment in which they existed.
25
 At the beginning of the attempt to 
define the concept, CSR was given wide interpretation and corporations a generous role of 
contributing to the socio-economic welfare of society, allowing its activities to be dictated by the 
socio-cultural system in which they operated. One such attempt defined CSR thus: 
In this approach, social responsibility in business is the pursuit of socio-economic goals 
through the elaboration of social norms in prescribed business roles; or, to put it more 
simply, business takes place within a socio-cultural system that outlines through norms 
and business roles particular ways of responding to particular situations and sets out in 
some detail the prescribed ways of conducting business affairs.
26
 
CSR was envisioned as an obligation of business to the public for “broad” social ends, a 
contribution beyond the interests of private persons, shareholders.
27
 The future of corporations 
was pegged on their response to the changing nature of society’s expectations under a perceived 
role that was not merely confined to the production of goods and services.
28
 In this context, it is 
highly unlikely that the corporation would have continued to exist as it was traditionally 
envisaged, as an entity created to maximise the wealth of its shareholders. Also curious is the 
apparent assumption that society dictates expectation of business entities, even though it had no 
perceived role in the corporation.  
                                                                                                                                                       
ISO (International Organization for Standardization) is an independent, non-governmental membership organization 
and the world's largest developer of voluntary International Standards. It is made up of 165 member countries who 
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responsibilities Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1967, 18). 
26
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enhance total socio-economic welfare… Social responsibility in the final analysis implies a public posture toward 
society’s economic and human resources and a willingness to see that those resources are used for broad social ends 
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growing concern over business responsibility’ (1960) 2 California Management Review 54, 60). 
28
 The Committee for Economic Development in America noted that business entities were ‘… asked to assume 
broader responsibilities to society than ever before and to serve a wider range of human values. Business enterprises, 
in effect, are asked to contribute more to the quality of American life than just supplying quantities of goods and 
services. Inasmuch as business exists to serve society, its future will depend on the quality of management’s 
response to the changing expectations of the public’. See Committee for Economic Development  (1971) Social 
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The liberal definitions of social responsibility initially adopted can be attributed to the 
attempt to respond to the novelty of the concept, which then met with the reality of corporations 
and the profit making purpose they were created to serve. The liberal definition was modified 
with time to reflect a less generous concept. If companies are ‘creatures’ of the law which 
defines them and provides for the elements that make them up, the social obligation of the 
company, if any, will be interpreted only to the extent provided by the law. The objects of the 
company are prescribed in its constitutive documents, the memorandum of association, which 
state for what purpose the company is formed, what it can do and what it cannot engage in. If the 
constitutive documents were to be given a strict interpretation, the discretion to engage in social 
obligations would be limited in many cases for the reason that many socially responsible ends 
fall outside the strict mandate of the company.  
In subsequent years, the argument of the place of social responsibility in the corporation 
took the form whether a ‘conscience’ could be attributed to a business in order to justify the 
apparently “non-business related” expectations made of it. Does the fact that a company is a 
separate legal entity, independent from the persons who own it, give the right to proponents of 
CSR to attribute to it a conscience (corporate though it be) in the same way as ‘conscience’ is 
attributed to a natural person? Does the fact of separate personality ascribe to the company a duty 
or obligation to the community in the same way a natural person has the duty to be a good 
citizen? In refuting these possibilities, it has been argued that: 
… we cannot and must not expect formal organisations and their representatives acting in 
their official capacities to be honest, courageous, considerate, sympathetic or to have any 
kind of moral integrity; such concepts are not in the vocabulary of the organisational 
language of the game….29 
In furthering the view against social responsibility, Milton Friedman, a celebrated CSR 
opponent asks ‘What does it mean to say that a business has responsibilities? The social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits.’30 In his view, only people have 
responsibilities. He further argues that the corporate executive, being an employee of the owners 
of the business, has a direct responsibility to conduct the business according to their wishes 
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‘which generally will be to make as much money as possible.’31 Expecting the businessman to 
carry out social responsibilities in his capacity as corporate executive would be tantamount to 
defying the interests of his employers and spending money belonging to other people for a 
general social interest.
32
 This expectation, he concludes, amounts to a ‘fundamentally 
subversive’ doctrine, in a society where business has only one social responsibility, to maximise 
profits.’33 However, concepts attributed to persons can also be attributed to organisations in as 
much as they are ‘persons’ operating in a wider community and exercising their functions within 
society; the company is made up of persons who can be held responsible for breach of social 
obligations.  
Whatever definition is adopted, CSR is seen as an acknowledgment by corporations that 
they do not exist for the sole purpose of making profits. It can be a good tool to get corporations 
and business entities to think of their impact on society, and has been applied positively in areas 
such as environmental management and in labour law to ensure compliance with the minimum 
wage.
34
 To the extent that it leads corporations to have greater care for their employees and other 
stakeholders, CSR is a very positive concept and ought even to be compulsory. But its 
limitations curtail its usefulness. Voluntary requirements are unenforceable; without an enabling 
environment, without laws or structures that can remedy the results of the social irresponsibility 
of corporations, CSR remains an ineffective concept for full corporate accountability.  
In seeming agreement with the voluntary nature of social obligations, majority of 
proposals to legislate CSR requirements have been unsuccessful. Some failed attempts at 
regulating the role of business in areas the area of corporate social responsibility are reviewed 
below with the aim of analysing whether the ultimate rejection of regulated CSR says something 
about the business entity and its mission that cannot be ignored. 
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4.4. Failed attempts to regulate Corporate Social Responsibility 
In addition to the problem of whom corporations are to serve, the social responsibility of 
corporations also raise the question how the corporation is to be regulated with regard to this 
obligation to society.
35
 Is the regulation of social obligations to be left to the market; do the 
contractual relations between the stakeholders suffice, such as the contracts that exist between 
the corporation and suppliers, or with employees and other stakeholders? Are existing laws 
sufficient to take care of the interests of stakeholders: labour laws, consumer protection laws or 
health and safety laws? Alternatively, should the public regulation by the state have a role to play 
in the social responsibility of business? Further, noting the preferred move to avoid the exclusive 
shareholder primacy theory, would not the enactment of laws reflecting the favoured enlightened 
shareholder alternative be useful? As one activist observed: 
[N]o one can sensibly argue that well-conceived regulation is not a valuable tool – indeed 
all the evidence suggests that companies themselves prefer to operate in environments 
where the regulatory framework is clear and predictable.
36
 
Acknowledging the direct link between CSR and directors’ duties,37 would not an attempt 
to legislate these duties with regard to CSR be legitimate?
38
 The failed attempts to regulate CSR 
through laws in Australia and South Africa as discussed below seem to suggest otherwise. 
In Australia, there was a move to introduce CSR law that would force directors to comply 
with social obligations. The Business Council of Australia in responding to the proposed law 
argued that companies needed to engage with communities in order to establish the best way of 
                                               
35
 Larry Cata Backer ‘Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International 
Law’ (2006) 37 Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 287 at 295. 
36
 Peter Davis ‘Tougher laws to improve UK human rights impacts?’(February 2009) Ethical Corporation47. Davis 
was at the time of writing Ethical Corporation’s politics editor and a director of the Ethical Corporation Institute. 
37
 Directors determine what projects the company will undertake; they decide if and how much will be spent in 
projects that do not directly generate revenues for the company.  
38
 See D. Doane, ‘The Myth of CSR: The problem with assuming that companies can do well while also  
doing good is that markets don’t really work that way’ (Fall 2005) Stanford Social Innovation Review 23, 28 
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company through laws will make them enforceable, removing any lack of clarity on what is expected of companies.  
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co-operating, rather than having obligations imposed on them.
39
 A parallel inquiry during the 
same period was carried out by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services.
40
 Intense deliberations were conducted on the question of social 
responsibility of corporations and its place in the law of corporations in Australia. The 
parliamentary committee requested advice on the extent to which directors’ duties under the 
Corporations Act 2001 should include corporate social responsibility or explicit obligations to 
take account of stakeholders other than shareholders.
41
 In a report published in December 2006, 
the Capital Markets Advisory Committee recommended that no change be made to the 
Corporations Act to clarify the extent directors duties should consider stakeholder interests in 
decision-making.
42
 The Committee further recommended that CSR reporting remain voluntary, 
with government intervention in encouraging social responsibility being limited to research and 
creation of a national network on social responsibility.
43
 
In the wake of the reform process that led to the amendment of the Companies Act in 
South Africa, comments by policy makers pointed to a wider role of the corporation in society 
and an attempt to legalise the enlightened shareholder position. Directors were permitted to 
consider the overall profitability of the company and would not be obliged to distribute dividends 
if in their view to do otherwise would be more beneficial to the long-term continuing interests of 
the company.
44
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In the view of the policy makers, the 1973 Companies Act needed a wholesome overhaul 
to reflect the principles of the new law and to keep within its spirit.
45
 According to the policy 
formulators, an underlying objective of the new corporation law was to promote competitiveness 
in South Africa by ‘encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance, 
recognising the broader social role of enterprises’.46 In their view, corporations and governments 
increasingly acknowledged that there is a need for higher standards of corporate governance and 
ethics and greater collaboration between enterprises and societies in which they operated.
47
 In 
May 2004, the South African Department of Trade and Industry released a policy paper
48
 that 
laid down the basic approach that was taken by the South African government in the company 
law reform
49
 and set the framework for detailed technical consultation that resulted in the 
Companies Act 2008. The policy makers expressed the view that company law ought to make 
provision for the needs and expectations of the different stakeholders and also that ‘directors 
should take into account the policies and principles reflected in the Constitution and other forms 
of regulation for the benefit of other groups.’50 In the South African context, therefore, it was 
desired that the corporation have a wider role in society, and be accountable to various 
stakeholders, roles that the traditional concept of shareholder primacy did not recognise. The 
policy document categorically stated that:  
..in the South African context, corporation law needs to take account of stakeholders such 
as the community in which the corporation operates, its customers, its employees, its 
suppliers and the environment in certain situations mandated by the Constitution and 
related legislation.
51
 
However, not much was eventually enacted in similar broad and explicit terms when the 
Companies Act was finally amended. The Companies Act 2008 cannot be said to reflect a 
‘comprehensive company law review’52 as was anticipated at the time the review took off. 
Whereas the formulators of the new law intended for an apparent major overhaul of the existing 
law at the time to reflect ‘the Unique South African context’ and to ‘take into account… ‘the 
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legitimate interests of other stakeholder constituencies’53 of the company, this attempt was 
watered down in the long run, and not adequately reflected in the final law, the Companies Act 
of 2008. The wording of the provision of the 2008 Act can hardly be said to represent a novel 
position, at least not as directly as would have been expected. Why, after advocating such a pro-
stakeholder approach, did the amended law settle for the more standard mid-point position that 
failed to explicitly recognise the ‘rights’ of the other stakeholders? Why did it rather seem to re-
state the primacy of the shareholder, much as was the case in the law that it sought to modify? 
In view of the failure to legislate the corporate responsibility of companies in the various 
jurisdictions highlighted above, would it be reasonable to conclude that social responsibility in 
profit-seeking is a myth? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, to what extent can 
social responsibility and profit maximisation be expected to co-exist?  Are the proponents of a 
wider social responsibility for businesses advocating for an inconceivable corporate objective in 
a world where social responsibility and profit maximisation are not expected to co-exist?
54
 The 
attempt to do good (carry out socially responsible projects) is seen by those who oppose CSR as 
only a ‘patchwork’ approach because such investments are, in any case, unlikely to pay off in the 
period that stock markets usually require (and in this sense are therefore unfavourable to the 
business); such attempts are eventually left out in favour of strict business ventures that directly 
benefit the shareholders.
55
 
It may be concluded from the abovementioned failed attempts to regulate CSR through 
laws that the profit making goal of business entities seems to be upheld as superior to the claims 
of other stakeholders.  
A number of arguments can be proffered against regulation of the social responsibility of 
corporations. First, statutes generally are a creation of states and in this era of globalisation 
where corporations transact across borders, it is not easy to envision national regulation that 
finds favour with the numerous corporations transacting in varying circumstances as branches or 
subsidiaries.
56
 But the attempt to impose social obligations at the international level also failed 
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with the rejection of the UN Norms as internationally binding on corporations. The UN Norms 
were seen to take the CSR deliberations from the national to international level, and to transcend 
the argument of permissible charity, making social responsibility a governance issue.
57
 Through 
the Norms, CSR would have had a place in International Law as the scope of stakeholders to 
whom the corporation was expected to be subject would go beyond the suppliers, employees and 
community.
58
 Under the regime of the Norms, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) would 
be tasked to carry out periodic monitoring and verification by United Nations in conjunction with 
other international and national mechanisms.
59
 With the rejection of the Norms, the attempt to 
introduce binding social responsibility on corporations failed at another level, again giving 
credibility to the notion that the law has no place in regulating social behaviour in relation to 
corporations. Once more, the attempt to force charity and ‘good neighbourliness’ was rejected, 
giving further voice to the opponents of a legislated social responsibility. 
Second, might not existing laws and contractual relationships be sufficient to regulate 
what is considered the social responsibility of business? Environmental law defines the 
company’s obligation in maintaining a clean and safe environment; contracts with suppliers 
ensure their fair treatment; consumer protection laws exist to protect the consumer against any 
short changing by self-seeking businesses; the government is charged with the duty to collect 
taxes (from the company in form of corporate taxes; from its executives in form of income tax) 
and apply these for the provision of essential services to the communities, such as hospitals and 
schools. Consequently, it may be argued, adding another set of laws regulating the obligation of 
directors to the stakeholders will be introducing one law too many. Too much regulation stifles 
creativity and innovation.
60
 
Third, it is the view of some that social responsibility cannot be imposed and has to be 
freely taken on. As one author opines:  
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I take responsibility to mean a condition in which the corporation is at least in some 
measure a free agent. To the extent that any of the foregoing social objectives are 
imposed on the corporation by law, the corporation exercises no responsibility when it 
implements them.
61
 
The company needs to respond to the needs of the society in which it operates, and can 
only do this if it assesses the situation itself, as opposed to having duties dictated by statutes.
62
 
Responsibility places a greater obligation on the corporation not only to comply with the strict 
requirements of law, but to exercise its ‘good sense’ in recognising that it does not exist in 
isolation; it operates within certain boundaries and like any person who lives in society, it owes 
and should meet certain duties and responsibilities to those it interacts with in its operations even 
when these have not been strictly sanctioned.
63
 Legislating social responsibility for the company 
can lead to a mechanical response where companies comply not because they recognise any 
obligation to society but merely to meet the minimum requirements of the law.
64
 This will not 
serve the purpose intended by the legislation.
65
 However, interestingly, it is the very lack of laws 
and regulations that has been blamed by others for lack of take up of socially responsible 
behaviour. Companies are said to be more inclined to act in a socially responsible manner if 
there are strong and well enforced state regulations, coupled with industry associations and 
independent institutions such as non-governmental organisations to monitor and enforce the 
rules.
66
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Fourth, the market forces do place a check on the delivery of expectations. The failure to 
regulate social responsibility seems to underscore the fact that the function of government must 
be limited; its responsibilities must have bounds, and regulation of social responsibility should be 
left to other agents, such as market forces. The market response is a key factor in obliging 
companies to consider the interests of stakeholders naturally, for the survival of business, and if 
well applied the need for legislation would be eliminated. Customers want to buy from 
companies that care about them and the environment in which they operate; they seek the 
assurance that the company is not just concerned with meeting the basic legal requirements, no 
more. Employees are motivated to work for companies that meet and respond to their needs as 
opposed to just using them to make money. The company is concerned about its perception in 
society and would therefore ensure it is viewed in good light. However, it is debatable whether 
market forces alone are sufficient to force compliance with social obligations by companies. In 
circumstances for example where the consumer lacks an alternative option to obtain goods and 
services, he cannot exercise the option of ignoring the socially irresponsible company. 
Finally, those who oppose the social responsibility of business argue that creating 
fiduciary obligations for directors towards the wider society transforms them from businessmen 
to unelected and unaccountable public servants,
67
 a role best left to the political process. When 
directors are made accountable to many people, the system of checks and balances on the 
exercise of such powers as are accorded to them is diluted and they become, in the end, 
accountable to no one. Furthermore, the fact that the various stakeholders have conflicting 
interests
68
 mars a feasible attempt at any expectation on the directors’ part to fulfill the complex 
role play. Directors can use this vague commitment to justify any decision they undertake on 
grounds that it benefits one group or the other. If therefore a choice has to be made of a single 
line of accountability, it would have to be to the shareholder, having as he does an entrenched 
interest in the business which can be used to give direction or focus to the interest of the other 
stakeholders. 
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4.5. Successful legislation of social responsibility 
Despite the trend of apparent acceptance of corporate social responsibility by corporations which 
either develop their own CSR codes, or adopt suggested industry codes, this obligation remains 
voluntary in most jurisdictions.
69
 In recent developments, India became the first country to have 
mandatory CSR spending by companies regulated in its Companies Act.
70
 The Act requires that 
a directors’ report be attached to the annual financial statements, and that the report contain 
details of the policy implemented by the company on CSR activities undertaken during the year. 
CSR activities are defined to include activities relating to eradicating poverty, promoting 
education, promoting gender equality and empowering women, reducing child mortality and 
improving maternal health, combating diseases such as malaria, supporting business projects and 
contributing to government funds set up to promote socio economic development.
71
 In a less 
forceful manner, or in a way that offers management greater flexibility, corporate laws in some 
US states authorise corporations to donate money to charity, even when the donations do not 
benefit the shareholders in any way.
72
 
After more than a decade of concerted attempts, the UK finally conceded to making 
social responsibility of corporations a legal requirement. A Corporate Responsibility Bill for the 
United Kingdom was drafted in 2003. Among other things, the Bill established and provided for 
the functions of a Corporate Responsibility Board, made provision for the environmental and 
social duties of directors and provided for remedies for aggrieved persons. This would have led 
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to regulation of business activities on non-financial issues and an assurance that they are 
conducted in accordance with international human rights standards and responsibilities which 
were then verifiable in annual reports. However, the Bill was not passed into law.
73
 In 
subsequent deliberations on company law reform that resulted in the Companies Act of 2006, 
discussions about the place of corporate social responsibility in the law continued. In a speech 
given by the Minister for e-Commerce
74
, the UK position that characterised the UK Company 
Law Reform which resulted in the Companies Act 2006 is clearly stated: 
We can't afford any longer to see economic success as being necessarily in conflict with 
social and environmental goals, and we don't need to. We need to see how creating a fairer 
society and a dynamic economy go together.
75
 
The corporate law review led to a new legislation, the Companies Act 1985 (Operating 
and Financial Review and Directors’ Report etc.) Regulations 2005, requiring quoted companies 
to prepare an Operating and Financial Review (OFR) as part of their annual report and accounts. 
The objective of the OFR was to complement reporting requirements at the time by providing 
“qualitative, non-financial and forward-looking” information on the performance of the company 
including social and environmental issues. The proposed law provided: 
The OFR is designed to address the need in a modern economy to account for and 
demonstrate stewardship of a wide range of relationships and resources, which are of vital 
significance to the success of modern business, but often do not register effectively, or at 
all, in traditional financial accounts.
76
 
The intention of the provision was non-revolutionary – desiring to make corporations 
consider interests beyond the shareholders, but not doing so in a manner that disregarded the 
principal place of the shareholder. This fact would have made it more acceptable to both those 
who held the shareholder view, and those on the opposing end who preferred a pluralist view.
77
 
However, in a ‘spectacular U-turn’78 this reporting requirement was withdrawn in 2005 with the 
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repeal of the OFR on the basis that social responsibility is best not regulated but left to the 
discretion of the companies. In explaining its decision, the government said that: 
… the burden of statutory requirements should be proportionate and necessary and due 
consideration should be given to the impact of such requirements on the competitive 
position of UK businesses. With these Regulations, the Government is therefore 
streamlining directors’ reporting requirements by removing the statutory requirement for 
quoted companies to produce an OFR for financial years commencing on or after 1 April 
2005.
79
 
In the Government’s view, due consideration ought to have been given to the potential 
negative impact of such requirements on the competitive position of UK businesses. There was 
in place another requirement for companies to produce in their directors’ reports a ‘Business 
Review’ setting out much of the information that was again separately required to be stated 
under the OFR, leading to the conclusion that upon reflection, the OFR was superfluous.
80
 The 
burden of the additional statutory requirements was considered disproportionate and 
unnecessary.
81
 
The desire to ensure that profit making was not seen as the ultimate or overriding end of 
business characterised the UK Company Law Reform of 2006.
82
 Section 172 of the UK 
Companies Act 2006 is an outcome of this desire. Section 172 requires directors to act in the 
interest not only of shareholders but also of employees and the community.
83
 It is a somewhat 
novel provision and has been considered revolutionary in broadening the outlook of companies 
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and making them responsible for more than just profit making.
84
 Section 172 makes provision 
for the duty of the directors to promote the success of the company as opposed to success of the 
shareholders, which would have been the assumption in the absence of the clear provision. The 
Explanatory note of the Section elaborates the duty of directors:  
This duty codifies the current law and enshrines in statute what is commonly referred to 
as the principle of "enlightened shareholder value". The duty requires a director to act in 
the way he or she considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of 
the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.
85
 
The discretion given to the directors can accommodate the inclusion of wider interests, 
including the human rights and other social impacts of the company on the community. 
However, Section 173 of the Act provides that the main aim of the directors should be the 
promotion of the company’s success for the benefit of the members.86 Therefore, although 
Section 172 introduces major alterations to the old law by extending the duty of directors to 
include the protection of social and environmental issues, the provision is merely theoretic and 
will not necessarily lead to protection of stakeholder interests.
87
 Stakeholders’ interests can be 
considered only to the extent that the directors think viable. There is nothing in the Act that 
specifically allows stakeholders to enforce the duty imposed upon directors to consider their 
interests.
88
 The clause creates general obligations which, it is arguable, are not enforceable 
because the directors still have the discretion to make decisions as to what constitutes the social 
responsibility of the company.  
The above interpretation of the provisions of Section 172 therefore also supports the 
assertion that the traditional role of the company reigns supreme; duties to shareholders must be 
considered before all others, and that these others will be considered only insofar as they do not 
undermine the shareholder’s position. It was the intention of the UK law reform deliberations 
that despite the apparent liberal wording of Section 172 and the requirement for consideration of 
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other stakeholders in the decision-making, the “overriding interest of members” was the main 
concern. The major concern of members was central even in the concept of developing the OFR, 
considered a bold move to force directors to consider stakeholders in decision-making.
89
 The 
primacy of the shareholder, previously accepted as a matter of principle as opposed to a legal 
provision, was thus legally mandated. It was this primacy that the OFR provisions were aimed at 
enlightening, creating a balance between the position directors hold, and a check on the 
discretion they would have to exercise in dealing with stakeholder interests. The statutory 
disclosure provided by the OFR was seen to be at the heart of the enlightened shareholder 
approach adopted by the UK Companies Act; the reporting provided under the OFR was to 
enlighten the shareholder approach. Repealing the OFR thus put in doubt the theory that the 
shareholder position could still be said to be enlightened.
90
 
There was effort by the government to reinstate the OFR in 2010 in a bid to ensure that 
directors’ reporting on social and environmental concerns of the company improved corporate 
accountability and transparency. Expressing its belief that business is the driver of economic 
growth and innovation, the Coalition Government at the time voiced its intention to “… reinstate 
an Operating and Financial Review to ensure that directors’ social and environmental duties have 
to be covered in company reporting, and investigate further ways of improving corporate 
accountability and transparency.”91 The result was a revised Companies Act and accompanying 
it the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013 (the 
‘Regulations’). The consideration of a wider obligation for directors paved the way for a review 
of the traditional shareholder-centric theory of the corporation, eventually resulting in a 
requirement that directors consider human rights impact of company activities in decision-
making.
92
 The amended legislation among other things requires the directors to prepare a 
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strategic report, which contains directors’ report on human rights issues, in addition to social and 
community issues as was the case before the amendment. 
Recognising the need for business entities to be socially responsible is a positive act, and 
every measure taken to create a culture of social responsibility that is entrenched in the systems 
of the business entity is laudable. However, as opponents of CSR would argue, corporate 
executives, while being ‘trustees’ for the owners of the business (shareholders) and thus 
mandated to act in their interest, are nevertheless ‘not elected representatives of the people, nor 
appointed social guardians, and therefore lack the social mandate that a democratic society 
rightly demands of those who pursue ethically or socially motivated policies.’93 If they are 
corporate executives versed in the affairs of a company, appointed or elected on the basis of their 
expertise in the particular business the company carries out: finance, or marketing, or mining, or 
banking consultancy, what criteria are they expected to apply in deciding on the needs of society 
at large? Whereas the shareholders are mandated to place a check on the exercise of directors’ 
duties in matters related to the operation of the company’s business, who checks on these extra 
discretionary powers of the directors to apply the shareholders’ money? In pursuance of 
perceived social end, how is the executive to know what action of his will contribute to that 
end?
94
 In the final analysis, the different roles in society had best be left to those most suited to 
execute them: allocation of taxes to the tax man, environmental concerns to the environment 
experts and community projects to the government since the company cannot ‘acclaim itself the 
self-appointed representative of the global civil society’95 believing that the economic, social, 
environmental and all other progress of society depends on it. 
 
4.6. Social responsibility and the law 
The consideration of the social responsibility of the corporation is not a pure legal engagement 
and many times revolves around economic or social and political concerns. One may fail to see 
the connection with the law when, for example, the anti-CSR proponents base their 
dissatisfaction with the principle on the fact that it is used to perpetrate public relations and 
marketing ends of the company rather than its social responsibility. A discussion of the morality 
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of such a deviation is, in my view, outside the scope of concern of corporate law. Also, any 
justification for the adoption of a pure stakeholder concept, legit though it may be, is to be found 
‘not in legal theory but in economic performance.’96 Berle & Means in questioning the 
application of the traditional logic of property in the modern corporation and whether the 
surrender of control by the owner of property may not have changed his interest in his wealth
97
  
also concluded similarly by saying that the answer to the question ‘cannot be found in the law 
itself’ but rather in the ‘economic and social background of law.’98 Another view also rejects the 
discussion of corporate social responsibility within the confines of the law of corporations: 
Corporate law is primarily about the relationships among shareholders, boards of 
directors, managers, and, occasionally, bondholders and other creditors; questions 
surrounding the role of corporations in society arise only at the periphery of the dominant 
narratives of corporate law, if at all.
99
 
Because corporate law creates the corporation and defines it, it regulates the relationships 
between those viewed as central to its function, and this has traditionally not included the 
category of ‘society’ or the ‘community’. To be valid, the demands of social responsibility of 
corporations therefore ought to find a place within the corporation law,
100
 which, as noted above, 
seems to have rejected it prompting the question whether this persistent rejection of CSR says 
something of the nature of the corporation and the mechanics of its regulation that cannot be 
ignored.
101
 
In assessing the attempts – and failure in most cases  – to regulate the social 
responsibility of business, one is led to consider the relevance of the law; ought the law to be the 
solution for every social problem? The law is a system (of rules) or an institution, which like any 
other system or institution has a purpose,
102
 and given its specific nature, it has bounds within 
which the powers of the legislator are valid and outside of which they are unjust, boundaries 
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which if not respected result in inconsistency.
103
 The law has been defined as a collective 
organisation of the individual (and natural) right to lawful defense of individual freedom, life and 
property.
104
 These attributes of the person, his individuality, liberty, property, are not given to 
him by laws – they precede human legislation and therefore are superior to it; laws were created 
to protect or defend man’s individuality, liberty, property and it would be an inconsistency that 
the same laws are used to take these away from man.
105
 
The law’s purpose has also been defined as maintaining justice106 and justice is 
‘measurable, immutable, unchangeable’ unlike charity and fraternity which are boundless and 
will always include concessions or deliberations to decide how much charity is enough; or how 
much fraternity is worth its name.
107
 To avoid creating such a problem, the law ought to be used 
only for the administration of justice, and not to “force organisation, to create an artificial unity 
or fraternity or association which, to be valid, demands individual responsibility.”108 Unity and 
fraternity should be fostered, but freely, without need for the law. A law is a law because it must 
be respected, failure which sanctions or punishment will ensue: the lawful jurisdiction of the law 
therefore should be areas where the use of force is necessary, for example the defense of life, 
liberty, property or individual human rights, but not for charitable purposes such as the creation 
of brotherhood, charitable donations and other philanthropic ends.
109
 Fraternity is a good thing; it 
should be an aim of society but should be sought by means other than the force of law.  
The law has an objective purpose which cannot be twisted to favour any side; neither 
those who have nor those who lack. In many instances public opinion tends to be less favourable 
when the victim is the one who has (the presumption being that he ought not to complain of 
anything) and less condemnatory when it is the poor who suffer (people then look to the law to 
provide for him what life has failed to afford him). The law should be objective and favour 
neither the poor nor the rich, depending on the opinion of the legislator at any given time. If such 
were ever to be the case, the justice purportedly rendered for the poor against the rich would still 
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amount to an injustice, and any attempt to favour the poor at the expense of the rich, by forced 
re-distribution of property for example, should be prevented by the law.
110
 
If the law is not directed to its proper function, it will be misused by legislators who, 
placing themselves above those they seek to represent, proceed to organise societal concerns 
according to their own criteria and in the process achieve what would be unlawful if done by 
individuals.
111
 If an individual, moved by a desire to foster fairness, took what, in his view, was 
excess and unnecessary from one person, and gave it to another whom he considered more in 
need of it, he would be guilty of the crime of theft, and liable for punishment. This should be the 
case where the law permitted the “forceful” taking of the entrepreneur’s property for charitable 
ends. Bastiat calls forced corporate responsibility “legal plunder” and observes that “when 
plunder is aided by the law, it does not fear your courts, your gendarmes and your prisons. 
Rather, it may call upon them for help.”112 If social responsibility, understood as philanthropy, 
was to be enforced by the law, corporations would be at a disadvantage, obliged to society in 
ways that are perhaps beyond their purpose. Problems exist, but their solution does not 
necessarily always lie in the realm of the law.  
What is not right to do cannot be made right by mere proclamation of the law no matter 
the justification, whether poverty, inability to work or whatever other misfortune that could have 
befallen the other, nor for the sake of social responsibility. Philanthropy, which is what CSR in 
many instances amounts to, should be voluntary – if it is not, it is a false philanthropy, as no one 
should be forced to give what is his: this destroys justice.
113
 One author does well in bringing out 
the amorphous nature of the responsibility that constitutes CSR, thus showing the near 
impossibility of crafting a law to enforce such an obligation. He notes:  
Perhaps the best way to understand social responsibility is to think of it as ‘good 
neighborliness.’ The concept involves two phases. On one hand, it means not doing 
things that spoil the neighborhood. On the other, it may be expressed as the voluntary 
assumption of the obligation to help solve neighborhood problems… Those who find 
neighborliness an awkward or coy concept may substitute the idea that social 
responsibility means the commitment of a business or Business, in general, to an active 
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role in the solution of broad social problems, such as racial discrimination, pollution, 
transportation, or urban decay.
114
 
Social responsibility seen as the altruism that leads one (the company) to ‘give’ back to 
society in things such as charitable donations, building of educational or social amenities for the 
communities and such other gestures is indeed ‘good neighbourliness’. The law aims to achieve 
organisation in society; but the law follows the presumption that people are human beings, and 
not merely things or matter; they are capable of organising themselves and deciding on matters 
to do with their living together – they do not need the law to tell them how to be good neighbours 
or to solve problems which they can solve by their own effort.
115
 
Expressing its position rejecting the imposition of law to regulate social responsibility on 
the basis that the need for the law had not been proved, the Australian Government expressed its 
view that: 
…guidelines for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) should be voluntary. The Norms 
represent a major shift away from voluntary adherence. The need for such a shift has not 
been demonstrated… We believe the way to ensure a greater business contribution to 
social progress is not through more norms and prescriptive regulations, but through 
encouraging greater awareness of societal values and concerns through voluntary 
initiatives.
116
 
Law requires the support of force; a law is law because if not respected there are 
consequences: punishment. Rather than promote some minimum level of duty or create 
fraternity,
117
 the law should aim at meeting objective requirements, for example, the defense of 
individual human rights.
118
 In any event, absent a concrete definition of corporate social 
responsibility, it would be difficult to determine what responsible behaviour is and regulation of 
the myriad facets attributed to the concept would require complex laws likely to be 
contradictory, a burden to corporations and impossible for the state to enforce.
119
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The voluntary codes that characterise CSR have so far resulted in inconsistent and 
incoherent efforts.
120
 As Dine observes, it is difficult to impose binding corporate social 
responsibility obligations because of the diversity of corporations, which, as creatures of legal 
systems are different from each other.
121
 In the absence of binding social responsibility 
obligations of corporations, Dine queries and later rejects the thought that corporations can 
become responsible of their own accord, thereby not needing regulation.
122
 To resolve this 
double-edged problem – of expecting corporations to be socially responsible and expecting them 
to regulate their responsibility of their own accord – Dine proposes a change in corporate 
structure, a move away from the primacy of profit-maximisation and traditional definition of the 
corporations, which she acknowledges will not be easy, before CSR can be embedded in the 
corporation, if at all. 
At a time when the idea of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is widely acknowledged 
and proclaimed as the way forward for corporations and other business entities, the apparent 
failure of CSR proponents to pass laws that regulate the social responsibility and human rights 
obligations of business presents a curious observation. The view that the raison d’être of 
business is to make profits seems to have gained wide acceptance, arguably more by the failure 
of law reformers to successfully enact laws that impose a wider duty on companies. Ultimately, 
the age-old definition of a corporation as a profit-making entity seems to reign supreme, 
prefiguring what might be reasonably expected of Ruggie’s Guiding Principles. His conclusion 
that there need not be binding laws at the international level can also be interpreted as affirming 
this view. 
4.7. Corporate Social Responsibility and Human Rights 
Most governments see their human rights responsibilities in relation to corporations from the 
point of view of the social responsibility of companies and not as an issue in its own right.
123
 
Despite the poor record of respect for human rights by corporations in Kenya, some of the big 
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companies, both foreign and local, are involved in commendable corporate social responsibility 
initiatives in the communities where they operate, including running schools for the children of 
workers, offering scholarships to them, running health care facilities for the workers and their 
families.
124
 Compliance with CSR is a positive move because it leads corporations to think 
beyond their profit-making goal. It is, however, not enough because it ‘promises too much and 
leads to cynicism and box-ticking’.125 A CSR conception of the corporation embraces the idea 
that company management should be concerned with human rights issues.
126
 A formal 
acknowledgement of this conception would thus be a starting point, requiring the corporation to 
be concerned with persons beyond the shareholders thus helping to create a culture that goes 
beyond profit-maximisation. Many companies in Kenya have CSR policies, but these policies 
say very little, or nothing at all about human rights. The little that is said of human rights is 
categorised under CSR or environmental health and safety provisions. A review of a few listed 
companies in Kenya will illustrate the fact that human rights either are totally absent from their 
policies, or are otherwise seen purely as a CSR concern.
i
 
Corporations can also acquire an impressive array of certifications on subjects such as 
ethics, social and environmental sustainability,
127
 giving the impression in theory that they were 
doing very well in keeping up with the required standards in the relevant sectors of their 
operations. But there could be a disjoint between what the business entity believes itself to be, 
the image it projects to the world, and what happens in reality. It may have seemed important for 
the company to get all the certifications it received, giving information that was deemed ‘proper’ 
whereas the reality presented a very different picture. Additionally, the corporations may be 
content to spend much of their resources on what they consider their corporate social 
responsibility – charitable ends – without giving enough attention to the nature of its operations 
and the obligations it has to ensure respect for individual human rights. 
From the attempts to define CSR which began as far back in the history of corporations 
as the debate by Berle and Dodd, or even before, the meaning of social responsibility has 
evolved with time. In the 1950s, the modern era of definitions began and was expanded in the 
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1960s and 1970s and although these definitions decreased in the 1980s there was more research 
on the subject, and alternative themes emerged, such as corporate social responsiveness, 
corporate social policy, public policy, business ethics, and stakeholder theory/management.
128
 
Whereas before social responsibility was interpreted to mean taking care of workers, charitable 
giving, provision of health care and such other social concerns, it has evolved and now concerns 
a wider consideration of issues, taking note of the complex nature of the relationship between 
corporations and the communities they operate in or produce goods and services for.
129
 The 
disclosure requirements of social responsibility reporting and participation of stakeholders 
promotes transparency and can serve to improve the culture of the business entity making it more 
mindful of the impact of its activities. But for all the good that it promises, corporate social 
responsibility still falls far short of a universal ideal. Who monitors the impact of the 
corporations’ socially responsible contributions to society, given their voluntary nature? And 
against which benchmark is the impact measured? 
A scholar argues “CSR and the human rights guarantees it encompasses must be 
‘something central to the corporation’s business, not something the corporation does in addition 
to businesses” (emphasis added).130 But CSR and human rights are not synonymous. CSR is 
relevant to the human rights debate insofar as it represents the existing corporate culture or 
understanding by business entities of a role that goes beyond profit-making or mere concern for 
shareholders. The KNCHR seemed to acknowledge this fact when in meetings convened in 
September 2009 bringing together stakeholders from the public sector and business, the 
Commission aimed to dialogue on ways through which the duty of businesses to respect rights 
could be seen not as a cost, a constraint or a charitable deed but instead as a source of 
opportunity, innovation and competitive advantage.
131
 In an inquiry into corporate violation of 
human rights by salt manufacturing companies in Kenya, Corporate Citizenship, which is a 
synonym for CSR, was perceived by the KNCHR not as a legal requirement, but nonetheless a 
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good indicator against which respect for human rights by non-state actors may be assessed.
132
 
This was an acknowledgement that CSR or corporate citizenship and human rights were not 
synonymous.  
In an apparent contradiction to its observation, the Inquiry at the same time set about 
assessing whether the companies in question had made “meaningful” investment in host 
communities.
133
 It went on in its findings to distinguish between what it classified as CSR and 
what in its view amounted merely to “patronisation of the local administration” where apparent 
benefits were seen as directed to relevant local administrators, such as fueling of vehicles needed 
to patrol the area and address security concerns.
134
 In outlining the problems found in the 
investigations, no distinction is made between what is strictly CSR and what amounts to human 
rights violations.
135
 Findings of fault against the salt mining corporations included issues such as 
unsatisfactory investment in education and healthcare in the communities or mutual suspicion 
between the companies and the communities. The solutions to these kinds of problems would 
lack clear benchmarks: what would constitute “satisfactory investment”: many schools? And by 
schools would school buildings suffice, or would the corporations also be expected to provide 
and oversee the work of teachers? What was the company to do to diffuse the suspicion with the 
communities? It is unlikely that any action towards this end would be enforceable under any 
laws but rather be matters of discussion and implementation according to the availability of 
resources and the goodwill of the companies.  
In the same list of grievances the KNCHR outlined valid human rights concerns: poor 
working and hygiene conditions, forceful evictions from ancestral land to give way to company 
operations: these constitute human rights violations and must be redressed as such. When no 
distinction is made between human rights and other societal concerns, valid though they may be, 
it is difficult to address them, or to see the role the corporation can legitimately be expected to 
play.  
In an assessment of the improvements in the communities following the 
recommendations made by the KNCHR to the salt manufacturing companies, an interesting issue 
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arises in the quest to give corporations a role to play in addressing the purported negative social 
effects in the communities. The problems associated with the salt works were said to include 
increased immorality, school dropouts, alcoholism and child delinquency.
136
 These allegations 
may be difficult to prove, or directly attribute to the corporations. Whereas the companies can be 
expected to contribute to their resolution, any expectations would be dependent on the goodwill 
of the company and are not synonymous with the human rights obligations of the company. 
CSR and human rights responsibilities only find a nexus in as far as both call for the 
corporation or business to be concerned about more than its profit making objective. The nature 
of the obligation differs under the respective fields. Human rights are aimed at maintaining the 
level of dignity of the person below which it is not morally acceptable to live or let others live 
when one is in a position or has an obligation to do something about it. CSR is vague and calls 
on the business to exercise responsibility or judgment, while respect for human rights demands 
that businesses in carrying out what they were formed to do, be mindful and not in any way 
violate or contribute to the violation of the rights of individuals; the former appeals to the sense 
of responsibility of the business, while the latter appeals to a sense of justice, requiring 
businesses to act not as a matter of choice but one of duty.  
The effort by companies to reach out to the communities, building schools and health 
facilities, or providing water and such other amenities, is many times done by the very same 
entities that disregard the environment within which they operate, or the rights and living 
standards of people they displace to set up projects, or such other wrongs which they seek to 
justify by projecting the good things they do for the communities.
137
 The corporate responsibility 
to respect has been described as a baseline duty, which cannot be off-set with the implication that 
negative effects of human rights in one place can be offset or compensated by positive effects of 
any nature in another place.
138
 
Promoting social giving or corporate philanthropy cannot be confused with the need to 
create a culture of human rights, and to make direct reference to human rights in the systems and 
processes of the business. If a corporate culture of human rights is to be successfully developed, 
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explicit use of the term human rights and human rights language in the operations of the business 
is necessary.
139
 Corporations need to be forced to see these differences, and should be required to 
adjust their corporate policies and practices accordingly. As evidenced in the variety of 
approaches highlighted in the sample above, CSR is management driven, corporate determined 
and ultimately geared towards promotion of the company’s good.140 Human rights on the other 
hand are an expression of the dignity of the person, centered on his person and therefore not 
voluntary; they are universal and transcend the corporate setting and have compliance 
mechanisms that apply across the board. An acknowledgement of the importance of human 
rights, seen as human rights and not merely a part of the bigger social or environmental concerns, 
must be done both at the level of the business and at the level of the state. Taken as an issue in its 
own right rather than considering it as part of a wider societal problem, human rights take on a 
significance, which takes it beyond the shareholder versus stakeholder deliberation.  
 
4.8. Conclusion 
CSR reflects the idea of businesses serving the common good; that the benefits of private 
ownership ought to be shared with the entire society. However, the nature of CSR has made it 
impossible to agree on a common set of rules or expectations that would be applicable and 
acceptable by all businesses as binding on them, as it is the owners of business entities who 
determine what should be given to society. Differences in culture make it impossible to agree on 
adequate levels of benevolence. In the United States for example, a culture of extensive 
community programs exists which offer different services to the communities in the name of 
social responsibility; from access to health, to “creations of beauty and philanthropy”141 such as 
universities, philharmonic orchestras and schools of music.
142
 In the United Kingdom, a different 
culture exists. Owing to the culture of government that provides to a basic and extensive 
infrastructure needed by communities as part of its (government’s) social responsibility, the 
“volunteerism” common in the US is absent.143 Such cultures define the needs of the 
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communities and thus what is needed in particular contexts. For some, social responsibility 
amounts to philanthropic giving and is purely about the corporation sharing profits made with 
persons or entities other than shareholders.
144
 This is not the case with human rights: human 
rights are objective and thus provide an unwavering or unchanging guide to direct the actions of 
corporations.  
In the CSR debate, competition is pitted against benevolence; the argument seems to be 
whether businesses should be concerned only about making profits, or whether they should also 
be concerned about the needs of society. These two ends are not mutually exclusive. Social 
responsibility is concerned with relieving suffering (which is what the principle of the common 
good calls for) as opposed to calling for the ordering of the products of business to achieve 
justice in society (which is impossible and raises questions that are completely outside the 
purview of businesses to determine or address). The expectation that businesses ought to give 
back to society in a manner that relieves the injustice or inequalities that exist, or that businesses 
should spend their earnings in building schools, repairing roads, feeding the poor and such other 
ends, seems political rather than economic, and thus have not taken on a universal acceptance in 
the world of business. These concerns are also not necessarily human rights concerns.
145
 
Unlike social responsibility, issues of human rights are issues of law and may be 
considered in their own right. The analogy between social responsibility and human rights only 
goes so far and cannot hold true beyond a given point. Direct reference to human rights in 
corporate governance codes and guidelines remains rare
146
 leading to the conclusion that such 
omission of reference to human rights in corporate law and policy is more by design than default. 
Business entities fail to make any reference to the obligations they have for human rights 
directly, seeing this as an external issue rather than an issue concern that should be their 
concern.
147
 This attitude is well supported by the long-standing assumption that human rights 
were a concern of the state and not of private entities. 
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i  CSR INITIATIVES OF SOME COMPANIES LISTED ON THE NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE 
Williamson Tea (http://www.williamsontea.com/our-way/our-foundation/) runs a foundation, the Williamson 
Foundation which funds projects aimed at improving its farms. It offers homes to thousands of its farmers 
and their families, provided clinics for them and a good education for their children. The Foundation cares 
about the people who grow our tea and the land on which it grows. It states that its farmers work in good 
conditions and earn a decent living. The company also ascribes to environmental conservation. 
Kakuzi (http://www.kakuzi.co.ke) has an ambitious social responsibility program that incorporates what 
would be tantamount to human rights considerations alongside its community-contributing activities. It 
seeks to understand how its activities can most effectively support the needs of the local communities and 
contribute to local programs and initiatives. The company provides accommodation and medical facilities to 
all employees through dispensaries offering medical services and care to employees (free of charge), their 
dependents and other people from surrounding areas. It also offers day care centers for employees’ 
children and encourages employees to have village kitchen gardens as a means of improving employee 
food security. The company has a comprehensive occupational health and safety program. In what would 
be tantamount to measures considered to safeguard human rights, the company consults the local 
communities affected by its businesses and undertakes to respond to and act upon all issues raised. It 
undertakes to ensure the social effects of major investments are assessed and monitored at the planning 
stage; this would help to mitigate any negative potential negative impacts before they occur. The company 
undertakes to provide basic services to the employees including access to food and water, primary 
healthcare, education and adequate housing. Kakuzi further undertakes to identify the environmental 
impacts of all its activities and manage them in a responsible manner to minimise the impact of our 
activities. It also seeks to comply with all environmental laws and to train its employees in the relevant 
areas. 
Car and General (https://www.cargen.com/society.php) has CSR initiatives that include the construction of 
dams in a poor part of the country in a bid to alleviate poverty. It partners with other organizations in this. It 
also runs free eye checkup, surgery operations for cataract cases, glasses and medication. In collaboration 
with institutions of learning, C&G donates learning equipment and trains students and offers attachment to 
the students and ‘general support’ to the institutions. 
Sameer Africa (https://www.sameerafrica.com/index.php/about/responsibilities) has a section on their 
website on “Responsibilities” which refers to an Environmental Policy that focuses on 3 main objectives: 
Continual Improvement of clearly defined objectives and targets, which are communicated to employees, 
suppliers and other interested parties; Pollution Prevention of the air, water, and land and Legal 
Compliance with requirements that affect how the company manages its environmental aspects. In all the 
provisions of the company’s responsibility, nothing is said about human rights. 
Marshalls EA Ltd (http://www.marshalls-ea.com/about-kia/enviroment.html), a car manufacturer, has as one 
of its goals the pursuit of meaningful corporate activities for consumers. Its effort to be seen as considerate 
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citizens of the world leads it to make exemplary and sustainable contributions to the environment. CMC 
Holdings  runs CSR activities including charitable donations to needy organizations. 
Barclays Bank (http://www.barclays.co.ke/citizenship/index.html) has a section on Citizenship, where it 
defines its primary stakeholders to include its customers, employees and ‘the community’. If focuses on 
Economic Development – through exercising good governance and community investment in areas such 
as small business growth and entrepreneurship. Barclays partnered with other institutions (CARE and Plan 
International) to launch a community-based savings and loan model with the goal of reducing poverty, and 
enhancing income opportunities for households in rural districts. Further, the company promotes 
environmental stewardship in its operations, as well as in the community. Its employees, management and 
board are strong supporters of environmental initiatives and are fully involved in conservation and 
awareness efforts in the community. 
I&M Bank (https://www.imbank.com/about-us/corporate-social-responsibility/) has a Social and 
Environmental Management Policy with CSR projects that serve diverse causes ranging from education, 
health care, children welfare and environment. Diamond Trust Bank  has a CSR program that seeks to 
improve the quality of living conditions and opportunities for the disadvantaged in communities in which its 
employees and customers live and work. CSR activities include support to children homes, tree planting, 
book donations to primary schools, food support to victims of HIV/AIDS among other such activities. 
Housing Finance Company Kenya Ltd considers it an obligation to support and be part of the community in 
which it conducts its business. The company’s CSR theme is “Assisting less fortunate individuals and 
communities to access decent shelter” and itscore Corporate Social Responsibility program is run in 
partnership with Habitat for Humanity Kenya, a non-profit, non-governmental ecumenical Christian 
organisation dedicated to eliminating poverty housing and homelessness in Kenya through provision of low-
cost housing to low income families. The numerous activities supported by the company include 
sponsorship to sportsmen to attend training programs, sponsoring a golf tournament in aid of diabetes, food 
donation to charities, donation of computers to a school, support to a project that promotes the rights of 
children and the needs of children with special needs. KCB  runs a Foundation whose main focus is 
enterprise development through support of projects that reduce poverty and increase income for 
communities and individuals including training programs, mentorship and provision of business 
development grants for entrepreneurs. The Foundation also supports environmental activities including tree 
planting, waste management, recycling and protection of ecosystems; the right to education of children 
through scholarships, learning materials and construction of classrooms; improvement of healthcare 
through provision of hospital equipment and treatment services and provision of emergency relief supplies 
to communities in times of natural calamities.  
Another example is given here of one agricultural company in Kenya which is representative of other 
companies within the industry, the biggest in the Kenyan economy. Considering itself as a responsible 
corporate entity, the company invests heavily in a number of projects as a way of giving back to the 
community. In the area of education, the company supports various learning institutions, a primary school, 
a secondary school and two pre-unit or nursery schools. In health it offers free voluntary counseling and 
HIV/AIDS testing at a Centre run by the company to the neighboring communities as a means of combating 
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the pandemic. The Company also maintains a vast network of roads infrastructure within the sugarcane 
zone. It nurtures agro-forestry nurseries where seedlings are sold to farmers at subsidized costs. 
Additionally, the Company has constructed several boreholes to provide clean drinking water to 
neighboring schools and communities.  
The ideal these companies have set for themselves cover important areas such as health and education 
and are undoubtedly impressive, a clear measure of concern for the community. However, one may rightly 
question whether this is the kind of responsibility anticipated in Ruggie’s corporate responsibility to respect 
pillar. Are not the managers, by committing themselves to such a rigorous CSR program, diverting the 
resources of the company, both human and financial, to a general purpose and plan to benefit mankind?  
Social responsibility is seen by some as corporate giving, measured in terms of how much money a 
corporation gives to charity.  Additionally, if the philanthropic giving increases the value of the firm, it is 
acceptable, if it does not, it amounts to an unfair distribution of the shareholders’ wealth and is not 
acceptable.  What motivates the corporate giving is the effect that giving has on the image of the company 
and how consumers react to it.  Charitable foundations are set up within the corporation, and many 
corporations express their pride in “helping others and making them more productive”.  Others referring to 
third parties out there who in no way make a contribution to nor are affected by the activities of the 
corporation. Is this not going a bit too far and diverting from the aim of the corporation in significant way? 
Failure to delineate the boundaries of social expectations creates unenforceable obligations. It is not the 
same to say that they have a responsibility to “give back” to society as in the terms of corporate 
philanthropy, as to say that corporations have a responsibility to respect human rights. Coming from a 
situation where corporate responsibility has been widely interpreted as CSR, effort will have to be made at 
the corporate level to clarify the difference between CSR and human rights obligations and to pursue the 
latter in appropriate and most effective ways. From having a pure profit motive, seeing itself as owing a 
duty to make profit for their owners perceivably at any cost, many corporations have grown to embrace a 
corporate social responsibility, accepting as it were that they owed a duty to other stakeholders. The task of 
the moment is to raise the duty of the corporation to a higher level and to give human rights obligations of 
corporations greater specificity so that they may be more effectively implemented. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. PILLAR I: THE STATE DUTY TO PROTECT 
5.1. Introduction 
The mandate given to the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN on Business 
and Human Rights, John Ruggie, in 2005 required him to elaborate on the role of States in 
effectively regulating and adjudicating the role of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with regard to human rights.
1
 In his research findings presented in the ‘'UN Protect, 
Respect Remedy Framework’ (the UN Framework) and the ‘UN Guiding Principles’, Ruggie 
shows that the state has a central duty to play in the business and human rights debate.
2
 Ruggie 
settled for a state or national focus as opposed to an international approach to dealing with the 
question of business and human rights: he points to the domestic sphere as the ideal place to 
articulate grievances and to apportion liability for human rights violations by corporation 
Pillar I of the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights elaborates on the legal duty 
of states to protect against human rights violations, showing that this duty includes an obligation 
to ensure that third parties do not violate human rights. In the UN Guiding Principles, Ruggie 
translates the existing obligation of states into accessible Guiding Principles, giving details of 
what it means for the state to have an obligation to ensure that third parties such as corporations 
do not violate human rights.
3
 This chapter discusses the human rights duty of the state and sums 
it up in a three-fold obligation. First, the state should take preventive measures including 
enactment of legislation to avert violations through control and regulation of private actors. The 
Constitution of Kenya which was adopted in 2010 binds corporations to the Bill of Rights. This 
expresses more concretely the awareness of the state of its duty to protect human rights and its 
commitment to ensure that third parties do not violate them. The Constitution further mandates 
the Government to enact laws that will aid its implementation. In the mix of possible approaches, 
law making will therefore constitute a central means to bring about a realisation of the corporate 
                                               
1
 Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights Human Rights Resolution 2005/69: Human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, 1(b). 
2
 David Kinley notes that they constitute the most appropriate, accessible and powerful forum within which to 
generate suitable regulatory responses. See David Kinley Civilizing Globalization: Human Rights and the Global 
Economy(2009). 
3
 Knox John H ‘The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations’ (August 16, 2011) Wake Forest 
Univ. Legal Studies Paper, also available in In Radu Mares (ed) The UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation (2011) 51-83. 
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obligation for human rights. Second, the state can offer guidance through having clear regulatory 
and monitoring mechanisms including reporting standards to track the effort made by 
corporations to establish the impact of their activities and address any negative concerns. Third, 
the state can, as reactive measures in the event that violation has already taken place, provide 
adequate means to investigate the violations, prosecute and punish violators and offer means of 
effective access to remedy for the victims where the business entities fail to respect their human 
rights.  
Execution of the State Duty will involve multiple approaches, applying both legal and 
non-legal measures to create a corporate culture respectful of human rights through a seamless 
interweaving of business and human rights at all levels. The chapter proposes the use of laws to 
require corporations to uphold human rights, and further recommends means to ensure that 
national and sectoral policies and strategies that regulate business are aligned with the provisions 
of the Constitution and international human rights obligations.  
 
5.2. State responsibility in international law and State Duty to protect against human rights 
violations 
International human rights law has historically been essentially state-centered and seems poised 
to remain so at least in the near future.
4
 State responsibility is one of the fundamental principles 
of international law.
5
 It entails the general set of rules governing the legal consequences of 
violations by States of their international legal obligations.
6
 States have the primary 
responsibility to promote, secure the fulfillment of, and ensure respect for human rights.
7
 
                                               
4
 Manisuli Ssenyonjo ‘Non-State Actors and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ in Mashood Baderin and 
Robert McCorquodale Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Action (2007) 133. In his work, Ruggie 
acknowledged the reality that international law holds states primarily responsible for protecting against human rights 
violations, and his proposals do not seek to alter international law as it is (as the Norms attempted to do), but rather 
to propose guidelines to be applied by states in their national contexts. 
5
 Malcolm N Shaw International Law 7 ed (2014) 566. See also Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa 'The doctrine of state 
responsibility as a potential means of making private actors accountable for human rights' (2004) 5(1) Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 1, 4. 
6
 John H Currie, Craig Forcese, Valerie Oosterveld International Law: Doctrine, Practice, and Theory (2007) 467 
7
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14, Paragraph. 42. See also Paragraph 
39 directing states to use legal or political means to prevent violation of the right to health in other countries and 
General Comment No.15, Paragraph 33 which enjoins states to prevent abuse of the right to water by both citizens 
and companies. 
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Conventional international law
8
 for long assumed that the state, as the principal subject of 
International Law and as party to the international treaties that codify human rights, has a 
monopoly of power
9
 and thus should be solely held accountable for violations of human rights.
10
 
But a practical understanding of the primary duty of the state extends the obligation to include 
oversight over the activities of non-state actors to ensure they do not violate human rights. It is 
the considered view of some that the principle of state responsibility, well established and 
accepted in international law, can be used to ensure that private actors respect human rights.
11
 
There is no convention or treaty stating the internationally accepted rules of state 
responsibility, but general applicable rules can be found in specific human rights treaties, 
customary international law, decisions of courts and tribunals, and the International Law 
Commission Daft Articles on State Responsibility (2001) (the Draft Articles), much of which 
reflects custom. The conventions of the UN on human rights (for example the ICCPR and 
ICESCR) and the comments of the UN interpreting the conventions place the blame for 
violations of human rights by third parties (such as business) on the state. The European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms assigns the obligation of securing to 
everyone the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention to the contracting parties - which are 
states.
12
 The Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms provides that every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possession offering to corporations the same protection under the protocol as individuals.
13
 The 
American Convention on Human Rights offers a general provision for states to respect the rights 
and freedoms recognised in the convention and ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction 
the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms.
14
 The African Charter on Peoples and 
                                               
8
 As shown in the wording of the international human rights instruments.  
9
 Power here is used to mean the ability to influence the lives of individuals negatively; for the state, power has been 
interpreted as giving rise to violations such as torture, termination of life and the violation of the right to property 
and other civil and political rights considered to fall under the monopoly of state protection. This power to influence 
does not only lie with the state; businesses employ people who spend most of the day working and earning their 
living and therefore naturally exert considerable power over them. 
10
 John Knox in ‘The Horizontal Human Rights Law’ (2008) 102(1) American Journal of International Law 1 at 19 
says that the common belief that treaties were drafted were for states as subjects which, if ever it was true, is not true 
now.  
11
 Chirwa considers the doctrine of state responsibility as an ‘under-utilised devise for ensuring that private actors 
respect human rights’. See Chirwa op cit note 5 at 1. 
12
 Article 1 read with the Preamble of the Convention. 
13
 Article 1 of the Protocol. 
14
 Article 1. 
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Human Rights states that parties to the Charter, which are states, shall recognise the rights 
enshrined therein and shall undertake to adopt measures to give effect to them.
15
  
The International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility (ILCASR) 
began the process of codifying international rules on state responsibility in 1949. The draft code 
of international rules was completed in 2001 and adopted by the ILC in 2011 but there is as yet 
no treaty, so the Articles are not binding. However, as the Draft Articles contain opinion of 
experts, highly recognised publicists in international law, it carries authoritative force in giving 
guidance on what state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts entails. Article 1 of the 
ILCASR provides that ‘Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international 
responsibility of that State.’ The Draft Articles define an internationally wrongful act as an act 
that constitutes a breach of an international obligation, and which action is attributable to the 
state.
16
 Under the Draft Articles, the conduct of the private actor must qualify as an act of the 
state for the state to be responsible. The Articles outline a number of situations where the 
conduct of the private actor will be attributable to the state. The conduct of the private actor 
would qualify if it exercised elements of governmental authority.
17
 This would cover activities of 
corporations which offer services that are normally considered the preserve of government, for 
example private security companies that may be tasked to exercise powers of detention and 
discipline pursuant to prison regulations; or private airlines that may have to exercise 
immigration control powers usually exercised by the government.
18
 The conduct of a non-state 
entity directed or controlled by a State would also be attributable to the state: a state corporation 
would be an example of such an entity.
19
 Only in circumstances where businesses concerned are 
                                               
15
 Article 1. 
16
 Article 2 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
17
 Article 5 of the Draft Articles. 
18
 See United Nations ‘Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session’ (2007) A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1. The Commentary by 
the ILC on Article 5 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility elaborates on what would amount to an exercise of 
governmental authority by providing that: ‘The article is intended to take account of the increasingly common 
phenomenon of Parastatal entities, which exercise elements of governmental authority in place of State organs, as 
well as situations where former State corporations have been privatised but retain certain public or regulatory 
functions’. (Part 2), 42. 
19
 Article 8 of the Draft Articles. 
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state-owned will the obligation of the corporation not to violate human rights have a direct 
meaning.
20
 
The International Law Commission in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
expresses the view that state responsibility in international law can apply to violations of human 
rights.
21
 This can be implied from the ILCASR provision that “There is a breach of an 
international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is 
required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.”22 (emphasis added). The 
Draft Articles draw precedence from the Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand/France) case
23
 where 
the Arbitral Tribunal emphasised that any violation by a State of any obligation, of whatever 
origin, gives rise to state responsibility – and therefore the duty of reparation.24 The state will be 
thus responsible when the violation is of a human rights nature.
25
 The same rules of state 
responsibility for international law generally can therefore apply to international human rights 
law.
26
 International human rights law and international law form one body of law and ought to be 
seen as mutually reinforcing,
27
 although international law is more general, and international 
                                               
20
 Dine Janet Companies international trade and human rights (2004), 175 et esq. It is noted however that the 
development of this jurisprudence is in its infancy and ultimately there is yet no enforcement mechanism at the 
international level. Another direct link is to be found where international treaties grant rights to corporations, as 
when the European Convention on Fundamental Rights grants corporations freedom of expression. 
21
 In the Commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, numerous references are made to international 
human rights instruments, and the decisions of regional human rights courts to elaborate on aspects of state 
responsibility. Lessons are drawn from the application of human rights obligations, and it can therefore be said that 
lessons from international law apply likewise to the field of international human rights law. 
22
 Article 12 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
23
 UNRIAA, vol. XX, p. 217 (1990) 251, para 75. 
24
 Cited in United Nations Legislative Series, Book 25: Materials on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, Chapter III. Breach of an International Obligation, Commentary on Article 12 of the Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility, p 100 available at http://legal.un.org/legislativeseries/book25.html accessed on 24 
September 2015. 
25
 In the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project case, (International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory 
Opinions and Orders Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) Judgment of 25 
September 1997, P 38/35) the ICJ was of the view that the responsibility of the state for breach of an obligation of 
‘whatever nature’ was well established (in international law). The internationally wrongful act could be of a human 
rights character, and the state will bear responsibility for its violation. 
26
 Although there is a school of thought that supports the view that general rules of international law on state 
responsibility cannot be appropriately applied to international human rights law, I support the view that it does, 
based on the reasons discussed immediately above. See Chirwa op cit note 5 at 9. 
27
 Chirwa ibid at 10. 
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human rights law more specific; in the event of a conflict, the specific human rights law 
provisions will prevail.
28
  
In making provision for state responsibility, the Draft Articles establish a caveat that the 
Articles do not purport to specify the content of the primary rules of international law or the 
obligations created for particular states.
29
 Noting that there is no breach of international 
obligation in the abstract, the Commentary outlines the object of the Draft Articles as 
highlighting the primary responsibility of the state, without particular concern for questions of 
evidence and proof of breach.
30
 As such, the draft articles can only play a secondary role in 
determining whether or not there was a breach.
31
 Much will depend on the facts of the case, and 
more factors than the theory of state responsibility will be necessary to determine the cases. Save 
for those differences between international law in general and human rights law, which are 
attributable to the specific nature of the field of international human rights law, and for the 
reason that international human rights law operates in the sphere of international law, rules of 
state responsibility in international law will be applicable for human rights law subject to the 
caveat the commentary elaborates as explained in the Commentary to Article 12 of the Draft 
Articles. The existence of the state responsibility in international law therefore means that private 
actors can be accountable at the international level for human rights violations, and that they can 
also be held responsible at the domestic level, when the state puts in place practical measures to 
execute its international obligation.
32
 
If responsibility arises for breach of an international obligation, what amounts to breach 
of an international obligation? The Commentary on the Draft Articles goes further to highlight 
the different scenarios that can give rise to a breach of state responsibility for an internationally 
wrongful act. Based on decisions of the decisions of the ICJ, breach of international obligation 
can arise from: incompatibility of the act of the state with its international obligations;
33
 actions 
                                               
28
 In the view of the American Law Institute, the two fields are similar and are increasingly converging in spite of 
the differences in their origin and jurisprudence. See American Law Institute Restatement of the Law Third, The 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States cited in Chirwa ibid, fn 58. 
29
 Commentary on Article 12, Book 25 p 97. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Chirwa, op cit note 5 at 4. 
33
 The Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
(ICJ Reports 1980, 3) was brought by the USA against the Islarnic Republic of Iran in respect of a dispute 
concerning the seizure and holding as hostages of members of the United States diplomatic and consular staff and 
certain other United States nationals. The Court found that ‘Iran, by cornrnitting successive and continuing breaches 
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of the state contrary to or inconsistent with a given international rule;
34
 failure to comply with 
obligations of treaties it has signed on to.
35
 All these different scenarios can be applied to 
establish breach of an international human rights obligation. 
5.3. State responsibility and the duty to ensure non-state actors do not violate human rights  
Although corporations by themselves cannot be held liable for violation of international human 
rights,
36
 governments, through their constitutions and laws, are expected to and can hold 
corporations accountable and responsible for violation of human rights. The duty on the state 
would necessarily include putting in place measures to ensure that human rights are respected by 
others, including third party non-state actors. Article 21 of the Kenyan Constitution refers to the 
state, organs of state and public officers as the duty bearers in the implementation of rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Although it may at first appear to be a limitation of duty bearers and is 
based on the assumption that these are the exclusive duty bearers, this is not true in view of 
Article 20 of the Constitution, which places a duty on private actors. One possible justification 
for Article 21 could be that the state is charged with the ultimate task of ensuring that all the 
rights are observed and none is violated even when it is not itself the perpetrator.
37
 The duty of 
the state therefore presumes an oversight role over individuals and other entities, including 
business entities, to ensure that human rights of individuals are not violated by anyone.
38
 
At the international level, the state’s primary obligation for human rights has been 
interpreted to include a duty to ensure that third parties have regard for human rights.
39
 Article 2 
                                                                                                                                                       
of the obligations laid upon it by the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, 
the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955, and the applicable rules of general 
international law, has incurred responsibility towards the United States.’33 The Court further held that the 
responsibility thus incurred entailed an obligation on the part of the Iranian State to make reParation for the injury 
caused to the United States.
33
 
34
 See International Court of Justice Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders Case Concerning Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 
1986. 
35
 See International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, ‘Case Concerning the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia)’ Judgment of 25 September 1997. 
36
 See discussion under section on ‘Are corporations subjects of international law’ in Section 2.5.6 above. 
37
 The court in the case of xx highlighted the overall duty of the state by noting that: ‘The very raison d'etre of the 
State is the welfare of the people and the protection of the people's rights and it is its obligation, under international 
and national laws, to ensure that human rights are observed, respected, and fulfilled, not only by itself but also by 
other actors in the country.’ 
38
 Section 40(3) of the Irish Constitution places on the government this oversight role. 
39
 John Ruggie ‘State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the United Nations’ 
core Human Rights Treaties’ (February 2007) available at  
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of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that “Each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant…” (emphasis added). 
Ensuring to all individuals rights under the Covenant will entail going beyond checking its own 
conduct to ensuring that others, non-state actors, do not violate human rights. The Human Rights 
Committee in General Comment 16 on the Right to Privacy has expressed its view that the right 
to privacy is required to be guaranteed against all such interferences and attacks whether they 
emanate from State authorities or from natural or legal persons.
40
 The obligations imposed by the 
right to privacy therefore require the State to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect 
to the prohibition against such interferences and attacks as well as to the protection of the right. 
The ICESCR imposes obligation on states to prevent violation of economic, social and 
cultural rights by both state and private actors. In saying that “Every State has the primary 
responsibility to promote the economic, social and cultural development of its people”,41 the UN 
General Assembly implies that the end of economic, social and cultural development is the goal, 
and the state is expected to ensure this by whatever means. The obligation of the state should be 
understood as conferring on it the responsibility to ensure that private persons within their 
territory respect and do not violate or contribute to the violation of human rights. The UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Committee) directs states to use legal 
or political means to respect the enjoyment of the right to health and to prevent third parties from 
violating the right to health in other countries. General Comment 14 reads: 
While only states are parties to the Covenant and thus ultimately accountable for 
compliance with it, all members of society - individuals, including health professionals, 
families, local communities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, civil 
society organizations, as well as the private business sector (emphasis added) have 
responsibilities regarding the realisation of the right to health. State parties should therefore 
provide an environment which facilitates the discharge of these responsibilities.
42
 
The provision contemplates responsibilities of private actors in realising the right to 
health, and it also speaks to the duty of states to ensure that this happens. Because states are the 
main subjects of international law, human rights law aims at strengthening their obligations 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.humanrights.ch/upload/pdf/070410_ruggie_2.pdf, accessed on 5 August 2014. 
40
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16 on the Right to Privacy.. 
41
 UN General Assembly Resolution No. A/RES/29/3281on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
para 7. 
42
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14, para 42.  
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thereby making them better able to ensure that private persons and entities in their jurisdictions 
respect human rights.
43
 This duty contemplates legislative, administrative and judicial measures 
by the state to guide businesses in respecting human rights and contributing towards their 
realisation.
44
 In drafting the laws and policies necessary to effect the corporate obligation for 
human rights, the state will clearly set out the expectation that all businesses domiciled in the 
state should respect human rights.
45
 In the same General Comment 14, the Committee attributes 
violation of the obligation to protect to the failure of the state to prevent infringement of the right 
by third parties.
46
 In General Comment 15, the Committee enjoins states to prevent abuse of the 
right to water by both citizens and companies.
47
 In General Comment 12, the CESCR further 
observed that “… while only States are parties to the Covenant and are thus ultimately 
accountable for compliance with it, all members of society - individuals, families, local 
communities, non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, as well as the private 
business sector - have responsibilities in the realisation of the right to adequate food”.48 The state 
is expected to provide an environment that facilitates implementation of the responsibilities of 
the different persons, non-state actors, who have an obligation under the ICESCR to realise the 
right to food.
49
  
The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights makes 
the duty of the state even clearer.
50
 It reads: 
The obligation to protect includes the state’s responsibility to ensure that private entities 
or individuals, including transnational corporations, over which they exercise jurisdiction, 
do not deprive individuals of their economic, social and cultural rights. States are 
                                               
43
 Ineta Zimele Human Rights Violations by Private Persons and Entities: The Case-Law of International Human 
Rights Courts and Monitoring Bodies (2009) EUI Working Paper AEL 2009/8. 
44
 Human Rights Council ‘Business and human rights: Towards operationalizing the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ 
framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (22 April 2009) A/HRC/11/13 [Ruggie Report 2009] 14. 
See further discussion on the legislative duty of the state in Section 5.4.1 below. 
45
 Human Rights Council ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework’A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011) [UN Guiding Principles] 7 para 2. 
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responsible for violations of economic, social and cultural rights that result from their 
failure to exercise due diligence in controlling the behaviour of such non-state actors.
51
 
Both the state on the one hand and corporations on the other have roles to play in 
promoting human rights, none taking the role of the other. What is expected rather is an increase 
in awareness by companies of the need to include human rights considerations in decision-
making, and application of means to enforce the obligation. The primary role of states in 
protecting human rights does not mean that business entities have no obligation. The state is 
expected to ensure that corporations and other business entities are placed in check, but 
corporations also have a role to play, a role that is different from that of states. In support of the 
fact that business entities are different from states, Ruggie noted in the UN Framework that: 
[W]hile corporations may be considered “organs of society”, they are specialized 
economic organs, not democratic public interest institutions. As such, their 
responsibilities cannot and should not simply mirror the duties of states.
52
 
Defining the interrelation between the role of the state and the business and clarifying the 
character of the complementarities of this relation will allay the fears of the opponents of human 
rights obligation of business that imposing human rights duties on business reduces the human 
rights obligation of the state.
53
 The effort to create successive codes of conduct to regulate the 
conduct of business with regard to international human rights, culminating in the Protect Respect 
Remedy Framework and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights is an attempt 
to remedy the gap or lack of clarity as to the exact nature of corporate accountability for human 
rights violations.
54
 Ruggie considered his task to identify the distinctive responsibilities of 
corporations distinguishing them from those of the state.
55
 In making this distinction, he came up 
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with the protect-respect categories of obligations, which have nonetheless been subject of 
criticism.
56
 
Although the state has a duty over non-state actors, it will not be responsible for all 
human rights violations that take place in the private sphere. The case of Velasquez Rodriguez v 
Honduras
57
 offers guidance in understanding the obligation of states and elaborates what the 
State Duty to uphold human rights entails. The case against the state of Honduras was that it 
ordered, supported or tolerated the forced disappearance of persons, including the deceased on 
whose account the petition was filed. The decision of the court reiterated the fact that the state 
has a duty to protect the human rights of everyone from abuse, including from abuse by third 
parties (corporations would fall in this category). However, violation of human rights of itself 
does not mean that the state failed to take the necessary preventive measures.
58
 The court in this 
case set the standard for determining the responsibility of the state for non-state actors, holding 
that the state obligation will arise only if the state failed to exercise due diligence to prevent or to 
respond to violations.
59
 A human right violation not directly imputable on the state (for example 
a violation committed by private persons) can give rise to an international responsibility if there 
was lack of due diligence to prevent violation (through having adequate laws in place) or to 
respond to it.
60
 The court was of the view that a failure to seriously investigate the acts of private 
parties operating in the states parties to the Convention would be tantamount to aiding the 
perpetrators and thus make the state responsible at the international level.
61
 
The state can take steps of a legal, political, administrative or cultural nature as 
considered reasonable bearing in mind the violation in question and the context of each state’s 
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circumstances, to prevent violations, to investigate them when they occur, to identify and punish 
perpetrators and ensure victims are adequately compensated as soon as possible.
62
 In the case of 
violations by a private person, which therefore are not directly attributable to the state, the state 
will nonetheless be responsible by reason of failing to exercise due diligence to prevent the 
violation or by acquiescing in the perpetration of the violation through failure to take steps to 
redress it and punish the perpetrators.
63
 In the present case it was held that allowing private 
actors to act freely and with impunity would amount to a failure of the state to comply with its 
obligation under the Convention (American Convention on Human Rights) if it led to violation 
of human rights recognised in the Convention.
64
 This decision was affirmed in subsequent cases 
of the regional human rights bodies and in particular the African Commission on Peoples and 
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.
65
  
The landmark SERAC case was brought before the African Commission of Peoples’ and 
Human Rights by the Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) on behalf of the 
Ogoni people of Nigeria, accusing the Government of Nigeria of violating their rights, of civil 
and political, and economic, social and cultural nature.
66
 The Nigerian Military government was 
involved in oil production through a state oil company, which was the majority shareholder in a 
consortium of oil companies with the Shell Petroleum Development Company.
67
 In the 
Communication, it was argued that the government did not monitor the operation of the oil 
companies to ensure compliance with established regulations; and that there were numerous 
omissions on the part of the state in keeping with international human rights and environmental 
protection standards.
68
 The Commission held that the government has a duty to protect its 
citizens not only through appropriate legislation and effective enforcement but also by protecting 
them from damaging acts by private parties. In making the decision, the Commission referred to 
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the Velasquez case
 69
 determined in the Inter American Court of Human Rights where it was held 
that failure to control private actors and letting them act with impunity resulting in violation of 
rights amounts to violation of the duty of the state to protect its citizens.
70
 
The African Commission in the SERAC Case also referred to the decision in the case of 
Commission Nationale de Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes v Chad.71 Chad was in a state of 
civil war; journalists were attacked and harassed by unidentified individuals whom the victims 
believed to be government agents, a fact which the government denied.
72
 The complainants 
alleged that the government failed to protect their human rights under the African Charter from 
violation by other parties; the government argued that no violation was committed by its agents, 
and it had no control over other parties especially in the country’s state of civil war.73 The 
Commission held that under the African Charter (Article 1), the State was not only required to 
recognise the rights under the Charter, but also to give effect to them, and therefore the failure to 
ensure the protection of the complainants’ rights would constitute a violation, even if neither the 
state nor its agents were the immediate cause of the violation.
74
 
The case of Young, James and Webster v The United Kingdom,
75
 brought before the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1981 is illustrative of the state obligation to ensure 
protection of individual human rights by everyone. The applicants refused to join trade unions 
which all employees were required to join following the signing of an agreement between the 
employer and three trade unions. The applicants argued that the action of their employer 
dismissing them from employment was a violation of their human rights under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The question arose whether the responsibility for the unfair 
dismissal could be attributed to the respondent state, the United Kingdom. The finding of the 
court was that the state had an obligation to ensure everyone’s rights as provided in the 
Convention were secured. The Court held: 
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… if a violation of one of those rights and freedoms is the result of non-observance of 
that obligation in the enactment of domestic legislation, the responsibility of the State 
for that violation is engaged. Although the proximate cause of the events giving rise to 
this case was the 1975 agreement between British Rail and the railway unions, it was the 
domestic law in force at the relevant time that made lawful the treatment of which the 
applicants complained. The responsibility of the respondent State for any resultant 
breach of the Convention is thus engaged on this basis.
76
 
Even though the applicants were private persons, and their employer was also a private 
person, the applicants could seek protection of their rights from the state, which by virtue of the 
Convention had an obligation to enact laws to ensure that everyone’s rights were protected and it 
had failed in this duty. 
In the case of JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd and JA Pye (Oxford) Land Ltd v the United 
Kingdom,
77
 the applicants brought the matter before the European Court claiming that taking 
away of ownership of their land due to adverse possession provisions of the UK’s Limitation Act 
1980 amounted to a violation of their right to property provided under Article 1 of Protocol to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Protocol No. 1). 
In determining whether the matter could be brought against the United Kingdom, the court made 
reference to the decision in Young, James and Webster v The United Kingdom cited above where 
it was held that the existence of the law that made it possible to dismiss the applicants was what 
gave rise to the State’s liability under the Convention. In the Pye case, the court held: 
The responsibility of the Government in the present case is therefore not direct 
responsibility for an executive or legislative act aimed at the applicant companies, but 
rather their responsibility for legislation which is activated as a result of the interactions 
of private individuals: in the same way as the law in James and Others was applied (and 
the Government were responsible for it) because private individuals had requested 
enfranchisement, in the present case the law was applied to the applicant companies only 
when the pre-existing conditions for the acquisition of title by adverse possession had 
been met.
78
 
In the final analysis, the court in the above cases held that the state had an obligation in the 
matter of rights of the private parties, even when it (the State) was not the violator of the rights. 
In what can be considered a matter of good conscience, the state ought to be responsible for what 
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it creates:
79
 if it gives a corporation the right to exist, it must ensure that the corporation operates 
within the legitimate parameters it set out to operate at its creation. Woodrow Wilson made this 
observation at the turn of the 20
th
 Century, concerned about the spiraling of corporations and the 
change in their nature of operations, which in his view called for new approaches and 
modification of laws to suit their new form.
80
 What was true then holds true even now, that the 
changing structure of society demands vigilance on the part of the state in devising means and 
ways of keeping the evolving corporations in check.  
A duty exists therefore on the part of the state, to be responsible for the protection of human 
rights, and this duty, as explained above, includes an obligation to ensure that private entities 
such as corporations do not violate human rights. But how may this duty be understood? The 
section below attempts to outline the various facets which will constitute the duty. 
5.4. Defining the State Duty to Protect 
The ultimate aim of the state should be to ensure that all companies come to an objective 
understanding of their human rights obligations, and that measures are put in place to monitor 
compliance with the obligations, and to punish those who fail to live up to their obligations. 
Ruggie’s Guiding Principles present a common global platform for action, an authoritative focal 
point that can be referred to as a point of reference to direct efforts geared at understanding the 
corporate obligation for human rights. Moral obligations
81
 as those that ensue from Ruggie’s 
findings and Guiding Principles have to be institutionalised through the state
82
 because it is such 
institutionalisation that will give them legitimacy and make them enforceable. Short of imposing 
direct obligations for human rights violations in international law on business entities,
83
 the most 
effective measures to effect corporate obligation for human rights will be the means each state 
adopts in fulfilling its obligation to protect against violation of human rights.  
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In his 2010 Report, Ruggie gives a list of what he sees as priority areas through which 
states can work to ensure corporate responsibility for human rights.
84
 However, these priorities 
must be seen as tasks for states and not solutions in themselves; states must review them in order 
to arrive at a comprehensive means of ensuring respect for human rights in their specific 
contexts. It will be the duty of the state to take upon itself the guidelines and make them practical 
for its specific circumstances. The ideal position is that human rights violations are avoided at all 
costs, that the state ensures that it does not, and no other person or entity violates individual 
human rights. If human rights are violated however, effort must be made to provide remedy for 
the victims, first at the domestic or national level, and only when this fails will recourse be made 
to the international dispute settlement mechanisms: this is what the principle of subsidiarity 
dictates.
85
 
In the course of his work, Ruggie observed the need for further refinement of the legal 
understanding of the State Duty to protect by authoritative bodies at national and international 
levels.
86
 How exactly may the primary obligation of states to prevent human rights violation be 
interpreted? Ruggie’s definition of the State Duty to protect is two-pronged: a negative duty to 
refrain from violating human rights, and a positive duty to ensure the enjoyment or realisation of 
those rights.
87
 Chirwa considers it settled that international human rights law generates three 
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levels of duty for the state – to respect, protect and fulfill human rights.88 He is also of the view 
that the duty to protect
89
 entails an obligation to prevent violations of human rights in the private 
sphere, to regulate and control private actors and to investigate violations, punish perpetrators 
and offer effective remedies for the aggrieved.
90
 The African Commission in the SERAC 
Communication brought on behalf of the Ogoni people against the Nigerian government outlined 
four levels of government responsibility for human rights, which in its view were reflective of 
the internationally accepted duties of governments.
91
 At the primary level, the state was expected 
to respect human rights, which it would achieve by refraining from interfering in the enjoyment 
of rights of individuals and peoples.
92
 This obligation will be applicable in the case of corporate 
human rights violations when the corporation in question is a state entity. The Commission then 
specified a duty of the state to protect human rights at the secondary level; this duty entailed 
implementing an effective interplay of laws and regulations and other relevant means to protect 
individuals and other subjects from violation of their rights.
93
 This duty is discussed further 
below.
94
 The state also had a duty to promote human rights, which it would do by actions such as 
building awareness of human rights, promoting tolerance and building infrastructure.
95
 The duty 
to fulfill human rights requires the state to live up to the responsibilities it freely undertook in 
signing onto various human rights regimes by taking practical means to make the attainment of 
the rights a reality.  
Considering the positive nature of the duty of the state, the question may be asked 
whether the reiteration of the State Duty to protect translates into an obligation for governments 
to provide houses, food and other such material necessities for their citizens. The example given 
by the Commission in the SERAC case of how the state can effect its obligation to fulfill human 
rights is by providing direct food aid or social security to ensure attainment of the right to food.
96
 
Can the government, any government, reasonably and realistically place on itself such an 
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obligation? In the effort to execute the State Duty, a further concern arises: how much faith can 
we have in the duty of states to protect human rights in situations where states themselves are 
incapable or unwilling to tame powerful business enterprises, as may be argued to be the case in 
many developing countries such as Kenya? In circumstances such as these, the power or duty 
given to the state will not lead to the desired end in reality. Nevertheless, the responsibility of the 
state is not diminished by virtue of its inability or unwillingness to fulfill its obligations.
97
 
The principle of subsidiarity will offer a useful guide in answering these questions and 
assisting the state to understand its role. The principle proposes that every action in society 
should be carried out by the persons or entities best suited to the task, without either usurping the 
duties of smaller entities, or relegating to higher authorities what can be done by lesser entities.
98
 
In situations where the most ideal entity is unable or unwilling to execute its duty, the principle 
of subsidiarity exhorts the higher entity to step in and assist, not leaving the subjects in distress. 
If the state is unable or unwilling to protect or promote human rights in its jurisdiction, the 
international community will be entitled to intervene and work to ensure that the individual 
human rights are upheld despite the failure of the state to play its role in securing individual 
human rights.
99
 Subsidiarity thus makes it possible for national and regional human rights 
systems to work together.
100
  
As envisaged in the principle of subsidiarity,
101
 and as Ruggie seems to have conceded in 
taking the position that he did with regard to the Guiding Principles, the international legal 
system ought neither to usurp the authority of states nor to take its place but rather to ‘create an 
environment in which the public authorities of each state, its citizens and intermediate 
associations, can carry out their tasks, fulfill their duties and exercise their rights with greater 
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security.’102 Looking at the duty of the state in similar light, the state ought not to take over the 
duties that rightfully belong to other entities, for example the duty of individuals to provide for 
their needs through their work. The Irish Constitution provides a classic application of the 
principle of subsidiarity where it states in Article 42: 
(1) The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the child is the Family 
and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to 
their means, for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their 
children. 
The same provision goes to provide that … 
(5) In exceptional cases, where the parents for physical or moral reasons fail in their duty 
towards their children, the State as guardian of the common good, by appropriate means 
shall endeavour to supply the place of the parents, but always with due regard for the 
natural and imprescriptible rights of the child. 
The obligation of the state to ensure that individual human rights are protected and 
respected will not translate into a duty to provide education, food or housing freely as sometimes 
is the expectation. If the state takes upon itself obligations or responsibilities that are impossible 
to attain, if it set to do all things that are demanded of it, such as to build houses for the poor or 
to give free education to all, the government would set itself up to be blamed for all misfortune 
that befalls man.
103
 The state ought to and should step in to alleviate any needs that individuals 
are unable – for whatever reason – to meet, but it cannot take on this task as its own in a manner 
that replaces the duty that rightfully belongs to others: parents of families, for example.  
Having set out a general outline of the State Duty for human rights, the study now turns 
to consider what this duty entails. The State Duty to protect as defined by Ruggie is not a 
standard of result, but rather a standard of conduct.
104
 As held in the Velasquez case,
105
 not every 
violation of human rights will give rise to the responsibility of the state.
106
 The government will 
exonerate itself if it can show that it has put in place means to prevent violations by corporations 
and other business entities, and to investigate offences if they occur, punish offenders and redress 
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victims. To achieve this end, the government ought to and should take the requisite steps to 
create a framework that ensures that the political and economic environment encourages business 
operations and investments and at the same time ensures that all business entities conduct 
themselves in an acceptable manner, respecting human rights. The duty of the state will take the 
following forms, taking into consideration the different attempts made to give meaning to the 
duty.
107
 
 
5.4.1. The duty of the state to regulate corporations and monitor compliance with 
corporate obligations 
a) The duty to make laws requiring corporations to respect human rights 
The duty of the state in relation to oversight over the activities of corporations is both preventive 
and reactive in nature. The preventive duty involves making laws to guide corporate activity and 
to prevent harm befalling individuals or groups by the action of corporations. The UN 
Framework and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights provide a foundation 
where both legal and voluntary measures have a “relevant and reinforcing” role to play in 
directing the behaviour of corporations and other business entities.
108
 Ruggie acknowledges that 
the state has regulatory and policy functions and in exercising them it is expected to enforce and 
assess the adequacy of laws that require business enterprises to respect human rights.
109
 
Kenya has ratified a number of international human rights conventions.
110
 It is assumed 
that in signing these agreements, the state acknowledges its obligations and undertakes to be 
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bound by them and to exercise all the measures necessary to realise them. In the past, such 
ratification by itself was not enough to make the obligations signed onto applicable in the 
country because Kenya followed the dualist system, which required the government to pass laws 
for international law to apply in the country. Under the 2010 Constitution, Kenya became a 
monist state and any treaty or convention ratified by the government will form part of the law of 
Kenya.
111
 The duty of the state would thus include the enactment or amendment of laws 
necessary to implement the international obligations. In defining the role of states parties, the 
ICESCR provides that: 
Each state Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
112
  
The provisions of both the Guiding Principles and the ICESCR encourage the use of 
legislative measures, which are perhaps given more importance, although they are not considered 
the only means of achieving the desired end. The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights has established that violations of the right to food can occur through the direct action of 
States or other entities insufficiently regulated by States.
113
 In General Comment 14 on Right to 
highest attainable standard of health, the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
expounds on the state’s obligation to protect the right to health under the ICESCR to include, 
among others, the duties of States to adopt legislation ensuring equal access to health care and 
health-related services provided by third parties.
114
 The state is also given the duty to ensure that 
the privatisation of the health sector does not constitute a threat to the availability, accessibility 
and quality of health facilities, goods and services.
115
 The General Comment further details the 
obligation of the state to include controlling the marketing of medical equipment and medicines 
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by third parties and ensuring that medical practitioners and other health professionals meet 
appropriate standards of education, skill and ethical codes of conduct.
116
 To perform its 
obligations under the Convention, the state needs to enact laws, regulations and other measures 
to ensure that the services provided by the private sector do not violate the right to health.  
Redress for violation of human rights by corporations can be availed through a creative 
reading of the domestic laws of countries in which the corporations operate.
117
 Legislation will 
help to create a hierarchy of measures to be applied and thus give a sense of direction to the 
means applied by the government to ensure that businesses are attuned to human rights.
118
 The 
current Kenyan Constitution, promulgated in 2010, has a Bill of Rights, which contains a wider 
scope of rights compared to the old Constitution. The Constitution, coupled with the completion 
of Ruggie’s work and the proposal of the UN Guiding Principles, creates an ideal environment 
for a review of the state’s effort to ensure businesses respect human rights. As Ruggie points out, 
the ‘failure to enforce existing laws that directly or indirectly regulate business respect for human 
rights’ is a ‘significant legal gap in state practice’.119 
If laws in Kenya relating to companies and company operations are read in light of the 
2010 Constitution, the need for corporations and other business entities to safeguard human 
rights becomes explicit because its provisions on human rights apply directly to juristic persons. 
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya binds business entities under Article 20, and also requires states 
to ensure that human rights are observed by all. To attain this end, the Government has to ensure 
that its laws and policies reflect international standards and that they are in keeping with the 
international obligations it has signed onto. The exercise of vertical coherence will serve to make 
sure that the ‘corporate laws and such other agencies that directly shape business practices are 
informed by the government’s human rights obligations and agencies’.120 This can only happen 
when there is a conscious effort on the part of the State to make the desire expressed in signing 
human rights instruments trickle down and guide the operations of all its departments, especially 
those whose activities are related to the obligations assumed.  
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Having laws gives more direction to companies in their quest to understand and respect 
their obligations.
121
 In the course of his research, Ruggie carried out a Corporate Law Project 
which involved exploring what laws existed and how corporate regulators and courts applied the 
law to require corporate respect for human rights.
122
 Going by the findings of the Report and the 
approaches outlined following the analysis of the country’s laws, it appears that there is no 
coordinated response to the question of human rights and business in Kenya. Regulation of 
responsibilities for business, even what may amount to human rights obligations, exists to a large 
extent in the form of labour laws, environmental laws and laws and regulations on occupational 
health and safety which have thus far helped to shape the understanding by businesses of their 
obligations.
123
  
The question may be asked whether corporations more easily abide by labour and 
environmental obligations because laws exist that deal explicitly with labour and environmental 
issues and punitive sanctions for violation are imposed. It is probable that Kenya’s 
environmental law contained human rights regulations for corporations because this particular 
law is relatively new and therefore up to speed with the developments in the area of human 
rights. All environmental laws in Kenya were put together in one Act, the Environmental 
Management and Coordination Act 8 of 1999 (the Act).
124
 The Act requires companies to carry 
out Environmental Impact Assessment to establish the impact their proposed activities will have, 
thus ensuring that the company only undertakes activities that will not harm the environment. If 
companies have been moved to acknowledge their role in protecting the environment because of 
the laws that provide clarity on expectations, they ought equally to be moved or motivated to 
recognise and respect their responsibility for human rights if the expectations were clarified in 
corporate laws. Because corporate laws shape what corporations do and how they do it, they can 
and should be used to offer a guide to corporations on human rights expectations. 
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Where environmental impact policies exist in a company, they can be referred to to 
provide a guide for checking the human rights impact of the company’s activities.125 The 
National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) is established under the Act as the 
principal instrument of government in the implementation of all policies relating to the 
environment.
126
 The existence of structured institutions that deal with environmental matters 
makes it easier to deal with environmental concerns and make the requirements of the Act 
understandable by companies; the same would apply if structured institutions existed to deal with 
corporate obligation for human rights. The 2010 Constitution also provides for National Human 
Rights Institutions that will offer guidance to the state in living up to its human rights obligations 
in all areas, including in the area of business.
127
 
Before the 2010 Constitution was promulgated, it was foreseen that with an enhanced Bill 
of Rights, parliament would be mandated to enact appropriate implementing laws.
128
 Similarly, 
courts would be bound to provide remedies for violations and certain rights could be protected 
by innovative use of the legislative framework.
129
 To this end, the Constitution of Kenya requires 
the government to ‘enact and implement legislation to fulfill its international obligations in 
respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
130
 Corporations in Kenya are governed 
mainly by the Companies Act.
131
 The Act makes no direct reference to any corporate obligation 
for human rights. The Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) has been 
working with the Kenya Law Reform Commission to ensure that the laws identified as pertinent 
to the implementation of the Constitution are drafted and presented in Parliament for debate and 
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adoption. However, none of the selected laws had anything to do with business entities and the 
expectation of the obligation the Constitution confers on them to uphold human rights.  
The Companies Act of 2015 (the Companies Act) attempts to give wider obligation to 
directors than the previous Companies Act which had been in operation from the time of 
independence over five decades ago, requiring them to consider “social and environmental” 
issues in decision-making.
132
 Section 655 of the Companies Act has some provisions similar to 
Section 417 of the UK Companies Act which, it is foreseen, may be interpreted in the future to 
require compulsory reporting on human rights.
133
 The provision does not talk about reporting on 
human rights directly, but it may be interpreted to include them among the environmental 
matters, or social and community issues that are required to be reported on. Though it is arguable 
that the provision can be used to require respect for human rights, it is vague, and should be 
further amended to clarify the expectation and make it align with the provision of the new 
constitution that binds companies to the Bill of Rights. In addition to Section 655, Section 704 
gives the relevant Minister the power to determine the form and content of financial statements, 
in effect offering the state the opportunity to give a comprehensive guide to companies on what 
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they are expected to report on in order to meet their human rights obligations.
134
 The issues 
which the Minister may outline in offering a guide for businesses to report on and therefore to 
implement in the operation of the business will be considered in in more detail below. 
Under the Companies Act, a person who claims to have been, to be or to be about to be 
adversely affected by the conduct or contemplated conduct, by the failure, or by a threatened 
refusal to do what is required under the Act, may apply to court for an injunction restraining the 
concerned person from engaging in the undesirable act, or forcing him to do what is required 
under the Act.
135
 This provision can be applied by third parties to institute proceedings against 
the company for violations or impending violation of their human rights. A more extensive 
proposal for use of the Act’s provisions together with proposed amendments necessary to effect 
corporate respect for human rights are discussed in Chapter Eight below. 
 
b) Corporate reporting as a means to offer guidance to corporations in executing their human 
rights obligations 
Once laws have been put in place laying down what corporations must do to uphold human 
rights, adequate reporting requirements must be applied to give further guidance to corporations 
on how to execute their obligations. An ideal way of ensuring awareness and action by 
corporations is to require mandatory reporting by corporations on their human rights obligations. 
Human rights reporting will ensure that corporations go beyond financial considerations and 
concern themselves with all aspects that affect stakeholders in a systematic manner. This will be 
a practical means of monitoring efforts made by business entities to live up to their human rights 
obligations and will help to foster corporate cultures respectful of human rights.
136
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In the Corporate Law Project carried out by Ruggie,
137
 only in a few of the more than 40 
jurisdictions studied did the existing corporate reporting requirements consider human rights 
related risks as factors determining materiality and therefore worth reporting on.
138
 The previous 
Companies Act of Kenya which had been in operation for over six decades had no clear 
requirement for reporting on the social impact of the company and its activities or aspects that 
may have a bearing on its human rights obligations. The repealed Companies Act made 
provision only for financial reporting; section 157 of the repealed Act required the directors to 
submit a directors’ report which dealt with the state of the company’s affairs (usually interpreted 
as financial affairs), the dividends and reserves recommended. An Auditor’s report was required 
in terms of the provisions of the Seventh Schedule of the Act which also only attests to the 
financial situation of the company.
139
 However, the position has changed in the Companies Act 
of 2015, which provides for reporting on non-financial issues which can be interpreted to include 
human rights concerns. 
Ruggie proposes in the UN Guiding Principles that the company should be able to 
communicate its human rights impact through formal public reporting.
140
 The Guiding Principles 
propose that the state should encourage and require such communication, and that financial 
reporting should clarify whether human rights impact is material or significant, and that 
corporations should consider having integrated financial and non-financial reports.
141
 For this 
proposal to be workable, there may be need for incentives for business to genuinely engage with 
human rights. Realistically, corporations exist to make profits and have done so for a long time; 
to move them out of this mind-set, they may need incentives that make business sense. These are 
more likely to work for the benefit of both parties, as opposed to using laws for a merely punitive 
role, demanding that businesses get out of the traditional perception of their role at the risk of 
punishment.  
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As an incentive for reporting, Ruggie suggests that the State could promise to give weight 
to self-reporting in judicial and administrative proceedings against the company.
142
 He also 
proposes that the state passes laws to clarify what and how business should communicate. This 
proposal is met to a certain extent under the proposed Companies Act 2015 of Kenya, which 
elaborates what a directors’ report should look like. As an incentive for business, and for 
practical purposes, the principle of progressive realisation can be applied to implement the 
corporate responsibility for human rights at the level of the corporation if immediate realisation 
is not reasonable or feasible.
143
 The implementation of corporate policies that will incur costs the 
company is not able to offset in a year for example can be required to be spread over several 
years, with particular targets for each year. A reporting and audit system can be put in place to 
check the implementation over the audit period.
144
 Progressive realisation should allow for 
capacity building and institutional change.
145
 The implementation of systems to implement and 
monitor compliance with human rights at the corporate level may require enhancing the capacity 
of company staff to understand human rights. Allowance may need to be made to enhance 
corporate features such as the risk and audit systems to factor the human rights risks and impacts. 
Clear principled means to assess reasonable burdens and time frames applicable in specific 
contexts should be put in place so that the provisions of the law on human rights are practical and 
corporate policies implemented have an effect and lead to meaningful change in corporate 
behaviour.
146
 
5.4.2. The duty of the state to investigate, punish and redress human rights violations 
In addition to enacting legislation to ensure that third parties conform to international human 
rights standards, the duty of the state includes a reactive obligation to put in place accessible 
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means of redress in the event of violation.
147
 The state will therefore be in breach of its duty not 
only by making a positive contribution to the violation of human rights, but also by failing to 
take steps to prevent violation, or if it occurs, by failing to investigate the incident, punish the 
perpetrators and redress the victims.
148
 The duty to react or respond to violations was also 
stressed in the Velasquez case,
149
 where the Inter American Court of Human Rights held that the 
state would be considered as having acquiesced and therefore be guilty of human rights 
violations even when it was not itself the perpetrator if it failed to take steps to redress the 
violation and punish the perpetrators.
150
 
Investigation into allegations of violation of human rights must not only be undertaken as 
an initiative of private actors or the families of victims but rather by the state, as its legal duty.
151
 
The Inter American Court of Human Rights in the Velasquez case held that the standard set for 
carrying out an investigation is not that it must produce efficient results, but rather that ‘it must 
be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective’.152 
The state will meet its obligation not because the result of a rights-violation-free society is 
achieved, but because it puts adequate measures in place to offer the necessary guidance, and to 
ensure that any violation is redressed.
153
 
At its present stage of development, Kenya is not too far from that dark history where the 
state contributed to the violation of human rights with impunity. The culture of human rights 
violations and disregard for the rule of law by state officials in Kenya had taken root over many 
years, and it will not be surprising that even with a new Constitution, the attitude behind 
violation of rights may take a long time to root out. Kenya ratified the ICCPR in 1972. Despite 
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this fact, the country was saddled with numerous human rights atrocities especially in the years 
when a single political party ruled the country. As a result of a coup attempt in 1982, Kenya was 
transformed into a de jure one party state and detention laws previously suspended were 
reinstated.
154
 Numerous constitutional amendments were made unopposed by parliament, aimed 
at strengthening the presidential powers, such as removal of the security of tenure for the 
Attorney General, the Controller and Auditor General and judges, effectively placing the 
judiciary under the control of the executive and reducing the legislature to the role of rubber 
stamping the decisions of the executive. The president of the country at the time resorted to 
centralisation and personalisation of power, and any attempt to criticise his leadership or engage 
in competitive politics was criminalised.
155
 In the view of some, political power in the country 
revolved around the president. The State was seen as a preserve of those in power, and for a long 
time it was known and seemingly accepted, even by the other arms of government, that despite 
the existence of laws, the executive made the final decisions.
156
 
Such an authoritarian style of leadership characterised the first president of the country 
and patronage came to be accepted as the reward for blind loyalty.
157
 For many years, persons 
considered political dissidents were held in infamous underground cells in a government building 
within the capital city and tortured because of the views they held, or on the basis of 
unsubstantiated claims they were alleged to have made.
158
 Being a power unto itself, the State 
was able to disregard human rights contained in its very Constitution, and to do so repeatedly 
because the Executive had unchecked powers and no one questioned what it did. For lack of 
independence, the Judiciary also failed in its role as a guardian of the rights of the people. To 
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effectively move away from this past demands a concerted effort on the part of the state to 
understand and play its role in advancing human rights. 
 
The principal role of the courts in punishing and redressing human rights violations 
In the absence of constitutional limitations to competing human rights, the judiciary will be faced 
with an arduous task for which it has no corresponding constitutional guidance.
159
 The courts 
will be faced with the difficult mission of deliberating and deciding the place of human rights in 
business. The exercise of political power must be subject to the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
whose administration is entrusted to the courts.
160
 In the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the courts 
are given the authority to uphold and enforce the Bill of Rights.
161
 They are expected to “develop 
the law to the extent that it does not give effect to a right or fundamental freedom”162 and thus 
ensure that human rights are accorded the importance that is due to them through a proper 
interpretation of laws.
163
 The judges come in between the legislature that makes the laws, and the 
people on whose behalf they are made, to keep the legislature within its assigned authority and to 
interpret the given laws.
164
 This is an important task that the courts play and it demands 
independence and the ability to weigh up the different and at times numerous factors arising in 
the analyses.
165
 In dealing with the question of corporate accountability for human rights, what 
has the attitude of the Kenyan courts been? 
The conduct of the Kenyan Judiciary has had a long history of ineffectiveness and 
corruption, and has thus not always inspired the confidence of the people. Following a 
constitutional amendment in 1988, high court judges held tenure ‘at the pleasure of the 
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president’.166 Persons who openly criticised the leadership or policies of the ruling party were 
detained without trial and under inhuman conditions.
167
 Judges who disagreed with the decisions 
of the ruling party were dismissed.
168
 In the 1980s, British judges were seconded to the Kenyan 
government on contracts that were renewable at the pleasure of the Government.
169
 This fact 
made the British judges susceptible to manipulation by an executive that was bent on doing 
exactly that, and which did not hesitate to issue directives to the judges in matters in which it had 
an interest.
170
 In 1990, following an outcry over the lack of independence that the lack of security 
of tenure would give rise to, the Government relinquished the tenure to a disciplinary tribunal 
appointed by the President and charged with the discipline of judges.
171
 Although in a less direct 
manner, the executive interference in judicial function continued. 
With no means to assert their constitutional rights, censure of political opposition and use 
of rogue means to silence those not in the ruling party became the norm. The State interfered in 
political cases
172
 and judges refused to hear cases by the opposition against the ruling party.
173
 
There were no institutions in the country responsible for the enforcement of human rights
174
 and 
the judiciary which could have played the important role of giving life to the otherwise lifeless 
rules on paper was too compromised to offer effective guidance, owing to its lack of 
independence. Under the old Constitution of Kenya, it was established law that in matters of 
constitutional rights, the court could be approached in any manner and that in such cases the 
substantive issues raised ought not to be defeated by negligence or omissions in procedure.
175
 
Disregarding this fact, in a case of breach of fundamental human rights brought before it, the 
High Court absurdly held that it had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter because no 
rules had been enacted to enforce the Bill of Rights as required.
176
 In a subsequent case,
177
 this 
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decision was upheld, and the court dismissed the case on procedural grounds, declaring 
inoperative the constitutional provision that gave it original jurisdiction to enforce fundamental 
rights and freedoms.
178
 The courts thus, following these precedents, refused to hear cases on 
breach of fundamental rights and freedoms because in their view, jurisdiction could only be 
conferred by statute and could not be assumed from the constitutional provision.
179
 In making 
these decisions and charting a course to be followed in later cases, the court went against 
precedents it had set in earlier cases.
180
 In earlier cases, Ooko v Republic
181
 and Madhwa v City 
Council of Nairobi
182
 the court had applied the Constitution to grant the claimants’ rights. The 
court’s decisions were further entrenched in the case of Felix Njagi Marete v The AG183  where it 
was held that ‘The Constitution is not a toothless bulldog nor is it a collection of pious 
platitudes. It has teeth and those teeth and in particular are to be found in Article 84’.184 To have 
later refused to apply the same Constitution to grant the rights claimed was a clear contradiction 
of the courts’ own decisions.185 
The advent of multi-party politics in the country in 1992 brought an apparent 
transformation of the judiciary. With the change of government and a more transparent judiciary, 
many victims of the human rights violations of the single party era got courage to seek redress in 
the courts, and they were compensated for the human rights violations they had suffered.
186
 This 
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would appear to give a certain level of confidence in the judicial system and its ability to ensure 
protection and respect for the human rights of all, at least in theory. Nonetheless, by 2003, almost 
a decade into the multi-party Kenya, the Judiciary was still facing many challenges and was far 
from the ideal.  
Following continuous complaints of corruption, the Judiciary Committee on Reforms and 
Development was revived and a subcommittee established, headed by a High Court judge, to 
investigate allegations of corruption in the Judiciary, to identify its forms and identify the corrupt 
members.
187
 A number of judicial officers were implicated in corruption, misbehaviour or want 
of professional ethics, a list of shame published and those mentioned advised by the Chief Justice 
to resign.
188
 While some of those named opted to resign or were retired in the interest of the 
public, others decided to face disciplinary tribunals.
189
 This exercise was dubbed a ‘radical 
surgery’ of the Judiciary; it was given much publicity and seen as what the country needed at the 
time to manage the corruption scourge. However, yet another decade on, corruption and 
inefficiency in the Judiciary were topics still very much talked about in the country. In a bid to 
change this perception, a competitive and transparent selection process was introduced and all 
judges required to re-apply for their jobs.
190
 
Upon taking office in 2011, the new Chief Justice described the judiciary as “so frail in 
its structure, so low in its confidence, so deficient in integrity, so weak in public support that to 
have expected it to deliver justice would have been wildly optimistic”.191 Despite the progress 
made with the advent of democracy, and the transformation pursued with the radical surgery of 
an inept institution, the Judiciary was still described as an institution ‘designed to fail’.192 Power 
was centralised in the person of the Chief Justice, accountability mechanisms were weak and 
reporting requirements were non-existent.
193
 In an environment such as this, it would be 
unrealistic to expect delivery of justice or for the Judiciary to act as the guardian of the rights of 
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the people and institutions as it was expected to be. More than two decades into a multi-party 
democracy in Kenya, the search is still ongoing for a judiciary that upholds the rule of law, 
dispenses justice fairly and effectively, validates and enforces human rights.  
It is worth noting that in spite of the challenges it continues to face, a change in attitude 
of the Judiciary cannot be denied. In the multi-party democratic era, the Kenyan courts became 
clear on the question of access to courts on issues of fundamental rights without the need to 
exhaust all other available alternatives,
194
 thereby giving human rights their due importance. In 
the 2010 Constitution, the right of access to courts is given further clarity in a provision that talks 
about the enforcement of the Bill of Rights, which is liberal on the question of who may institute 
court proceedings, and the importance to be given to procedural technicalities in matters that are 
brought to court on the issue of fundamental rights and freedoms.
195
 Article 22 of the 
Constitution allows every person to institute court proceedings claiming that a fundamental 
freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated or infringed, or is threatened. 
Additionally, proceedings may be instituted by a person acting on behalf of another person, a 
person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; a person acting in 
the public interest; or an association acting in the interest of one or more of its members.
196
 The 
role of the courts in ensuring access to remedy for victims of corporate human rights abuse is 
discussed further in Chapter Seven below.  
 
5.4.3. The duty of the state to ensure policy coherence 
In creating the Protect, Respect Remedy Framework and the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights to operationalise it, the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the 
UN for transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, established that 
the duty to protect was understood by the states.
197
 In his view, what was what is less understood 
in his view is the different policy options the state can employ to fulfill this duty with respect to 
business activities.
198
 He noted that even within existing legal principles, the policy dimensions 
of the duty to protect would require increased attention and more imaginative approaches from 
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states.
199
 In his 2008 Report, Ruggie pointed out a few specific areas which in his view required 
policy alignment.
200
 He talked of vertical incoherence (when the state fails to implement the 
human rights obligations it agrees to take on by signing international treaties) and horizontal 
incoherence (when different government departments work at cross purposes or fail to work with 
one mind to promote the human rights obligations the state has agreed to take on in theory). He 
highlighted the need to ask the question how the different government departments could work 
together to foster the state’s human rights obligations and the agencies charged with 
implementing them. He also pointed out the need to balance investor interests and the human 
rights obligations of host states as seen in the contents of trade agreements.
201
 Ruggie further 
proposed as an urgent priority for government the task of formulating policies to guide 
corporations to manage the risks they could not manage on their own, including the dynamic 
social risks arising from interactions of communities with businesses.
202
 
In Kenya’s latest development policy, Vision 2030 (the Policy), the government pledges 
its commitment to the supremacy of the constitution and respect for the Bill of Rights and 
individual human rights of the citizens
203
 and at the same time underscores its willingness to 
respect the property rights of investors, both local and foreign.
204
 In meeting the numerous but 
focused objectives of the strategy, the government pledges its commitment to ‘the rule of law 
applicable in a modern market based economy in a human rights-respecting state’.205 As a 
specific objective, the government goes further to express its aim to ‘align the national policy 
and legal framework with the needs of a market-based economy and national human rights and 
gender equity commitments’.206 Although initially criticised for not having undergone a human 
rights audit,
207
 the Government is said to have requested the help of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) to support the integration of human rights into the national 
development blue-print, with the aim of shifting its focus from economic growth and 
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infrastructure to reducing disparities caused by poverty and inequality. This move is 
commendable as it embraces the human rights approach heralded in the 2010 Constitution.
208
  
The Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) worked with the 
Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and the National Stakeholder’s Forum to 
give a constitutional focus to the development of the 2
nd
 Medium Term Plan for implementing 
the Policy.
209
 The 2
nd
 Medium Term Plan lays out the development agenda for the country, 
including the implementation of the Constitution.
210
 The Ministry of Planning developed human 
rights-based indicators to ensure that the development championed under the Policy is guided by 
human rights.
211
  
However, notwithstanding the good will expressed in the Policy, abiding by the high 
ideals set will require a more concerted effort by the government agencies and departments 
concerned with trade. Government initiatives have so far fallen short of the standards idealised in 
this forward-looking overall Policy. In the Government of Kenya, Ministry of Industrialisation 
and Enterprise Development, Strategic Plan (2013-2017) the Government outlined its plan for 
attracting local and foreign investment; none of the proposed measures were directed at the 
requirements the investors would be expected to meet. This was the same case in the Kenya 
Private Sector Development (KPSD) Strategy, a policy tool developed to deliver the Economic 
Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation of Vision 2030, Kenya’s development 
blueprint.
212
 The KPSD Strategy which was developed to enhance private sector growth and 
competitiveness states that the aim of the government was to create a conducive business 
environment by alleviating major constraints. The improvements targeted included simplification 
and elimination of licenses and the creation of an e-registry to operate as a point of reference for 
investors to find information on the licenses they needed to operate a business in the country. 
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The regulatory improvement exercise undertaken by the government was geared solely at 
making the licensing conditions favourable for investors.
213
  
Following the experience in other areas that showed that central oversight units within 
government are essential to coordinate reform efforts, a Business Regulatory Reform Unit 
(BRRU) was established.
214
 The purpose of the BRRU was to monitor all regulatory regimes to 
ensure that new regulatory requirements did not create unnecessary burdens on businesses.
215
 
The regulatory reform exercise was completed with considerable success.
216
 The BRRU was 
established, an e-registry set up, a number of licenses eliminated and a single business permit 
introduced, making it easy for businesses to commence operations. Nevertheless, nothing was 
mentioned in the reform efforts about the obligations the investors were expected to meet; 
nothing was highlighted about the need to ensure that the private sector played its part in 
upholding and not violating human rights. The KPSD Strategy notes the promotion of rights as a 
function of the political pillar of Vision 2030, but does not itself make any reference to human or 
fundamental rights or the need of their promotion by the private sector. Throughout the Strategy 
reference is made to deliberations on intellectual and industrial property rights, but nothing of 
human or fundamental rights.  
Balancing interests between business and human rights in the 2010 Constitutional context 
will involve balancing the quest for investors against human rights of individuals; this presents 
no easy task. As a robust and growing economy, Kenya must be concerned to minimise negative 
impacts of human rights, a goal that requires the incorporation of efforts to recognise and 
demand respect for human rights in its national policies and strategies. One of the measures that 
the state can take to ensure corporate responsibility for human rights is making demands on 
investors to have a human rights policy.
217
 It is proposed that the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) National Investment Policy Guidelines (the Guidelines) be 
applied as a guide for national policymaking. Application of the UNCTAD Guidelines will 
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enable the government to effectively play a guiding role, helping it to align government practices 
with its human rights obligations. 
The Guidelines consist of a set of core principles for national investment policy-making. 
The Guidelines, which are applicable as a policy framework, propose that states include investor 
obligations in the investment agreements, in addition to the treatment and protection of investors, 
which is what most states focus on.
218
 The Guidelines propose that host governments require 
investors to comply with its laws and regulations, and that they adhere to international standards 
of responsible investment, including standards set by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights.
219
 The UNCTAD Guidelines propose that governments encourage compliance 
with high standards of responsible investment and corporate behaviour, through incorporating 
existing standards into regulatory initiatives, and/or turning voluntary standards (soft law) into 
regulation (hard law).
220
 Investment policies should be grounded on a country’s overall 
development strategy. They should have a balance of rights and obligations for the state and the 
investors.  
A conscious effort to ensure coordination between government departments that deal 
with business, trade or investments and those that are directly concerned with the promotion of 
human rights will contribute to the development of a consistent response to human rights 
concerns by government, and this will make it easier to demand the same of business.
221
 The 
Investment Promotion Act 6 of 2004 makes provision for the Kenya Investment Authority. The 
Authority can play the role of coordinating all agencies responsible for investment to ensure that 
there is coherence at the national level on the procedures and expectations of investors and that 
these ascribe to international best practice, including human rights standards. The powers of the 
Authority are all directed in favour of the investor, to assist investors in obtaining license and 
exemptions, to review the investment environment and propose changes that would promote and 
facilitate investments among other duties.
222
 None of the obligations give the Authority power to 
ensure that investors respect the laws and institutions of the country. Granting of an investment 
certificate and license under the Investment Promotion Act should be predicated on business 
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entities having a human rights policy, whose implementation will be monitored through 
reporting obligations as proposed under the Companies Act, and the renewal of the license be 
subject to successfully meeting its human rights obligations including measures taken to mitigate 
or redress any negative impact arising from their activities. It should further be a requirement 
through an agreement between the concerned ministries
223
 that an investment license will be 
retracted if companies are found to be in continual breach of their human rights obligations. 
 
5.5. The need for an action plan for business and human rights 
Unlike other countries in Europe and elsewhere that have built upon the UN Guiding Principles 
to develop national plans, there appears to be a lack so far of concrete national action plans on 
business and human rights in African countries.
224
 This failure to devise national action plans or 
lack of interest in doing so both within governments and among business entities could be 
attributed to an ignorance of the existence of initiatives following Ruggie’s extensive research 
and proposals at the conclusion of his mandate.
225
 In fulfilling their obligation to protect against 
human rights abuse, states are expected to provide effective guidance to businesses to enable 
them respect human rights through their operations.
226
 Governments should work to ensure that 
companies and other business entities are alive to the impact of their operations so that they can 
adequately prepare to prevent or mitigate them.
227
 The process of developing a national 
framework will raise awareness of the pertinent issues in all the relevant sectors and amongst the 
stakeholders and provide the necessary guidance to government departments and agencies, civil 
society and rights holders.
228
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The 2010 Constitution makes a clear case for the application of the Bill of Rights to 
companies: companies are thus expressly required to respect and uphold all the rights contained 
in the Constitution. The effort to implement the Constitution must therefore include proposals of 
what will be done to actualise Article 20(1) which binds corporations to the Bill of Rights. 
Without a conscious effort on the part of the government to find application of the provision 
binding legal persons to the Bill of Rights, if juristic persons are left unpunished for the human 
rights violations they commit or contribute to, the bill as espoused in the Constitution will in a 
considerable part remain good theoretical ideas confined to the boundaries of the paper they are 
written on. Without an effort on the part of government to ensure that corporations abide by the 
Bill of Rights as the Constitution provides, it will have failed in its duty to protect against the 
violation of human rights. 
Despite the failure by government to consider the human rights obligation of business as 
an important topic in its own right, there have been efforts in other quarters to highlight this 
issue. The organ of state tasked with ensuring compliance with its human rights obligations, the 
KNCHR,
229
 in 2011 outlined proposals that the state and business entities should put in place to 
operationalise the Constitution.
230
 The proposals were contained in a report, the first of a series 
of reports intended to review the operationalisation of the Bill of Rights and offer proposals to 
aid policy makers and implementers in implementing the Constitution.
231
 The Commission 
acknowledged the binding nature of Article 20 of the Constitution on business enterprises, noting 
that it “unequivocally brings to all businesses operating in Kenya new constitutional 
responsibilities in respect of human rights.”232 
The KNCHR observed that the Framework prepared by Ruggie on Business and Human 
Rights, and the UN Guiding Principles enjoined the Government to provide a roadmap for the 
application of the Bill of Rights to businesses.
233
 To this end, the Commission proposed the 
review of business laws such as the Companies Act and Partnership Act to infuse in them human 
rights principles and ensure that they complied with human rights requirements.
234
 It was noted 
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that the Companies Act was already under review and some improvements had been made, for 
example inclusion of a requirement for directors to consider the interests of employees, 
suppliers, customers and other stakeholders in decision-making.
235
 It was further proposed that 
the Government be cognisant of its duty to protect human rights when considering investment 
agreements, for example in the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) investment transactions where 
tax and labour law exemptions were given to attract foreign investors in the EPZs.
236
 In spite of 
the proposals given, the Government’s ultimate strategy and action plan to implement the 2010 
Constitution did not include any of the suggestions made.
237
 Had the proposals made by the 
Commission been considered by the Government, they could have made a useful contribution in 
efforts to implement Article 20 of the Constitution.  
The Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) was set up under the 
2010 Constitution to monitor the implementation of the Constitution and ensure that the spirit of 
the Constitution is respected.
238
 The CIC was mandated to “monitor, facilitate, coordinate and 
oversee the development of legislation and administrative procedures necessary to implement the 
Constitution”.239 Following a meeting between the CIC and the Ministry of Justice, National 
Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs on 15 June 2011, it was agreed that a National Policy and 
Action Plan for Human Rights be drafted to offer a guide to implementers of the Constitution.
240
 
The Office of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, which is the Ministry in 
charge of human rights, developed a National Policy and Action Plan for Human Rights
241
 in 
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consultation with the KNCHR
242
 to operationalise Chapter 4 of the 2010 Constitution, with the 
objective of making the wide array of human rights it contains accessible to all.
243
 
The National Policy and Action Plan on Human Rights was developed following 
consideration of best practice examples from other countries and wide consultations with 
stakeholders such as civil society, Faith Based Organisations and government agencies. The 
public expressed their views on what was of importance to them and the National Policy and 
Action Plan was seen as genuinely reflecting national priorities.
244
 The document provided a 
“comprehensive and coherent framework that elaborates broad human rights principles to guide 
government and other actors in carrying out programs, strategies and plans that will enhance the 
realisation and enjoyment of rights by the people of Kenya”.245 
Development of the Action Plan for human rights was motivated by the realisation that 
the inability to attain the desired human rights impact in the past was caused by the lack of a 
“comprehensive framework [that would] create cross-sectoral and cross-agency 
collaboration”.246 The Action Plan thus purported to offer a comprehensive and coherent 
framework bringing human rights principles into national development, planning and 
implementation across all sectors.
247
 The Action Plan highlighted the priorities of the state for 
the following five years and was to guide government ministries and departments, the law 
makers and the Judiciary in their actions and decisions relating to human rights.
248
 The National 
Policy and Action Plan was expected to provide the basis for the people to evaluate the national 
and county governments and hold them accountable for the realisation of their human rights.
249
 
The identification of priority areas of focus for the Action Plan was further premised on a 
baseline survey on the status of human rights in Kenya, conducted in 2005.
250
 The Survey 
highlighted gaps in the effective realisation of human rights and made recommendations of what 
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could be done to remedy the situation.
251
 The responsibility of business for human rights was not 
one of the recommended areas. Perhaps a reason for the omission to say anything of the 
obligation of business is because the baseline study was conducted in 2005, prior to emergence 
of the heightened international debate and deliberations on business and human rights via the 
United Nations Special Representative’s mandate, which only began in that year. Of interest also 
regarding the attitude of Government is the fact that in a 2014 report highlighting the State’s 
compliance with the ICESCR, the only reference made of compliance by business with human 
rights is the signing by many businesses of the Code of Ethics for Business, pursuant to the 
provisions of the Global Conduct.
252
 Nothing is said of the efforts made to implement the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights which were operational by that time. 
In the quarterly report for the period after the decision to draft the Action Plan, the CIC 
noted that the National Policy and Action Plan was one of the policies set to be audited by the 
Commission in 2012 to ensure that it complied with the “letter and spirit of the Constitution as 
well as the integration of human rights.”253 When the Action Plan came for review in the CIC, it 
was rejected.
254
 The main reasons given for its rejection were its failure to reflect the rights-
based approach contemplated in the Constitution, and that the methodologies adopted in 
preparing it gave precedence to international instruments over the Constitution.
255
 It was also 
rejected for not giving importance to the new structure of government where counties were 
expected to play a critical role in the implementation of human rights.
256
 
Among the recommendations given to the Commission for the revision of the Action 
Plan were that it outlines all the rights enumerated in the Constitution and provide the 
Government position regarding their implementation; that the Action Plan be cross referenced to 
the Vision 2030 Development Policy as a guide to implementers of the Policy; that it outlines the 
approaches the national and county levels of government would pursue to uphold each right; also 
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required was an elaboration by the Government, as the bearer of the “bulk” of the obligations 
relating to human rights, of what it perceives the Bill of Rights demands of it, including expected 
standards to be met.
257
 On the basis that the Constitution binds all state organs, it was proposed 
that the Action Plan should identify the state actors that bear the duties for the different rights; it 
was further proposed that the Action Plan incorporate the underlying fundamental constitutional 
values and principles and other values highlighted in the Constitution.
258
 Additionally, the CIC 
directed the Ministry to consider: the need for (i) broad formulation of the government‘s position 
and what is to be pursued with respect to each right; (ii) Constitutional obligations and 
international obligations relating to the rights; (iii) relevant legislation in [listing] relevant laws 
and a plan for legal reform; (iv) designated implementers; (v) broad statement on challenges and 
how these are to be addressed; (vi) resources (including institutional and human) and budgetary 
requirements.
259
 
Nothing is mentioned in the subsequent reports of the CIC about the progress made, if 
any, to the proposed amendment of the National Policy and Action Plan. In the Quarterly Report 
for the Period April to June 2012, under the sub topic “Engagements with Ministries on the 
effective implementation of the Constitution” the Commission merely noted that:  
[The] Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs is the Ministry 
in charge of constitutional matters and a partner with CIC on implementation matters 
including procedures and deadlines for enactment of Bills under the Constitution. The 
Ministry is also coordinating the national civic education programme on the Constitution 
and is also the ministry in charge of human rights having spearheaded the development 
of the National Policy and Action Plan on Human Rights.
260
 
No further work on the Policy and Action Plan was brought to light. The 
conclusions/recommendations formulated during the interactive dialogue during the periodic 
review of Kenya held by the HRC 19-30 January 2015, make numerous repeated calls for Kenya 
to finalise the process of adoption of the national policy and action plan for human rights, and to 
ensure its full operationalisation.
261
 However, assuming that the Policy and Action Plan will be 
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amended and re-drafted following the indications of the Commission, the critique of the policy 
document for failure to consider business and human rights as a field to monitor and ensure 
compliance with the Constitution still stands. Nothing of the Commission’s elaborate 
recommendations for the revision of the National Policy and Action Plan touches upon business 
entities and their obligation under the Constitution to uphold human rights. Although the reality 
remains to be seen, it is unlikely that a revised draft of the Policy and Action Plan would include 
provisions on the role of business entities in the implementation of the Constitution.  
5.6. Conclusion 
Following the observation that countries generally and Kenya in particular lacks a coordinated 
response in dealing with the question of business and human rights, this Chapter has proposed 
the application of the UN Framework and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights to guide the state in executing its duty to protect against corporate violation of human 
rights. Only when rights are not only rhetorically asserted but can be demanded as legal 
entitlements will human rights law become an effective system for protection of human dignity. 
It makes no sense to assert rights which cannot be claimed or guaranteed; existence of a right 
means there is a duty holder who bears the responsibility of ensuring the right is secured.262 The 
Human Rights Council in a Resolution dated 23 June 2014 recognised the role that national 
legislation can play in the protection, promotion, fulfilment of and respect for human rights, at 
the same time expressed concern that weak national laws and implementation could not serve to 
mitigate the negative impact that human rights can have.
263
 Corporate laws shape what 
corporations do and how they do it – because of this, corporate laws can and should be used to 
offer a guide to corporations on human rights expectations. The Companies Act of Kenya can be 
applied to give guidance and hold corporations accountable to their human rights obligations if 
applied as proposed in more detail in Chapter Eight.  
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The National Policy and Action Plan for Kenya was drafted after the release of the UN 
Guiding Principles, and it would have been expected that reference would be made in to the 
effort being made to comply with the Guiding Principles. Considering the size of the business 
sector, in terms of revenues generated, people employed, livelihoods sustained and the immense 
power that this sector has to impact individuals’ human rights, it is a grave oversight not to 
include any directives relating to business entities in a national Policy and in the accompanying 
Action Plan devised to guide the implementation of the Constitution for a period of five years. 
Such oversight lends itself to the real possibility that human rights in the business sector will be 
relegated to a secondary position, and this may lead to continued incidences of violation, at times 
serious violation, as has happened in the past. Within the context of a new constitutional order 
and the quest to give the most sublime meaning to life, human rights, which are founded on the 
dignity of the person, ought to find application in the lives of people and not merely be 
presuppositions that remain in laws and constitutions. Human rights are principles (as opposed to 
mere rules)
264
 and must be considered as the guiding directives for the formulation of all 
government policy, laws and decisions including those relating to businesses. 
The state has the primary duty to uphold human rights, but the corporations and other 
business entities also have a role to play. The next chapter seeks to define the obligation of the 
corporation in upholding human rights. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. PILLAR II: THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT 
6.1. Introduction 
Pillar II of the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework on Business and Human Rights 
provides for the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The primacy of the duty of the 
state to protect against human rights violation does not in any way preclude the responsibility of 
business for its actions.
1
 Many issues that directly touch on human rights are no longer the 
exclusive concern of the state, as might have been the case in times past. The right of access to 
many of the economic, social and cultural rights is dependent on private actors; private 
companies for example play a major role in the pharmaceutical industry, determining the ease or 
otherwise of medicines and thereby affecting the realisation of the right to health. The provision 
of services such as security, water, electricity and the building of public amenities like roads are 
no longer the exclusive concern of governments. The harm envisioned as likely to befall 
individuals by the action of the state in providing for these basic human needs can arise from the 
private actors, which must also therefore be required to uphold international human rights 
standards and be held responsible for any violations they cause or contribute to.  
The duty of the state to protect against human rights violations is a traditionally accepted 
obligation of states in International Law;
2
 but the corporate responsibility to respect lacks 
universal acceptance at the international level and is seen by some as a ‘new’ precept developed 
by Ruggie.
3
 Though initially defined in a broad and general manner,
4
 Ruggie later describes the 
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corporate responsibility to respect as a ‘well established and institutionalised social norm’.5 The 
norm he contemplates has “near-universal” recognition by all stakeholders and requires 
businesses to avoid causing or contributing to human rights violations, to address them when 
they occur and to seek to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts directly related to their operations.
6
 
The duty thus defined is not law and with no legal basis and even if it had wide acceptance, it 
would at best be soft law. Ruggie further defines the corporate responsibility to respect as the 
baseline norm for all companies in all situations, but he does not say how the duty he proposes 
for corporations and businesses is to come about, or who should recognise it – this creates an 
important gap.
7
 Ultimately, the corporate responsibility to respect would appear to be 
inspirational, binding no one; it would seem only a social or ethical expectation as was the case 
before Ruggie’s intervention.8 
In so far as he distinguishes the human rights obligations of states from that of 
corporations, arguing that the former’s position in international law is more certain than the 
latter’s, one would appreciate Ruggie’s argument. International law, under which international 
human rights law falls, looks at states as subjects, and international treaties, conventions and 
other instruments which embody these laws place obligations for the fulfilment of the laws on 
the state. This cannot be said, at the international level, of corporations. However, business 
entities, keen to be good corporate citizens, have abided by labour and environmental laws, and 
strove to create CSR policies to govern their relations with the communities around them. In 
doing this, they integrated human right principles in their operations perhaps without expressly 
calling them human rights. The argument therefore that the obligation of corporations with 
regards to human rights is only a social norm is therefore not accurate. The Constitution of 
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Kenya states that the purpose of recognising and protecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities and to promote social justice 
and the realisation of the potential of all human beings.
9
 In seeking to preserve the dignity of the 
person therefore, the Constitution secures the protection of human rights outlined in its Bill of 
Rights, and binds all persons to it, including juristic persons such as corporations. Contrary to 
Ruggie’s allusion of a mere social norm, there is therefore, at the very least, a legal obligation on 
corporations to respect all human rights, which this chapter will attempt to define. 
In further defining the corporate obligation for human rights, this chapter supports a 
move away from the shareholder supremacy concept. Whereas the shareholder can be said to be 
the main stakeholder in the corporation, around whom the corporation revolves and without 
whom it would not exist, without the other stakeholders who make an input to the operations of 
the corporation as suppliers, employees, customers or the wider community, the corporation 
would not function optimally. This chapter reviews the positive aspects that Ruggie devices to 
make the corporate responsibility to respect human rights effective: the requirement for 
corporations to carry out human rights due diligence; and the expectation that corporations will 
integrate human rights policies throughout their operations. The chapter also addresses the 
question which human rights are relevant to business, whether corporations can be held 
accountable for a limited list of rights, or whether they can violate and be held accountable for 
violation of any human right.  
Ruggie considers the remediation part of the corporate responsibility to respect. This is 
well noted, but this study will review remediation at the corporate level under the chapter on 
access to remedy which consolidates all the different means available to provide access to 
remedy for victims of human rights abuse. 
6.2. Defining corporate obligation for human rights 
Ruggie defines the responsibility to respect as comprising responsibility to do no harm: to ‘avoid 
causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts’ and to ‘seek to prevent or mitigate 
adverse human rights impacts’.10 He describes the corporate responsibility to respect as a 
baseline responsibility to comply with national laws, and to respect human rights; a 
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responsibility owed by the corporation as part of a social license to operate.
11
 Defining the 
corporation’s obligation as a social expectation is restrictive.12 What happens when social 
expectations change? In addition, social inconsistencies arise because the enforcement of the 
responsibility is dependent upon the ‘courts of public opinion’.13 The duty of corporations is 
defined in the UN Guiding Principles as a ‘global standard of expected conduct’ and not a legal 
obligation as in the case of states.
14
 Unlike obligations whose breach will subject the state to 
legal courts, breach of expected social conduct will subject the corporation only to ‘courts of 
public opinion’ which includes employees, communities, consumers, civil society, or investors.15 
If this conclusion is accurate, it begs a further question: can social expectations provide a 
sufficient grounding for corporate obligations for human rights?
16
 
In defining the responsibility to respect vaguely, Ruggie uses language that makes it 
difficult to enforce and can leave room for corporations to get away with not fulfilling 
anticipated duties. If the obligation is founded on a social license to operate as Ruggie argues, it 
is highly unlikely that those who give this license, the very people whose rights the corporation 
can violate with impunity, will have the power to revoke the license. The possibility of an 
effective court of public opinion is even less in a developing world context where consumers 
might not be informed, or may lack sufficient or affordable options to ignore the corporation that 
violates human rights.
17
 
Lack of a legal basis of enforcement implies that corporations can look at their role in the 
question of human rights as a matter of choice, charity or beneficence and not as something they 
are obliged to live up to.
18
 Some  attribute the consensus achieved in the Human Rights Council 
with regard to Ruggie’s work to the fact that the corporate responsibility to respect he crafted is 
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not a traditional or formal legal obligation
19
 and therefore there was no need to object to them as 
legal obligations. This non-binding definition of corporate responsibility was perhaps opted for 
as part of the compromise strategy to achieve maximum consensus from all states and business 
enterprises and steer away from the methodology applied in developing the previous attempts to 
create binding international obligations, which had failed.
20
 The UN Norms on Business and 
Human Rights attempted to create binding obligations on corporations, giving the impression 
that human rights law applied directly to corporations. At the start of his work, Ruggie reviewed 
the Norms and rejected them on grounds that they made exaggerated legal claims – that human 
rights law applied to corporations directly – and for what he called conceptual ambiguities and 
doctrinal excesses.
21
 The difficulty he then faced in his task was to avoid creating direct legal 
obligations of corporations for International Law (as the Norms had tried to) and yet at the same 
time come up with corporate obligations that have an impact in preventing corporate violation of 
human rights.
22
 
The question of corporate obligation requires an appraisal of corporate ownership and 
purpose. Who are the owners of the corporation? And what is the basis for determining that they 
are owners?
23
 The traditional definition of a corporation is a profit making entity owned by 
shareholders and run by management on their behalf, and whose major if not exclusive concern is 
the shareholders, the suppliers of capital who are often justified as the primary stakeholders.
24
 The 
shareholder provides capital for the business and needs profits to be made in pursuance of a 
given goal; he (principal) cannot do it himself, so he gets and agent (directors/management) to do 
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it for him.
25
 The main party to the contract has always been perceived to be the shareholder, and 
this perception has tended to make everything revolve around the shareholders’ interests, usually 
interpreted as profit making.  
The traditional principal-agent model of the corporation thus provides a general overview 
of the corporate entity and how it ought to be run, and any proposal that sought to offer a more 
inclusive description of the relationship has been resisted on grounds that it stands the danger of 
giving managers who are custodians of the contract more leeway to use the residual resources of 
their principal for purposes they did not approve. Seen in this light, the concerns of other 
stakeholders such as human rights concerns of employees and communities affected by the 
corporations’ activities are seen as marginal, and thus ignored. However, a human rights due 
diligence exercise should lead the business entity to note its impact on its stakeholders, seeing its 
duty as owed to a  wider audience than shareholders, and comprising of more than a duty to ‘give 
back’ to the community.  
In addressing the subject of corporate accountability, it is noted that many companies 
define their human rights obligations in terms of CSR.
26
 This research has dealt with the question of 
CSR in Chapter Four above, discussing the fact that corporate social responsibility is not the same as 
human rights responsibility, making the case for an unambiguous adoption of human rights language in 
corporate policies. The problems of the stakeholder debate (justifying shareholder supremacy) 
which include the lack of a benchmark to measure directors’ performance and what weight to 
give to the different stakeholder groups
27
 take on a different turn if human rights, rather than 
social responsibility are the concern. Human rights are objective and the question of compromise 
between competing interests ought not to arise. In distinguishing corporate social responsibilities 
from human rights, one writer says that “rights are not mere gifts or favours, motivated by love 
or pity, for which gratitude is the sole fitting response. A right is something that can be 
demanded...”28 The challenge lies in making all human rights obligations of business universal; 
so that business entities are obliged to uphold human rights not as a matter of charity but rather a 
question of commitment and enforceable responsibility. The Constitution of Kenya, in providing 
for the horizontal obligation of juristic persons to respect human rights creates a legal obligation 
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 Dine Janet Companies international trade and human rights (2004). 
28
 Joel Feinberg Social Philosophy (1957) quoted in Bilchitz op cit note 3 at 120. 
    
190 
 
for corporations to respect all human rights. What the new push for business and human rights 
(expressed in the provision for horizontality) demands however is that human rights language be 
made explicit in the operation of business and be referred to as such. This will be a challenge, 
especially because human rights language was initially phrased referring to the state, and now 
has to be applied to non-state entities. This requires contextualising of the rights to give them 
meaning and to provide for their redress.
29
 
The substantive content of the corporate responsibility to respect directs companies to 
draft human rights policies and ensure they are well integrated in the company’s operations. The 
UN Guiding Principles direct corporations and other business entities to follow the International 
Bill of Human Rights and the human rights principles contained in the International Labour 
Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work to determine the 
scope of their responsibility.
30
 This requirement gives a more grounded focus to the corporate 
responsibility to respect, guiding corporations as to the level of expectations placed on them. As 
part of their responsibility to respect, business entities are required to carry out impact 
assessments, track their performance and outline any preventive or mitigation measures they put 
in place to prevent, manage or reduce negative human rights impact. Companies can make use of 
existing systems for assessing financial risk, modifying them where necessary to assess and 
report on the human rights risk of its activities. The a fusion of the demands of the Constitution 
together with the Guiding Principles offered to be applied in the particular contexts of each state 
can give rise to proposals for amendments to the laws regulating companies in Kenya, in order to 
create enforceable human rights obligations for corporations.  
 
6.3. Challenges in defining a corporate obligation for human rights 
One of the challenges in defining a corporate duty for human rights arises from the long history 
of state-only obligation for human rights. The general view has been that states and not non state 
actors have responsibilities for human rights in international law.
31
 Conventional international 
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law32 for long assumed that the state as the principal subject of International Law and as party to 
the international treaties that codify human rights has a monopoly of power which it could use to 
the detriment of individuals.
33
 The state was thus to be solely held accountable for violations of 
human rights and be a sufficient guarantor of human rights protection for individuals.34  
In the recent past, the question of human rights and business has received more attention, 
and different reactions have arisen seeking to address the concern.35 In the broad field of 
international law, several attempts to codify corporate obligations for human rights have been made, 
mainly indirect efforts through voluntary codes.
36
 Additionally, numerous initiatives are made to 
create internal codes of conduct either company-specific, designed specifically for a company in 
its particular context, or as part of a number of industry-level private initiatives promulgated to 
offer guidance to corporations in the area of human rights or general social responsibility.
37
 In 
these initiatives, businesses take on proposed guidelines or create guidelines specific to their 
entities and incorporate them in their activities out of their own volition. As a result of the 
multiplicity of initiatives, there has been for a long time the lack of a focal point in the business and 
human rights debate and a confusing environment38 that does not make it easy to establish clear 
duties and obligations for business. The intersection between human rights and business has been 
described, and arguably remains ‘chaotic and unclear’.39 Navigating the existing initiatives and 
making a place human rights within the popular but arguably different policies on CSR will not 
be easy.  
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Although both states and corporations can be argued to have a duty to uphold and respect 
human rights, the corporate human rights obligations differ from the duty of the state. The 
entities are fundamentally different in nature; corporations are profit making entities created to 
serve the interests of shareholders, and states are public democratic entities elected to serve the 
interests of citizens. Because business entities are specialised organs of society, their duties 
cannot mirror those of states.
40
 State duties are better understood, but may not provide relevant 
lessons for corporate application. Clarifying the duties of states and corporations will ensure that 
there is no fear of corporations taking over state human rights obligations or falling short of the 
ideal in providing for them.
41
  
Another challenge for business will be defining the extent and scope of expectations 
owing to the wide variety of corporate obligations identified, and the level of expectation to 
place on the state in terms of guidance for this task. Following his work and findings, Ruggie 
ultimately only offers guidelines for states and businesses based on existing standards and 
practices,
42
 but he leaves it up to the states to apply the principles as befits their context and 
circumstances.
43
 So far, no institutional mechanism exists to enforce the principles formulated by 
Ruggie, raising concerns about how they will be implemented. Jurisdictions that have attempted 
to enforce the corporate obligation for human rights have not been as successful as would have 
been imagined, with practical challenges leading to less than optimal court decisions on the 
meaning of corporate obligation for human rights.
44
 This apparent set back raises the question 
whether the limitation of human rights law as a means to ensure corporate obligations for human 
rights are upheld seems much more than its potential.45 
Three categories of human rights obligations for corporations have been identified; direct 
obligations which exist and are defined in international criminal law and whose enforcement is in 
international law, for example the obligation not to be complicit in perpetration of crimes against 
humanity such as genocide; direct obligations defined in International Law but whose 
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enforcement is left to states; and a third category, indirect obligations which corporations have a 
duty to ensure but whose exact nature is left to states to define, and whose enforcement is to be 
carried out by states.
46
 For practical and political reasons, the direct obligations with enforcement 
in International Law are the fewest (crimes against humanity), and the indirect obligations the 
majority.
47
 It is argued that for administrative reasons, it is not very practical to entrust to the 
international order the obligation to adjudicate and redress numerous violations.
48
 Yet again 
something of such a grave nature as crimes against humanity should not be limited to the 
jurisdiction of the state alone: in the event that the state is unwilling or unable to come to the aid 
of victims of such serious claims, the victims ought to find a means of redress through the 
intervention of others. 
Once determined, the corporate obligation for human rights will be implemented with the 
guidance of state governments. Under the indirect responsibility, states have an obligation to put 
measures in place to ensure corporations in their jurisdiction do not violate human rights, and 
therefore are responsible for any corporate violations that may occur.
49
 Following the proposals 
for governments to provide clear, practical actions that business entities must take in order to 
discharge their human rights obligations, one may ask whether it is in the place of government to 
offer such practical directives. The size of the corporation and the industry in which it operates 
determine the human rights it is likely to impact, and therefore the obligations it will be expected 
to uphold. It may therefore be unreasonable for corporations generally to expect clear, practical 
guidelines from the state as such and it may be more reasonable that corporations come up with 
these guidelines themselves. What then is the silver thread that links what needs to be done, what 
corporations can or should do, and what role the government should play? Government cannot 
do everything, it should not, and it should not do what corporations by themselves can do.
50
 To 
be effective, any corporate obligations for human rights with respective duties for the state and 
corporations must be effectively defined and understood by the state, by the business entities it 
regulates and by the individuals it seeks to protect.  
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Codes of conduct or other regulatory provisions that make unrealistic demands which go 
beyond the capability of the business entity or its nature as a profit making entity would reduce 
their regulatory effectiveness.
51
 It would be undesirable to place excessive obligations on 
business entities as they could lead to inordinate dependencies between employers and workers, 
reproducing paternalistic relationships.
52
 An example would be the expectation that business 
entities ought to provide for the socio economic rights of employees, for rights such as education 
and housing. Despite constitutional provisions binding the corporation to the Bill of Rights, the 
South African courts have been conservative in holding that corporations have a positive 
obligation to provide for human rights. The courts have been reluctant in applying the 
Constitution horizontally to juristic persons, despite the provision of Article 8(2) of the 
Constitution which binds corporations to the Bill of Rights. The reason given for the reluctance 
of the courts to make radical decisions holding that corporations are bound by the Bill of Rights 
was that Article 8(2) did not directly extend to economic, social and cultural rights (which 
generally are more directly linked to corporations than civil and political rights) owing to their 
inherently limited nature; ie their subjection to availability of resources and progressive 
realisation. If they are by nature limited, economic, social and cultural rights cannot be 
demanded of corporations unconditionally.
53
 If such an attempt were ever made, it would not be 
implementable.  
A challenge in defining the corporate obligation for human rights  may arise with regard 
to claims referred to as rights but which do not feature in conventional human rights categories, 
namely civil and political rights or economic, social and cultural rights. One example relevant to 
corporations in a direct way is consumer rights. Consumer rights are in the list of rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya.
54
 An attempt has been made to justify 
consumer rights as human rights for a number of reasons, including the ground that it contributes 
to the right to dignity (sic).
55
 Consumer rights have been said to fall into a third 
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generation/category of rights which have not been recognised internationally as human rights, 
but which have been approved by the various organs of the UN.
56
 It has also been said that 
consumer rights are economic rights, and therefore will find protection under economic and 
social rights.
57
 The right to consumer protection has also been found to exist under the UDHR by 
extrapolation or indirect association: that consumer rights are aimed at protection of the 
consumer’s health and well-being.58 Making reference to the constitutions of Portugal, Spain, 
Brazil and Switzerland which have consumer rights protected in the constitution, one author 
argues that their being placed in the constitution enhances their status and places them at par with 
other human rights.
59
 
If consumer rights and other emerging rights not found in the international Bill of Rights 
were to be considered human rights, a greater challenge will be faced by corporations to define 
their activities in light of these new or emerging rights as and when they emerge.
60
 Their 
recognition in some constitutions and not others goes against the notion of universality of human 
rights, and may present a problem when recognised in the constitution of a host state for 
example, but not the parent state of a trans-national corporation. Enforcing such rights may result 
in different results in the different countries. 
With the growth of the corporation, there is recognition that a purely shareholder-centric 
concept of the company, which may have held some truth at the founding of the corporation, is 
now only a one sided and incomplete perception of the modern day corporation. In reality, there 
is much more to the corporation than the principal and agent. In an analysis of the sale of a 
corporation which was offered at much more than the value of its assets and shares, it was found 
that the difference in value between the selling price and the asset value was attributed to the 
value of “human capital”.61 There is an undeniable aspect of intellectual capital, the knowledge 
and experience of employees without which production would not be optimal; these too need to 
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feature in an accurate definition of the corporation.
62
 If this is the case, it would be imprecise to 
continue talking about the owner as if he were the shareholder only.
63
 
 A further challenge will be defining the obligation of business entities within the unlimited 
scope they have to undertake whatever objects are desired. Over the years, corporations have 
grown in size, social function and the attendant power to impact society. Initially, the operations 
of the company were limited to its objects clause which was thought necessary for purposes of 
protecting the shareholders on the one hand, and creditors on the other hand.
64
 The objects of a 
company were drafted to make it clear what precise object the company sought to fulfil. If the 
company transacted in objects beyond those specified in its objects clause, the transactions 
would be declared ultra vires, which means ‘beyond the power’. Companies, being creatures of 
law, can only engage in activities that the law expressly allows them to
 65
 and anything beyond 
that is considered ultra vires or beyond the capacity of the corporation. In the early stages of its 
application, the ultra vires doctrine was meant to do away with the assumption that companies, 
being persons, had the same powers and capacity as natural persons. Unlike an individual who 
could do anything, corporations were held to be legally able to carry out only the activities it was 
created to carry out as prescribed in its memorandum of association
66
 and implied powers to do 
all things necessarily incidental to or consequential upon the attainment of the specified 
objects’.67 This position was given judicial credence in the case of Ashbury Railway and 
Carriage Company v Riche.
68
  
Realising the limitation of the objects clause on the capacity of a company to carry out 
certain activities, company lawyers were quick to navigate this predicament and articles were 
subsequently drafted to include all possible activities a company could undertake or participate 
in. From the initial corporation which was formed for a specific and limited purpose, the modern 
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corporation has evolved into an entity with unrestricted objects
69
 and therefore capable of doing 
all things incidental or conducive to the carrying on of any trade or business.  
The just repealed Kenyan Companies Act (of 1948) made provision for the doctrine of 
ultra vires by stating that the memorandum of association of the company shall state the objects 
of the company.
70
 The Act provided for amendment of the objects by special resolution, but even 
then not in a manner that substantively alters its initial intended main objective of the company.
71
 
However, similar to the current UK Companies Act 2006, the Kenyan Companies Act 2015 does 
away with the doctrine altogether by providing that the objects of the company are unrestricted, 
unless its articles of association provide otherwise.
72
 The Companies Act now enables a 
company, at least in theory, to do anything and pursue any objectives as it deems fit from time to 
time. 
 The main aim of the ultra vires doctrine is protection of the shareholders and other parties 
who deal with the company from the outside: shareholders because they need the assurance that 
the money they invest in the company is used for the purpose for which it was intended at its 
giving; and the other third parties because they need to know the extent to which the company 
can lawfully deal with them.
73
 When the objects of the company become too vague because they 
are too wide, the creditor fails to get protection in the event that the mind of the creditor and 
‘company’ did not meet at the time of contracting. In the absence of the doctrine of ultra vires, a 
creditor cannot seek protection against a company for losses incurred in a transaction which the 
company could not have properly completed. Looking at the doctrine from another perspective, 
it would also be useful for purposes of giving the context in which the directors and management 
are expected to be knowledgeable. If a corporation’s main goal is the building of roads, the 
expectation that management would be competent in the areas incidental to building of roads, 
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and that they would also be conversant with matters related to the processing of milk and milk 
products is unfounded. 
6.4. Responsibility of business for all human rights 
Defining the corporate responsibility to respect human rights necessitates answering the question 
which human rights business should be responsible for. While some argue that businesses can 
violate any and thus should be responsible for all the recognised human rights,
74
 theory seems to 
associate businesses with some human rights and not others.
75
 It may be argued that economic, 
social and cultural rights such as the right to work and earn a fair wage are associated with 
business entities as much as, if not more than, the civil and political rights such as the right to life 
or a fair trial, for example. Defining the obligation of business in some instances can be complex 
and those who argue that corporations are responsible only for some human rights and not others 
raise a valid concern. What exactly would an obligation in the area of socio economic rights 
mean, for example the obligation with regard to the right to food or education? What will amount 
to breach and how can they be held accountable for violation of this right?
76
 Would corporations 
be required to run schools, or distribute food in the communities? In view of the difficulties that 
have been faced in the effort to embrace and enforce socio economic rights in the countries 
where they have been adopted, such a question is not totally unanticipated. Additionally, with 
further regard to socio economic rights, concepts such as progressive realisation apply, and these 
rights are subject to the availability of resources, meaning that they would not imply exactly the 
same thing in different states. If such cases, the connection between human rights and business is 
not straightforward; yet the universal nature of human rights and freedoms is beyond question 
and its meaning in the context of corporate human rights obligations must be grappled with.  
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The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action of 1993
77
 characterised human rights as 
universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.
78
 Limiting the list of human rights that 
businesses can violate would go against the concept of universality and interdependence of 
rights; if all rights are related and interdependent and necessary to uphold the dignity of the 
person, it would not make sense to let businesses get away with violating some of them. The 
Vienna Declaration went on to say that ‘Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the 
birthright of all human beings; their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of 
Governments’.79 Human rights exist despite their recognition or otherwise by governments. They 
should be upheld whether or not they are defined in instruments, and should not cease to exist 
merely because they stop being recognised in a country’s statutes or corporation’s regulations, or 
because they are complex to define.  
One of the arguments advanced against the notion of universality of human rights is that 
in the face of so many different cultures, which define and limit values and rights, nothing can be 
universal.
80
 Some developing countries argue that some rights are simply not relevant to their 
societies
81
 or that the poorer countries are battling with numerous other fundamental concerns 
considered of greater importance such as economic development and consolidation of state 
structure, that the quest for human rights is not paramount.
82
 The view of the United States 
government of the economic, social and cultural rights supports this perception. Opposed to the 
very notion of this category of rights, it has been said that:  
[A]t best, economic, social and cultural rights are goals that can only be achieved 
progressively, not guarantees. Therefore, while access to food, health services and quality 
education are at the top of any list of development goals, to speak of them as rights turns 
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the citizens of developing countries into objects of development rather than subjects in 
control of their own destiny.
83
 
Whereas there may be some legitimacy in this observation, the fact remains that human 
rights are not rights because they can be afforded, and neither do they become rights when they 
can be afforded, but rather they are entitlements by the fact of being human, which fact should be 
recognised independent of the ability to provide for them. And whereas the USA may hold this 
view of the rights, it has systems in place, for example social security and food aid programs, 
that ensure that these basic needs are met, whether they are listed as rights in the constitution or 
not. The American view of ESCRs goes to support the point that rights are not rights because 
they are written in the Constitution, and whether or not these basic needs are recognised in their 
Bill of Rights, they are nevertheless given due importance and measures are taken to ensure they 
are met. If rights are universal therefore, the dilemma of which rights corporations should be 
held responsible to protect becomes marginal, the main point being the need for business entities 
to acknowledge their role in respecting all fundamental human rights that arise in the course of 
their operations.  
John Christopher Anderson discusses the evolving duty of corporations to respect human 
rights, noting that what was once perceived as a social duty was now becoming an issue of 
concern for the profitability of companies: consumer action against negative conduct has forced 
companies to re-consider their decisions.
84
 He discusses a number of initiatives that have been 
applied by international organisations, private corporations (internal private codes) and 
governments to address human rights abuse.
85
 It is noteworthy however that all the examples 
discussed show efforts to address the abuse of civil and political rights such as child labour, 
forced labour, discrimination and health and safety of employees at work. This seems to reflect a 
bias in corporations and governments against economic social and cultural rights giving the 
impression that corporations do not violate this latter category of rights. John Knox attempts to 
rationalise the apparent bias, noting that human rights are more likely to be specified the more 
susceptible they are to violation by private actors, for example labour rights.
86
 Other human 
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rights that may not find application to all corporations and would depend on the nature of each 
corporation’s activities would not ideally be the subject of a law that applies to all corporations. 
The Human Rights Council asked the Special Representative to elaborate on [his] view 
that businesses have a responsibility to respect all human rights and to provide concrete guidance 
to business and other stakeholders expressed in his report on the issue of human rights and 
transnational business and other business enterprises.
87
 In his report on the issue of human rights 
and transnational business and other business enterprises,
88
 Ruggie elaborates findings from a 
survey indicating that businesses violate human rights of all natures (ie including the economic, 
social and cultural rights hitherto not as widely recognised as the civil and political rights) and 
not only the traditional labour related rights as narrowly understood by many.
89
 In his view, 
businesses can infringe any of the internationally recognised human rights and should therefore 
be responsible for respecting, promoting and protecting all these rights.
90
 
If the task of creating a hierarchy of applicable rights was undertaken, two options exist. 
First, to establish internationally agreed upon corporate-related human rights standards and then 
seek to protect human rights according to what the company deems relevant to their business. 
This option would stand the danger of using limited rights to impose ‘imprecise and expansive 
responsibilities’ on the corporation.91 Ruggie notes that there cannot be a limited list of rights to 
which corporations must look to identify their responsibilities because they can violate any of the 
recognisable human rights. Second, a rights-based approach could alternatively be used, where 
companies take on universally accepted human rights as declared in the international instruments 
and work back to define corresponding policies and practices. A rights based option, the latter 
approach, has the advantage of creating specific responsibilities for corporations with regard to 
all rights. The approach the companies take must proceed from the premise that human rights are 
universal and ought to be applied with equal force and uniformity by all. This remains a 
challenge for most states.  
                                               
87
 In Resolution 8/7 paragraph 4(b). 
88
 Ruggie Report 2008 op cit note 1. 
89
 Addendum to Ruggie Report 2008, op cit note 1 - A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 Business and human rights: a survey of the 
scope and patterns of alleged corporate-related human rights abuse. See also Ruggie 2008 Report, para 52. 
90
 The Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights (BLIHR), UN Global Compact and the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) ‘The Essential Steps for Business to Respect Human Rights Guidance 
Note’(Guidance Note) available at 
http://www.integrating-humanrights.org/data/fe/file/ES%20final%20for%20web.pdf, accessed on 6 August 2014. 
91
 Ibid at 15. 
    
202 
 
When all is said and done about which human rights are relevant for business and which 
are not, the task of ‘hierarchising’ rights, some being considered fundamental and others not, fails 
because it leads to mystifying of rights rather than clarifying them.
92
 A question that arises in this 
endeavor is, if rights are not considered fundamental should they be ignored? And if not, to what 
end is such classification done? It would be much easier and more practical to follow the existing 
list of rights contained in the international human rights documents. The UN Guiding Principles 
state that the corporate responsibility to respect includes all the rights recognised in the 
international Bill of Rights.
93
 The particular responsibility of businesses will depend on the right 
in question, the capacity of the entity to make an impact on the human rights in question and the 
nature of the activities of the company.
94
 
 
6.5. Creating a corporate culture respectful of human rights 
Much trust is put on the ability of the business entities by themselves to be propagators of the 
human rights cause. In the absence of laws enforcing the corporate obligation to respect human 
rights, corporations will be expected to uphold human rights on their own volition. In any event, 
even if such laws existed, corporations would be expected to comply not merely because of the 
sanctions for non-compliance, but because they have an interest to operate without violating 
human rights. They will succeed in this task by creating or developing a corporate culture that 
respects human rights.  
Culture may be defined as: 
… information capable of affecting individuals’ behaviour that they acquire from other 
members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social 
transmission.
95
 
The information about human rights ought to be understood first by business entities, and 
then at all levels of the entity. This information can be transmitted through means outside the 
law. A culture of respect for human rights will enable the business to carry out its core functions 
as intended, without viewing respect for human rights as an additional task they need to create a 
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separate department for. Policies are the instruments that translate the ideas proposed or created 
by the law into action. Private initiatives are seen by some as being more favourable than 
government intervention in addressing the issue of human rights; this view proposes that 
government intervention should only come in to give guidance to the private initiatives.
96
 John 
Knox supports this opinion, and points out that although an international mechanism would be 
more effective, more uniform and predictable in specifying the scope and content of private 
duties for human rights, it is more important to have a clear and uniform understanding of what 
the duties anticipated are.
97
 These duties can then be specified and human rights due diligence 
standards and applied by corporations as needed. 
To give form to what would otherwise seem as a negative duty requiring companies only 
to refrain from violating human rights, Ruggie’s responsibility to respect includes a positive duty 
to carry out a human rights due diligence.
98
 
 
6.5.1. Human Rights Due Diligence 
The corporate role in advancing human rights will be expressed in awareness of the need for 
vigilant human rights due diligence in all its operations. Such responsibility, while being linked 
to what many business entities already carry out as part of their corporate social responsibility, is 
however much more than that: something as fundamental as human rights cannot be “left to the 
whim of companies, and to the vagaries of voluntary codes of conduct and CSR initiatives”99.  
The intention behind the UN Guidelines was not to create a new international legal order 
but rather to establish a common global standard that maybe applied by the different states and 
by business enterprises to bring about or ensure respect for human rights.
100
 Guided by the 
recommendations proposed in the Guidelines, the Kenyan government can put in place measures 
to meet certain obligations, and working within such a framework stipulated by government, 
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companies can be guided to aspire to meet the international standards of human rights 
compliance. What form will this guidance take?  
The due diligence requirement is a relatively new concept, appearing for the first time in 
Ruggie’s 2008 Report,101 a fact which raises questions about its status.102 There is no legal 
obligation to conduct the human rights due diligence, and as yet there is no agreement on the 
most effective way to carry it out.
103
 In defining the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights, Ruggie talks of a due diligence requirement for business to enable them identify and 
mitigate any possible negative impacts, or where they have already occurred, to address such 
adverse effects.
104
 Carrying out due diligence will enable business entities to understand and 
define their responsibility to respect because it provides a methodology for them to evaluate and 
address human rights risks and impacts.
105
 Any human rights due diligence ought to cover all 
adverse impacts the business may cause at any given stage of its operations, meaning that the 
exercise to identify and mitigate negative impacts should be continuous in order to cover any 
evolving risks or operating circumstances.
106
 Undertaking a human rights due diligence would 
require companies to think beforehand of the possible risks their business activities will pose to 
individuals and communities and plan how to overcome them.
107
 
Surya Deva argues that human rights due diligence is counterproductive, and that there 
would be serious implications of transferring its meaning from the commercial context, where it 
looks to the welfare of the company, to the legal and human rights discourse which looks to the 
welfare of human beings.
108
 It would be important therefore to consider this fundamental 
difference in assessing and factoring in the risk arising from human rights assessment compared 
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to the other risks the business may face; the former involves human beings and cannot therefore 
be a mere business calculation of probabilities as would be in the case of the latter.
109
 
The pillar of the Protect Respect Remedy Framework on corporate responsibility to 
respect presupposes that market driven human rights can be effective enough to advance the 
human rights agenda, guided only by moral expectations.
110
 Market forces will be relied on to 
place a check on the delivery of expectations. However, it is debatable whether market forces by 
themselves are sufficient to force compliance with social obligations by companies. The due 
diligence expected of corporations cannot happen solely through market forces.
111
 For markets to 
operate optimally there is need for ‘adequate institutional underpinnings’112 where human rights are 
integrated in the values of the business and executed in its operations. Even in an ideal market 
system where the forces of demand and supply reign supreme and government regulations or 
interference is kept to a minimum, only with perfect competition would all concerns be 
mitigated. A company exists to make profits and it will make the most profit if it has consumers 
for its services. In a perfect market, consumers will have a choice and will go to the supplier who 
supplies the best product at the best price. It would thus be in the best interest of the business 
enterprise to produce efficiently, produce goods of superior quality and sell them at the best 
price.  
However, perfect competition is not the usual case; market inefficiencies, imperfect 
information, government policies and such other reasons make it impossible to have a perfect 
market. The quest to get customers and make sales to generate the maximum profits is thus 
saddled with ethical concerns; disregard for quality; unfair means of production such as cheap 
labour; disregard for the means of production, application of cheap and unethical means to 
reduce production costs; disregard for the environment among other concerns. Developing a 
human centered approach to business management is thus considered one of the important 
directions that the concept of human rights due diligence has to take in the next few years.
113
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Ruggie gives guidance on what would constitute an ideal model of human rights due 
diligence. Conducting a human rights due diligence demands that the company have a statement 
of policy articulating its commitment to respect human rights; that it carry out a periodic 
assessment of actual and potential human rights impacts of its activities and relationships; that it 
integrates these commitments and assessments into internal control and oversight systems; and 
that it tracks and reports on their performance.
114
 The Guiding Principles should be used by 
business entities in Kenya to devise what would be an ideal model to carry out human rights due 
diligence. Possible measures that can be applied by corporations in creating a culture respectful 
of human rights are discussed below. 
 
6.5.2. Corporate policy statement articulating human rights obligation 
The business entity must undertake the exercise of assessing human rights impacts, and ensure 
that the findings are communicated and integrated at all levels of the business. The question what 
form the assessment will take can be answered in different ways. The human rights assessment 
can either be incorporated into existing apparatus, such as environmental and social impact 
assessments, or when this is not possible, an independent assessment of human rights may be 
undertaken.
115
 The business entity can either have a human rights policy statement that stands 
alone, or it could be incorporated in the other areas of the business under which concerns typical 
of human rights are considered, for example its social and environmental policies.
116
 Whatever 
form of policy articulation the business adopts, it would be useful to have one main point of 
reference to its obligations for human rights, even if the different aspects may be reviewed in 
detail in different policies. For example, environment related human rights obligations could be 
elaborated in the environmental policy, and community related human obligations in the CSR 
policy; but the company’s overall mission statement could make reference to the company’s 
commitment to uphold and respect all human rights.  
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The corporation should acknowledge the relevant stakeholders; highlight the mutual 
interests, goals to be achieved in each relationship and the potential impact the corporation 
would have on them; monitor the relationship with each and develop supportive policies to deal 
with them.
117
 At present, proposals for corporate governance offer useful and practical guidelines 
for policy content that would enable companies to assess and monitor their overall impact, 
including the effect of their activities on the human rights of individuals. For example, the 
proposed Sample Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance
118
 prepared by Private Sector 
Initiative for Corporate Governance (of Kenya) has clear expectations on corporate boards, 
which if applied, would promote a culture of compliance with human rights in the company. 
Among the principles outlined, the directors will be expected to identify the corporation’s 
internal and external stakeholders and agree on a policy, or policies determining how the 
corporation should relate to them; identify key risk areas (human rights risks could be included 
here), highlight the key performance indicators of the business and monitor these factors; and 
compile and communicate company policies, strategies etc. covering the style of operation, 
external and internal relationships among other requirements.
119
 To this end, the business entity 
can be required to stipulate what information or reports it prepares on a regular basis and to point 
out how it will evaluate its own performance.
120
 
As the business grows or takes on new customers or suppliers, initiates new projects or 
undergoes any other changes, it ought to carry out a human rights due diligence in order to 
ensure that it is well prepared to deal with new situations as they arise. Any serious effort to 
assess and manage negative impact must be accompanied by measures to adequately monitor its 
policies in order to evaluate whether they are being implemented in the most effective manner.
121
 
This process will entail application of qualitative and quantitative indicators, engaging with 
affected persons to obtain their feedback, and reporting on the outcome in the normal reporting 
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procedures of the business, indicating how the business enterprise identifies and addresses 
adverse human rights impacts.
122
 
 
6.6. Obligation of directors as the ‘mind and will’ of the company 
Corporations are fictional entities; they can only act through human agents. Shareholders, usually 
regarded as the principals of the corporate entity, appoint a board of directors and management 
who act on their behalf in the daily operations of the company. This relationship was well put in 
a case where the judge held that: 
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve 
centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in 
accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company are mere 
servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said 
to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the 
directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of 
these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such.
123
 
Directors inevitably play an important role in understanding and advancing the duties and 
responsibilities of business entities, both financial and otherwise, because the image and 
personhood of the corporation is embodied in them. The duties of care and skill, loyalty and 
good faith established in common law guide the actions of the directors. In the company 
legislation, the principle of shareholder supremacy is, to a large extent, guided by the duties and 
obligations imposed on directors to exercise their powers in the best interest of the company; 
‘company’ is usually interpreted to mean the owners of the company who are normally seen as 
the  shareholders. Fulfillment of the responsibility of directors must start with a clear enunciation 
of what the duty entails. However, any elaboration of the duties will only be useful to the extent 
that the directors and other officers responsible for implementing it are aware of, understand and 
commit themselves to executing the duties. 
Instead of phrasing the problem in terms of who the corporation has an obligation 
towards, shareholders or wider group of stakeholders, it is proposed rather that the problem be 
directed at management because they are the ones who make decisions and have the obligation to 
ensure that laws are respected. Neither shareholders nor stakeholders make decisions,
124
 so it is 
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management who need to be guided in considering the entire spectrum of possibilities that 
contribute to their accountability in decision-making. What ought the management of business 
entities and employees to understand as their duty on the question of human rights? Setting aside 
the technicalities concerning who in law can be held responsible for human rights violations, 
directors should ensure that business activities are conducted in a manner that respects individual 
human rights, and which does not in any way contribute to their infringement.  
Human rights, which are inalienable, are grounded on the nature of human beings, which 
is dignified; no man can lose his nature.
125
 Human dignity is the foundation of human rights and 
must also be an essential consideration in every decision where human beings and their interests 
are involved:  
Man must not primarily nor even less so exclusively be considered as an object to be 
defined and employed as a mere quantitative factor in economic calculations but he must 
be looked upon foremost as an individual with a dignity of his own which is not 
expendable.
126
 
If this is the person that human rights aim to defend, it is incumbent on business entities 
to respect his dignity and his rights in all circumstances. Whoever has the ability to infringe 
human rights therefore has a responsibility to refrain from doing that. “Human dignity is said to 
have acquired a resonance that leads it to be invoked so widely as a legal and moral ground for 
protest against degrading and abusive treatment.”127 When a person is in the employ of a 
business, the business cannot divorce its end as a profit making entity from its obligation to 
respect his dignity. Directors and management of business entities are involved in the delicate 
task of “organising human labour and the means of production so as to give rise to the goods and 
services necessary for the prosperity and progress of the community”.128 Prosperity and progress 
demand a respect for the rights of the person. In seeking this end, there ought not to be any 
question about compromising the indisputable worth and dignity of the person without which 
there would be no true progress in society; business entities must respect and be seen to respect 
this dignity.  
Berle and Means say that the duty of directors towards the company has its foundation in 
equity with the fiduciary obligation arising as in any case where one party is entrusted with the 
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management of the property of another.
129
 They questioned the capability of courts to interpret 
the directors’ fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of its shareholders. In their view, the courts 
were not well equipped to interfere in the management of the companies and could only exercise 
supervisory jurisdiction in the solution of issues brought before them.
130
 They pre-empted the 
problem of creating an objective standard by which the conduct of directors can be measured. 
What, for example, is ‘best interest’? Does it include social responsibility? If it does, what 
criterion is applicable to determine proper exercise of the duty? They predicted a new concept of 
the corporation which defined with greater clarity the relationships between the different 
stakeholders. They predicted that ‘it remain[ed] only for the claim of the community to be put 
forward with clarity and force…’ and when this was done, it was their view that the property 
rights that existed, then vested in the shareholder, would yield to ‘the greater interests of 
society.’131  
What does this putting forward with ‘clarity and force’ mean? Could Berle and Means 
have been talking about legislating the expectations of the stakeholders in the company? 
Possibly. From a logical point of view, this move would be appreciated because it would make 
assessment of the expected obligations and their violation quite straightforward and subject to a 
less subjective interpretation of the courts. Whereas the accountability of directors to 
shareholders is founded on the nature of the company, accountability to other stakeholders would 
be justified if founded on a contractual relationship, or alternatively on legislative provisions.
132
 
Can directors of companies that may have been used to perpetrate violation of human 
rights be held accountable for the violations? The Kenyan Companies Act is not clear on the 
expectations of directors’ decisions in the interest of the company on issues that deal with human 
rights. The directors’ duties in Kenya are currently found in common law; this fact contributes to 
the uncertainty of expectations on the directors. In Kenya, directors’ duties are owed to 
shareholders as there is no explicit requirement in the current Companies Act that directors 
consider the interests of other stakeholders. Generally, there is no guidance in law for directors 
on how to exercise their duties. In the survey carried out in Kenya under Ruggie’s Corporate 
Law Project, it was found that there was no guidance of when, how or why directors should 
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consider impacts on non-shareholders.
133
 The Project also noted that the penalties imposed by the 
Companies Act on directors for breach of their duties have not been amended for many years and 
are hardly enforced.
134
 As such, these penalties cannot serve the intended objective of deterring 
negligence by directors in exercising their obligations, even in the instance that these could be 
interpreted to include obligations with regard to the human rights obligation of the company.  
A solution to the problem of lack of clarity on expectations on directors could be to codify 
directors’ duties. Codification of directors’ duties could be one way of living up to the provision 
requiring states to ‘set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their 
territory respect human rights throughout their operations’.135 In the UK Companies Act of 2006, 
the directors’ duties are codified and provided for in a more extensive way than was previously 
the case. The provision seems to rebut the principal-agent theory where control is seen as a 
feature of ownership.
136
 Section 172 of the UK Companies Act requires the director to promote 
the success of the company and in doing so consider the interests of employees, be mindful of 
the relationship with ‘suppliers, customers and others’ and consider the impact of the company’s 
operations on the community. The UK position follows the enlightened stakeholder approach to 
the role of the corporation under which directors are required not to base their decisions solely on 
profit motives but to consider the interests of other stakeholders.
137
 This can be interpreted as 
requiring the directors to identify, monitor and mitigate any possible negative impacts of the 
company activities on the communities.
138
 It was the intention of the government that directors 
be required to consider the interests of other stakeholders in making decisions affecting the 
company. It was noted at the time of its drafting that: 
This duty codifies the current law and enshrines in statute what is commonly referred to as 
the principle of "enlightened shareholder value". The duty requires a director to act in the 
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way he or she considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole.
139
 
A criticism of the provision is that although it introduces major alterations to the current 
law by extending the duty of directors to include the protection of social and environmental 
issues, the provision is merely theoretic and does not in fact lead to this eventuality.
140
  This 
provision does not create a direct obligation to consider the interests of other stakeholders in the 
company. The existing preference for shareholder supremacy is given as much importance as the 
attempt to strengthen the stakeholder concept indicated by requirement of company law to ensure 
‘appropriate participation of other stakeholders’141  because the same provision also states:  
4. Transparency 
… 
c) The law should protect shareholder rights, advance shareholder activism and provide 
enhanced protection for minority shareholders.
142
 
Clause 173 of the UK Act provides that the main aim of the directors should be the 
promotion of the company’s success for the benefit of the members.143 Stakeholders are not 
given a voice in the company affairs, and their interests can be considered only to the extent that 
the directors find this viable, and there is nothing in the Act that specifically allows stakeholders 
to enforce the duty imposed upon directors to consider their interests.
144
 The clause creates 
general obligations, which it is argued, are not enforceable because the directors still have the 
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discretion to make decisions as to what constitutes the social responsibility of the company. This 
fact therefore ultimately supports the assertion that the traditional role of the company still reigns 
supreme:
145
 duties to shareholders must be considered before all others, and that these others will 
be upheld only insofar as they do not destabilise the shareholder’s primary position. 
Another recent example of codification of directors’ duties is the South African company 
law. The initial approach adopted at the commencement of the company law reform in South 
Africa (leading up to the amendment of the Companies Act 1973 which was replaced by the 
Companies Act 2008) which was quite overt in its call for a stakeholder approach in corporate 
governance was diluted by the time the final document was arrived at.
146
 Whereas the 
formulators of the new law intended for an apparent major overhaul of the current law to reflect 
‘the Unique South African context’ and to ‘take into account… the legitimate interests of other 
stakeholder constituencies’147 of the company, in the final analysis, this attempt is ‘watered 
down’ and not reflected as forcefully as would have been anticipated. The wording of the 
provision of the current companies’ law can hardly be said to represent such novel position, at 
least not as directly as would have been expected. On the issue of social responsibility of the 
company, the Companies Act 2008 cannot be said to reflect an ‘extensive review of the current 
[1973] company law’148 and neither a ‘comprehensive company law review’149 as was 
anticipated at the time the review took off.  
The Companies Act 2008 of South Africa introduces a form of codified regime of 
directors’ fiduciary and reasonable care duties in addition to the common law directors’ duties. 
This was a significant change from the previous law which did not contain clear rules regarding 
corporate governance and the duties and liabilities of directors.
150
 There was an attempt, 
expressed in the Companies Bill 2007, to make the directors more accountable to shareholders in 
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a more objective manner directing them to act ‘honestly and in good faith and in a manner the 
director believes to be in the best interests of and for the benefit of the company’.151 The South 
African Companies Act 71 of 2008 similarly provides for Standards of directors conduct but not 
with the exact words of the Bill.
152
 The Act goes further to define what ‘best interests of the 
company’ means and provides that the director will meet this objective if he has, among other 
considerations, ‘taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the subject matter of 
the judgment...’153 This provision can be applied to ensure that even in the event that the 
company has to consider social responsibility issues, the directors will evaluate such options in 
order to arrive at a decision that ultimately enhances the best interests of the company, which is 
most likely to be interpreted as enhancing the shareholder value. 
From the brief analysis of the UK and South African company law reform and the 
attempts to codify directors’ duties and make them consider wider interests than those of 
shareholders, shareholder primacy still reigns supreme. Stakeholders’ interest will be considered 
only insofar as it gives overriding credence to the former principle.
154
 Suppliers, customers, 
employees and the wider society are not at the same level as the shareholders; the place of the 
shareholder as owner of the business, as investor, as risk taker appears to give him a bigger stake 
in and with that a greater expectation from the company. In the final analysis, the business is 
formed to make profits for the owners; this remains the case despite the changes that have taken 
place in the environment in which the company operates.  
In a significant move towards a more stakeholder-embracing attitude, the Companies Act 
2015 (the Act) in Kenya codifies the common law duties of directors in a manner that makes the 
duty more embracing than the UK and South Africa provisions.
155
 The Act provides for the duty 
of the directors to act within powers,
156
 to promote the success of the company,
157
 to exercise 
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independent judgment,
158
 to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence
159
 to avoid conflicts of 
interest
160
 and not to accept benefits from third parties.
161
 In exercising their duties, the directors 
are directed to have regard to the interests of both shareholders and stakeholders, making it 
clearer their concern should not be exclusively centered on the shareholder as is currently the 
case.
162
 The Act  goes further to make demands of the directors, calling on them to consider the 
long term effect of the decisions they propose to take, the interests of the employees, customers, 
suppliers and others, the impact company operations will have on the community and the 
environment and the need to maintain high standards of business conduct.
163
 
Although the Companies Act has been passed, the practicality of the provisions on 
directors’ duties can only be assessed with time.164 In the other jurisdictions with similar 
provisions, it has been argued against such provision that the cost of making directors 
accountable for competing and conflicting interests to a wide and varied spectrum of 
stakeholders and the likely confusion and misunderstanding that will arise by courts and litigants 
outweigh any potential benefits that the statutes might bring about.
165
 Such an argument in my 
view is an attempt to simplify what is not simple by nature. If the corporation consists of the 
complex interweaving of numerous relationships, it is only to be expected that those who run it 
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should be able to take into consideration the interests of all the stakeholders, and not only some, 
for the mere reason of simplifying their task. In any event, this argument is countered by the 
observation that directors of corporations have had to deal with different classes of shareholders 
who have different interests and they have usually managed to deal with them all in a beneficial 
manner.
166
 In a similar way the directors can be required to consider and act upon the interests of 
the different stakeholders of the corporation. 
In the shareholder supremacy debate, the argument seems to be whose interests should 
take precedence, whether the shareholders’, to the detriment of the interests of other 
stakeholders, or the stakeholders’, at the expense of the shareholders’. The principal-agent theory 
places shareholders at the top of the corporation tier because it is he who provides the capital 
without which the organisation would not exist. The principal-agent theory creates an efficient 
mechanism for the practical running of the organisation: different roles are played by different 
people who coordinate their efforts to provide the necessary information which is then passed on 
to the principal, who makes the decisions.
167
 However, the directors should not be forced to 
express their allegiance on either side: either on the shareholders’ side as current corporate law 
places them or to the side of the other stakeholders as proponents of the stakeholder theory 
propose. If the concern of the director is to promote the success of the company, as the 
Companies Act 2015 of Kenya provides, the director need not be on either side because the 
interests concerned are not always of a nature to be traded off against each other.
168
  
In carrying out their role therefore, directors ought to be concerned about the different 
stakeholders who are in one way or another connected with the business, and take their interests 
into account in making decisions. However, whereas shareholders are concerned about the return 
on their investment, the other stakeholders have different expectations: customers want the best 
goods for the fairest price, the community imposes a moral obligation on the company to 
acknowledge their (the community’s) contribution to its success, and to mitigate the losses it 
causes them to incur as a result of its activities; employees want conducive working environment 
and a fair wage for their labour. In many instances, these expectations are not complementary 
and the profit maximisation theory argues that the profit maximisation ideal should override the 
other interests because the shareholders are the owners of the business; that it is they who invest 
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in the business, and without them the company would not be in existence to serve all the other 
varied interests. It has also been said against the use of fiduciary duties to safeguard the interests 
of the community that in the absence of an agreement (between the corporation and the 
communities), creating an amorphous, open-ended fiduciary duty to the local community in 
which the firm operates, is impractical.
169
 It is said to amount to a decision to transform the 
business executives into unelected and therefore unaccountable public servants.
170
 The 
opponents of this view argue that creating a fiduciary obligation for directors on behalf of society 
transforms the manager from a businessperson to an unelected and unaccountable public servant, 
a role best left to the political process.
171
 Proponents of the profit maximisation theory further 
argue that for ease of monitoring performance, the company ought to have a single goal and 
again, following the argument of shareholder supremacy, this goal should be profit 
maximisation. 
Respect for human rights requires the company to be concerned that no activity it carries 
out negatively impacts the community around it, and also that they take positive steps to meet the 
positive obligations that are within its scope, such as ensuring that its employees right to a decent 
living is not violated. To the extent that the duty to stakeholders concerns their human rights, it is 
not a contracted duty and the obligation of the corporation cannot be traded off against its 
obligation to shareholders. Blair and Stout observe the emergence of a progressive school of 
corporate scholars who believe that corporate law should require directors to serve a wider group 
of stakeholders but not as a general duty, rather one along a mediating hierarchy. This model 
suggests a mid-point strategy that places the directors on neither extreme: not on the exclusive 
camp of shareholders as the shareholder primacy model desires, neither that of the stakeholders 
and therefore does not put them under the command or control of either group.  
It is my view that requiring directors to consider the interests of stakeholders does not put 
them under the control of stakeholders, and concern for shareholders does not necessarily 
prejudice the interests of the others stakeholders. Expansion of the directors’ duty to stakeholders 
will serve to ensure that directors direct responsible operations of the company with a focus on 
the main reason for its existence, but also with a concern not to harm others in the process of 
achieving whatever it conceives of as its main goals. The guiding principle for directors in 
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overseeing the relationship with stakeholders would be to avoid or reduce harm, rather than 
creating benefits for the community at large, which may not be in the place of the corporation to 
do in the first place.
172
 Amending the law to make directors more accountable to other 
stakeholders beyond the shareholders will change this position and project a more accurate 
picture of reality of a corporation which has many players who have different interests, each of 
which is valid in its own right. 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to project the responsibility contemplated by Ruggie into the 
corporate context. If the Guiding principles are to be concretised through laws, regulations or 
codes of conduct, the responsibility contemplated will be more specific and thus more easily 
enforceable. The process of translating the general standards into applicable obligations in the 
varying local contexts is complex and contested.
173
 Generally however, translation of the 
responsibility to respect will take place in two stages: from the international standards outlined in 
the Guiding Principles to corresponding responsibilities, and from the responsibilities to 
everyday business practice.
174
 The duty of states to protect its citizens against abuse by 
corporations is best regulated though ‘appropriate and universally enforced national 
regulation’.175 The Guiding principles can be institutionalised through corporate law which 
codifies the corresponding obligations. Governments will live up to their obligation to ensure 
respect of human rights by amending their company laws to make this possible. Once codified in 
provisions of corporate law, they will be further translated into operational practice through 
corporate human rights policies that spell out what will be done throughout the business entity to 
uphold the responsibility. 
The corporate responsibility to respect is not merely a negative duty to refrain from 
causing harm. It encompasses all means the corporation ought to employ to ensure human rights 
are not violated. Such means would include the carrying out of a human rights due diligence, the 
crafting of corporate human rights policies applied at all levels of the business entity, and 
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reporting of the human rights obligation overseen by directors acting as the mind and will of the 
company. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. PILLAR III: ACCESS TO REMEDY 
 
7.1. Introduction 
As part of its duty to protect, the state has the obligation to ensure that all persons whose human 
rights are violated have access to effective remedy.
1
 This chapter discusses access to remedy, 
foreseen as the single most challenging aspect in the quest to ensure business entities respect 
human rights.
2
 In the context of corporate accountability for human rights where no international 
treaty exists on the subject, and where no norm has congealed into customary international law, the 
proper place to resolve any claims for violation of human rights by corporations will be under 
domestic law. It is incumbent on states to ensure proper measures are in place to control the 
activities of corporations in their jurisdictions and to redress any violations they cause.  
This chapter highlights some of the challenges the state will face in availing access to 
remedy for violation of human rights by corporations, including poverty and corruption, and a 
formal legal system struggling to rise from a history of corruption. In the face of weak or corrupt 
formal legal systems, there is need to focus on a mixed approach to promote the rights, interests 
and aspirations of the poor.
3
 Being a low income country with more than half the population 
living below the poverty line
4
, the vulnerability of the poor in Kenya is a critical factor that 
affects their access to justice.
5
 However, the legal aid system in Kenya is not well developed, and 
there is no national legal aid system in place. Although a Legal Aid Bill (2014) has been drafted 
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pursuant to the Constitutional provision guaranteeing access to justice for all persons,
6
 the Bill is 
currently not considered a priority and may take long to be enacted and to have any impact.  
The judicial mechanism of dispute resolution involves resolving human rights disputes 
through courts with power to award damages for human rights violations. Possibilities to 
improve judicial enforcement of human rights are discussed, and a proposal made to amend the 
Penal Code to recognise the capacity of corporations to commit crimes and to hold them 
responsible for it. Operational or company level mechanisms provide an important non-judicial 
alternative to the overstretched judicial mechanisms. The absence of strict formalities in 
company level mechanisms will enable decision makers to use trade-offs and arrive at decisions 
that are beneficial to all parties. As a national human rights institute, the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) will play an important role in helping the state to align 
its laws and policies with its human rights obligations, and in providing guidance on human 
rights to corporations.  
 
7.2. Judicial grievance mechanisms 
The main means by which remedy may be availed for business related human rights abuses is 
through judicial mechanisms, court decisions on questions of human rights presented before it. A 
functioning judicial system plays an important role because clarification of emerging 
corporations’ obligations will happen through court decisions, which will set the stage for 
informed specification of obligations in the future. Domestic courts, with the power to award 
damages for human rights violations, would be key to promoting compliance with the human 
rights obligations.
7
 States are expected to take steps to ensure the effectiveness of judicial 
mechanisms.
8
 This effectiveness will in turn be measured by the impartiality of the judicial 
process, its integrity and conformity with due process in dealing with matters before them.
9
 The 
Success of the Bill of Rights under the 2010 Constitution will depend on the extent to which the 
Kenyan judiciary, previously saddled by allegations of lack of transparency and a tainted 
integrity, has been transformed and is able to effectively play its role as the guardian of the laws 
                                               
6
 Articles 48 and 50 (2) (g) and (h) of the Constitution. 
7
 John Knox ‘The Horizontal Human Rights Law’(2008)102(1) American Journal of International Law 1 at 44. 
8
 Human Rights Council ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (21 March 2011) A/HRC/17/31 [UN Guiding Principles], Operational 
Principle 26. 
9
 Ibid, Commentary on Operational Principle 26. 
    
222 
 
of the country. High stakes must therefore of necessity be put on the new judiciary if it is to play 
a part in the transition of the Country into a constitutional democracy that rests more firmly on 
important values such as the rule of law, human dignity, equality, social justice, human rights, 
transparency and accountability which are values promoted by the 2010 Constitution.
10
 
The ability of the courts to perform the task of being custodians of the law, and of the 
2010 Constitution which brings in many issues hitherto not addressed (including the question of 
human rights and business, and clear provision for socio economic rights) will highly unlikely be 
managed by the judiciary of the past. Bills of rights are interpreted by judicial officers tainted 
with legal and cultural bias which necessarily affects their interpretation of the constitution
11
 and 
it is important that they are able to exercise their judgment as freely as possible, basing their 
judgment on the facts of the cases before them. As elaborated elsewhere in this study,
12
 for the 
longer period of its history, Kenya had a judiciary that was not independent and was in most part 
shaped by the ‘patrimonial’ nature of the government of the day which resulted from the 
authoritarian leadership style inherited from the colonial era.
13
 Owing to a weak judiciary, the 
old Constitution of Kenya underwent successive changes over a period of time, resulting in a 
person-centred rule rather than one guided by the rule of law and institutions that are committed 
to uphold it at all costs.
14
 The authority of the state ought to be based on laws which the Judiciary 
is guardian over to ensure they are applied consistently and not according to the whim of 
authorities who give themselves power to ignore or misconstrue them.  
Legitimate institutions, including the Kenyan Judiciary, have to develop through a 
process of struggles or political contestations.
15
 The ability to change is an important feature of 
any legal system if it is to remain relevant. Modern legal systems are a product of continual 
shaping and reshaping in response to societal demands.
16
 The nature of modern legal systems 
demands that as society changes, the systems ought to be able to incorporate and reflect new 
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principles in an orderly manner.
17
 Commendable measures have been put in place so far, starting 
with the fundamental restructuring of the Judiciary by the Constitution, enabling it to be an 
independent custodian of justice and guardian of a state where human rights are enjoyed by all.
18
 
Additionally, the competitive selection of officers as opposed to appointments at the will of the 
Executive will improve competence of judicial officers and their independence. An 
ombudsperson’s office has been set up to process complaints from the staff and the public; a 
code of ethics and conduct for judicial officers has been created and a standing committee 
established to enforce discipline.
19
 The High Court of Kenya has original jurisdiction to hear 
claims for violation of human rights and has been divided into several divisions, including the 
Constitution and Human Rights Division which will be a court of first instance for constitutional 
cases and is expected to play a leading role in addressing issues on interpretation and 
enforcement of the expanded Bill of Rights.
20
 It is this department of the High Court that will be 
charged with the task of giving meaning to the law in the emerging area of business and human 
rights. It will need expertise and a willingness to look to other jurisdictions to see what is being 
done in this field and apply best practices in developing its competence.
21
 
 
7.2.1. Accessibility of courts for effective protection of human rights 
Despite provision of human rights in the Constitution, the effectiveness of human rights 
protection in reality will depend on a number of factors. There is need for translation of the 
theoretic provisions of the Constitution into the everyday reality of individuals.
22
 Making the 
human rights provisions practical will depend on whether the Constitution requires implementing 
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legislation to effect the rights and the accessibility of courts and other grievance mechanisms in 
terms of ease of approach, costs involved and the complexity of requisite procedures.
23
 
A concern affecting the ease and propriety of accessing the courts for judicial remedies 
for human rights violations would be the nature of the remedies sought: should they be civil or 
criminal? Civil wrongs, also referred to as torts are wrongs that give rise to an action at common 
law for liquidated damages, injunction or restitution.
24
 They arise from breach of duty created by 
statute or common law and the basic remedy sought is damages, a right to be compensated for 
suffering loss.
25
 Under civil litigation, the wrong doer is sued without arrest. Civil litigation 
targets or seeks to regulate the private, individual situation while criminal prosecution creates a 
wider public interest.  
Trial of human rights violations usually takes the form of criminal prosecutions.
26
 Human 
rights violations would normally constitute crimes, and a proposal to consider them as mere civil 
wrongs would appear to trivialise them.
27
 Unlike torts and contracts, crimes are public wrongs. 
The aim of sentencing in criminal cases is to punish the wrong doer by bringing upon him 
societal condemnation and stigma, to prevent the wrong doer from committing the crime again, 
to protect the public from the action of the offender and to secure his or her reformation.
28
 
Crimes involve more than a private injury and cause social harm, a violation of public rights and 
duties due to the whole community in its social aggregate capacity.
29
 Redress of civil wrongs is 
directed at the defendant who is sued and is in most instances satisfied by compensation, whereas 
criminal wrongs are seen as an affront against humanity, calling for the wrath of the entire 
community and thus not redressible by mere financial compensation.
30
 Trial of criminal wrongs 
is meant to express society’s outrage at the offence committed, and payment of fines is not 
adequate to punish the offender. 
                                               
23
 Ibid at 506-7. 
24
 Tudor Jackson The Law of Kenya: An Introduction (1970) 192. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Beth Stephens ‘Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations’ (2002) 27(1) Yale Journal of International Law 1. 
27
 Ibid at 12. 
28
 P L O Lumumba Criminal Procedure in Kenya (2005) 166; Criminal Procedure Code. See also Tudor Jackson op 
cit note 24.  
29
 Joshua Dressler Understanding Criminal Law 5ed (2009) 1. 
30
 Stephens op cit note 26 at 12. 
    
225 
 
Under criminal law in Kenya, if justice would be best served by punishing the offender, 
he or she is either imprisoned or given a death sentence.
31
 Although the payment of fines is one 
of the remedies provided for under the Criminal Procedure Code and is meant to be punitive, 
courts have been reluctant to make use of the compensatory provisions of the Code.
32
 Punitive 
damages are considered a matter for the civil courts and the criminal courts prefer to be 
concerned about punishing the offender, leaving the task of justifying harms and calculating 
compensation figures to civil courts.
33
 
Under Kenyan law, payment of a fine under criminal law is required to be in relation to 
the ability of the offender to pay: the court ought to consider the accused’s means before 
imposing the fine, to ensure that it is a sum that he is in a position to pay.
34
 The accused’s 
earning capacity is of no consequence to the court’s decision: it matters not that he earns much 
money that paying the fine imposed will not be punitive for him,
35
 and neither that he is so poor 
that the amount fined will be paid by others, thus preventing the accused from suffering the cost 
of getting the money.
36
 No costs, or very minimal figures, are payable in criminal matters, except 
for private prosecution and contempt of court cases.
37
 In this light, any fines imposed are not 
meant to have a punitive effect. 
However, sometimes a wrong classified as a crime under law does not justify public 
condemnation – and in such cases the line between a crime and a civil wrong is thin and 
blurred.
38
 Under the Constitution of Kenya, no distinction is made between civil and criminal 
remedies, implying that what is important is that the wrong committed be redressed. Article 23 
of the Constitution specifies the remedies that would be applicable for breach of human rights. 
Under the Constitution, the court may award the aggrieved party both civil law remedies, and 
criminal law remedies compensation, an injunction, a conservatory order, an order for judicial 
review among other remedies. The broad concern would be to provide redress to victims of 
human rights abuses, and the details of the most effective means of attaining that end would be 
secondary – so long as the specific means applied provides the reprieve sought. The 
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constitutional line between punishment for criminal wrongs and redress of civil wrongs is 
difficult to draw and can be said to be illusory.
39
 
The decision to classify a human rights violation as a crime or tort would depend on 
whether the moral wrong attributed to it can be said to be an affront to an individual person, or to 
the whole community.
40
 However, it may also be argued that if a civil suit can be used to achieve 
the ends normally considered achievable through criminal cases, social reform, deterrence and 
punishment of the offender, then civil litigation can be applied to redress human rights wrongs. 
The preference for either system, civil or criminal, could be more apparent than real, and 
dependent more on the legal language of a given jurisdiction and the means available effect the 
goals intended, more than any particular ideological preference for one system over the other.
41
 
In the USA, the US Supreme court has decreed that in the absence of a clear line for determining 
what is civil in nature, breach of which demands compensation or restitution,  and what is 
criminal, breach of which demands punishment, cases will be treated as either civil or criminal 
depending on the intent of the legislature: if the wrongs are contained in the Penal Code they will 
be treated as criminal wrongs, and if in other laws or common law they will be decided as civil 
wrongs.
42
 
In some jurisdictions such as the USA, civil human rights litigation has been applied to 
redress human rights violations, rather than criminal prosecution.
43
 In the USA, certain cultural 
and procedural characteristics of the legal system make it possible to apply civil litigation to 
offer redress for human rights violations.
44
 The United States has a tradition of public interest 
litigation and civil litigation has been used to as a tool to promote social reform.
45
 The aim in 
public interest litigation is to hold perpetrators accountable, and to raise policy concerns, even 
when litigation does not result in an enforceable judgment.
46
 
To deal with the problem of access to the courts, the Kenyan Constitution makes it easier 
for aggrieved persons to seek redress by extending locus standi to very person.
47
 The 
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Constitution provides that any person who feels aggrieved, or a person acting in his interest or in 
the interest of the public may bring a claim for violation of human rights before the courts.
48
 
Under the old Constitution, public interest litigation could only be instituted by parties who 
could prove they had a direct personal interest in the matter.
49
 Allowing other persons to file 
proceedings on behalf of the aggrieved person will ensure that victims of human rights violations 
are not excluded from accessing remedies owing to ignorance or poverty.  
To further ensure that the Courts are accessible, the Kenyan Constitution provides that no 
court fees will be charged for claims of human rights violations,
50
 and that formalities related to 
the proceedings and concern for procedural technicalities will not be obstacles in enforcing the 
Bill of Rights.
51
 While commendable in the effort to increase accessibility to courts and to ensure 
redress especially for the most vulnerable, this provision nevertheless raises issues of 
implementation. First, the danger arises of unrestricted access to the courts by litigants who have 
nothing to lose by instituting frivolous matters, which can lead to abuse of the court system.
52
 To 
reduce the probability of unnecessary litigation, there should be a minimum requirement of 
professional responsibility under the rules of civil procedure.
53
  
The second concern raised is the alternative means of financing the proceedings in the 
absence of litigation fees and requirement that no costs be borne by the losing party. Poverty is a 
real obstacle in accessing remedies for violation of human rights. Disputes against business 
entities will, in many cases, mean that the complainants have less access to expert information or 
financial resources to pursue redress compared to those accused of violating human rights.
54
 
Availability of legal aid from the state or other institutions would have been a viable way of 
increasing access of the poor to the courts, both in terms of lower costs and availability of expert 
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support. However, the efforts made by the government towards providing access to justice for 
the poor and underserved communities are not sufficient. The National Legal Awareness 
Program (NALEAP) exists in Kenya as a project of the Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion 
and Constitutional Affairs to co-ordinate and facilitate the realisation of Democratic Governance 
through protection and enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms.
55
 However, the program 
appears to still be operating on a pilot basis; the failure to develop into a full program raises 
concerns of how effective it has been in meeting its objectives.
56
 
 
7.2.2. Litigation-friendly procedures that will make civil litigation of human rights 
violation possible 
Punitive damages payable in civil suits, can be used to create a deterrent effect on the 
perpetrator. Payment of punitive damages implies punishment for the defendant, making the civil 
claim more identified with a criminal prosecution.
57
 Redress of civil wrongs can thus share the 
element of punishment and deterrence with criminal wrongs. 
Other litigation-friendly features of the US civil litigation system that have made it 
possible to use civil causes to redress human rights violations include the fact that in the US, 
there is no penalty for losing a suit, thereby encouraging those who have cases that satisfy the 
minimal requirements of procedure and professional responsibility to bring a suit before the 
court, without fear of having to pay the defendant’s costs should they lose the case.58 In Kenya, 
unless the judge has exceptional reasons for ordering otherwise, the costs follow suit, and the 
loser pays the costs of the party who wins the case. This can be a discouraging factor, and 
especially so for the poor victims of human rights abuse who have to go against big companies. 
A more litigation friendly environment will encourage victims to bring matters for resolution 
before the courts, even when the probability of success is unknown, as may be the case in many 
instances when considering the novelty of issues around corporate accountability for human 
rights. 
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This study makes the point that the outcome of a concerted effort to implement the 
Constitution in its entirety necessitates the amendment of the law of companies to reflect the 
obligation of corporations to uphold the Bill of Rights. It is proposed to make recommendations 
for the amendment of the Companies Act to make it comply with Article 20(1) of the 
Constitution. It is argued that at the very least, Article 20(1) which provides for a horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights envisions an entity that cannot claim shareholder primacy to the 
exclusion of other stakeholders, and therefore it is proposed to amend the law of corporations to 
reflect a more balanced view of all the stakeholders and demand that their rights be respected. 
This research proposes that, being creatures of law and thus guided by the law in terms of what it 
can or cannot do, amending the Company Law of Kenya to define an entity that has an obligation to 
respect human rights is the best way to ensure accountability of business for their human rights 
obligations.
59
 The Companies Act will thus make it a wrong for the company to commit certain acts 
that amount to violation of human rights, and such breach will be redressed accordingly under the 
provisions of the civil procedure Code, and appropriate remedies be provided to the plaintiffs who 
institute cases. 
 
7.2.3. Corporate criminal liability for corporate violators of human rights: a possibility? 
Being the law that defines and shapes what companies do, and how they ought to operate, 
mention of human rights duties of companies in company laws is encouraged.
60
 Corporate laws 
have in the past not included direct provisions on human rights. The framing of company law, 
defining how liability for the acts of a corporation may be attributed to the persons who manage 
the company, can present legal barriers to redressing business related human rights abuses.
61
 
With reference to violation of human rights, can states punish corporate entities directly, apart 
from the individuals acting on their behalf?
62
 And what liability should be applied for the 
wrongs, personal liability or corporate liability? Ruggie notes in his 2009 Report that there was 
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still uncertainty regarding whether corporate entities should be punished directly, separately from 
the individuals who act on their behalf and also whether civil causes of action should be applied 
to corporate related abuse.
63
 
The application of corporate criminal liability would be a viable affront against the shield 
of the corporate veil of incorporation that individuals may hide behind to escape responsibility 
for wrongs they cause. In contemplating the option of corporate crimes, one must deal with the 
consideration that despite having a corporate personality and a legal body, corporations cannot 
commit crimes because criminal wrongs need a physical body and mens rea to legally constitute 
a crime.
64
 While acknowledging the concept of separate legal personality, courts in Kenya have 
not been hesitant in finding corporations liable for committing criminal offences, and holding 
them responsible for it.
65
 Corporations as legal persons have been held liable for crimes under 
laws, in courses of action brought under the Penal Law. The Penal Code of Kenya, under which 
all criminal charges are brought to court, provides: 
Where an offence is committed by any company or body corporate, or by any society, 
association or body of persons, every person charged with, or concerned or acting in, the 
control or management of the affairs or activities of such company, body corporate, 
society, association or body of persons shall be guilty of that offence and liable to be 
punished accordingly, unless it is proved by such person that, through no act or omission 
on his part, he was not aware that the offence was being or was intended or about to be 
committed, or that he took all reasonable steps to prevent its commission.
66
 
Under the Penal Code, the offence of the person of the company is therefore attributable 
to persons in charge of the company, who may advance a defense if they can show that they were 
unaware of it or took reasonable steps to prevent its occurrence. This possibility presents an easy 
way out for persons called upon to take the blame on behalf of the corporation, giving them 
much leeway to wiggle out of their duty.  
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The position of the Kenyan courts in matters that relate to criminal liability of 
corporations appears to be no different from the criminal liability of natural persons. In the case 
of Manager, Nanak Crankshaft Ltd v Republic
67
 one of the issues raised on appeal was whether a 
company, which is a corporate entity, could be charged with a criminal offence. The appellant 
disputed that the he, as manager of the offending company was the right person to plead to the 
charge on behalf of his company. The judge noted that the initial position where the difficulty of 
taking a plea from an incorporated body made charging it for a criminal offence seemingly 
impossible was no longer the case.
68
 In this particular instance, it was held that the Public Health 
Act
69
 made provision for the manager or secretary to be summoned to plead to charges on behalf 
of the company, and to be held liable if the company contravened the provisions of the Act. The 
issue before the court was not whether or not the company could be an accused party in a 
criminal case. That seemed settled. In another case Director, Wonderloaf Bakery Ltd v 
Republic,
70
 a company was convicted by a subordinate court for failing to comply with 
provisions under the Public Health Act.
71
 In Paper House of Kenya Ltd v Republic
72
, the trial and 
conviction of a company for failing to comply with provisions of a law
73
 was upheld on appeal. 
The sentence imposed was a fine or imprisonment in default. 
The treatment of natural and corporate persons in a similar manner is however a 
simplification of issues.
74
 Majority of the cases where companies were criminally charged and 
convicted involved the violation of the provisions of the Health Act. If the same reasoning is 
applied, it would in theory be possible to bring corporations to court and charge them for breach 
of provisions of the law that also amount to violation of human rights. There is a gap that needs 
to be filled through the development of the law, so that the effort made in prosecuting juristic 
persons has the intended deterrent results. Some of the issues that need addressing and which 
make existing criminal sentences less effective for business entities include the challenges 
involved in administering the punishment of natural persons to companies. Whereas fines may 
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affect an individual and impose on him or her social stigma, corporations may simply treat the 
fines imposed as part of the cost of doing businesses.
75
 The loss or effect of paying the fine will 
be felt by the shareholders, and perhaps not the directors or managers who make the decisions 
that result in criminal offences. Additionally, the fines imposed generally serve to punish the 
offender, in this case the company, but they do not compensate the victims of the crime.
76
 
In considering the alternative of criminal liability of corporations for human rights 
violations, it would be useful to consider the development of sentences that serve the purpose of 
punishing business entities for violation of human rights, deterring them from repeating the 
offending actions
77
 and offering redress to the victims of abuse. Examples of such alternative 
punishment include restricting the place where the company can operate, banning it from 
procurement opportunities, requiring it to publicise the sentence or punishment given as a means 
of naming and shaming, confiscation of property and winding up.
78
 
A proposal made at the 19
th
 African Union Summit appears to offer a meaningful 
solution to this question. If the proposal goes through as put forward, the African Court of Justice 
and Human and Peoples Rights will be the first regional court to have international corporate 
criminal jurisdiction.
79
 Though the proposal will no doubt come up against many challenges, the 
possibilities it offers are promising. A recommendation was made to merge the African Court of 
Justice and the African Court on Human and People’s Rights and give it jurisdiction to try 
criminal cases.
80
 In a meeting held in May 2012,
81
 the ‘Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol 
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights’ was drafted. The Protocol 
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makes provision for an entirely new section on ‘Provisions Specific to the International Criminal 
Jurisdiction of the Court’.82 Article 46C of the Chapter provides for Corporate Criminal 
Liability.
83
 The Protocol states that the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples Rights, 
a regional court set up to ensure protection of human and peoples’ rights in Africa, will have 
jurisdiction over legal persons.
84
  
The revised version of the Draft protocol has amended the provisions on corporate 
criminal liability. In the initial draft, the mens rea, or corporate intention to commit a crime 
under the Protocol would be established by proving that company policy, expressly stated or 
implied,
85
 supported the action or actions that caused harm. The revised Protocol merely requires 
proof that the offending act was based on the policy of the corporation.
86
 A policy may be 
attributed to a corporation where it provides the most reasonable explanation of the conduct of 
that corporation.
87
 Under the initial Draft Protocol, corporate culture, defined as attitude, policy, 
rule, course of conduct or practice,
88
 could be applied to determine that the corporation was 
aware of the offending action.
89
 This provision is omitted in the revised Draft Protocol. Under 
the initial Draft, the corporate veil could not be imposed to shield persons responsible for the 
actions resulting in violation of human rights,
90
 meaning that individuals will be held responsible 
should they instigate, contribute to or condone action that results in violation of human rights. 
The current (Revised) Draft does not refer to the corporate veil, but states that kit will be 
sufficient to prove that the corporate knowledge of the commission of an offense was possessed 
within the corporation.
91
 The effect of both provisions is to prevent the directors or management 
of the corporation from hiding behind the veil of incorporation when criminal offenses are 
committed within the organisation. Although not dealt with in exhaustive detail, the directives 
given can act as a guide for the Court (the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples 
Rights) in deciding questions of corporate abuses that amount to violation of human rights.  
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The clarity with which the additions proposed in the initial Draft Protocol addressed 
pertinent issues was commendable. Though numbing the effects by toning down the language of 
lifting the corporate veil and deducing intention to do wrong from the culture of the corporation, 
the provisions enabling the imposition of corporate criminal liability will serve to ensure that 
corporations that commit corporate crimes are held responsible. If impunity of governments or 
other factors make it impossible to obtain redress for violations or to prosecute offenders, victims 
should be able to have recourse to a higher level authority. The regional courts provide a possible 
alternative. In any event, the relevant provisions as articulated in the Protocol offer an example 
that national jurisdictions may emulate in the bid to address the question of liability for corporate 
crimes. Specific amendments to the Companies Act and to the Penal Code to make it possible to 
hold corporations accountable for human rights violations and to ensure redress for victims are 
provided in Chapter 8 below. 
 
7.3. Company level operational mechanisms 
Human rights are shaped by peoples’ struggles in their search for dignified lives, and the means 
that promise to secure this life for them.
92
 Land and natural resources, which are the source of 
raw materials for the operations of many corporations, are also the most valuable assets to 
communities, representing their identity and values, reflecting their understanding of the world.
93
 
Land and the natural resources found on it are thus bound to be a source of conflict between the 
corporation and community, and a source of human rights violations. The Law is seen as rules 
and systems relevant for governing communities and resolving disputes
94
 and will be effective in 
the measure that it achieves the end of resolving disputes and providing access to remedy for 
victims of human rights violations.  
Non-judicial mechanisms for dispute resolution could be administrative or legislative and 
they may be mediation based or adjudicative.
95
 Mediation and dialogue-based methods are ideal 
for operational level mechanisms at the level of the business entity which seeks to resolve an 
issue while at the same time being a party to the complaint.
96
 An operational level grievance 
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mechanism engages the business entity directly in assessing the complaints raised and is 
accessible directly to individuals and communities adversely impacted by the activities of a 
business entity. It is administered by the business entity, alone or in collaboration with relevant 
stakeholders or a mutually acceptable external expert or body.
97
 It should ideally be the first 
point of call, accessible by the complainant without having to exhaust other means of recourse.
98
 
The responsibility to respect requires business entities to identify negative human rights 
impacts, caused by their operation, or towards which they have contributed, and to work on their 
remediation.
99
 From a practical point of view, and considering the over-stretched court system 
and the operational challenges likely to be faced by the National Human Rights Institute (NHRI), 
operational level mechanisms run by companies may be the most practical means to afford 
victims of corporate human rights violations the respite they need. In proposing operational 
mechanisms as ideal remedial system, reference is made to their potential practicality compared 
to the other mechanisms of redress.
100
 They are formed by the decision of the company to 
constantly address the complaints by its employees, communities it serves and other 
stakeholders, thus progressively putting a limit on complaints and making them manageable by 
addressing recurring grievances. This will save on time that would have been spent resolving 
cases through other means. They could be adjudicative, or dialogue based or may be adapted 
through any culturally appropriate means.
101
 
An operational level mechanism is important and useful to the business entity as it offers 
a channel by which its operations may be analysed to pick out recurring trends to identify and 
correct negative practices.
102
 The direct nature of the solution also presents an immediate means 
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of addressing negative impacts thereby containing the resulting harm.
103
 Being non judicial 
mechanisms, company level mechanisms have the advantage of garnering the requisite expertise, 
and thus providing a specialised point of reference to resolve the questions of business and 
human rights, ensuring that disputes are addressed by people with adequate skills. Business 
entities are best suited to operating operational level grievance mechanisms which are directly 
accessible to affected persons and communities without the need to have gone through other 
means of redress.
104
  
Other advantages of the internal company-level mechanisms include the familiarity of the 
contesting parties; the existing relations between the aggrieved persons (most likely to be an 
employee, supplier, customer or community members) and the mediator/corporation would mean 
that they know more about the circumstances giving rise to the conflict than an outsider such as 
the court would, and therefore there is an assumption that they would be keener on arriving at an 
amicable solution that reduces the tensions created by the dispute.
105
 Additionally:  
Internal decision-making processes and decisions can be less formal, more flexible, and 
better able to deal with subtleties. Whereas court decisions tend to be zero-sum, internal 
decision makers can use tradeoffs that avoid or side-step zero-sum games
106
 
Operational level mechanisms allow for negotiations among the disputing parties, and 
compromises which, while not offering the most ideal solution, will offer solutions to both 
parties. For operational level mechanisms, directors as custodians of corporate conduct will play 
an important role in ensuring that the business entity does what it says it will do in its policies. 
Only when a grievance cannot be sorted through the internal grievance mechanism should 
recourse be had to the external options.  
To address the possibility that a company level mechanism managed by the company’s 
management may not be able to resolve issues without bias for the shareholders against the 
company’s other stakeholders, it is proposed that a stakeholder relationships committee be 
constituted by the board of directors and charged with the task of operating the company level 
grievance mechanism. To make the process more trustworthy, the conflict resolution team 
should have representatives from the employees and the community. A properly constituted 
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committee of the board can be tasked to deal with the matters relating to stakeholders and any 
disputes arising, and only when this fails will the matter be taken to the KNCHR or to court. 
Because of the knowledge they have regarding the operations of the company and the 
relationships arising in relation to the activities the company undertakes, it is proposed that 
directors be the main arbiters in conflicts between the company and relevant stakeholders.  
To put in place a Stakeholders’ Relationship Committee, the insertion of a Section 
134(B) in the Companies Act 2015 with the following wording is proposed: 
 
Provision of Law:  
Appointment of a Stakeholders Relationship Committee 
134(B) A company that is a quoted company or a public interest company shall establish and 
appoint a stakeholders relationship committee and outline its mandate: 
1. A company's board of directors shall constitute a Stakeholders Relationship Committee 
consisting of a chairperson who shall be a non-executive director and such other members as 
may be decided by the Board. Ideally, members should include representatives of all the 
different stakeholders who interact with the company, both voluntary stakeholders (employees, 
suppliers) and involuntary stakeholders (such as communities in the areas the corporation 
operates). 
2. The Stakeholders’ Relationship Committee will be responsible for looking into and redressing 
grievances brought forward by stakeholders of the company relating to any matters arising out 
of the activities of the company and any such matters that may be considered necessary in 
relation to stakeholders of the Company. 
3. The Stakeholders Relationship Committee shall be responsible for appointing a compliance 
officer and fixing his responsibilities. 
4. The chairperson of each of the committees constituted under this section or, in his absence, 
any other member of the committee authorised by him in this behalf shall attend the general 
meetings of the company. 
 
The mandate of the Stakeholders’ Relationship Committee, in order to bring about the 
effects desired under the above provision will include an obligation to: 
a) Prepare the business review outlining the human rights policies of the company and 
action taken to conduct an impact assessment, to mitigate and remedy any 
grievances resulting from its activities. 
b) Identify the principal stakeholder risks and uncertainties facing the company, 
including human rights risks 
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c) Establish a monitoring and evaluation system to recognise risks that are harmful to 
the company, and to address them early. 
d) Establish and provide information about stakeholders with whom the company has 
contractual or other arrangements which are essential to the business of the 
company and any company matters that are likely to significantly impact them;  
e) Develop stakeholder policies and particularly the human rights policy of the 
company and develop board procedures regarding communication of the policies 
and policy statements 
f) Provide periodic information about stakeholder policies and the extent to which the 
policies have been successfully implemented. 
 
7.4. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) 
Out of all the possible judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms available to victims of 
human rights abuse, those that are state based are expected to form the fundamental basis of 
access to remedy.
107
 National Human Rights Institutes (NHRIs) fall under the state based 
grievance category of mechanisms. Non judicial mechanisms are administered by the state, or 
branch or agency of the state, or an independent body on a statutory or constitutional basis.
108
 
Collaborative efforts between the state and non-state entities can also be sought to enhance the 
state based initiatives.
109
 In his 2009 Report, Ruggie looks to the NHRIs as a potential avenue at 
the national level for remedying human rights abuses and calls on them to assess how they may 
contribute to giving effect to the Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework.
110
 
Non-state legal systems are important in ordering community interactions and providing 
recourse to remedy.
111
 The UN Guiding Principles propose that states should provide guidance to 
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business enterprises on how to respect human rights throughout their operations.
112
 This could be 
done effectively through an institution such as the Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights, an organ of the state. The UN Guiding Principles argue for the reinforcement of the role 
of National Human Rights Institutes (NHRIs) in ensuring a positive human rights impact of 
business activities. The Guiding Principles note:  
National human rights institutions that comply with the Paris Principles have an important 
role to play in helping states identify whether relevant laws are aligned with their human 
rights obligations and are being effectively enforced, and in providing guidance on human 
rights also to business enterprises and other non-state actors.
113
 
The Constitution of Kenya makes provision for the Kenya National Human Rights and 
Equality Commission
114
 which will act as the principal state organ in the task of ensuring 
compliance with obligations under human rights treaties and conventions.
115
 The Commission is 
tasked with promoting respect for and developing a culture of human rights in the public and 
private institutions of the country;
116
 its jurisdiction goes beyond state organs to include business 
entities.  
 
Functions of the Kenya National Commission for Human Rights (KNCHR) 
The KNCHR (the Commission) is mandated under the Constitution to act as the principal organ 
of the state (and therefore national human rights institution (NHRI)) in ensuring compliance with 
obligations under international and regional treaties and conventions relating to human rights.
117
 
The work on business and human rights within the KNCHR is carried out under the Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights program, whose objective includes an obligation to ensure a greater 
commitment by business entities to respect human rights.
118
 Work done under this program 
relating to business and human rights falls into four broad categories: inquiries into complaints, 
capacity building, developing guidelines for investors and networking.
119
 The KNCHR acts as a 
supervisory body over the Government in the area of human rights, aiming to provide key 
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leadership in moving the country towards the status of a human rights state.
120
 It is expected to 
develop a culture of human rights in the country by promoting the protection and observance of 
human rights in public and private institutions.
121
 It is also required to investigate and report on 
the observance of human rights in all spheres of life, receive and investigate complaints about 
alleged abuses of human rights and take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights 
have been violated.
122
 The Commission is further tasked with the obligation of investigating or 
researching issues of human rights in public or private institutions, either of its own initiative, or 
on the basis of complaints it receives, endeavor to resolve the issues through conciliation, 
mediation or negotiation
123
 It is also expected to make recommendations to improve the 
functioning of state organs.
124
  
NHRIs take on a convening role, bringing together all the concerns for human rights and 
business and the different players in the field; coordinating the efforts of different institutions 
and other government departments dealing with human rights and facilitating understanding of 
human rights among them.
125
 The KNCHR, being the national body tasked with safeguarding 
human rights should take upon itself the mission of consolidating the framework and ensuring 
that all relevant parties play their part in executing it. It would be the best placed to play a 
coordinating role, bringing about greater integration of human rights principles and standards 
between government departments which deal with business and trade and economic related 
issues.
126
  
The KNCHR undertakes capacity building activities. Formulation of teaching material 
and education on human rights are tasks of the NHRIs, as proposed under the Paris Principles.
127
 
National Human Rights Institutions are required to publicise human rights issues through 
information and education.
128
 The KNCHR Act mandates the Commission to develop and 
implement programs that raise public awareness of rights and obligations of citizens under the 
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Constitution.
129
 In line with the Paris Principles, the KNHCR seeks to assist in the formulation of 
programs for the teaching of, and research into, human rights. The KNCHR further seeks to 
develop Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials to support various issues of 
human rights and business.
130
 It thus engages in capacity building through conducting human 
rights education, facilitating training, campaigns and advocacy on human rights. The KNCHR 
further seeks to publicise human rights issues generally and make efforts to combat all forms of 
discrimination by increasing public awareness.
131
 A task or function in line with this objective 
would include dissemination of good practice to the public and private sectors.
132
 
Training could be carried out for communities to sensitise them on their rights in relation 
to businesses that operate where they are, or which seek to set up operations within their 
communities. Corporations and other business entities could benefit from an elaboration of what 
their responsibility under the Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework and the UN Guiding 
Principles entails. Government officials in the departments and agencies that deal with trade and 
business matters could also be trained on what the obligation to protect means and how they may 
go about executing it.  
The KNCHR plays an advisory role to governments.133 In this role it is expected to give 
opinions, recommendations or make proposals on legislative provisions, after examining the 
relevant legislations in force, including bills, and make recommendations necessary to align them 
with human rights requirements.
134
 Following the 10
th
 Meeting of NHRIs,
135
 the participants at 
the meeting sought to develop methodologies that could be applied to assess public policy and 
state action against its obligation for human rights and business.
136
 The International 
Coordinating Committee (ICC) Working Group on Business and Human Rights agreed to 
broaden the work on NHRIs in the area of human rights and business, and to include business 
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and human rights in their strategies and work plans.
137
 As one of their key priorities, the NHRIs 
would reinforce the state’s duty to protect as the foundation of their work on business and human 
rights.
138
 In 2010/11, the Advisory Committee for the Government of Kenya on the UN Protect, 
Respect, Respect Framework on Business and Human Rights was formed.
139
 However, there is 
no publicly available information stating the existence of the Committee or highlighting its work 
and progress. Such a Committee would be instrumental in assisting the Government to translate 
the UN Guiding Principles into practicable considerations in the relevant government ministries 
and departments. The task falls back to the KNCHR to execute in its advisory role to the 
government. 
 The KNCHR is also required to play an advisory role to business entities. The KNHCR 
seeks to undertake initiatives to help clarify and support business in taking up their human rights 
responsibilities and to monitor corporate conduct through compliance assessments in order to 
make relevant interventions and provide strategic advice to government and specific business 
sectors.
140
 It seeks to award business entities that employ sound human rights practices and carry 
out activities that complement realisation of human rights.
141 
In its advisory role, the Commission endeavors to develop and share relevant tools and 
approaches to assist Government, business and Civil Society Organisations to cooperatively 
strengthen the realisation of human rights for and in Kenya.
142
 The Commission undertook the 
task of developing guidelines for investors on issues of human rights and identified a tool 
developed by the Danish Institute, which it could adopt for its purposes.
143
 In 2009/10, an 
analysis of the human rights situation in Kenya was carried out using the tool, and the main areas 
of concern for investors were identified as non-discrimination, freedom of association, 
workplace health and safety, conditions of employment, corruption and bribery.
144
 The 
development of a locally adapted tool such as the Danish Tools is recommended for a systematic 
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partnership between NGOs and NHRIs on business and human rights” Edinburgh, Scotland (October 8-10 2010), 2 
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 KNCHR 2010/11 Report xvi. 
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 KNCHR ‘Promoting business responsibility for human rights’ available at  
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and effective dissemination of advice to corporations on their corporate obligation for human 
rights. 
Going by the above analysis, the KNCHR has a comprehensive mandate and seems very 
much alive to business and human rights concerns and the role it can play. However, the 
activities it engages in appear too many, and there may be need to refine its mandate if it is to be 
able to effectively address all concerns in the business and human rights sphere. These multiple 
roles defined for a NHRI are demanding, and may be too much to take on for some NHRIs. The 
primary responsibilities of NHRIs are human rights promotion and protection. Additionally, they 
are expected to advise governments, make recommendations or proposals, promote 
harmonisation of national laws, regulations and policies with international human rights 
standards, cooperate with other institutions dealing with human rights and assist in the 
formulation of  programs or material for teaching human rights
145
 - as indeed the KNCHR seeks 
to do. Whereas these would constitute a comprehensive mandate that would result in respect and 
promotion of human rights by all concerned, it may be too ambitious for KNCHR.  
Based on the experience had since it ventured to take on business and human rights as 
one of its areas of concern, the KNCHR ought to take stock and assess whether it is practical or 
most effective for it to take on all the relevant tasks. The Constitution of Kenya makes a 
restructuring of the KNCHR possible, enabling the creation of a second Commission which can 
take on some of the duties of the KNCHR thus making its workload manageable.
146
 It may be 
advisable for the Commission to review its mandate with the aim of assessing what is practically 
achievable, and what might best be passed on to another institution, perhaps one similar the 
proposed UK Commission on Business, Human Rights and the Environment.
147
 
 
                                               
145
 Ibid at 34. 
146
 Under Section 59 (4). 
147
 In 2009 there was a proposal to have a UK Commission for Business, Human Rights and the Environment 
designed to be a dispute resolution body with coordinating, capacity building and informational roles (but which 
does not seem to have come into operation). (See Corporate Responsibility (CORE) ‘Why the UK needs a 
Commission for Business, Human Rights and the Environment’ available at http://corporate-responsibility.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/COREvalues.pdf accessed on 6 August 2014). It was designated to receive, investigate and 
settle complaints against UK companies for human rights abuses, clarify standards of conduct with regard to human 
rights, and in its capacity building role promote learning on business and human rights among stakeholders. The 
proposal was rejected by the UK Government, and it was suggested that the existing NHRI could become more 
active in the private sector and do the work proposed for this new Commission. (Human rights and the UK Private 
Sector op cit note 2 at 89.) 
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7.4.1. Bringing a complaint before the KNCHR: lessons from the Malindi Inquiry 
As already noted, the Commission is tasked to monitor, investigate and report on the observance 
of human rights abuses in all spheres of life.
148
 It undertakes to receive and process petitions 
relating to allegations of human rights violations by corporate bodies.
149
 This provision gives it 
the authority to go into the private sphere and ensure human rights are upheld. The Complaints 
and Investigation Program of the KNCHR investigates the complaint received and attempts to 
solve the matter by mediation or negotiation, and advises the Commission on options for redress. 
The Redress Department coordinates the redress mechanisms, whether litigation, public inquiry, 
or mediation, negotiation or conciliation methods of alternative dispute resolution are applied. If 
there are adequate remedies available through other means, the Commission can refuse to take 
up the investigations.  
Persons may complain to the Commission alleging denial, threat to their human rights, or 
actual infringement.
150
 Complaints can be received by letter, email or orally. Similar to the 
Constitution which makes a wide provision of who may institute court proceedings for violation 
of human rights, the KNCHR Act provides for persons other than the aggrieved persons as 
admissible complainants.
151
 However, the Act limits who can act on behalf of an aggrieved 
person by stating that representation of the aggrieved person by a member of his or her family or 
other suitable person is permissible if the aggrieved person is dead or otherwise not able to act 
for himself or herself.
152
 A member of the National Assembly can initiate proceedings with the 
consent of the aggrieved person or other person who is entitled to make the complaint on behalf 
of the aggrieved person.
153
 The Commission will receive and investigate complaints on violation 
of human rights and take steps to ensure appropriate redress.
154
 
                                               
148
 Section 59 (1)(d). 
149
 Promoting business responsibility for human rights op cit note 140. 
150
 Section 59 (3). 
151
 See section 7.2.1 above on “Accessibility of courts for effective protection of human rights” for the 
Constitutional provisions. The person aggrieved, a person acting on his behalf, or a person acting as a member of, or 
in the interest of a group of persons, a person acting in the interest of the public or an association acting on behalf of 
its members may institute proceeding for violation of human rights in Court 
152
 Section 32(2) (a). 
153
 Section 32, KNCHR Act. 
154
 Section 59(1)(f). 
    
245 
 
In 2005, the KNCHR carried out its first major inquiry into corporate violation of human 
rights in Kenya.
155
 A committee comprising the local community, provincial administration and 
salt companies was established to amicably resolve any issues arising affecting the human rights 
of the individuals in the community.
156
 The Inquiry exposed numerous challenges and 
shortcomings on the part of the corporations: poor health and safety and sanitation conditions; 
lack of adequate work clothing or equipment; unsuitable transport of workers; poor housing 
conditions; workers who worked on casual basis permanently; companies that operated without 
the required certificates, for example from the Occupational Health and Safety Directorate 
among other short comings.
157
 
From an operational perspective, one of the challenges experienced during the Malindi 
Inquiry and which is likely to affect the capacity of the Commission to execute its mandate is the 
resource-consuming nature of the procedures in relation to the capacity of the Commission. It 
was observed that during the entire inquiry, the Commission scaled down on the other work as 
practically all the Commissioners were needed to participate in the inquiry.
158
 Lack of 
procedures for bringing maters before the Commission resulted in lack of clarity on whether 
witnesses could be represented; whether there would be cross examination or whether the 
Commission could issue compensation to the victims. Additionally, the summons for witnesses 
to appear before the Commission were issued late, and some of the witnesses ignored them.
159
 
Shortcomings of this kind can lead to a lack of trust by those the inquiry procedure is meant to 
serve. From the experience, the Commission realised the need for clear procedures well known 
to the parties before the inquiry. Some of these concerns arising from the Inquiry were addressed 
in the KNCHR Act of 2011 drafted pursuant to the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. The Act lays 
down the general powers of the Commission, and the powers of investigation, jurisdiction and 
manner of presenting the findings.
160
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Being the first of its kind, the Inquiry was viewed as a learning experience of what the 
Commission could expect in future exercises of the kind.
161
 One of the main lessons learnt in the 
inquiry process was that conflict cannot totally be eliminated, and can even be seen as a good 
thing, a means to bring to the fore the different voices necessary in the process or search for 
development, for the re-ordering of society.
162
 It is through deliberations and negotiations on the 
different views that new procedures are formed and get to acquire legitimacy.
163
 In the 
Commission’s view, deliberations with the companies improved the understanding of business 
entities of their human rights obligations. The Commission involved the Government, 
community and companies in the inquiry, and afterwards disseminated the findings to each 
group. The Commission further helped stakeholders to develop and adopt a joint action plan to 
guide salt companies in observance of human rights of the community and discussed with each 
group the proposed plan of action.
164
 
Following consultations with the concerned companies, communities and government 
departments, the Commission made numerous recommendations which in its view the concerned 
parties had an obligation to comply with.
165
 The Commission recommended that the concerned 
corporations implement the requisite law and policy standards, and provide the appropriate 
clothing and implements for the workers. Proposals were also made directed at the government 
ministries and departments, requiring for example the allocation of adequate budgets for the 
proposed measures.
166
 The Commission directed the umbrella body of salt manufacturing 
companies to develop codes of conduct that salt manufacturing companies would be expected to 
abide by in order to meet international standards.
167
 
The Commission’s recommendations are overall suggestions which, if they were not be 
complied with, there would be no penalty to the government ministries and departments or 
corporations concerned. The proposed increase in government budgets to enable the employment 
of more labour inspectors should go hand in hand with facilitation of a greater understanding of 
the corporations of their obligations, so that the intervention of the Commission is not merely 
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one of policing. Development of codes of conduct would have to be accompanied by oversight 
measures to ensure that the companies complied.  
A more direct way of facilitating corporate change in behaviour is to require compliance 
through legislative provisions and offering guidance through reporting requirements highlighting 
what companies can do to meet the legal requirements. The Human Rights Council in a 
Resolution dated 23 June 2014 noted the value that action plans and such other frameworks can 
contribute to the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles encouraged states to develop such 
plans and frameworks.
168
 
 
7.4.2. The Danish Tools: a model for offering human rights guidance to business entities 
The training offered by the KNCHR should include instruction of lawyers on the principles of 
responsible contracting
169
 to ensure that they are well equipped to negotiate foreign contracts or 
to advise their clients, where the client is the Government. Training could also be carried out for 
communities to sensitise them on their rights in relation to businesses that operate where they 
are, or which seek to set up operations within their communities. Corporations and other business 
entities could benefit from an elaboration of what their responsibility under the Protect, Respect, 
Remedy Framework and the UN Guiding Principles entails. Government officials in the 
departments and agencies that deal with trade and business matters could also be trained on what 
the obligation to protect means and how they may go about executing it. The KNCHR should 
seek to make it clear to all stakeholders what is expected of them in the issue of business and 
human rights, and, being a relatively novel area in every jurisdiction, it could do this by putting 
together best practices and sharing with the relevant stakeholders during the training. 
During the 10
th
 International Conference of National Human Rights Institutions, the 
NHRIs committed to “…consider implementing non-judicial remedial processes that are 
consistent with international human rights principles for effective remedies to address business 
and human rights issues”.170 The Business Department of the Danish Institute for Human Rights 
(DIHR) created tools to help companies translate international human rights standards into 
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company practices and give practical recommendations to companies.
171
 The Department has 
developed both an assessment tool and risk framework to translate the international human rights 
obligations into measurable company performance. It has created four tools so far: the Human 
Rights Compliance Assessment (HRCA) the HRCA Quick Check, the Global Compact Self-
Assessment Tool and the China Business and Social Sustainability Check.
172
 
The Danish Institute for Human Rights has also developed a framework looking at 
company operations, site locations, stages of engagement and legal liability with the aim of 
helping the companies to ensure that their codes of conduct are effective in helping them to 
respect human rights.
173
 The framework covers 3 areas: company risk, country risk and policy 
analysis. Company Risk Mapping will help the companies to understand which of their actions 
will put them at risk of interfering with the human rights of individuals either directly or through 
its supply chain, or through a lax government or other business partners, so that they can take 
appropriate measures to avoid these. This framework also enables managers to identify human 
rights risks so that they can avoid them.
174
 Country Risk Mapping refers to assessment of the 
human rights risks in the local operating environment to help companies identify and tackle key 
challenges in a country setting where it plans operate.
175
 Policy Analysis helps companies to 
match external commitments to the entity’s internal procedures regarding human rights.176 The 
DIHR helps companies to conduct a ‘gap analysis’ which contrasts company policies to 
international human rights law, sector-specific standards and industry best practices so that the 
company’s policies can be aligned as necessary. Creation of tools similar to those developed by 
the Danish Institute for Human Rights would help the KNCHR carry out its task of providing 
guidance to business entities in a tangible manner.  
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7.5. Conclusion 
A Legal Aid Bill has been drafted creating a National Legal Aid Fund, pursuant to the 
Constitution which requires the state to provide access to justice,
177
 guaranteeing the right to free 
trial and right of any complainant to be represented in proceedings or to have an advocate 
assigned to him.
178
 The KNCHR Act currently provides no representation or legal aid, (although 
it charges no fees to receive and process complaints) but it is hoped that with the enactment of 
the Legal Aid Bill victims will have recourse to the national fund for the access to means for the 
resolution of their disputes. 
Companies should be required to have grievance mechanisms, and it is proposed that the 
KNCHR offer guidance and capacity building in the setting up of the mechanisms. Only when 
recourse has been had to this mechanism and no reprieve given should the complaint be brought 
before the KNCHR. The KNCHR will investigate the matter, and propose litigation, or 
conciliation, mediation of the dispute. Because the country is still at a nascent stage of 
development of the business and human rights jurisprudence, it is proposed that more recourse 
be had to inquiries and stakeholder negotiations to resolve disputes. The process of inquiry is 
effective as it creates a forum for engagement of the stakeholders, raising concerns, education on 
duties and responsibilities, leading to an overall increase of knowledge of corporate human rights 
responsibility, and better relationships among the stakeholders.
179
 Although the method has 
many challenges, it has equal promise, as noted by an independent evaluation of the Malindi 
Inquiry:  
An independent evaluation of the inquiry observes that while it may not have achieved 
immediate life-changing positive results for the workers and community members, it 
galvanized the community, put government officers in the area in the spot light and most 
importantly, opened the salt companies to demands for public accountability on their 
human rights record. The evaluation noted that the companies were responding to 
community concerns, that there were attempts at coordination by CBOs to rally around the 
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salt mines issue. It also observed that the inquiry re-energized citizen participation in 
governance issues and in particular in protecting their fundamental rights and freedoms.
180
 
In the resolution welcoming the work of the UN Working Group on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, the Human Rights Council 
requested the Working Group to conduct consultations with states and other relevant 
stakeholders from 2015 to deliberate and facilitate sharing of legal and practical remedies for 
victims of corporate human rights abuses.
181
 Such sharing of experiences will serve to further 
refine and boost the capabilities of state and non-state mechanisms applicable to provide remedy 
for victims of corporate human rights abuse, providing new possibilities of approaches to 
availing remedies for victims of corporate human rights violation. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
8. IMPLICATIONS OF THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND 2010 CONSTITUTION 
ON THE KENYAN LAWS ON CORPORATIONS 
 
8.1. Introduction 
A sharing of practices applied in different jurisdictions and found to be effective will help to 
facilitate the useful implementation of the UN Guiding Principles in crafting workable solutions 
to the business and human rights problem. The 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement are deemed to have been effective in bringing about change in governments 
attitudes towards internal displacements.
1
 Like the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement are not legally binding. 
Nonetheless, states that had ratified human rights and humanitarian instruments that formed the 
foundation of the Guiding Principles are bound by the principles. States could also opt to 
incorporate the Guiding Principles into domestic law, thus making them binding in the domestic 
context.
2
 In a review of the effectiveness of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement ten 
years after they were drafted, it was fond that the Principles had become a key point of reference 
in developing frameworks for protection of internally displaced persons in domestic laws and 
policies.
3
 The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights can similarly be 
incorporated into national laws and policies and applied as a guide to make clearer the legal 
obligation of corporations for human rights. It may even be hoped that if the Guiding Principles 
                                               
1
 The Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons was prepared by the Representative of the Secretary-
General on internally displaced persons, which were presented to the Commission on Human Rights in 1998. 
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Displacement available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/idp/english/id_faq.html, accessed on 7 April 2015. The 
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on Business and Human Rights are effectively implemented, the need for direct obligations (as in 
the form of a treaty) may be diminished.
4
 
This chapter proposes the amendment of the Companies Act, the main law that governs 
corporations, if the implementation of the Constitution is to be more completely achieved. 
Although a Companies Act was passed,
5
 a proposal is made to further amend the Act. The 
chapter reviews provisions of the Act that can be strengthened, together with other relevant laws, 
and offers rationale for the proposed amendments and additions. Specifically, it proposes 
amendment of the provisions to require directors to consider the interests of stakeholders in 
decision-making. A proposal is made for an obligation of directors to consider the human rights 
impact of company operations as opposed to a general duty to consider only social interests. 
Constituency Statutes are proposed as a model for the proposed amendments. Constituency 
Statutes are state laws in the USA which were seen as revolutionary when they emerged in the 
1980s because of their intent to codify social and community obligations of directors.  
In line with the 2010 Constitution and its greater elaboration of human rights, it is 
proposed that the Government make a commitment to embrace the changes proposed below to 
the country’s Companies Law CAP 486. The proposed changes are suggested as a most 
immediate and direct way of making human rights obligations applicable to corporations, in line 
with the provisions of the Constitution which contemplates a horizontal application of the Bill of 
Rights to non-governmental entities. A concrete addition on business and human rights to the 
most recent national action plan on human rights drafted to implement the Constitution will help 
to show the government’s commitment to ensure human rights are respected by all, including 
business entities. 
The strategies of Commission for the Implementation of the (2010) Constitution (CIC) in 
Kenya do not include directives that would make the Constitution applicable to corporations as 
contemplated in Article 20 of the Constitution. The recommendations made in this chapter are 
proposed to be included in the action plan for implementing the Constitution, and especially 
Article 20 which binds corporations to human rights. 
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8.2. Implementing the 2010 Constitution: need to amend the Companies Act 
The Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) is required to work with the 
Attorney-General and the Kenya Law Reform Commission to prepare for tabling in Parliament 
the legislation necessary to implement the Constitution.
6
 The CIC worked with the Kenya Law 
Reform Commission, the agency tasked to spearhead the law reform and review process, to 
identify the legislation that needed amendment to ensure that the law ‘conforms to the letter and 
spirit of the Constitution’.7 Article 20 of the 2010 Constitution binds corporations to the Bill of 
Rights, in effect making the Bill horizontally applicable to corporations.  
The CIC has as one of its tasks the identification of legislation and policies that may 
require amendment in order to conform to the Constitution.
8
 With the aim of meeting its 
objective, the CIC drafted an Implementation Guide for Integration of the Bill of Rights in the 
Public Service (the Guide) whose objective was to ‘guide implementers in all sectors of the 
public service on the integration of constitutional and human rights principles… in their work.’9 
The implication of this Guide is that the impact of non-state actors such as companies is not 
considered important. Restricting the focus of implementation of the Constitution by seeking to 
implement the Bill of Rights only in the public sector, ignores a major source of inequality, the 
economic power of oppression that corporations can have,
10
 which makes them pose as much a 
threat to the exercise of fundamental rights as governments.
11
 The CIC based its decision to 
develop the implementation guide for the public sector on the reason that its three years of 
experience in implementing the Constitution and international best practice showed that the key 
                                               
6
 Article 261 (4) of the Constitution Transitional and Consequential Provisions; see also Section 4 of the 
Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution Act (No. 9 of 2010) [Rev. 2012]. 
7
 The Kenya Law Review Commission Act Section 6(1) states that “The Commission shall — (a) keep under review 
all the law and recommend its reform to ensure—(i) that the law conforms to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. 
8
 Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (October to December 2014) Quarterly Report 44. 
9
 Reported to have been processed in the period October – December 2012- see Commission for the Implementation 
of the Constitution, Quarterly Report (October-December 2012), 21. See also  “Integration of The Human Rights 
Principles in all Sectors: CIC Develops a Human Rights Implementation Guide for the Public Service” available at 
http://www.cickenya.org/index.php/newsroom/item/286-integration-of-the-human-rights-principles-in-all-sectors-
cic-develops-a-human-rights-implementation-guide-for-the-public-service#.VLksI_sV_RY, accessed on 16 January 
2015.  
10
 Gavin Anderson ‘The Limits of Constitutional Law: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
Public-Private Divide’ in Conor Gearty and Adam Tomkins (eds) Understanding Human Rights (1996) 546. 
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 G E Devenish ‘Human Rights in a Divided Society’ in Conor Gearty and Adam Tomkins (eds) Understanding 
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to achieving the expected change was changing the public service mindsets, beliefs, culture and 
public service delivery institutional structures.
12
 
It was precisely the recognition of the negative impact that juristic persons can have in 
the enjoyment of rights that led to the constitutional provision binding them to the Bill of Rights 
alongside state organs in what was previously seen as a state-only sphere. In recognition of this 
fact the CIC recognises the need to ‘ensure effective implementation of human rights [by] all 
stakeholders, both state and non-state actors, [who] should appreciate their responsibility in the 
implementation process’.13 It is therefore imperative that effort be made to ensure that juristic 
persons appreciate the obligation they have under the Constitution because failure to do this will 
result in only a partial implementation of the Constitution. The proposed amendments to the 
relevant laws are further elaborated below. 
 
8.3. Constituency statutes as a model for amending the Companies Act 
Human rights are not optional; they are due where owed. Similarly, regulatory goals that would 
make the attainment of human rights are non-negotiable. However, the means of best achieving 
the end of human rights protection will vary depending on the size, sector, organisational culture 
or compliance capacity of the business entity. What is effective in one culture may not be 
effective in another and therefore a direct transplanting of laws across jurisdictions may not be 
ideal.
14
 However, laws can be used as models, taking provisions that are likely to be applicable, 
adapting them to local circumstances and modifying them as the need arises. It is with this 
understanding that Constituency Statutes are proposed as a model for the modification of the 
Companies Act of Kenya. 
Almost half a century after commencement of the debate on corporate purpose and the 
perceived role of the director in the corporation, corporate statutes stipulating directors’ duties 
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 The Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution Quarterly Report for July to September 2013, 11. 
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 ‘Integration of The Human Rights Principles in all Sectors: CIC Develops a Human Rights Implementation Guide 
for the Public Service’ available at http://www.cickenya.org/index.php/newsroom/item/286-integration-of-the-
human-rights-principles-in-all-sectors-cic-develops-a-human-rights-implementation-guide-for-the-public-
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 Haines Fiona, Macdonald Kate & Balaton‐Chrimes Samantha Contextualizing the business responsibility to 
respect: How much is lost in translation?, in The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
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that go beyond the traditional shareholder-centric concern did actually emerge. From the 1980s 
in the USA, different states came up with what came to be known as director statutes, or 
constituency statutes which codify the duties of directors, requiring them to consider the interests 
of stakeholders in decision-making.
15
 Constituency statutes originated as a response to corporate 
boards lobbying for more legislative protection against corporate takeovers.
16
 The statutes were 
revolutionary in codifying what until then had been regarded as voluntary obligations. The broad 
duty of corporations which extended to the wider societal groups was regarded as best enforced 
out of the corporation’s own volition, without the force of law. The constituency statutes 
emerged to take the CSR deliberations a step further, making a legal obligation out of the 
requirement that directors consider the interests of stakeholders. Gavis refers to the emergence of 
constituency statutes as the codification of a ‘subversive doctrine’, because the statutes sought to 
entrench the stakeholder theory, destabilising the traditional shareholder supremacy model of 
corporate law.
17
 
None of the existing constituency statutes direct or require corporations to consider 
stakeholder issues, but rather invite them to do so, using the term ‘may’ as opposed to ‘shall’.18 
In the only state that attempted to use the mandatory phrase ‘shall’ referring to the obligation of 
directors, the law was changed in 2010 to refer to ‘may’ as all the other statutes.19 An 
interpretation of these laws therefore leads to a conclusion that still places the shareholder above 
the other stakeholders. A typical constituency statute provision on the duties of directors reads: 
 … a director of a corporation … may consider, in determining what he reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, (1) the long-term as well as the 
short-term interests of the corporation, (2) the interests of the shareholders, long-term as 
well as short-term, including the possibility that those interests may be best served by the 
continued independence of the corporation, (3) the interests of the corporation’s 
employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and (4) community and societal 
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 Andrew Keay, ‘Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has it got what it takes?’ (2010) 9(3) Richmond Journal of 
Global Law and Business 246.The first statute was enacted in 1983 in Pennsylvania. 
16
 Nathan E Standley ‘Lessons Learned from the Capitulation of the Constituency Statute’ (2012) 4 Elon Law 
Review, 209. Corporate interest was interpreted as shareholder interest justifying takeovers which benefitted 
shareholders to the detriment of the other stakeholders. 
17
 Alexander C Gavis ‘A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors' Responsibilities under State Non-
shareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts’ (1990) 138 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 1451. 
18
 Standley op cit note 16 at 215.  
19
 The  Connecticut General Statutes (Title 33 Chapter 601,  Section 33-756) which provides for General standards 
for directors: CT Gen Stat § 33-756 (2013). 
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considerations including those of any community in which any office or other facility of 
the corporation is located. A director may also in his discretion consider any other 
factors he reasonably considers appropriate in determining what he reasonably believes to 
be in the best interests of the corporation.
20
 (Emphasis added) 
In effect, the constituency statutes have been effective in theory more than in practice. 
Although they generated debate among the practitioner and academic circles and were seen as 
the harbingers of a radical change in corporate law, constituency statutes were generally 
overlooked by courts; judges did not seem to know how to interpret them independent of the 
requirement of shareholder primacy.
21
 In the absence of clear guidelines in answer to ambiguities 
of the statutes, courts seemed to resort to common law and in doing so perpetrated the status 
quo.
22
 The statutes were described as potentially revolutionary, but in reality they were 
considered ‘superfluous, adding nothing new to existing law and having no direct impact of the 
statutes in US commercial life.’23 These laws are seen at best to be ideological in giving legal 
recognition to stakeholder interest with the result, at least in theory, that shareholder primacy 
remains supreme. 
Keay defines the disadvantages of the constituency statutes in a radical way.
24
 Gavis 
expresses equally wild fears of adopting constituency statutes, arguing for example that they 
would encumber the corporations with “unwieldy” contracts, making them unattractive to 
potential bidders thereby harming shareholder interests.
25
 Other disadvantages of the statutes are 
briefly considered here. First, constituency statutes can lead directors to hide behind them, 
making any decisions to the detriment of shareholders and claiming that the decision was made 
at the behest of stakeholders.
26
 Second, constituency statutes are said to transfer wealth from 
shareholders, leading them to be disinclined to take up shares. Thirdly, the authority to consider 
other interests amounts, in the view of some, to a descent to socialism as it leads to confiscation 
of shareholder property and its distribution to others. Constituency statutes are also seen as a 
form of wealth sharing or re-distribution, encouraging those who benefit from the corporation 
                                               
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Keay op cit note 15 at 246 and Standley op cit note 16 at 209. 
22
 Standley op cit note 16 at 209. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Keay, op cit note 15 at 246. 
25
 Gavis op cit note 17 at1451. 
26
 Standley op cit note 16 at 228-9. 
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(usually shareholders) to compensate those who lose (the other stakeholders).
27
 Fourth the 
challenge of considering conflicting views is another disadvantage: what weight ought to be 
given to the different interests by the directors? Under the constituency statutes, directors are 
expected to consider the best interests of all stakeholders in making decisions: but the best 
interest of the stakeholder is not defined, and directors may make decisions that compensate 
stakeholders for losses they incur resulting from decisions aimed at shareholder maximisation.
28
 
If the interests of all stakeholders were to be considered, there would be too many 
considerations as to make it difficult to arrive at any meaningful decisions in good time.
29
 Gavis 
argues that requiring directors to consider the interests of everyone will give directors a ‘multi-
faceted super-corporate defense’ for any wrong decision they make.30 There would be too many 
masters in the relationship, and others not even foreseen, making it impossible for the directors 
to attend to each one.
31
 In aiming to reach everyone, constituency statutes fail to offer a 
benchmark for shareholders or stakeholders to hold directors accountable.
32
 Fifth, the inherent 
softness of the wording of constituency statutes creates a significant problem, and this gap has 
given courts the leeway to construe them to reflect the common law which favours shareholder 
supremacy.
33
 Finally, constituency statutes are more theoretic than practical because they fail to 
give the shareholder a right of enforcement.
34
 The lack of power by stakeholders to bargain with 
directors to consider their interests and the lack of enforcement of directors’ duties towards the 
stakeholders present a fundamental problem that defeats the purpose of giving the rights in the 
first place.
35
 
Standley notes that the failures of the constituency statutes ought to provide opportunities 
for legislatures to learn from their mistakes, enabling them to make the provisions clearer and 
more effective in facilitating change in corporate law.
36
 Suggestions for improvement made by 
                                               
27
 Gavis op cit note 17 at1451. 
28
 See discussion on arguments against the stakeholder theory in Keay, op cit note 15 at 269 – 298. 
29
 Standley op cit note 16 at 218. 
30
 Gavis op cit note 17 at 1451. 
31
 Keay op cit note 15 at 246 (12). 
32
 Keay op cit note 15 at 277. 
33
 Gavis op cit note 17 at 1451. Standley also notes the permissive wording of constituency statutes as a problem and 
shows that case law on constituency statutes hesitated to deviate from common law of shareholder primacy. 
34
 Standley op cit note 16 at 212. 
35
 Gavis op cit note 17 at 1451; and Standley op cit note 16 at 209. 
36
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Standley include: requiring that directors consider the conflicting interests of stakeholders 
mandatory rather than permissive; that they be applied in any conceivable situation where a 
number of stakeholders with different interests are concerned; that there be included in the 
statute stakeholder enforcement rights; and that managers provide evidence to show that they 
have fulfilled their obligations to stakeholders
37
 (this can be done through reporting). Standley 
also proposes that meetings be held between the corporations and stakeholders to facilitate the 
airing of stakeholder grievances; these interactions can lead to reduced litigation.
38
 In further 
support of the constituency statutes, Gavis also concedes that despite the numerous possible 
shortcomings the statutes seem to have, legislative and judicial standards can be put in place to 
avoid director abuse of discretion.
39
 
A proposal is made to introduce in the Companies Act of Kenya a provision regarding the 
duty and scope of directors’ duty to stakeholders, suggesting that it includes specific reference to 
responsibility to consider human rights impact of the company’s activities, taking into 
consideration the perceived weaknesses and suggested solutions considered above. 
 
8.4. Proposed changes to the Companies Act (2015) of Kenya 
Corporations and other business entities ought to be able to look to the state for concrete 
guidance on what they can and ought to do in order to fulfill their human rights obligations. 
Business entities ought to be assured of the backing of government in terms of effective 
assistance in assessing and managing the human rights risks involved.
40
 The Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), considered the genesis of the international bill of human 
rights, proclaims a common standard of achievement for the promotion and respect of rights and 
freedoms by all peoples including every organ of society.
41
 The UDHR as such directs every 
individual and every organ of society to promote respect for the rights and freedoms contained 
                                               
37
 Standley op cit note 16 at 227 et esq. 
38
 Ibid at 230. 
39
 Gavis op cit note 17 at1451. 
40
 The Joint Committee on Human Rights, appointed by the House of Lords and the House of Commons ‘Any of our 
business? Human rights and the UK Private Sector’ First Report of Session 2009–10 (2009) 63. 
41
 The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: ‘Now, Therefore the General Assembly 
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therein. Nevertheless, businesses have not considered the expectations placed on them in this 
regard clear.
42
 As J. F. Sherman notes: 
…expectations of appropriate corporate conduct are unclear; currently companies are 
uncertain as to what practical actions they should take to discharge their human rights 
obligations beyond the need to comply with statutes imposing liability directly upon 
them to avoid complicity with human rights violations committed by others.
43
 
The Companies Act 2015 says something that may be interpreted to give guidance to 
corporations by requiring them to heed their human rights obligations. However, as it is, the 
provisions are too vague and need reinforcement to make them more stakeholder-oriented and 
thus capable of bringing about the desired impact. The Companies Act introduces the 
enlightened shareholder value, similar to the approach brought about by the UK Company law 
review that resulted in the 2006 Companies Act.
44
 The enlightened shareholder value approach 
implies the probability that the directors can consider the interests of a wider spectrum of 
stakeholders in their decision-making. Section 655 of the Companies Act 2015 requires directors 
to prepare a business review and in it describe how they take into account social and community 
issues in making decisions. Whereas these provisions open the way for the inclusion of efforts to 
show what the company does to exercise its corporate obligation to respect human rights, the 
indications and requirements are permissive, and not clear even to the corporations that may be 
well disposed to apply them.  
Proposals are made below regarding reporting obligations of corporations. The 
requirements will provide companies with a guide of what they can do to ensure respect for 
human rights. Directors may not be clear on the role they ought to play in view of the wider 
obligation imposed on the company in the Constitution and on them by the Companies Act 2015. 
As a corporate executive observed, “Firms don't violate human rights because they are evil, but 
typically because they are not aware of the impact of their business.”45 The proposals made offer 
                                               
42
 Human Rights Council ‘Business and human rights: Towards operationalizing the “protect, respect and remedy” 
framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises’A/HRC/11/13(22 April 2009) [Ruggie Report 2009] 57. 
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 John F Sherman, Corporate Duty to Respect Human Rights: Due Diligence Requirements (2007), 1 available at 
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45
 Susanne Stormer, vice president of corporate sustainability at Danish pharmaceutical giant Novo Nordisk cited in 
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a refined description of directors’ duties giving them a more focused idea what the company 
ought to do in respecting human rights. It is hoped that the probability of the amendments and 
additions suggested succeeding will be higher because they address an objective problem and 
clarify expectations, as opposed to merely seeking to punish companies for failing to uphold 
human rights.
46
 
 
8.4.1. Modifications to company reporting obligations 
Corporate reporting and codification of directors’ duties can be used as means of facilitating and 
ensuring corporate accountability for human rights and holding directors accountable for this 
task. Reporting obligations are necessary for tracking performance. Adequate reporting 
requirements must be used to ensure that corporations go beyond financial considerations and 
address in a systematic manner all aspects that affect stakeholders. It is through reporting that 
business entities can make known what measures they have in place to ensure respect for human 
rights, and how they are faring in executing those measures. In a British case, the obligation of 
reporting was interpreted as a duty conferred on the corporation by the privilege of limited 
liability.
47
 In return for the incentive granted to entrepreneurs to take risky ventures in the 
comfort that their liability if they incurred losses would be limited, corporations were expected to 
keep accounts that show the world what was happening.
48
 Reporting is seen as a way for 
directors to show that they have complied with the reciprocal obligations on which their duty to 
make decisions on behalf of the company is based. The court expressed its opinion thus: 
…thus a total failure to keep statutory books and to make statutory returns is significant 
for the public at large and a matter which amounts to misconduct if not complied with 
and is a matter of which the court should take account in considering whether a man 
can properly be allowed to continue to operate as a director of companies, or whether 
the public at large is to be protected against him on the grounds that he is unfit, not 
                                               
46
 Ko-Yung Tung et al, World Bank Legal Review: Law and Justice for Development “Assessing a bill in terms of 
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because he is fraudulent but because he is incompetent and unable to comply with the 
statutory obligations attached to limited liability…49 
The same reasoning can be applied where the directors fail to adequately prepare the 
statutory books, thereby showing negligence which should be used to call for their 
disqualification. If the reporting obligations are amended to require a comprehensive report that 
includes an analysis and justification of the company’s decisions and actions affecting 
stakeholders, then a failure to prepare the report, or failure to adequately prepare it will be a 
reason for the disqualification of the director. This view of the director’s duty should motivate 
him to ensure that the required reports are well prepared, reflecting the state of operations of the 
company and by extension facilitate the creation of a corporate culture respectful of human 
rights. 
In the Guiding Principles, Ruggie proposes that the state encourage, and where 
appropriate require business enterprises to communicate how they address their human rights 
impacts.
50
 Companies are required to communicate the country context and whether there are 
any particular challenges that affect their responsibility to respect human rights; the human rights 
impact of their own activities; and any chance of complicity in human rights violations by other 
entities through their business relationships.
51
 
 
8.4.2. A reflexive law approach to law making 
In situations where the ability of the law to adequately regulate a set of relationships is 
diminished owing to the complexity of the relationships, the reflexive law approach has been 
proposed as an alternative to the traditional substantive legislation.
52
 As opposed to commanding 
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a given outcome, the reflexive law approach guides thinking, leading the concerned parties to 
arrive at the desired results. The law of corporations which regulates the conduct of companies 
can be applied to require corporations to consider their activities and the impact they will have to 
ensure that the activities do not result in violation of human rights. The reflexive law approach 
goes beyond the mere prohibition of certain conduct; the law offers guidance that prompts 
change in behaviour rather than the law merely being used as a reproach for the company’s 
inappropriate behaviour.
53
 
The human rights and business scenario presents such a set of complex relationships. 
Corporations are created and regulated by domestic statutes; human rights have long been 
considered the preserve of states. Although corporations have grown in size and power and the 
capacity to negatively impact on human rights, International Law has not been successful in 
devising means to hold them accountable at the international level. The states are thus faced with 
the obligation of holding corporations accountable for human rights – although they also have no 
readymade means of doing this. Reflexive law in such a situation holds that the most important 
and urgent task is to achieve the desired outcome – respect for human rights in the present case - 
as opposed to drafting of laws to cover every conceivable relationship which may result in 
complex laws perhaps impossible to implement.
54
 In this situation, social accounting, auditing 
and reporting are seen as reflexive means to control corporate behaviour.
55
 This approach 
encourages self-examination, a self-reflective and self-critical process that leads to adjustment of 
behaviour based on the findings made.
56
 The requirement for social accounting and reporting 
acknowledges the reality of a corporation that operates within a context that is not purely 
financial thereby necessitating varied reporting. 
Laws can used to channel behaviours into desired patterns as opposed to merely changing 
rules or commanding companies to act in a given way.
57
 Through the provisions guiding 
corporations on what to report on, and how to report, the law can transform institutions, the 
company in the present case, making it develop a culture of respect for human rights. Without 
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the provisions of law that guide directors on what to consider in decision-making, and without a 
format for reporting on the impact of its activities, companies would have good intentions but no 
knowledge how to translate the ideals to perceptible reality. The insertion of the following 
proposed provisions to the Companies Act 2015 will help to bring about consistency in company 
reporting in a manner that ensures that human rights are considered and respected in company 
operations. 
 
8.4.3. A guide for reporting 
In discussing the need for corporate reporting on matters other than the traditional financial 
concerns that are objective and quantifiable, the difficulty involved in accounting for intangible 
assets is not overlooked: 
In particular, any requirement that ‘“soft” assets’ be disclosed must face the problem that 
‘adequate standards and benchmarks for reporting do not yet exist, capable of carrying 
the weight which is needed to establish effective pressures to ensure that there is an 
adequate response to this range of interests.
58
 
Despite the difficulty in assessing and putting value to the efforts by the company to deal 
with the non-quantifiable factors affecting the company, it is nonetheless imperative to do this if 
a comprehensive picture of the company, its activities and impact is to be given. Best practice 
reporting standards should be applied, showing among other non-financial impacts the human 
rights impact of the company’s operations.59 Towards this end, a recommendation is made for 
companies to refer to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) which offers a guide for qualitative 
reporting and a means to standardise voluntary disclosure as an important initial step in the effort 
to change corporate behaviour and create a culture that respects human rights. Subscribing to the 
GRI is an accessible means to bring to the knowledge of business entities the different 
obligations they have and to provide a means of living them out. The GRI is a comprehensive 
guide for sustainability reporting, offering guidelines and an implementation manual to guide 
entities in the reporting process. The GRI outlines areas of human rights concern that should be 
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reported on.
60
 Using the GRI will both enable companies to meet their obligations under the 
Companies Act, and in addition give them a guide to apply regarding what to include in the 
report to enable them meet other relevant requirements, such as sustainability.  
Through the GRI process, the business entity will be required to report on material 
aspects of the business, which may be defined as activities, issues or concerns that could result in 
significant economic, environmental and social impact. In addition to the GRI Framework, the 
Implementation Manual accompanying it helps the business entity to identity the relevant topics, 
the extent, scope or boundaries to consider in reviewing the relevant topics, whether the impact 
may be deemed material, the reporting priority and the extent of reporting or coverage required.
61
 
Requirements of the United Nations Guiding Principles are identified in the Initiative as 
considerations that may make a topic relevant for reporting.
62
 
The GRI offers a well-defined multi-step process for the company to follow in order to 
arrive at the material aspects. The initial step involves a systematic identification of significant 
aspects, considering all activities of the business. These are generally the topics considered 
potentially important to reflect the impact of the organisation’s activities.63 Boundaries are 
determined, which may also be referred to as the sphere of influence, delineating exactly where 
the impacts occur, whether within or outside the organisation.
64
 The next step involves a 
qualitative analysis and quantitative assessment, followed by a discussion to determine the way 
forward. Once the relevant topics to determine materiality and the need for reporting have been 
identified, each topic will be assessed on its influence on stakeholder assessments and decisions 
and the significance of organisations’ economic, environmental and social impacts.65 The 
engagement with stakeholders, both internal, such as employees and suppliers; and external, such 
as communities affected by the operations of the business entity, is expected to be a systematic, 
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two-way and objective dialogue, either continuously or specifically for purposes of reporting had 
there been no need to engage them earlier.
66
 
The Third Step is directed at validating the report prepared, giving a reasonable and 
balanced analysis of the potential impacts, both positive and negative, with the aim of finalising 
the report content.
67
 This stage of the process addresses the concern or need for completeness to 
ensure that all possible material aspects have been considered and their boundaries determined 
for the current reporting period. The resulting compilation of material aspects ought then to be 
approved by the senior decision makers of the organisation, including the directors.  
The final step is concerned with reviewing the report after its publication. The material 
aspects identified and stakeholder feedback given in the previous period are reviewed with the 
aim of better preparing for the current reporting cycle. The aim of this step is to ensure that the 
report gives a reasonable and balanced view of the organisation’s impact.68 This would be 
important to ensure improvement and learning from the past in order to get better results. The 
end result of a conscientious application of the GRI guide for reporting will be the creation of a 
corporate culture that respects human rights. 
 
8.4.4. Proposal for insertion of a Business Review Supplement to the Companies Act 2015 
In the USA, the courts have interpreted directors’ fiduciary duties to include an obligation to 
ensure that a reporting system exists to provide management and directors timely and accurate 
information needed to form an opinion of whether and how the corporation complied with legal 
requirements.
69
 Section 655 of the Companies Act 2015, which is similar to Section 417 of the 
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UK Companies Act, requires directors of quoted companies to prepare a Business Review which, 
among other requirements, gives information on ‘Social and community issues, including 
information on any policies of the company’ in relation to those matters and the effectiveness of 
those policies.
70
 
                                               
70
 See specifically section 655 (4) (b) The Section in its entirety provides: 
(1) Unless the company is subject to the small companies’ regime, the directors shall include in their report a 
business review that complies with subsection (3), so far as relevant to the company. 
 
(2) The purpose of the business review is to inform members of the company and assist them to assess how 
the directors have performed their duty under section 145 (duty to promote the success of the company). 
 
(3) The business review complies with this subsection if- 
(a) It contains-- 
(i) A fair review under subsection (l) of the company's business; and 
(ii) A description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company; and 
(b) Is a balanced and comprehensive analysis of- 
(i) The development and performance of the business of the company during the company's financial year; 
and  
(ii) The position of the company's at the end of that year, consistent with size and complexity of the business. 
 
(4) In the case of a, quoted company, the directors shall specify in the business review (to the extent 
necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position of the company)- 
(a) The main trends and factors likely to affect the future development, performance and position of the 
business of the company; 
(b) Information about- 
(i) Environmental matters (including the business of the company on the environment); 
(ii) The employees of the company; and -.  
(iii) Social and community issues, including information on any policies of the company" in relation to those 
matters and the effectiveness of those policies; and 
(c) Information about persons with whom the company has contractual or other arrangements that are 
essential to the business of the company. 
 
When business review not required: 
(5) If the business review does not contain information of each kind mentioned in subsection 
(4(b) (i), (ii) and (iii) and (c), the directors shall specify in the review which of those kinds of information it 
does not contain. 
 
(6) The directors shall include in the business review (to the extent necessary for an understanding of the 
development, performance or position of the company's business)- 
(a) An analysis using financial key performance indicators; 
(b) If appropriate, an analysis using other key performance indicators (including information relating to 
environmental matters and employee matters); and 
(c) References to, and additional explanations of, amounts included in the company's annual financial 
statement. 
 
(7) In relation to a group directors' report, this section has effect as if a reference to a company were a 
reference to an undertaking to which the report relates. 
 
(8) The directors shall also include in the business review references to, and additional explanations of, 
amounts included in the company's annual financial statement. 
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While acknowledging the contribution this provision makes to the elaboration of 
directors duties, additions that can further refine the Business Review provisions and make them 
clearer in guiding human rights are hereby proposed.
71
 The additions can be contained in a 
Schedule to the Act providing the necessary guidance to directors in fulfilling the obligation 
outlined in the Act to show the company’s compliance with human rights obligations. The 
Business Review reflects the directors’ understanding and analysis of the business, and it should 
be written in such a way as to complement the corporation’s annual statements.72 The Business 
Review will be prepared by the directors and audited and published as part of the company’s 
financial statements. The Review can thus be viewed as a legal compliance mechanism to which 
directors may be held accountable for in the task of ensuring corporate compliance with human 
rights provisions.  
This Business Review Supplement is proposed to be inserted in the Companies Act 2015 
and read together with Section 655 of the Companies Act 2015. 
A. Provision of Law: 
1. Objective of the Business Review 
(1) A business review must be a balanced and comprehensive analysis, consistent with the size and 
complexity of the business, of— 
a) The development and performance of the business of the company during the financial year, 
b) The position of the company at the end of the year, 
c) The main trends and factors underlying the development, performance and position of the 
business of the company during the financial year, and 
d) The main trends and factors which are likely to affect the company’s future development, 
performance and position, prepared so as to assist the members of the company to assess the 
strategies adopted by the company and the potential for those strategies to succeed. 
 
Explanation: 
Business performance will be interpreted to include non-financial activities and impacts of the 
company in line with the requirements of Section 655 of the Companies Act 2015. The position 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
(9) If directors of a company fail to comply with a requirement of this section, each director of the company 
who is in default commits an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred 
thousand shillings. 
71
 The suggestions are in large part modelled on the repealed UK Operating and Financial Review of 2005, drafted 
to supplement the amended Companies Act of the UK.  
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of the company at the year-end will reflect both the financial position as presented in the balance 
sheet, and the non-financial considerations arrived at following the guide hereby provided. 
Reporting on the main trends and factors presupposes the continuous tracking and 
analysis of relevant data – financial, social, environmental, human rights etc, reflecting the 
company’s impact throughout the year. The company needs to adopt relevant policies to 
facilitate the systematic and objective collection of this information and its evaluation by the 
directors on a regular basis. The policies adopted should encourage responsible business 
practices, and foster an understanding by business of what it means to develop a corporate 
culture that respects human rights.
73
 A regular analysis of the company’s policies on human 
rights will enable the directors to account for the trends likely to affect the company’s future 
development and therefore to factor them in in decision-making. Reporting in a standardised 
form from one period to the next will facilitate the comparability required in assessing common 
trends and factors. Specifically, the targets should be identified and progress measured against 
targets for each reporting period, lessons learned drawn and applied in the operations of the 
following reporting period. 
 
B. Provision of Law: 
2. Other general requirements 
(1) With regard to human rights and other social concerns, the review must include: 
a) a statement of the business, objectives and strategies of the company;  
b) a description of the resources available to the company; 
c) a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company; 
d) information about persons with whom the company has contractual or other arrangements which 
are essential to the business of the company;  
 
Explanation: 
For an understanding of the business, it is imperative that the Articles of Association refer to a 
concrete list of objects outlining what the company is set up to do as duly amended from time to 
time. Based on the stipulated objects, the directors will describe the structure of the business, its 
products or services, its operations, relevant market, the major market(s) in which it operates and 
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its competitive position within those markets, the legal and regulatory features that affect it, the 
social environment that impacts it and where its impact is felt
74
 and any other information the 
directors deem necessary for an understanding of the business. The objectives of the business 
should include where appropriate non-financial objectives, well defined to give users of the 
review a good understanding of the entire business. 
The Business Review should explain in detail the operational, stakeholder, strategic, 
financial, environmental and social or reputational risks, and the opportunities and impacts based 
on the objectives of the business and its current and intended activities. The directors should 
assess and highlight the likelihood for each risk materialising, and the impact it could have and 
also outline its strategy for dealing with the identified risks. These will include human rights 
risks, impacts and opportunities based on the definition of human rights in relevant laws, 
including the Constitution and other internationally accepted standards. Operational risk 
assessment would include awareness of possible judgment owing to real or potential cases 
against the company, settlement costs that could accrue, reputational harm that could arise from 
the activities of the company or any particular circumstances, possible criminal charges against 
the management or directors of the company etc Human rights can lead to great reputational 
harm and must be factored in risk management by putting in place systems that relay relevant 
information – this could be in the internal reporting which is also verified by the external auditor. 
The risks should be prioritised, and the criteria for prioritising disclosed. In subsequent reporting 
periods, the progress made in mitigating the identified risks should be elaborated. Persons with 
whom the company has had essential dealings could be communities in which they conduct 
business and which have given up their land. 
 
C. Provision of Law: 
3. The Review should provide information about human rights issues, and social and community issues. 
An insertion is proposed to include human rights and thus replace Section 655(4)(b)(iii) with: 
“Human rights, social and community issues, including information on any policies of the company in 
relation to those matters and the effectiveness of those policies” 
 
Explanation: 
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Social and community issues may be taken to include the issues that fall within the social 
responsibility of the business, and those distinguished from the typical financial issues that the 
company usually reports on. Social and community issues will comprise non-financial issues that 
have an impact on the business, or impacts of a nature that the directors consider material 
because they affect the business. In reporting on community and social issues, a distinction must 
be made between social and responsibility concerns that arise out of the philanthropic 
endeavours of the company, and those matters that strictly speaking are human rights issues.  
The information given will include strategic priorities and specific areas of concern for 
the short and medium term with regard human rights and the effort made to respect the 
Constitutional provisions and other internationally recognised standards on human rights, and 
how such standards relate to the long-term organisational strategy and success. The human rights 
impacted will depend on the industry in which the business operates. It is incumbent on the 
directors to identify the relevant industry and apply the guidelines given by the Cabinet Secretary 
to identify appropriate indicators to track impact. 
A proper understanding of CSR will be important as a means of underscoring a view of 
the corporation that goes beyond concern for the shareholders only. Though used in other 
contexts, the term social responsibility does not have a universal meaning.
75
 An understanding of 
social responsibility in a more universal or widely acceptable usage will be important in 
consolidating the existing experience of the corporations and using that experience to move on to 
a higher plane to appreciate the role it has in promoting human rights. To this end, a standardised 
definition of social responsibility that could be applied is: 
Responsibility of an organisation for the impacts of its decisions and activities (products, 
services and processes) on society and the environment, through transparent and ethical 
behaviour that contributes to sustainable development, including health and the welfare of 
society; takes into account the expectations of stakeholders; is in compliance with applicable 
law and consistent with international norms of behaviour; and is integrated throughout the 
organisation and practised in its relationships (within its sphere of influence).
76
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 See Working Report on Social Responsibility (30 April 2004) Prepared by the ISO Advisory Group on Social 
Responsibility. 
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 ISO 26000 definition of Social responsibility. ISO (International Organization for Standardization) is an 
independent, non-governmental membership organization and the world's largest developer of voluntary 
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D. Provision of Law: 
4. Policy statement and policies articulating human rights 
(1) The review must, in particular, include — 
a) Information about the human rights policy of the company; and 
b) Information about the extent to which the policy has been successfully implemented. 
 
Explanation: 
The business entity must first undertake the exercise of assessing human rights impacts, and 
strive to ensure that the findings are communicated and integrated at all levels of the business. It 
can either have a human rights policy statement that stands alone, or it could be incorporated in 
the other areas of the business under which concerns typical of human rights are considered. The 
question as to what form the assessment will take can be answered in different ways: the human 
rights assessment can either be incorporated into existing apparatus, such as environmental and 
social impact assessments, or when this is not possible, an independent assessment of human 
rights may be undertaken.
77
 An independent approach to human rights would be in keeping with 
the unique nature of human rights claims that makes them superior to any other claims that may 
arise. 
As the business grows or takes on new customers or suppliers, initiates new projects or 
undergoes any of the changes typical to business entities, it ought to carry out a human rights due 
diligence in order to ensure that it is well prepared to deal with new situations as they arise. Any 
serious effort to assess and manage negative impact must be accompanied by measures to 
adequately monitor its policies in order to evaluate whether they are being implemented in the 
most effective manner.
78
 This process will entail application of qualitative and quantitative 
indicators, engaging with affected persons to obtain their feedback, and reporting on the outcome 
in the normal reporting procedures of the business, indicating how the business enterprise 
identifies and addresses adverse human rights impacts.
79
 
                                                                                                                                                       
world, with a Central Secretariat. ISO standards aim to give world-class specifications for products, services and 
systems thus facilitating international trade and relations in the standardized areas. 
77
 The State of Play of Human Rights Due Diligence: Anticipating the Next Five Years, 2 available at 
http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/The_State_of_Play_of_Human_Rights_Due_Diligence.pdf, accessed on 6 August 2014. 
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 UN Guiding Principles op cit note 49 at 20. 
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E. Provision of Law: 
5. Indicators that objectively measure the policies articulated. 
(1) The review must include analysis using financial and, where appropriate, other key performance indicators, 
including information relating to human rights, environmental and employee matters.  
 
Explanation: 
Key performance indicators (KPIs) refer to factors by reference to which the development, 
performance or position of the business of the company can be measured effectively. A separate 
proposal is made for the use of the GRI to provide KPIs relevant for measuring the social and 
community issues that may touch on human rights concerns.  
 
F. Provision of Law: 
6. Reference to and explanation of company’s accounts and compliance with accounting and reporting 
standards.  
To the extent necessary to comply with the general requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2, the review must, where 
appropriate, include references to, and additional explanations of, amounts included in the company’s annual 
accounts. 
 
Explanation: 
Ideally, the value of the corporation will be affected by issues that are not readily quantifiable, 
for example impending costs of litigation either due to suits in action, or potential suits that are 
foreseen or could be expected owing to the nature of the company’s activities. An explanation of 
such costs – whether financial or non-financial – should be provided in the review. The directors 
should also comment on significant activities that may alter the value of the business after the 
balance sheet date.
80
 The nature and extent of information included in the Business Review 
should be determined by the nature of the business and how it is operated, also bearing in mind 
what the directors judge to be material. Where relevant, directors should reveal the source of the 
information used, and its reliability to enable those who use the information to make a reasoned 
judgment.
81
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G. Provision of Law: 
7. Compliance with required standards 
The review must— 
a) State whether it has been prepared in accordance with relevant reporting standards, and 
b) Contain particulars of, and reasons for, any departure from such standards. 
 
Explanation: 
Acknowledging the widespread efforts across numerous corporations to live out some form of 
social responsibility, particular effort is made to draw a distinction between social responsibility 
and human rights. Human rights responsibility, while being linked to what many business 
entities already carry out as part of their corporate social responsibility is, however, much more 
than that: something as fundamental as human rights cannot be “left to the whim of companies, 
and to the vagaries of voluntary codes of conduct and CSR initiatives”82. The effort of business 
to create a culture of human rights respect throughout its activities will be supplemented by the 
government’s oversight role, in an understanding of the complementary obligation of both the 
state and business entities for human rights. In addition to Section 655, a provision is proposed 
that gives the relevant Minister the power to determine the reporting standards that may be 
applied in preparing the Business Review.  
H. Provision of Law: 
8. Reporting standards for Business Review 
i) Proposed addition to definition of "prescribed financial accounting standards" as provided in Section 3 of the 
Companies Act: 
“prescribed financial accounting standards” means statements of standard accounting practice issued by a 
professional body or bodies in accounting and finance recognized by law in Kenya”. 
These standards would include relevant reporting standards, in relation to a company’s Business 
Review, as issued under the “companies’ general regulations” in accordance with Section 3 of 
the Act.” 
ii) Proposed addition in the “companies’ general regulations” made and in force under the Act, referred to in Article 
3 of the Companies Act: 
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“The ‘prescribed financial accounting standards" which are statements of standard accounting practice 
issued by a professional body or bodies in accounting and finance recognized by law in Kenya include best 
practice standards (as proposed by the Cabinet Secretary or issued by the relevant accounting body) that 
companies can apply in preparing the Business Review required under the Act.” 
Explanation: 
This provision will put forward a standard against which corporations will be judged. The 
provision can be used by the Cabinet Secretary to propose best practice standards that will enable 
business entities to present their efforts to uphold human rights in a manner that can be verified 
by outside parties.
83
 A suggestion is further made for the Cabinet Secretary in the regulations to 
require that corporations adopt the Global Reporting Initiative as a standard for preparing the 
Business Review. 
I. Provision of Law: 
9. Auditors’ report on Directors’ Report and Business Review 
If the company is a quoted company, the auditors must state in their report— 
a) whether in their opinion the information given in the business review for the financial year for which the 
annual accounts are prepared is consistent with those accounts; and 
b) whether any matters have come to their attention, in the performance of their functions as auditors of 
the company, which in their opinion are inconsistent with the information given in the business review.” 
 
A proposal is made to replace Section 728 of the Companies’ Act 2015 (on auditors’ report on 
directors’ report) with the following: 
728 Auditor’s Report on Directors’ Report and Business review 
The auditor shall state in the auditor's report on the company's annual financial statement: 
a) Whether in the auditor’s opinion the information given in the directors' report and the Business Review for the 
financial year for which the financial statement is prepared is consistent with that statement; and 
b) Whether any matters have come to their attention, in the performance of their functions as auditors of the 
company, which in their opinion are inconsistent with the information given in the Business Review.” 
 
Explanation: 
While the directors will have the discretion to prepare the Business Review in the manner they 
consider best and most aptly representative of the business, the process applied to arrive at the 
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document should be subject to audit, to avoid the danger of the directors misusing or abusing the 
discretion they have in the process.
84
 Such an audit will enable the auditor to establish whether 
adequate and relevant processes have been applied in reaching the judgments that the directors 
do, for example, in deciding what is material enough to be reported on, but it will not entail a 
questioning of the directors’ judgment, which the auditor should not do, nor a substitution of 
their judgment for his.
85
 
 
J. Provision of Law: 
10. Cabinet Secretary’s notice in respect of reports and reviews 
It is proposed that sections 697 of the Companies Act 2015 - “Application to the Court to rectify defective 
annual financial statement or directors’ report of the company”, 698 - “Power of Cabinet Secretary to 
authorise other persons to make application to the Court under section 710 (sic)” and 700 - “Power of 
Cabinet Secretary or authorised person to require documents, information and explanations” be amended 
to include “business review” in all the places where “financial statement or directors’ report” is mentioned. 
 
Explanation: 
The Cabinet Secretary himself, or through persons who have a stake in the status of the business, 
may require the provision of more information regarding the business review, and if the 
company fails to comply, the matter can be taken to court to compel the directors to provide the 
information and produce a revised business review that reflects the position of the business. On 
receiving complaints of human rights violation against a company, the body receiving the 
complaint, such as the KNCHR, can assess the business review, request for more information 
through a revision of the business review, and if breaches of the company’s obligations are 
found, the necessary remedial action will be taken. 
The purpose of the provision is to give the Cabinet Secretary or other authorised person 
power to require revision of the financial statement, directors’ report or business review to 
provide further explanation as may be necessary to provide satisfactory explanation of the 
position of the business. This provision provides a further check to ensure that the directors 
                                               
84
 Modern company law for a competitive economy: Completing the Structure URN 00/1335, A consultation 
document from the Company Law Review Steering Group - November 2000, para 3.39. 
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present an accurate position of the company, and if they fail, they can be ordered to redo the 
business review. 
Section 697 of the Companies Act 2015 empowers the Cabinet Secretary to authorise 
persons who can investigate complaints against the company or who ought to ensure compliance 
by directors with the provisions of the Act to take the directors to court requiring them to revise 
the business review and if necessary have it re-audited. This provision can be used to ensure that 
the corporation provides accurate information regarding compliance with human rights 
requirements.  
 
8.4.5. Right of stakeholders to bring a claim against directors for breach of duties towards 
them 
For the extended duties of the directors as proposed above to have an impact, stakeholders ought 
to be able to bring a claim against the directors for breach of their duties towards them. It is 
proposed to add a provision to the law to enable other stakeholders to also have the right to sue 
directors for breach in line with the provision creating the obligation for directors to consider 
their interests. Under Part XI of the Companies Act 2015 of Kenya which provides for derivative 
actions, only members of the company can sue directors for an actual or proposed act or 
omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust. In the effort to observe 
the duty of directors to promote the success of the company,
86
 the director is required to have 
regard to the impact of the company’s activities on the community and the environment.87 It 
would make little sense if this requirement is not enforceable. It is therefore proposed, as a 
complementary provision to the wider duty of directors, to give non-shareholder stakeholders a 
right of enforcement, allowing them to bring action against the director for breach of the duty 
they have towards them.
88
 
All stakeholders whose interests are mandated to be considered by directors should have 
a right to bring an action against the directors should they feel that the directors have breached 
this obligation. The stakeholders will have the duty to prove that there has been an injury against 
them and that the injury arose form a valid contractual relationship or other relationship of 
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legitimate expectation with the corporation, which they can prove.
89
 The directors will then be 
tasked to prove that the decision they took leading to the detrimental cause of action was taken 
purely in the interest of the company.
90
 The complaining stakeholder can then show that the 
intended purpose could have been fulfilled through less injurious means.
91
 To effect this 
scenario, it is proposed to add the following provision to the Companies Act under a proposed 
Section 996 (B): 
 
Provision of Law: 
Injunctions 
The Court may, on the application of a person whose interests have been, are or would be affected by the 
conduct, grant an injunction, on such terms as the Court thinks appropriate, restraining the first-mentioned 
person from engaging in the conduct and, if in the opinion of the Court it is desirable to do so, requiring that 
person to do any act or thing. Where a person has engaged, is engaging or is proposing to engage in 
conduct that constituted, constitutes or would constitute: 
a) a contravention of this Act; or 
b) attempting to contravene this Act; or 
c) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring a person to contravene this Act; or 
d) inducing or attempting to induce, whether by threats, promises or otherwise, a person to 
contravene this Act; or 
e) being in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention by a 
person of this Act; or 
f) conspiring with others to contravene this Act. 
 
 
8.4.6. Changes to requirements regarding the objects of the company 
a) The Companies Act 2015 provides in Section 28 (1) “unless the articles of a company 
specifically restrict the objects of the company, its objects are unrestricted.” 
 
It is proposed that the provision be amended to read: 
“The memorandum of every company shall state the objects for which the company is proposed to be 
incorporated and any matters considered necessary in furtherance thereof.”  
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b) Section 20 (1) of the Act, on Company's Constitution: Articles of association reads:  
The regulations may prescribe model articles for companies 
 
It is proposed that the following addition be made to Section 20: 
i. 20 (1) The articles of incorporation must set forth provisions not inconsistent with law:92 
ii. Outlining the purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organised. 
iii. Defining, limiting, and regulating the powers of the corporation, its board of directors, and 
shareholders. 
iv. Eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary 
damages for any action taken, or any failure to take any action, as a director, except liability for acts 
or omissions which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law. 
v. Stipulating that, in discharging the duties of their respective positions and in determining what is 
believed to be in the best interests of the corporation, the board of directors, committees of the board 
of directors, and individual directors, in addition to considering the effects of any action on the 
corporation or its shareholders, will consider the interests of the employees, customers, suppliers, 
and creditors of the corporation and its subsidiaries, the communities within the sphere of influence of 
the corporation, and all other factors such directors consider pertinent; provided, however, that any 
such provision shall be deemed solely to grant discretionary authority to the directors and shall not be 
deemed to provide to any constituency any right to be considered. 
 
Explanation: 
In assessing whether the best interests of the company have been considered, the director is 
expected to have taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the subject matter of 
the judgment. It is further suggested that in view of the multiplicity of expectations, the director 
should apply a hierarchy of director duties: that he seeks to obey the constitution and decisions of 
the company which bind the director; to promote what he calculates in good faith to be likely to 
promote success for members’ benefit; and, as part of that process, to take account of the factors 
(after identifying and assessing them in accordance with his duty of care and skill) which he 
believes in good faith to be relevant for that purpose.
93
 This will ensure that in the event that the 
company has to consider human rights issues, the directors will evaluate such options diligently 
and thus factor them in their decision-making. 
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8.5. Modification to other laws 
a) The Penal Code CAP 63 Laws of Kenya 
In order to make the Penal Code of Kenya more suitably applicable to hold corporations 
accountable for violation of human rights, the following proposals are made for its amendment.
94
 
I. Addition to Section 4 of the Penal Code on “Interpretation” 
board of directors, of a corporation, society, etc., means the body exercising the  executive authority of the 
corporation, society, etc., whether or not the body is called the board of directors. 
corporate culture, for a corporation, society, etc., means an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice 
existing within the corporation, society, etc. generally or in the part of the corporation, society, etc. where the 
relevant conduct happens. 
senior management, of a corporation, society, etc., means an employee, agent or officer of the corporation, 
society, etc. whose conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation, society, etc 
because of the level of responsibility of his or her duties. 
 
II. Additional punishments to be added to Section 24 on “Different kinds of punishments” 
… 
j) restricting the place where a corporation, body corporate, society, association or body of persons  can 
operate  
k) banning corporation, body corporate, society, association or body of persons from procurement 
opportunities,  
l) requiring corporation, body corporate, society, association or body of persons to publicise the sentence or 
punishment given as a means of naming and shaming, confiscation of property  
m) winding up of corporation, body corporate, society, association or body of persons 
 
III. Replace Section 23 of the Penal Code with the following: 
23. Offences by corporations, bodies corporate, societies, associations or bodies of persons 
1) General principles 
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This Code applies to corporations, societies, etc in the same way as it applies to individuals, but subject to 
the changes made by this part and any other changes necessary because criminal responsibility is being 
imposed on a corporation, society, etc .rather than an individual. 
 
2) Physical elements 
A physical element of an offence consisting of conduct is taken to be committed by a corporation, society, 
etc. if it is committed by an employee, agent or officer of the corporation, society, etc. acting within the actual 
or apparent scope of his or her employment or within his or her actual or apparent authority. 
Where an offence is committed by any company or other body corporate, or by any society, association or 
body of persons, every person charged with, or concerned or acting in, the control or management of the 
affairs or activities of such company, body corporate, society, association or body of persons shall be guilty 
of that offence and liable to be punished accordingly. 
 
3) Fault elements other than negligence 
(1) In deciding whether the fault element of intention, knowledge or recklessness exists for an offence in 
relation to a corporation, society, etc., the fault element is taken to exist if the corporation, society, etc. 
expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorises or permits the commission of the offence. 
(2) The ways in which authorisation or permission may be established include— 
(a) proving that the corporation, society, etc.’s board of directors intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly engaged in the conduct or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted 
the commission of the offence; or 
(b) proving that a senior management of the corporation, society, etc. intentionally, knowingly or 
recklessly engaged in the conduct or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted 
the commission of the offence; or 
(c) proving that a corporate culture existed within the corporation, society, etc. that directed, 
encouraged, tolerated or led to noncompliance with the contravened law; or 
(d) proving that the corporation, society, etc. failed to create and maintain a corporate culture 
requiring compliance with the contravened law. 
(3) Subsection (2) (b) does not apply if the managerial agent proves that through no act or omission on his 
part, he was not aware that the offence was being or was intended or about to be committed, or that he 
or she exercised appropriate diligence and took all reasonable steps to prevent the conduct, or the 
authorisation or permission that led to its commission. 
(1) Factors relevant to subsection (2) (c) and (d) include— 
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a) whether authority to commit an offence of the same or a similar character had been given by a 
senior management of the corporation, society, etc.; and 
b) whether the employee, agent or officer of the corporation, society, etc. who committed the offence 
reasonably believed, or had a reasonable expectation, that a senior management of the 
corporation, society, etc. would have authorised or permitted the commission of the offence. 
(2) If recklessness is not a fault element for a physical element of an offence, subsection (2) does not 
enable the fault element to be proved by proving that the board of directors, or a senior 
management, of the corporation, society, etc. recklessly engaged in the conduct or recklessly 
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence. 
 
4) Negligence 
(1) This section applies if negligence is a fault element in relation to a physical element of an offence and no 
individual employee, agent or officer of a corporation, society, etc. has the fault element. 
(2) The fault element of negligence may exist for the corporation, society, etc. in relation to the physical element 
if the corporation’s conduct is negligent when viewed as a whole (that is, by aggregating the conduct of a 
number of its employees, agents or officers). 
 
5) Mistake of fact—strict liability 
A corporation, society, etc. may only rely on section 36 (Mistake of fact—strict liability) in relation to the conduct 
that would make up an offence by the corporation, society, etc. if— 
a) the employee, agent or officer of the corporation, society, etc. who carried out the conduct was under a 
mistaken but reasonable belief about facts that, had they existed, would have meant that the conduct would 
not have been an offence; and 
b) the corporation, society, etc. proves that it exercised appropriate diligence to prevent the conduct. 
 
6) Intervening conduct or event 
A corporation, society, etc. may not rely on section 39 (Intervening conduct or event) in relation to a physical 
element of an offence brought about by someone else if the other person is an employee, agent or officer of the 
corporation, society, etc. 
 
7) Evidence of negligence or failure to exercise appropriate diligence 
Negligence, or failure to exercise appropriate diligence, in relation to conduct of a corporation, society, etc. may 
be evidenced by the fact that the conduct was substantially attributable to— 
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a) Inadequate corporate management, control or supervision of the conduct of one or more of the employees, 
agents or officers of the corporation, society, etc.; or 
b) Failure to provide adequate systems for giving relevant information to relevant people in the corporation, 
society, etc. 
 
b) The Nairobi Securities Exchange Act 
The Corporate Governance Guidelines issued by the Capital Markets Authority of Kenya offers 
guidelines and best practices for public listed companies to enhance self-regulation of these 
entities. The listed companies are expected to disclose annually the extent to which they comply 
with the stipulated requirements and give reasons for non-compliance. Commitment to 
respecting human rights is not an explicit requirement at incorporation or when companies are 
listed in the stock exchange. However useful these guidelines are, they are voluntary and 
corporations apply them at will. It is proposed that a specific requirement be made in the NSE 
Act, to require that the Business Review outlining the Company’s treatment of human rights be 
provided as part of the listing requirements.  
 
Provision of the law: 
Amend Section C. 07 of the Nairobi Securities Exchange Act to read as follows: 
C.07 A statement that for a period of not more than fourteen days before the date of listing and until fourteen days 
after the date of listing, at a named place as the Authority may agree, the following documents (or copies thereof), 
where applicable, could be inspected-  
... 
j) the audited accounts of the issuer or, in the case of a group, the consolidated audited accounts of the issuer and its 
subsidiary undertakings for each of the five financial years preceding the publication of the Information Memorandum, 
including, in the case of a company incorporated in Kenya, all notes, reports or information required by the 
Companies Act “together with the Business Review outlining the Company’s human rights….95 
 
Explanation: 
Ruggie’s Corporate Law Project studied more than 40 jurisdictions and only in few of these did 
the existing reporting requirements consider human rights related risks as factors determining 
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materiality, and thus worth reporting on.
96
 What is material will be determined by directors, and 
will be a response to the question: ‘Given my good faith, honest judgment about the best way of 
presenting the operations of the business for its defined purpose, does this item matter?’97 Ruggie 
suggests that human rights risks be defined as potentially material and that they be disclosed in 
the financial reports. It would therefore be important to require compliance with human rights as 
a pre-condition for listing on the Stock Exchange. 
 
c) The Special Economic Zones Bill 
One of the laws that can be used to enforce human rights is the Special Economic Zones Bill, 
which is set to replace the Economic Processing Zones Act, the law that governs special zones 
set aside for manufacturing goods for export, and which offer a free trade area and liberalized 
regulatory environment. Export Processing Zones (EPZs) have been in Kenya since 1990.
98
 
Numerous regulatory exemptions were given to investors who invest in the EPZs,
99
 and many 
workers’ human rights were consistently violated within these zones. In addition to tax 
incentives, procedural incentives are offered to investors within the EPZ area such as the offer of 
facilitation services by the EPZ Authority together with exemption from having to take out a 
number of licenses. Whereas the benefits to the investors are clearly spelt out in the EPZ Act, the 
demands placed on them are not. With this glaring anomaly, the Government cannot actively 
refute assertions that it is more concerned about attracting investments than it is about protecting 
the interests of its citizens. For many years, it was known that EPZs which are sources of 
                                               
96
 Human Rights Council ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie -  Business and Human Rights: 
Further steps toward the operationalization of the “protect, respect and remedy” framework’ (9 April 2010) 
A/HRC/14/27 [Ruggie Report 2010] 9. 
97
 Modern company law for a competitive economy op cit note 83 para 3.34. 
98
 Lene Kristin Vastveit, Export Processing Zones in Sub-Saharan Africa – Kenya and Lesotho, (Thesis) Department 
of Economics, University of Bergen (01.09.2013) 33. 
99
 Tax incentives are offered to investors that locate their operations in Export Processing Zones under the Export 
Processing Zones Act (and subsequent amendments thereto): an initial 10-year corporate income tax holiday and a 
25% corporation tax rate for a further 10 years thereafter; 10-year withholding tax holiday on dividends and other 
remittances to non-resident parties; perpetual exemption from VAT and customs import duty on inputs – raw 
materials, machinery, office equipment, certain petroleum fuel; perpetual exemption from payment of stamp duty on 
legal instruments; 100% investment deduction on new investment in EPZ buildings and machinery, applicable over 
20 years; exemption from any quotas or other restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports with the exception of 
trade in firearms and military equipment (Export Processing Zone Act Cap 517 (Rev. 1993) sec 29) (See United 
States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices for Kenya (2011) 42-43).  
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employment for many are excluded from the Factory Act's provisions and, unlike other 
businesses, EPZs could not have their work sites inspected.
 100
 
Kenya plans to continue the growth of EPZs as shown in its Vision 2030 Strategy, aiming 
to create three special economic zones in Mombasa, Kisumu and Lamu as a means of creating 
jobs in the manufacturing sector.
101
 Bearing in mind the dark history of EPZs, it is important for 
the Government to have clear guidelines for investors who it will seek to attract to the EPZs, to 
ensure that they know what is expected of them and that they respect human rights. In line with 
this, enactment of the proposed Special Economic Zones Bill is anticipated.
102
 However, this 
new law does not offer any guidance on the issue of human rights, with no mention of it being 
made anywhere in the Bill.
103
 
The Special Economic Zones Bill establishes the SEZ Authority (SEZA) (the 
Authority).
104
 Among other tasks, the SEZA is mandated to recommend regulations for the 
operation and regulation of SEZs, determine investment criteria and issue the requisite approval 
and licenses for the establishment of the SEZs. This presents an opportunity for the Authority to 
ensure that entities that come to invest have a high regard for human rights, by specifying human 
rights among the criteria necessary for granting licenses required. Numerous incentives are given 
to attract investors, such as tax exemptions, reprieve from advertising fees or business permit 
fees and exemption from regulation under the Standards (Quality Inspection of Imports) Act 
among others.
105
  
Whereas these concessions for investors are viable, there must be equal demands on the 
investors to ensure that they reciprocate the privileges given to them by investing in high 
                                               
100
 United States Department of State’s Report on Kenya ibid at 42. 
101
 Government of the Republic of Kenya ‘Kenya Vision 2030’ (2007) – Second Medium Term Plan 2013 – 2017 at 
54. Approximately 2,000 km
2
 of land have been identified for Mombasa and 700 km
2
 for Lamu. 
102
 SEZ 2013-17 Page 13. As at December 2012 the Bill had been approved by the Cabinet and was awaiting passing 
by Parliament but has not been approved as at the date of completing the thesis. 
103
 A total absence of the term human rights in the EPZ Act and the SEZ Bill that will replace it implies a lack of 
determination to undo the wrongs of the past. It is interesting to note that the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Bill 
contains many of the provisions that were contained in the EPZ Act. The Bill refers to the SEZA’s obligation to 
ensure compliance with customs procedures, financial regulations, to recommend prohibited activities and to 
suspend or cancel licenses for violation of the SEZ Act, the Customs and Excise Act or the Value Added Tax Act 
(See Part III). The SEZ Bill further mandates the SEZA to assess the engineering and financial plans, financial 
viability and the environmental and social impact of proposed projects before issuing licenses. If it went into such 
detail to give direction to the SEZA on the things it ought to consider, the Bill ought to have similarly touched on the 
need for upholding human rights. 
104
 Section 11. 
105
 Section 38. 
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standards of production with due regard to the persons who work for them and the communities 
in which they operate. A vague use of terminology in the SEZ Bill – referring to environmental 
and social impact only
106
 – may lend itself to interpretation that fails to accord human rights the 
priority they deserve. Whereas environmental and social duties as used in the Bill may be 
interpreted to include human rights duties, it is not guaranteed that this will be the case. One way 
to ensure respect for the human rights situation is to be clear about the importance of human 
rights, and to demand their respect, censuring their violation in at least as much clarity as 
violation of tax and finance requirements. It is therefore recommended that the SEZ Bill be 
amended to place a clear obligation on investors to respect human rights. 
 
8.6. Conclusion 
The purpose of the proposed changes and additions to the law is to acknowledge that there are 
other constituents who contribute to the success of the corporation in addition to the 
shareholders, and whose interests should also be considered in the operations of the company. 
The proposed amendments will highlight the fundamental importance of human rights – different 
from and superior to mere corporate social responsibility – and guide management in the 
application of human rights considerations in their operations and decision-making. The aim of 
elaborating on the expectations of directors in carrying out their obligations is to offer guidance 
on how they can consider stakeholders’ interests. The Business Review supplement, by 
highlighting the expectations in reporting on the activities of the company, compels companies to 
disclose qualitative and substantive information not usually found in the financial statements of 
the company.
107
 
Using law to regulate the constitution of the company, the framing of its objects and the 
exercise of directors’ duties is preferable to using ‘softer’ means such as corporate codes of 
conduct. Any proposed amendments to such a law would be subjected to discussions and debate 
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 Section 28 of the SEZ Bill provides that ‘In evaluating applications for special economic zone developer, 
operator and enterprise licenses, the Authority shall assess the specific engineering and financial plans, financial 
viability, and environmental and social impact of the applicant's proposed special economic zone project, as 
appropriate.’ 
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 Andrew Johnston After the OFR: Can UK Shareholder Value Still be Enlightened? (2006) 7 European Business 
Organization Law Review 817, 818. 
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in parliament, and the resulting compromises would thus be more acceptable and in the best 
interests of all concerned.
108
  
                                               
108
 Modern company law for a competitive economy op cit note 83 para 3.31. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
9. CONCLUSION 
9.1. Introduction 
The main question this research sought to answer is what must be done by states and 
corporations to guard against corporate violation of human rights, and to remedy violation when 
it occurs. On the foundation that Ruggie set in proposing the UN Protect Respect Remedy 
Framework and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the corporate 
obligation for human rights could develop in different ways. It was the intention of Ruggie in 
developing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights that each state consider in 
its particular circumstances how best to give meaning to the corporate obligation for human 
rights. This study has attempted to give greater specificity to the corporate obligation for human 
rights, recommending changes to laws and alignment of policies to facilitate the creation of 
corporate cultures respectful of human rights.  
In proposing means to operationalise the Protect Respect Remedy Framework, Ruggie 
refers to the inadequacy of the market forces to promote social objectives or allocate scarce 
resources.
1
 Left to the mercy of market forces, the needs and concerns of the shareholder seeking 
to maximise profits will be given priority to the detriment of the other stakeholders. Big 
companies may wield their power to take advantage of the employees for example, by paying 
them poorly, or offering poor working and living conditions, counting on the fact that they have 
no means to attain alternative employment. Without state intervention, corporations may pursue 
their ends with total disregard for the impact of their operations on their employees and the 
communities within which they operate.  
The need for a free market, the different sizes of business entities, the need for protection 
of all human rights and not only some, among such other factors serve to make the efforts to 
consolidate all the requirements for the effective guidance on the corporate obligation for human 
rights into one comprehensive framework very complex. Yet, because states bear the primary 
responsibility of ensuring that individual human rights are protected and respected at all costs, it 
behoves governments to play a role for which there is no substitute: to integrate social and 
                                               
1
 Council for Human Rights ‘Business and human rights: Towards operationalizing the “protect, respect and 
remedy” framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (22 April 2009) A/HRC/11/13 [Ruggie Report 2009] para 
7. See also Azhar Kozami Business Policy and Strategic Management,2e (2002) 370. 
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human rights concerns into all their plans and to do so in a systematic and effective way so as to 
bring about corporate cultures respectful of human rights.
2
 This chapter presents proposals on the 
way forward regarding the question of corporate responsibility for human rights, taking the 
research objectives and the research questions into account. In concluding this study, this chapter 
reviews the core arguments of the research and proceeds to make recommendations under the 
state duty, the corporate responsibility and access to remedy pillars of the United Nations 
Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework and Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
 
9.2. Core arguments of the study 
In stating the problem of the study, Chapter One set out to establish how corporate accountability 
for human rights in Kenya can be promoted in the absence of internationally binding human 
rights obligations for business. The study proceeded from a backdrop of two central points of 
departure which bring to the fore the role of corporations in promoting human rights, and 
contextualise the question of corporate accountability for human rights: the debate at the 
international level on the corporate obligation for human rights as expressed in the UN Protect 
Respect Remedy Framework, and the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. Going 
against expectations that time for an international treaty was ripe, Ruggie had preference for a 
domestic approach to the question of business and human rights. The UN Guiding Principles are 
the product of evolving international debate on business and human rights. They are the latest of 
a string of attempts at the international level to keep corporations in check. Though the 
Framework and UN Guiding Principles are voluntary like many of the previous attempts, they do 
a better job of converting the obligation of corporations into implementable standards than the 
previous efforts. The UN Guiding Principles offer concrete ways that states and corporations can 
apply to translate the corporate obligation into implementable standards.  
For Ruggie’s critics, the decision to offer guidelines to implement the Protect, Respect, 
Remedy framework he devised rather than create a treaty, or propose its negotiation, was the 
biggest failure of his work. Having chosen to approve Ruggie’s approach, Chapter Two set out to 
offer a defense of this approach, showing that his decision that the solution to the question of 
business and human rights would best be found at the national rather than international level is 
                                               
2
 Ruggie Report, ibid para 10. 
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not fatal to the business and human rights agenda.
3
 The research made the case that signing onto 
the treaty by itself would not be a guarantee that the treaty obligations will be observed. The 
research refers to empirical findings to show that states that signed and ratified international 
human rights instruments did not always reflect human rights compliant practices. The 
development of strong institutions to serve as local enforcement mechanisms will serve better 
than a treaty to bring about change in the behaviour of corporations to make them human rights-
respecting. Additionally, International Law relies on domestic enforcement; recourse to 
International Law requires exhaustion of local remedies, a fact which presupposes that local 
remedies exist and are well developed. Furthermore, the international jurisprudence builds on 
domestic experiences; effective International Law draws on lessons from the domestic level to 
help build a stronger and more effective system. For these reasons, the study describes the need 
for the moment as developing a domestic jurisprudence on business and human rights, including 
the strengthening of local implementing institutions as a more immediate task compared to the 
negotiation and signing of a treaty. 
If human rights infringements do not threaten international peace and security, any claims 
for violation should be addressed at the domestic level.
4
 Such would be the case in the 
circumstances of a developing country like Kenya, where many companies are locally incorporated 
and operate within the state. The UN Guiding Principles will serve to develop the domestic 
jurisprudence, offer means to create awareness of, and understand state and corporate human 
rights obligations better, as well as create consensus around the subject. All these efforts made at 
the domestic level will serve to create the solid foundation needed for a more successful 
negotiation and implementation of a Treaty on Business and Human Rights in the future. 
Kenya adopted a new constitution in 2010, modern in its provisions which make it 
applicable beyond the traditional public-private divide. Unlike the previous constitution which 
applied only to public entities, the 2010 Constitution also applies horizontally to juristic persons. 
Chapter Three sought to analyse the Constitution in light of its application to juristic persons, 
situating it amongst existing models of horizontality in a bid to project its application to 
corporations in Kenya. The absence of settled jurisprudence on the place of International Law 
                                               
3
 See Chapter 2, 2.2 above. 
4
 Rein A Mullerson ‘Human Rights and the Individual as Subject of International Law: A Soviet View’  (1990), 39 
quoting L Henkin ‘Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction’ in T Buegenthal (ed) Human Rights, International 
Law and the Helsinki Accords (1979) 22. 
    
290 
 
under the 2010 Constitution will raise a number of challenges.
5
 Although Kenya becomes a 
monist state under the 2010 Constitution, the Treaty Making and Ratification Act enacted 
pursuant to Article 2(6) of the Constitution requires domestication of treaties through a process 
that essentially reverts to the dualist system.
6
 Further clarification is needed, or a law to 
harmonise the implication of the Act. Additionally, the process of domestication of treaties will 
involve practical challenges, such as the need for public participation which will entail civic 
education and the attendant resources needed to ensure useful participation.  
A further challenge is posed by the attitude of the courts in interpreting the novel 
provisions of the Constitution. Court decisions made after the promulgation of the 2010 
Constitution tend to underplay the role of International Law; jurisprudence on the matter is not 
well developed – for example, one court interpreted the Constitution to give International Law a 
lower ranking in the Constitution than Acts of Parliament; another ranked it at the same level, 
and yet another expressed no preference, arguing that the court was not the proper forum to 
decide the matter. Resolution of these uncertainties is of utmost importance if International Law 
were to play a substantial role in the promotion and protection of human rights. 
The study finds that a different kind of corporation is contemplated by the 2010 
Constitution, placing on business – as it does – a direct obligation to respect and uphold the 
human rights enumerated thereunder. The jurisprudence in other jurisdictions with similar 
provisions was explored, and prevailing gaps highlighted. Even in the jurisdiction with the most 
identical provisions, courts have been conservative in holding corporations bound by the Bill of 
Rights.
7
 In face of such uncertainties, the UN Guiding Principles would serve a useful purpose in 
the effort to implement Article 20(2) of the Constitution. The Constitutional provisions binding 
corporations may be implemented by amending corporate law as proposed under the UN 
Guiding Principles to require companies to respect human rights, thus re-defining the corporation 
and making it consider other stakeholders in decision-making, not only the shareholders. 
Owing to the fact that many corporations and other business entities in Kenya ascribe to 
CSR policies as the main means of expressing an appreciation of a duty to society, Chapter Four 
sought to establish whether CSR can be a measure for human rights obligations. Most policies 
express an appreciation of CSR as philanthropic activity, giving back to the community, in the 
                                               
5
 See Chapter 3, 3.2. 
6
 See Chapter 3, 3.2.1. 
7
 See Chapter 3, 3.4.4. 
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measure that the corporation is able to. The vague nature of CSR has made it difficult to 
legislate; the bid to impose legal social responsibilities on corporations in many jurisdictions that 
attempted has been futile, raising doubts whether the force of the law ought to be applied to 
create the fraternity that CSR envisions.
8
 Corporate social responsibility in Kenya is not 
legislated, and may continue to be unlegislated in the long run; there are no mandatory 
requirements in the area of social responsibility, and no systematic means of reporting on efforts 
made by an entity in this regard. Whereas an appreciation of CSR is important because it moves 
the company into a culture that owes responsibilities and sees beyond the profit-making motive, 
it is not sufficient. With no objective measure of CSR requirements, having different meanings 
and no sanctions for non-compliance, CSR cannot adequately underpin the human rights 
obligation of the corporation.
9
 Unlike social responsibility, human rights are mandatory, 
objective and not dependent only on the perception of the corporation. The nature of human 
rights makes their observance or execution unique and irreplaceable. Unlike social responsibility 
as popularly understood, human rights demand the force of the law to implement. Human rights 
obligations are contained in the International Bill of Rights and in the Constitution, which binds 
corporations, thus taking pride of place and demanding their respect by everyone, including 
corporations. Merging business and human rights will entail bringing business into a vague 
landscape of human rights conception; transforming their perception of corporate social 
responsibility (understood as doing good to the community, when possible and in the measure 
that is considered reasonably possible) to an appreciation of mandatory obligations, owed as a 
matter of right and not dependent on the good will or philanthropic inclination of the business 
entity. To have the importance they deserve, therefore, corporate policies must adopt the specific 
terms “human rights”; human rights policies ought to be endorsed by senior management of the 
company, applied throughout the company operations and verified in regular reporting of the 
non-financial aspects of the company.
10
 
Chapter Five elaborated on the state’s primary duty to protect human rights. This was 
proposed as a two-fold obligation including a positive duty to provide for human rights, and a 
negative duty to refrain from violating human rights, and at the same time ensure that human 
rights are not violated by anyone else, including corporations. The duty of the state to protect 
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 See Chapter 4, 4.7. 
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will involve giving guidance to corporations through laws; offering guidance through having 
clear reporting standards which track the effort made by corporations to monitor the impact of 
their activities, and address any negative concerns; and providing means of access to remedy for 
the victims where the business entities fail to respect their human rights. In executing its duty the 
state will ensure that corporate laws are aligned to the provisions of the constitution; it will offer 
regulations on corporate reporting to guide corporations on reporting beyond the traditional 
financial status of the corporation; and it will ensure vertical coherence where its policies are 
aligned with its International Law obligations. In light of the concerted efforts to implement the 
2010 Constitution and particularly the provision making it applicable to juristic persons, the state 
duty to protect could be aptly summed up in an action plan for business and human rights, 
outlining the roles and responsibilities of the different actors involved.
11
 The state duty includes 
adjudication of corporate violation of human rights to ensure redress for violation, a task for 
which the courts can be better prepared, owing to the novelty of the corporate obligation and lack 
of a settled jurisprudence on the application of the Constitution to corporations. 
The corporate responsibility to respect was discussed in Chapter Six. The primacy of the 
duty of the state to protect against human rights violation does not in any way preclude the 
responsibility of businesses for their actions. The initial view that only states can infringe human 
rights is a myth of the past; it is now well acknowledged that corporations have the power to 
infringe human rights and individuals therefore need protection and recourse to remedy in the 
event that their rights are violated by corporations. However, moving from the perception of the 
state as the only bearer of human rights obligations to recognising corporate entities as wrong-
doers demands an elaboration of duties both with respect to the right holder and the one who 
owes the right. Bringing together perceptions of corporations and corporate law on the one hand 
and human rights on the other, long considered foreign to each other, will not be easy.  
Ruggie’s corporate responsibility to respect is a vague and indeterminate obligation, 
described as a social expectation thus casting doubt as to its ability to ensure human rights are 
upheld. However, by considering certain aspects, Ruggie entrenches the obligation, making it 
more concrete. He proposes positive aspects to supplement the negative character of the 
responsibility to respect; the requirement for human rights due diligence, and the need for 
corporate human rights policies overseen by directors who act as the mind and will of the 
                                               
11
 See Action Plan in Appendix 1. 
    
293 
 
corporation. Additionally, by relating the corporate responsibility to specific and concrete human 
rights instruments and directing states to require that corporations respect all internationally 
accepted human rights as contained in the international Bill of Rights and ILO Conventions, the 
responsibility to respect is given a firmer foundation. The responsibility will be effected by 
incorporating the different proposals in national laws that shape the operation of corporations. 
The essence of providing human rights is that they must be protected. This was discussed 
in Chapter Seven. The existence of human rights creates an obligation upon someone who has 
the power to provide for them and who should face consequences for failing to provide for them, 
or for violating them. Enforcement of human rights will ensure that the appropriate tools, 
mechanisms and institutions exist or are formulated so that human rights find application in 
reality. In the absence of direct obligation for corporations to respect human rights, this right is 
contained within the obligation of the state to protect human rights, which would require that the 
state guarantees the protection of human rights by all, including business entities, and when this 
is not done, that appropriate sanctions are meted out to recompense the victims. Judicial and non-
judicial means play a complementary role in ensuring that human rights are upheld by all. 
However, the mechanisms are under developed and not adequate to deal with the complaints of 
corporate violations of human rights, owing to the emerging jurisprudence on the subject which 
is still in its very early stages. Effort is therefore needed at the level of corporations, the KNCHR 
and the Judiciary, to develop efficient means and procedures to deal with the subject. 
The relationship between human rights and business so far has been by default more than 
any deliberate effort on the part of the Government or the business entities themselves to ensure 
such linkage. Chapter Eight proceeds from the argument that legal certainty guarantees 
enforcement and thus offers the most effective guidance by states for corporate human rights 
obligations. Amendment of corporate law is further mandated by the novel provisions of the 
Kenyan Constitution which contemplates a human-rights respecting corporation. To this end, the 
law that creates the corporation and directs its operations has to be amended to require it to 
comply with human rights obligations.
12
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9.3. Recommendations 
An important role for NGOs in advancing the Business and Human Rights agenda 
The goal of corporate respect for human rights will be achieved if the State takes the lead in 
playing its central part, avoiding any direct violation, and ensuring that corporations and other 
business entities also do not violate human rights. Whereas the law outlining the obligation of 
juristic persons is well laid out in the Constitution, thereby setting a good foundation for the 
advancement of the cause of corporate respect for human rights, it may  not, by itself be 
sufficient. In 2013, the African Civil Society Dialogue convened a Regional meeting to gather 
inputs and recommendations from experts and key stakeholders to inform the development of a 
comprehensive Toolkit to support national implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). It was noted that compared to other regions, African 
States had failed to devise action plans to implement the UNGPs, and this failure or lack of 
interest, both within governments and among business entities, was attributed to an ignorance of 
the initiatives following Ruggie’s extensive research and proposals at the conclusion of his 
mandate.
13
 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) can play a communication function,
14
 creating 
an awareness of rights and obligations among all the concerned sectors: states, corporations and 
potential victims of human rights violations, making known what corporate accountability entails 
in the part of the different stakeholders. NGOs can lobby the Government, charting out the 
importance of respect for human rights and the dignity of all, convincing the State to make the 
concern for business and human rights part of its efforts to implement the 2010 Constitution. 
Through their work, exercising their ‘power of persuasion’15, NGOs can move the Government 
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 This was the general view expressed by African representatives at the African Civil Society Dialogue held in 
Accra in November 2013. See African Civil Society Dialogue on the National Action Plans Project in Accra, Ghana 
(25 November 2013) Summary of Participants’ Observations at 1, available at 
 http://accountabilityroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/African-Civil-Society-NAPs-Dialogue-
Summary.pdf, accessed on 10 August 2014. 
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 At the advent of the internationalization of human rights after WWII, the initial draft of the UN Charter was 
designed to have only a passing reference to human rights. (See William Korey ‘Human Rights NGOS: The Power 
of Persuasion’ (1999) 13(1) Ethics and International Affairs 151, 153). However by the action of NGOs, human 
rights became a central component of the Charter, paving way for the deliberations on and adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. 
15
 Korey, ibid. 
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to include the business and human rights agenda in the proposed National Action Plan for the 
implementation of the 2010 Constitution.  
In the event that the Government neglects play its role in furthering the cause for business 
and human rights, NGOs can put pressure on it, recalling the international treaties and 
conventions it has signed which place on it the duty of overseeing corporations and ensuring that 
they do not violate human rights, and calling upon it to live up to the obligations it freely took on 
in signing those human rights instruments. NGOs can serve to remind the Government of the 
country’s past, where corporations violated the human rights of many, calling upon it to fully 
implement the 2010 Constitution in order to ensure that human rights are not violated as they 
have been in the past. 
NGOs can also influence government policies, contributing to critical discussions by 
Government on emerging issues that touch on business and human rights. NGOs can play an 
important role for example in pushing the agenda for justiciability of economic, social and 
cultural rights a reality, and highlighting the role that corporations and other business entities can 
play in advancing them, and not contributing to their violation. Through their activism, NGOs 
can play an important and irreplaceable role in the effort to bring about corporate respect for 
human rights by pushing for action in ways that may include advancing the following 
recommendations in order to advance corporate accountability for human rights under  the three 
Pillars of the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights. 
 
9.3.1. State Duty to Protect 
The state has a duty to protect the human rights of everyone from abuse. The duty includes an 
obligation to ensure that third parties, including corporations, within its territory respect the 
human rights of others. Some recommendations made in this study relating to the duty of states 
include the following.  
First, inspired by the adoption of the progressive 2010 Constitution, Kenya should move 
on to align its policies with its obligations, creating a seamless synthesis across all relevant 
departments and agencies that deal with business. This will ensure that they are aware of and 
implement measures that will promote respect for human rights. Because it guarantees 
enforcement, legislation is an ideal means to regulate the conduct of companies and ensure they 
do not violate human rights. However, the state, in its efforts to promote corporate cultures 
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respectful of human rights, ought to see legislation as just one element of a mixed economy of 
approaches. Regulation, while not being a solution for every conceivable wrong in society, can 
play a useful role in ensuring that the economic ends of business are not pursued at a negative 
cost to the fundamental rights of other stakeholders. The Government will express its 
commitment to Business and Human Rights through the design and implementation of a human 
rights action plan specific to business entities. The National Policy and Action Plan and any 
subsequent initiative drawn up by the Ministry of Justice to implement the Constitution should 
include a section on business and human rights as a specific category together with 
accompanying goals, timelines and agencies responsible for implementation.
16
 The Kenya Law 
Reform Commission should include the Companies Act, Nairobi Securities Exchange Act and 
Penal Code among the laws proposed to be amended to implement the Constitution. The laws 
will contain particular provisions regarding an enhanced duty of directors to consider the human 
rights impact of stakeholders in decision-making, a provision on reporting that includes an 
obligation to report on the human rights impact of the company and modification of requirements 
of corporate crime and punishment for corporate crimes. 
Second, as Kenya embarks on an ambitious development agenda in its Vision 2030 
strategy, human rights must be at the very core of its concerns. The national drive in recent years 
to develop infrastructure of varying kinds and colossal sizes: ports and highways, railways, 
airports and an oil and gas pipeline among other infrastructure, the investments in agribusiness in 
collaboration with foreign states and companies among other development goals, should be 
accompanied by governmental vigilance to ensure protection of human rights. All whose 
livelihoods are currently sustained on the land and resources required for the new developments 
should be adequately consulted and appropriately compensated where necessary. The 
government should require a guarantee that the projects and investments undertaken will not 
negatively impact human rights.  
Consequently, the Government, through the KNHCR should conduct a human rights 
audit of laws and regulations to ensure that they comply with international human rights 
standards, and thus contribute to executing the human rights agenda of the Government in line 
with the Constitution. For purposes of coherence with the national policy for development, 
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Vision 2030, which has already undergone a human rights audit, it is proposed that other national 
plans and strategies related to trade, business and the private sector
17
 be similarly developed with 
a specific concern to ensure respect for human rights in the respective areas. This audit of 
relevant laws, policies and strategies related to trade and economic development could be 
undertaken in the baseline study to outline the human rights’ status of the country vis-a-vis the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The baseline study will involve the audit 
of relevant laws, policies and strategies related to business, trade and economic development to 
establish if they acknowledge the need for respect for human rights. The baseline study will 
establish the extent to which the relevant government departments and corporations generally, 
are conversant with the requirements of international human rights standards. This knowledge 
will inform the interventions put in place to ensure that the State, through its various ministries 
and departments, and corporations are aware of their obligations; for example, the training and 
technical advice given by the KNCHR. The Ministry of Justice should put in place measures to 
ensure that all departments that deal with trade and business report on implementation of human 
rights, and it should use this information to feed into regional and international reports which it is 
required to prepare outlining the status of human rights in the country. 
Third, intervention by the government should be checked or measured by applying the 
principles of subsidiarity, the ideal of a free market, human dignity and the common good. The 
exercise of making laws and regulations and specifically those that affect businesses and 
elaboration of the role that different government agencies play in the bid to make human rights a 
reality for all should be reviewed through the lens of these principles which will ensure that there 
is legal intervention where and whenever needed, and also that any intervention is only in the 
required measure. To this end, laws enacted should seek to enforce respect for human rights, and 
not just social responsibility widely understood as corporate philanthropy. The state should 
facilitate the creation of corporate cultures respectful of human rights by giving appropriate 
guidance to business entities through laws and regulations and reporting guidelines. Existing 
laws can be used to promote respect for human rights. However, human rights claims should be 
seen as claims in their own right, predicated on the dignity of the person, due to all alike and 
therefore not negotiable. The particular use of the term ‘human rights’ in relevant laws, corporate 
policies and plans and government strategies – as opposed to generic terms such as social 
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considerations or corporate social responsibility – is therefore important as it raises the nature of 
the claims made and demand their more pressing fulfilment.  
Fourth, it is proposed that the Companies Act be amended to expand directors’ duties to 
include a concern for the impact of the companies’ activities on the human rights of stakeholders 
– employees, communities and others who may be affected by the decisions and actions of the 
corporation. For this measure, it is proposed that the concept behind the constituency or 
shareholder statutes in the USA be adopted to codify directors’ duties to stakeholders. However, 
effort should be made to address the shortfalls of the present Constituency Statutes, which are 
currently silent on issues which are necessary to give weight to the proposed statutory duties. 
The provision on directors’ duties should provide clarity about the expectation of directors to 
consider the human rights impact on stakeholders as opposed to mere social effects of the 
companies’ activities. Additionally, the Companies Act should require directors not only to 
consider but to act on shareholder interests. The provision on directors’ duties should be further 
accompanied by provisions indicating what will happen if the directors fail to function as 
provided for in the law. The provision should specifically offer guidelines to answer the 
questions: how does one go about deciding who are the relevant stakeholders among the local 
communities? What weight ought to be given to shareholder interests compared to the other 
stakeholders’ interests? What action will be taken in the event that stakeholder and shareholder 
interests conflict, and cannot be reconciled? What standard ought the court to use in determining 
whether the director duly exercised his duty to safeguard stakeholder interests?  
Proposed solutions to the above queries are incorporated in the amendments suggested 
for the Companies Act under the provisions on Business Review.
18
 At present, Kenya does not 
have any laws that require companies to report on their human rights risks and impacts. The 
Government has not put out a policy or set out other expectations regarding reporting on how 
companies address potential and actual adverse human rights impacts. A comprehensive 
Business Review which includes a report on the human rights impact of the company should be 
prepared to accompany the directors’ annual report. The Business Review provisions in the 
Companies Act (2015) of Kenya should be further amended to require the directors to report on 
the human rights impact of the company, thus reflecting the effort made to carry out a human 
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rights due diligence to prepare for and mitigate against any possible negative human rights 
impacts and efforts to remedy any grievances resulting from the entity’s operations. 
Fifth, on reporting and corporate governance requirements, it is recommended that 
companies be required to apply the Global Reporting Initiative as a guide to reporting. It is 
proposed that the Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Justice, by the powers granted to him 
under the Companies Act,
19
 prepares regulations regarding company reporting. In the 
regulations, the Cabinet Secretary can require companies to use the Global Reporting Initiative 
which offers comprehensive guidelines on reporting on social and human rights issues as a guide 
in preparing the Business Review. The Global Reporting Initiative will offer a useful and 
comprehensive guide to corporations and other business entities, enabling them to create and 
sustain corporate cultures respectful of human rights. The resulting Business Review should be 
audited and presented alongside the financial statements of the company. 
Finally, it is also recommended that the listing requirements should make human rights 
reporting a condition for listing. Commitment to respecting human rights is not an explicit 
requirement at incorporation or when companies are listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange. It 
is proposed that a specific requirement be made in the Nairobi Securities Exchange Act to 
require the Business Review to be provided during application for listing, outlining the 
Company’s treatment of human rights. It is further recommended that licensing of potential 
investors for operation in the country is made conditional on respect for CSR and human rights. 
Corporate social responsibility as understood and applied by corporations in Kenya is not 
sufficient to underpin corporate obligation for human rights. Owing to the current use of the term 
among corporations in Kenya where CSR is seen merely as a philanthropic exercise of making 
corporate donations to worthy causes, it should not be confused with the acceptance of human 
rights responsibilities.  
The specific obligations of directors to consider the impact of human rights on 
stakeholders, and the reporting obligation of corporations under the Companies Act as proposed, 
will help to clarify the differences in expectations between CSR and human rights. Current CSR 
initiatives do not make a concerted effort to refer to human rights. However, owing to the fact 
that corporations have mostly understood their obligations beyond profit making through the lens 
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of CSR, it is recommended that CSR be required as a minimum standard of conduct for any 
business as part of the licensing requirements for local or foreign business entities wishing to 
operate in the country. There are no specific national CSR policies, programs or regulations. The 
Kenya Bureau of Standards has been developing guidelines, and has also proposed the adoption 
of ISO 26000 as a guide for corporate reporting on social responsibility. It is recommended that 
together with these, reference be made to best practice international CSR initiatives which 
companies can adapt to their needs in reporting on their social responsibility. 
 
9.3.2. Corporate responsibility to respect 
The corporate responsibility to respect will ensure a balance between free market unfettered by 
government regulation and the creation of a corporate human rights culture within business 
entities. The following proposals are made for companies to create a human rights-compliant 
culture within the organisation: 
First, every corporation should be required to conduct a human rights due diligence to 
ascertain how their operations impact the communities they relate with and which particular 
human rights are likely to be affected.
20
 The findings of the due diligence should be integrated 
into corporate structures and management systems through human rights policies. The business 
entity ought to have a public statement expressing its commitment to identify, prevent or 
mitigate human rights risks, and remedy any adverse impact it has caused, or contributed to.  
Using the UN Guiding Principles on the corporate responsibility to respect, the KNCHR 
as advisor to business entities can offer guidance or give advice to business entities, proposing 
considerations they can apply for the design of human rights policies. The development of a 
locally adapted tool such as the Danish Tools is recommended for a systematic and effective 
dissemination of advice to corporations on their corporate obligation for human rights.
21
 All 
policies must include the explicit use of the term human rights, and a commitment to respect all 
human rights and international human rights standards. This commitment will be verified in the 
Business Review reporting. It should be noted that although CSR policies and their application 
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 Human Rights Council ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
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set a good foundation for appreciation of a duty beyond profit making, CSR policies should not 
be confused with human rights policies, unless particular effort has been made to incorporate 
human rights obligations into a CSR policy. Human rights policies may be found in the business 
entity’s statements of business principles, in codes of conduct or other values-related literature, 
in stand-alone statements on company websites or in other public corporate responsibility 
documentation.
22
 The policy should be adopted by the directors, committing the company to 
respect international human rights standards. 
Second, the directors of the company or other business entity, as guardians and decision 
makers, ought to be held responsible to ensure that laws, regulations and guidelines set to 
safeguard human rights are upheld. The Companies Act (2015) of Kenya provides a general duty 
of care and skill which is too broad and may not be adequate to enable directors to see how to 
fulfill their duties so as to ensure respect for human rights in their companies.
23
 A proposal has 
been made to specifically require directors to consider the interests of stakeholders in decision-
making.
24
 Directors, as managers of potential risks of the business entity, should be required to 
establish a monitoring and evaluation system to recognise risks that are harmful to the company, 
including human rights risks, and to address them early. The reporting requirement in the 
Companies Act (2015) requires directors to provide in their report a Business Review outlining 
social and community issues.
25
 It has been proposed that this provision be amended to 
specifically include human rights impacts of the company. The effectiveness of directors in 
ensuring that the business review is carried out and presented appropriately will be assessed 
through the report produced, approved by the directors and verified by an independent party. 
Third, reporting should be applied as a means to ensure that the existing obligations are 
well understood and complied with. An elaborate reporting process required for presenting the 
Business Review will enable business entities to develop a culture of respect for human rights as 
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 United Nations Global Compact Office and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
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it offers a means to establish, evaluate and review the operations of the business regularly. A 
recommendation is made that companies be required to refer to the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), and use it as a guide for their reporting on activities, issues or concerns that could result in 
significant economic, environmental and social impact.  
A summary of the GRI process to be applied in reporting on exercise of corporate human 
rights obligations: 
a) Identify significant aspects which are the topics considered potentially important to show 
impact of the organisation’s activities.26 
b) Determine boundaries or the sphere of influence, delineating exactly where the impacts 
occur, whether within or outside the organisation.
27
 
c) Conduct a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the significant aspects to determine 
materiality and the need for reporting of each relevant aspect, assess each topic on its 
influence on stakeholder assessments and decisions’ and effect on the organisation’s 
economic, environmental social and human rights impacts.
28
 
d) Engage with stakeholders, both internal, such as employees, suppliers and external, such as 
communities affected by the operations of the business entity, in a systematic, two-way and 
objective dialogue, either continuously or specifically for purposes of reporting if there was 
no need to engage them earlier.
29
 
e) Validate the report, giving a reasonable and balanced analysis of the potential impacts of all 
possible material aspects, both positive and negative, with the aim of finalising the report 
content.30 
f) Require the senior decision makers of the organisation, the directors, to approve the report 
before its publication.  
g) Review the report after publication, identify material aspects and review stakeholder 
feedback given in the previous period with the aim of better preparing for the current 
reporting cycle.  
h) Carry out independent third party verification of the report. 
i) The state should require a compliance report to be kept and submitted by the company 
whenever it requires a permit or approval from the state. 
 
9.3.3. Access to Remedy 
The access to remedy goal should aim to ensure that there are means for victims of corporate 
human rights abuses to seek redress; that victims know and can access them through simple 
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procedures and at non-prohibitive costs. Access to remedy should be through an ideal mix of 
judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms.  
For complaints that raise issues of criminal law, non-judicial mechanisms are not an 
option and these complaints ought to be addressed through judicial means.
31
 Upon investigation 
of a complaint referred to it, the KNCHR may refer the matter to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions or other relevant authority when the findings disclose a criminal offence.
32
 For all 
other grievances, recourse should first be had to the company operational level grievance 
mechanisms where available, or to the KNCHR, and only then to the courts, if still unresolved. 
The KNCHR Act provides that the KNCHR shall investigate complaints and provide appropriate 
redress where necessary, or make recommendations for improvement of the functioning of state 
organs.
33
 The Commission may also make recommendations it deems necessary to the 
complainant, governmental agency or other entity of other means it proposes for settling a matter 
referred to it or for obtaining relief.
34
 The state organ, public office or organisation is expected to 
make a report to the Commission outlining the measures it will take, or has taken in response to 
the complaints made against it.
35
 Failure of the violator of human rights to remedy the breach 
will be reported to the National Assembly for it to take action
36
 and a finding that person, an 
officer or employee of the state organ, public office or organisation was guilty of misconduct, 
shall be reported to the relevant authority.
37
 
As the national human rights institution, the KNCHR’s role is to support both 
government and business to quicken the uptake of responsibilities under the UN Guiding 
Principles as a way of enhancing realisation of human rights. The KNCHR is expected to review 
corporate laws, regulations and policies with a view to enhancing their human rights 
responsiveness.
38
 To this end, the KNCHR should submit regular reports to parliament for 
deliberations on proposed actions and possible laws or amendments that would bring about the 
realisation of corporate obligation for human rights, and to inform the legislative mandate of the 
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government on the subject. This will result in the harmonisation of national legislation, 
regulation and practices with the international human rights instruments to which the state is a 
party. The KNCHR should also follow up the response of government, government ministries 
and businesses to issues raised and recommendations made on human rights obligations. In this 
regard, the KNCHR provides training on business and human rights; and monitors the conduct of 
business and provides feedback to government and businesses. It is proposed that a more 
concrete way of ensuring the uptake of the Guiding Principles is to incorporate them in the 
Action Plan for implementing the Constitution, outlining the specific actions to be carried out by 
the different role players, having the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs as the 
custodian department in charge of ensuring implementation of the Plan, and the KNCHR as the 
overall overseer playing the role of advisor and monitor as it is already doing. 
A proposal is made for the KNCHR, in its advisory role to the government, to initiate 
dialogue with the relevant government departments and recommend the use of international 
standards in negotiating terms with potential investors.
39
 An example is the United Nations 
Principles for responsible contracts: integrating the management of human rights risks into state-
investor contract negotiations: guidance for negotiators (the Guide).
40
 These Principles are 
outlined in an addendum to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
41
 and 
their application will enable the state to integrate human rights considerations into contracts, 
thereby making human rights demands on potential foreign investors. The Guide refers to ten 
principles, their key implications and a recommended checklist of issues that should be 
considered in the negotiations.
42
 This Guide ought to be applied by the relevant government 
departments when reviewing all potential investments and the KNCHR can monitor to ensure it 
is applied appropriately. In view of the ongoing wave of foreign investments in the agricultural 
sector, in mining, infrastructure and potential oil and gas production, such focused negotiation is 
essential if the dignity of the person is not to be disregarded in the search for economic gain and 
prosperity. 
                                               
39
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To ensure that KNCHR plays its part effectively as a National Human Rights Institute  
(NHRI), it is recommended that the staff be continuously capacitated to deal with complaints of 
corporate human rights violations and to assist victims to obtain redress. It is also recommended 
that the government ensures that it is well funded and financially independent to be able to 
implement its mandate under the Constitution. 
On the judicial mechanisms for seeking redress of corporate human rights violations, a 
recommendation is made to amend the Penal Code to make it suitable to applying corporate 
criminal liability to hold corporations liable for human rights violations. Courts in Kenya have 
held corporations as legal persons liable for crimes in causes of action brought under the Penal 
Code. Whereas corporate criminal liability presents a possible route for the punishment of 
corporate violation of human rights, further development of criminal law is proposed to make the 
law suitable for addressing corporate human rights violations. The current sentences under the 
Penal Code should be developed so that they serve the purpose of deterring business entities 
from repeating the offending actions
43
 and offering redress to the victims of abuse. Examples of 
alternative punishment proposed to be included in the Penal Code are: restricting the place where 
the company can operate, banning the company from procurement opportunities, requiring the 
offending company to publicise the sentence or punishment given as a means of naming and 
shaming, confiscation of property and winding up. It is further recommended that the concept of 
a corporate mens rea or corporate intention to commit a crime be developed to make it applicable 
to corporations. Specific developments to the Penal Code include a provision that corporate mens 
rea will be established by proving that company policy, expressly stated or implied,
44
 supported 
the action or actions that caused harm. A policy should be attributed to a corporation where it 
provides the most reasonable explanation of the conduct of that corporation.
45
 Corporate culture 
can be applied to determine that the corporation was aware of the offending action.
46
 
Additionally, the corporate veil cannot be applied to shield persons responsible for the actions 
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resulting in violation of human rights,
47
 meaning that individuals will be held responsible should 
they instigate, contribute to or condone action that results in violation of human rights.  
Finally, it is noted that the novelty of the human rights situation created by the 2010 
Constitution, the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights, and the provision for a 
horizontal application for the Bill of Rights to juristic persons, will require the Judiciary to play 
an important role in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution specifically with regard to 
business entities, and also in providing adequate remedies for victims of violations. As provided 
by the 2010 Constitution, the exercise of any power, political or economic, whether arising from 
the nature of relationships between employers and employees, or business entities and the 
communities in which they operate, must be subject to the provisions of the Bill of Rights whose 
administration is entrusted to the courts. An independent judiciary will play a major role in 
ensuring that the Bill of Rights, which defines principles fundamental to the creation of an open 
and democratic society, is respected.  
To augment the ongoing efforts to create a renewed and vibrant Judiciary, ridding it of 
the negative public image arising from allegations of corruption, specific training for judicial 
officers on Kenya’s human rights obligations under International Law and the standards related 
to business and human rights is recommended, consolidating and applying best practice and legal 
analysis from other jurisdictions that have similar provisions in their Constitutions in order to 
provide a pool of comparable lessons and practices to draw from. In establishing the meaning of 
the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights to incorporate and unincorporated persons under 
Article 20 of the Constitution, it will be important for the judiciary to refer to jurisdictions with a 
similar horizontal application of the constitution to the private sphere in order to get examples to 
emulate. The Judiciary Training Institute will play an important teaching or capacity-building 
role to equip judicial officers with the requisite knowledge and skills to deal with this emerging 
field.
48
 In the absence of such supporting institutions or functions, the transition from the old 
constitution to the new one might lack substance.
49
 
                                               
47
 Article 46C (6). 
48
 Training offered at the Institute include courses in substantive law, evidence and procedure and, where 
appropriate, subject expertise see http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/page/judiciary-training-institute accessed on 6 
April 2015. 
49
 See Willy Mutunga ‘The 2010 Constitution of Kenya and its Interpretation: Reflections from the Supreme Court 
Decisions’ (October 16, 2014) University of Fort Hare, Inaugural Distinguished Lecture Series on the views of the 
Chief Justice on the value and importance of the Institute: ‘The Judiciary Training Institute (JTI) must become our 
institution of higher learning, the nerve centre of our progressive jurisprudence. JTI will co-ordinate our academic 
    
307 
 
9.4. Way Forward 
A proposal is made to institutionalise the UN Guiding Principles and at the same time give effect 
to Article 20 of the Constitution, as contained in the proposed Action Plan for Business and 
Human Rights attached as Appendix 1. Moral obligations
50
 as those that ensue from Ruggie’s 
findings and the UN Guiding Principles have to be institutionalised through the state
51
 in order to 
gain legitimacy and become enforceable. At the same time, implementation of the 2010 
Constitution ought to provide a spur for the state to amend the Companies Act to make it require 
corporate accountability for human rights violations, as required under the horizontal application 
provision of the Constitution.  
The Commission charged with the implementation of the Constitution, the CIC, 
developed a Public Service Delivery (the Change Management Framework) among the 
administrative procedures and institutional structures for implementing the Constitution.
52
 The 
Change Management Framework involves development of an action plan that concretely and 
logically identifies the sequence of activities and responsible actors to act as an implementation 
roadmap. A similar framework for the implementation of the Constitution in the private sector is 
proposed. The proposals are made to be fulfilled by the relevant government departments and 
agencies as part of the on-going efforts to implement the 2010 Constitution.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
networks, our networks with progressive jurisdictions, our training by scholars and judges, starting with our own 
great scholars and judges. In our training to breathe life into our constitution our jurisprudence cannot be legal-
centric; it must place a critical emphasis on multi-disciplinary approaches and expertise.’ 
50
 Contrasted with legal obligations; the UN Guiding Principles do not give rise to any legal obligations. 
51
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Undermining the Human Rights Obligations of Companies’ in Surya Deva & David Bilchitz (eds) Human rights 
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APPENDIX 
Action Plan for Business and Human Rights 
The objective of the proposed Action Plan on Human Rights and Business is to offer a means to 
facilitate the integration of human rights obligations in business entities. It offers a guide of the 
actions that the state can take in playing its oversight role. The Government of Kenya has 
responsibility to protect against violation of human rights, and this duty includes an obligation to 
ensure that human rights are not violated by anyone, including corporations and business entities. 
The Action Plan aims to provide a roadmap to offer guidance for corporations on how to execute 
their responsibility to respect.  
 
Appreciation of the Constitution of Kenya as a change driver for corporate change 
The present situation in Kenya has the advantage that the complete absence of a business and 
human rights component in the national policy for implementing the Constitution offers an 
opportunity for a comprehensive and action plan to be developed and integrated into the national 
strategy and action plan. The obligations and responsibilities of all parties involved are 
consolidated plan to avoid the efforts being scattered and subsumed in numerous departments of 
government that may have a role to play.
1
The aim of the proposed action plan is to make 
expectations on the question of human rights clearer. Towards this end, the democratic values 
dignity, equality and freedom, highlighted in the 2010 Constitution as national values and 
principles of governance
2
 ought to be recognised as part of the legal system. These principles 
should be applied in the interpretation of the Constitution and the enactment, application and 
interpretation of any law, giving the courts a fundamental duty to use them to give meaning to 
cases before them and in doing so guide the private sector to develop a better understanding of 
its role in the protection of human rights. 
In projecting its future and the plan for growth and improvement, the Government 
espouses a Human Rights Based Approach to development in the Constitution, highlighting 
principles that should guide all government planning.
3
The proposed action plan for 
implementing the Constitution’s provisions that relate to corporations will outline what could be 
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done to ensure that the human rights based development intended by the state finds meaning in 
business entities, and impacts the lives of individuals, including the most vulnerable. The 
proposed action plan brings together the different players, outlining their roles and proposing 
practical means of ensuring that human rights duties and obligations are understood and adhered 
to by the different parties.  
Clearer guidance and support for business and human rights will be given in the form of 
legal certainty [the bearing of relevant corporate laws on human rights, jurisdiction and 
accessibility of courts, access to alternative avenues for access to remedy] and a policy 
framework that is clear and coherent and informed by the government’s human rights 
obligations. Other useful means of ensuring corporate respect for human rights include 
withholding support from companies that fail to comply with required guidelines
4
(by pegging the 
issuance of necessary operational licenses on the entity’s compliance with human rights) and a 
clear reporting mechanism outlining what is to be reported and how. In a number of jurisdictions, 
mostly in Europe, governments have attempted to develop action plans to implement the UN 
Guiding Principles in their jurisdictions.
5
 In making the proposal below for an action plan that is 
applicable in the context of Kenya, reference is made to the National Policy and Action Plan,
6
 
drafted to implement the 2010 Constitution and a toolkit prepared by the Danish Institute for 
Human Rights and the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable. 
 
Ownership of the action plan 
The process of developing the action plan for implementation of the UN Guiding Principles for 
Business and Human Rights must involve all relevant stakeholders; stakeholder approval is 
important to legitimise the action plan once finalised and render it credible.
7
 Views and 
suggestions must be solicited from all stakeholders, making it necessary to conduct a 
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‘stakeholder-mapping’ exercise prior to conducting the baseline study, to ensure that all relevant 
persons and entities are involved.
8
 
Although all relevant stakeholders in the business and human rights discussion should be 
involved in the development of the action plan, for purposes of clarity and focus, it is important 
that a specific entity or government department takes ownership of the process. In a meeting of 
civil society leaders from African countries to dialogue on the question of business and human 
rights,
9
 the general view held representing the African perspective was that it was preferable to 
have the NHRIs take charge of putting together the national action plans for implementing the 
UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights rather than having a government 
department do it. This was because being champions of human rights; NHRIs had the necessary 
experience in developing action plans in other areas and therefore had the expertise to lead the 
process also in the area of business and human rights.
10
 It is through institutions that compliance 
with norms is effected; there must be institutions to ensure that the Guiding Principles are put 
into practice in the specific state contexts.
11
 The KNCHR would be the best example of such an 
institution in Kenya. 
Alternatively, if for reasons of inadequate capacity or any other challenges the KNCHR 
were unable to take up this leadership role, it could be taken by a government ministry or 
department that is central in the business and human rights discussion, or by a representative 
number of the departments most linked with the subject. An ideal entity in Kenya would be the 
Office of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, which took charge of developing 
the current National Policy and Action Plan for Human Rights. The Department of Justice would 
be the ideal entity on grounds that it has already undertaken the human rights assessment on a 
national level in the other fields and it would therefore be ideal to add the perspective of business 
to the existing plan.  
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Society Convening on Human Rights and Business. Twenty-one civil society leaders from 13 different African 
countries attended. See highlights of meeting in Joanne Bauer Presentation on behalf of Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies, Wits University (CALS) & Partners to the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, Open 
Consultation on National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights Geneva (20 February 2014) 
10
 DIHR and ICAR Toolkit op cit note 5 at 63. 
11
 Carlos Lopez, ‘The “Ruggie Process”: From Legal Obligations to Corporate Social Responsibility?’ in Surya 
Deva & David Bilchitz (eds) Human rights obligations of business: beyond the corporate responsibility to respect? 
(2013) 58-77. 
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An action plan that identifying a sequence of activities and responsible actors to act as an implementation road map 
 
I. STATE DUTY TO PROTECT Proposals for increasing corporate responsibility and 
accountability for human rights 
Responsible Agencies and Government 
Departments 
1. Human rights audit of laws, 
regulations and strategies related 
to trade/business/the private 
sector to ensure compliance with 
human rights: 
The state duty to protect the human 
rights of everyone from abuse 
includes obligation to ensure that 
third parties, including corporations, 
within its territory respect the 
human rights of others.  This duty 
will find immediate application in 
the Government’s efforts to 
implement the 2010 Constitution. 
1) Human rights should be at the core of implementing 
Vision 2030 strategy. Governmental vigilance to 
ensure current and upcoming development projects 
with foreign states and companies involving 
infrastructure including ports and highways, 
railways, airports, an oil and gas pipeline among 
other infrastructure, investments in agribusiness do 
not negatively impact human rights. 
2) The Proposed National Policy and Action Plan and 
any subsequent initiative drawn up by the Ministry 
of Justice to implement the Constitution should 
include a section on business and human rights as a 
specific category together with accompanying goals, 
timelines and agencies responsible for 
implementation.
1
 
3) Audit of national plans and strategies related to trade 
and economic development to be undertaken in the 
baseline study to outline the human rights status of 
the country vis a vis the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights.  
a) The Ministry of Justice will be the custodian 
department in charge of ensuring 
implementation of the Plan. The Ministry 
should conduct a stakeholder mapping 
exercise to identify and involve all relevant 
stakeholders in the baseline study. 
b) The KNCHR will act as the overall overseer 
playing the role of advisor and monitor in the 
implementation of the Action Plan.  
c) The KNHCR to conduct a human rights audit 
for all national strategies for trade and private 
sector growth such as the Ministry of 
Industrialisation’s Private Sector Strategy to 
ensure they are drafted in line with the 2010 
Constitution.  
d) The Ministry of Justice to ensure that all 
departments that deal with trade and business 
report on implementation of human rights in 
their operations. 
2. Legal measures to ensure 
corporate respect for human rights 
 
1) Legislation as an ideal means to regulate the conduct 
of companies and ensure they do not violate human 
rights; and to facilitate the creation of corporate 
cultures respectful of human rights by giving 
appropriate guidance to business entities. 
a) The Ministry of Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs Customer Service Delivery Charter 
includes the harmonisation of laws with the 
Constitution as one of the core functions 
linked with the review process.  
                                               
1
 The Tanzanian National Human Rights Action Plan 2013-2017 has a section on Business and Human Rights 
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2) Bring together all laws that deal with trade or are 
business related and ensure that they express concern 
for human rights and are aligned with the 
international instruments and treaties the 
Government has signed.
2
 
3) This law-making intervention by the government to 
be checked or measured by applying the principles of 
subsidiarity, the ideal of a free market, human 
dignity and the common good.  
4) The particular use of the term human rights in 
relevant laws, corporate policies and plans and 
government strategies is therefore important as it 
raises the nature of the claims made and demands 
their fulfilment.  
5) Laws should seek to enforce respect for human 
rights, and not social responsibility understood as 
corporate philanthropy.  
6) Proposed amendment to Companies’ Act to comply 
with the Constitution: 
a) Redefine directors’ duties to include duty to other 
stakeholders:  
It is proposed to adopt the concept behind the 
constituency or shareholder statutes in the USA but 
addressing the following short falls” 
i. Require directors to consider the “human rights 
impact” of the companies’ activities on stakeholders 
as opposed to merely “social issues”; 
ii. Require directors not only to consider but to act on 
b) The KNCHR - under the Paris Principles, 
NHRIs ought to play an advisory role to 
governments, and in this role they can give 
opinions, recommendations or make proposals 
on legislative provisions, and make 
recommendations necessary to align them 
with human rights requirements, including 
international human rights instruments signed 
by the government.
3
 
c) The Kenya Law Reform Commission should 
include the Companies Act among the 
proposed laws required to be amended for the 
implementation of the Constitution. 
d) The corporations and business entities will be 
responsible for preparing the Business 
Review, which will be audited to ensure it 
reflects an accurate picture of the human 
rights compliance of the corporation. 
e) The sanctions applied against directors for 
violation of their obligations have to be 
stricter than has been the case until now. 
 
 
 
                                               
2
 A list of all regional and international instruments the government has signed can be accessed at the Kenya Law Treaties and Agreements Database available at 
http://kenyalaw.org/treaties/treaties/types/Treaties, accessed on 7 April 2015. All laws that make provision for human rights should be identified and the 
obligations that exist under these laws clarified. 
3
Paris Principles [Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions: Competence and Responsibilities] A/RES/48/134. 
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shareholder interests,  
iii. Specify punishment for the directors’ failure to 
comply with the law.  
iv. Offer guidelines on the following: 
 How to decide who are the relevant shareholders 
among the local communities;  
 What weight to give to shareholder interests 
compared to stakeholder interests; 
 What action to be taken in the event that stakeholder 
and shareholder interests conflict and cannot be 
reconciled? 
 What standard court will use in determining whether 
the director duly exercised his duty to consider 
stakeholder interests. 
b) Amend the Business Review provisions to require the 
directors of listed companies to report on the  human 
rights impact of the company, reflecting the effort 
made to carry out a human rights due diligence to 
prepare for and mitigate against the possible negative 
human rights impacts and efforts to remedy any 
grievances resulting from the entity’s operations. 
The resulting Business Review should be audited 
and presented along with the financial statements of 
the company. 
3. Reporting and corporate 
governance requirements 
 
1)  In line with the spirit of the 2010 Constitution, 
amend the Companies Act 2015 to expressly require 
reporting on human rights 
2) Further clarity will be provided by applying the 
Global Reporting Initiative as a Guide to Reporting 
3) Make human rights reporting a condition for listing: 
Amend NSE Act to require the Business Review to 
a) The Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of 
Justice by powers under the Companies Act 
should be required to prepare regulations 
regarding company reporting. 
b) In the Regulations, propose the use of the 
Global Reporting Initiative which offers 
comprehensive guidelines on reporting on 
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be provided prior to listing outlining the Company’s 
treatment of human rights. 
4) Make licensing conditional on respect for CSR and 
Human Rights 
5) Propose best practice CSR Guidelines for adoption 
by companies: The Kenya Bureau of Standards has 
been developing guidelines, and has also proposed 
the adoption of ISO 26000 as a guide for corporate 
reporting on social responsibility. Together with 
these, reference can also be made to international 
CSR initiatives which companies can adapt to their 
needs. 
6) Align existing CSR frameworks of companies with 
the Guiding Principles. 
social and human rights issues as a guide in 
preparing the Business Review. 
c) A compliance report should be kept by the 
corporation and required to be submitted by 
the company whenever it requires a permit or 
approval from the state. 
 
 
 
II. CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT 
  
1. Proposal for companies in 
creating a human rights compliant 
culture within the organisation: 
 
The corporate responsibility to 
respect will ensure the creation of a 
corporate human rights culture 
within business entities.  
 
1) Companies should carry out human rights due 
diligence to ascertain how they impact stakeholders.
4
 
Integrate the findings of human rights due diligence 
into corporate structures and management systems 
through human rights policies.  
2) Drafting a public human rights policy statement 
expressing company’s commitment to identify, 
prevent or mitigate human rights risks, and remediate 
any adverse impact it has caused or contributed to.  
3) All policies must include an explicit commitment to 
respect all human rights  
4) Human Rights Policies may be located: 
 in the business entity’s statements of business 
a) Corporations will be in charge of ensuring 
they devise human rights policies. Clear 
management responsibility shown by 
adoption by the directors 
b) Using the UN Guiding Principles on the 
corporate responsibility to respect, the 
KNCHR as advisor to business entities can 
offer a guide or give advice to business 
entities on designing a human rights Action 
Plan . 
c) Business Review prepared by the companies 
should be verified under the normal auditing 
processes. 
                                               
4
 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework A/HRC/17/31 (Guiding 
Principles) 19 (Commentary on Para 19) 
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principles 
 in codes of conduct or other values-related 
literature 
 in stand-alone statements on company websites 
or in other public corporate responsibility 
documentation.
5
 
2. Directors as guardians of human 
rights 
 
The directors as the decision makers of the company 
ought to be held responsible to ensure that laws, 
regulations and guidelines set to safeguard human rights 
are upheld.  
a) A proposal has been made amend Companies’ Act to 
specifically require the directors to consider the 
interests of stakeholders in decision-making. 
b) A proposal has been made to amend the Business 
Review to specifically report on human rights 
impacts of the company.  
Directors, as managers of potential risks of the 
business entity, should be required to: 
a) Endorse the proposals made to create a 
corporate culture of human rights within the 
corporation; 
b) Establish a monitoring and evaluation system 
to recognise risks that are harmful to the 
company, including human rights risks, and to 
address them early. 
3. Tracking and reporting 
performance 
 
 
A recommendation for companies be required to use the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) as a guide for their 
reporting on activities, issues or concerns that could result 
in significant economic, environmental and social 
impact.
6
 A summary of the GRI process  to be applied in 
reporting and preparing the Business Review: 
1) Identify significant aspects - topics that reflect the 
impact of the organisation’s activities.7 
2) Determine sphere of influence; delineate exactly 
where the impacts occur, whether within or outside 
a) The state can use reporting requirement as a 
means to ensure that the existing obligations 
are well understood and complied with and to 
develop a culture of respect for human rights.  
b) Directors of corporations will ensure that 
reporting on human rights is carried out as 
required under the Business Review. 
                                               
5
 United Nations Global Compact Office and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2011 A Guide for Business How to Develop a 
Human Rights Policy available at <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/DevelopHumanRightsPolicy_en.pdf>, accessed on 1 March 2014 
6
 This would be in line with the UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD), National Investment Policy Guidelines which 
propose that governments encourage compliance with high standards of responsible investment and corporate behaviour, through incorporating existing 
standards into regulatory initiatives, and/or turning voluntary standards (soft law) into regulation (hard law). 
7
 Global Reporting Initiative ‘Sustainability Reporting Guidelines: Implementation Manual’ 33 
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the organisation.
8
 
3) Conduct a qualitative and quantitative assessment of 
the significant aspects to determine materiality and 
the need for reporting of each relevant aspect; assess 
each topic on: 
 influence on stakeholder assessments and decisions 
 effect on the organisation’s economic, environmental 
and social and human rights impacts.  
4) Engage with stakeholders, both internal, such as 
employees, suppliers and external, such as 
communities affected by the operations of the 
business entity, in a systematic, two-way and 
objective dialogue, either continuously or 
specifically for purposes of reporting if there was no 
need to engage them earlier.
9
 
5) Validate the report, giving a reasonable and balanced 
analysis of the potential impacts of all possible 
material aspects, both positive and negative, with the 
aim of finalising the report content.
10
 
6) Require the senior decision makers of the 
organisation, the directors, to approve the report 
before its publication.  
7) Review the report after publication, identify material 
aspects and review stakeholder feedback given in the 
previous period with the aim of better preparing for 
the current reporting cycle.  
8) Carry out independent third party verification/audit of 
the report. 
                                               
8
 Ibid  
9
 Ibid p35 
10
 Ibid p38 
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9) The state should require a compliance report to be 
kept and submitted by the company whenever it 
requires a license/permit or approval from the state. 
III. ACCESS TO REMEDY   
a) Proposals for procedure for access 
to means of redress  
Access to remedy goal aims to 
ensure that there are means for 
victims of corporate human rights 
abuses to seek redress, that victims 
know and the can access them e.g. 
owing to simple procedures and 
non-prohibitive costs.  
Complaints will not normally be 
framed in human rights terms.
11
 This 
also calls for vigilance on the part of 
the business entities to treat all 
complaints that might negatively 
impact on human rights seriously, 
whether or not the complaints were 
properly formulated in human rights 
terms.  
 
1) Upon investigation of a complaint referred to it, 
where findings disclose a criminal offence the 
KNCHR will refer the matter to the Director of 
Public Prosecution.
12
 
2) For all other grievances, recourse should first be had 
to the company operational level grievance 
mechanism, then to the KNCHR and to the courts if 
still unresolved. Encourage operational level dispute 
resolution mechanisms. Advantages of internal 
company-level mechanisms include: 
 The familiarity of the contesting parties and the 
mediator/corporation would mean that they know 
more about the circumstances giving rise to the 
conflict than an outsider such as the court would, and 
therefore there is an assumption that they would be 
keener on arriving at an amicable solution that 
reduces the tensions created by the dispute  
 It makes possible an analysis of company operations 
to pick out recurring trends to identify and correct 
negative practices.
13
 
 The direct nature of the solution also presents an 
immediate means of addressing negative impacts 
a) The KNCHR will investigate complaints and 
provide appropriate redress where necessary, 
or make recommendations for improvement 
of the functioning of state organs.
19
 
b) At the company level, the stakeholder 
relationships committee appointed under the 
proposed amended Companies Act will have 
the mandate to: 
i. Prepare the business review outlining the 
human rights policies of the company and 
action taken to conduct an impact assessment, 
to mitigate and remedy any grievances 
resulting from its activities. 
ii. Identify the principal stakeholder risks and 
uncertainties facing the company, including 
human rights risks 
iii. Establish a monitoring and evaluation system 
to recognise risks that are harmful to the 
company, and to address them early. 
iv. Establish and provide information about 
stakeholders with whom the company has 
contractual or other arrangements which are 
                                               
11
 Ibid para 31. 
12
 Section 41 of the KNCHR Act. See also Business and human rights: Towards operationalizing the “protect, respect and remedy” framework, Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises A/HRC/11/13(22 
April 2009) para 91 
13
 Ibid para 29. 
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thereby containing the resulting harm.
14
 
3) The Commission may also make recommendations it 
deems necessary to the complainant, governmental 
agency or other entity of other means it proposes for 
settling a matter referred to it or obtaining relief.
15
 
4) The state organ, public office or organisation is 
expected to make a report to the Commission 
outlining the measures it will take, or has taken in 
response to the complaints made against it.
16
 
5) Failure of the violator of human rights to remedy the 
breach as proposed will be reported to the National 
Assembly for it to take action
17
 and a finding that 
person, an officer or employee of the state organ, 
public office or organisation was guilty of 
misconduct shall be reported to the relevant 
authority.
18
 
essential to the business of the company and 
any company matters that are likely to 
significantly impact them;  
v. Develop stakeholder policies and particularly 
the human rights policy of the company and 
develop board procedures regarding 
communication of the policies and policy 
statements 
vi. Provide periodic information about 
stakeholder policies and the extent to which 
the policies have been successfully 
implemented. 
 
b) Non Judicial mechanism for 
access to remedy: the KNCHR 
 
To ensure that KNCHR plays its part effectively as a 
NHRI, it is recommended that: 
1) The staff be continuously capacitated to deal with 
complaints of corporate human rights violations, and 
to assist victims to obtain redress. 
2) The government ensures that it is well funded and 
financially independent to be able to implement its 
mandate under the Constitution, 
3) Submit regular reports to parliament for deliberations 
to inform the legislative mandate of the government 
As the national human rights institution, the 
KNCHR supports both government and business 
entities to quicken the uptake of responsibilities 
under the UNGPs as a way of enhancing 
realisation of human rights. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
19
 KNCHR Act Section 8(d) – (e) 
14
 Ibid, see section on ‘State -based non-judicial grievance mechanisms’, Commentary on para 29. 
15
 Section 41(c)  
16
 Section 42 
17
 Section 42(4) 
18
 Section 44 
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on the subject. 
4) Follow up the response of government, government 
ministries and businesses to issues raised and 
recommendations made on human rights obligations. 
5) Provide training on business and human rights; 
monitor the conduct of business and provide 
feedback to government and businesses.  
c) Judicial remedy: applying 
corporate criminal liability to hold 
corporations liable for human 
rights violations 
 
Corporations in Kenya have held 
corporations as legal persons liable 
for crimes in courses of action 
brought under the Penal Code. 
Proposed developments of criminal 
law to address corporate human 
rights violation: 
a) Develop the current sentences under the Penal Code to 
serve the purpose of punishing business entities for 
violation of human rights, deterring them from 
repeating the offending actions.
20
 
b) Amend Penal Code to include the following 
alternative/additional punishments for corporate 
violators of human rights: 
 Restricting the place where the company can 
operate,  
 Banning the company from procurement 
opportunities 
 Requiring the offending company to publicise the 
sentence or punishment given as a means of 
naming and shaming 
 Confiscation of property  
 Winding up 
c) Developing the concept of a corporate mens rea or 
corporate intention to commit a crime: 
 Corporate mens rea will be established by proving 
that company policy, expressly stated or implied,
21
 
supported the action or actions that caused harm.  
The Kenya Law Reform Commission to 
undertake the process of amending the Penal 
Code. 
                                               
20
 Ibid. Under the US Sentencing Guidelines Manual, para. 8D1.4(c), an offending company can be placed on probation, and the court can require it to put in 
place compliance and ethics programs and and report on their implementation. 
21
 Article 46C(3). 
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 A policy may be attributed to a corporation where 
it provides the most reasonable explanation of the 
conduct of that corporation.
22
 
 Corporate culture can be applied to determine that 
the corporation was aware of the offending 
action.
23
 
d) The corporate veil cannot be applied to shield persons 
responsible for the actions resulting in violation of 
human rights,
24
 meaning that individuals will be held 
responsible should they instigate, contribute to or 
condone action that results in violation of human 
rights.  
d) Capacity of judicial officers 
 
Specific training for judicial officers on Kenya’s human 
rights obligations under International Law and the 
standards related to business and human rights is 
recommended, consolidating and applying best practice 
from other jurisdictions in order to provide a pool of 
comparable lessons and practices to draw from. 
Judicial Training Institute 
 
 
                                               
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Article 46C(4). 
24
 Article 46C(6). 
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